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ABSTRACT 
 
Managing vertical relationships within diversified organizations is crucial to the attainment of 
overall organizational goals, yet it can also present a significant challenge. Vertical 
relationships can be characterised by intensified political games and incompatible interests. It 
is thus a contested relationship of conflicting interests; yet both parties to the relationship are 
motivated to maintain the relationship because they assume that its long–term benefits 
outweigh the costs.  
Whilst most of the literature focuses on managerial issues that are likely to emerge in vertical 
relationships, it does not appear to focus on the needs of vertically–related units and the 
development of such needs, particularly as the lower level unit develops. Therefore, the 
consequences that are likely to occur if these needs are not met have not been explored.  One 
way to address this gap is by focusing on vertical inter–unit relationship quality; positioning 
relationship quality as a social resource in a power–dependence relationship (the vertical 
dyad). This thesis therefore aims to explore the meaning and the concomitants of relationship 
quality between vertically–related units in the context of diversified organisations. This is 
expected to contribute to the understanding of vertical inter–unit relationships by shedding 
light on the underlying meaning of relationship quality and the attributes that are likely to be 
attached to it from the perspectives of the parties to the relationship. In turn, this enables an 
exploration of the factors impacting on that quality as well as its consequences. 
To meet the study objectives, data collection was divided into two stages; a qualitative and a 
quantitative stage. First, an intensive qualitative investigation was conducted into 15 cases of 
the relationship between UK University–based Business Schools and their Higher University 
 
 
ii 
 
Authorities. In total, 54 in–depth interviews were conducted with boundary spanners that 
participated in the vertical relationship from both sides; the Higher University Authority (the 
higher level) and the Business School (the lower level). Second, an online survey directed to 
the Deans of Business Schools was conducted to test some of the propositions suggested by 
the qualitative findings. 47 usable replies were received, giving a response rate of around 41% 
of the study population. 
The qualitative results suggest that the meaning the higher level unit tends to attach to high 
relationship quality is in terms of exercising effective control and influence on the lower level 
unit. The lower level unit, on the other hand, tends to view a relationship of high quality as 
one in which it can realise what it regards as a satisfactory balance of influence between the 
two levels. Influence, thus, becomes a contested resource. 
Focusing on the perspective of the lower level unit, concomitants of the perception of 
relationship quality highlight the critical role played by the balance of interdependence. 
Different modes of reciprocity are found to take place based on the perception of relationship 
quality; affecting both the behaviour of the boundary spanners and the behaviour of the lower 
level unit. This in turn has implications for the organisation as a whole.  The quantitative 
findings generally support the qualitative propositions. The study opens up a number of 
avenues for future research and offers significant theoretical and practical contributions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“The attempt to combine wisdom and power has only rarely been successful and then 
only for a short while.” (Albert Einstein) 
Perusing the world political news might be one possible way to assess the veracity of this 
statement. As a student of organisations, I am intrigued by the study of the use of power in 
organisations. This thesis undertakes an in–depth exploratory study into vertical inter–unit 
relations in diversified organisations or simply relations between vertically–linked units 
within the same organisation. Borrowing from the relationship marketing literature, I 
introduce the concept of vertical inter–unit relationship quality (VIRQ) in order to develop an 
understanding of vertical inter–unit relationships and the factors affecting, and affected by, 
their perception by parties to the relationship.  
1.1 An Introductory Note on the Research Problem and Objectives  
The vertically structured organisation remains the norm. Vertical inter–unit relations exist 
when there is a controlling higher level unit and a controlled lower level one. These relations 
could be areas of potential conflict, particularly when the controlled lower level unit evolves 
and develops its own sources of power. With the evolution of the controlled lower level unit, 
the structural power (emerging from the organisational structure) of the controlling higher 
level unit could be put into question. Vertical relations can become somewhat akin to political 
battlefields, although normatively they are expected to be harmonious in order to support the 
achievement of the general organisational goals. The quality of relationships within this 
verticality is therefore highly consequential for how organisations perform, including how 
well they permit innovation and other initiatives by subsidiary units. It is also highly 
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consequential for the quality of working life experienced by the people heading the subsidiary 
units and ultimately for the kind of voice that those at the lower levels of an organisation can 
express. What relations are considered good and what relations are considered poor, and why, 
seem thus to be important, but as yet unanswered questions.  
In the study reported here, I use the concept of VIRQ specifically to address the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the meanings and the attributes associated with the concept of VIRQ (based 
on the perspectives of both the higher level and the lower level units)? 
2. What are the likely antecedents that affect the perception of VIRQ (from a lower level 
perspective)? 
3. What are the likely concomitants and consequences associated with the perception of 
VIRQ (from a lower level perspective)? 
The study gives most attention to the perspective of the lower level unit since it is likely to be 
less present in the academic literature and because it is the object of the structural power of 
the higher level. However, the views of the higher level unit are not ignored. I shall attempt to 
establish the meaning and the attributes attached to VIRQ from the perspective of both higher 
level and lower level units. However, the antecedents and consequences of the perception of 
the quality of vertical inter–unit relations are mainly explored based on the lower level unit’s 
perspective. 
The vertical relationship between UK University–based Business Schools (UBBS) and their 
Higher University Authorities (HUAs) is the unit of analysis in this study. This context is 
selected for several reasons (see Chapter 4) but mainly because it is a well–defined 
institutional field, which facilitates comparisons across the different cases under investigation 
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and because Business Schools are likely to be central to their host universities due to their 
presumed economic power. To meet the study’s objectives, both qualitative and quantitative 
methods are employed. The qualitative investigation is more exploratory in nature and was 
conducted through 15 revelatory case studies. The quantitative investigation tests the 
propositions postulated by the qualitative investigation in the wider context of UK 
University–based Business Schools as a whole. 
1.2 Internal Organisation of the Study 
Chapter 2 begins by reviewing the general organisation studies literature relevant to the 
subject in hand. Following this, there is a note on theories related to organisational vertical 
authority or internal power relations. To reflect on the contemporary issues that have emerged 
in the study of vertical inter–unit relationships, the chapter finally discusses the literature on 
headquarters–subsidiary relationships. 
Chapter 3 presents the rationale for using the concept of VIRQ. It outlines the use of the 
concept of “relationship quality” by students of marketing. To help build an apriori 
framework to guide the study of the concept of VIRQ and its likely concomitants, insights 
from social exchange and power–dependence theories are used. VIRQ is conceptualised as a 
social resource that is exchanged between the vertically–linked units (the higher level and the 
lower level units) in a power–dependence relationship (the vertical dyad).  
Chapter 4 reports on the philosophical and the methodological considerations that were taken 
into account while conducting this study, and provides a brief introduction to the selected 
research context; UK University–based Business Schools. This chapter is concerned with 
describing methods, data collection, and data analyses techniques as well as the rationale 
behind their use. The study employs both qualitative (comparative case study) and 
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quantitative (survey) approaches and uses them in a complementary manner whenever 
possible.  
Chapter 5 is the first of four chapters that present the empirical findings. The first three 
chapters discuss the qualitative data and the fourth chapter presents the analysis of the 
quantitative data. Chapter 5 addresses the first research question – what are the meanings and 
the attributes that are likely to comprise VIRQ from the perspective of both higher level and 
lower level units. The chapter, however, raises the question of what leads the vertical inter–
unit relationship to be perceived favourably or unfavourably. This question is addressed from 
the lower level perspective in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 6 is concerned with identifying the antecedents that are likely to cause variations in 
the perception of VIRQ; the second research question. The chapter focuses primarily on the 
lower level unit’s perspective and uses a combination of within–case and cross–case study 
analyses to derive the reported findings. This chapter first presents and discusses the likely 
antecedents, then it discusses how these antecedents can be linked to the perception of VIRQ 
and how the different antecedents are themselves inter–linked. The chapter highlights the 
significant role played by the balance of interdependence between the vertically–linked units 
and how its perception tends to colour the perception of the other relationship variables. The 
chapter also completes the construction of the meaning of VIRQ by shedding light on what 
affects its perception. 
Chapter 7 builds on within–case and cross–case analyses to answer the third research 
question, which is concerned with identifying the likely consequences and other concomitants 
associated with the perception of VIRQ from the lower level unit’s perspective. The findings 
are in line with the premises of social exchange theory that social resources (VIRQ) are likely 
to be reciprocated even in power–dependence relationships (the vertical dyad). The important 
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role of reciprocation is discussed along with its various identified modes. The chapter also 
shows how the distribution of power between the vertically–linked units can be affected as a 
consequence of the choice of the mode of the reciprocation. 
The chapters reporting the qualitative findings (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) conclude with a series of 
propositions directed towards answering each of the research questions. Chapter 8 builds on 
these propositions, by converting them into testable hypotheses whenever possible. This 
chapter builds on quantitative data analysis to test the qualitative findings in the wider 
population of UK University–based Business Schools, whereby evidence from 47 Business 
Schools is used. The quantitative analysis generally supports the qualitative findings. The 
chapter provides a general support for a newly–developed scale to measure the concept of 
VIRQ. The chapter also provides general support for the meaning, the antecedents, and some 
of the other concomitants suggested based on the case study evidence. 
Chapter 9 summarises and discusses both the qualitative and the quantitative findings. This 
chapter also discusses the various theoretical and practical implications of the reported 
findings. The findings advance the study of vertical inter–unit relationships in general by 
putting forward a measure of VIRQ. In addition, the findings can extend social exchange and 
power–dependence theories by discussing the crucial roles of the perception of the balance of 
interdependence and the choice between the modes of reciprocation. Implications for UK 
University–based Business Schools and their Higher University Authorities are also 
presented.  
Chapter 10 concludes this study by discussing its limitations and suggesting possible avenues 
for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: VERTICAL INTER–UNIT RELATIONS IN 
ORGANISATIONS 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter is one of two that report on the literature relevant to the three research questions 
posed in Chapter 1. The chapter starts with an exploration of the general organisational 
studies’ literature. Surprisingly, this rich and broad literature appears largely to have ignored 
vertical inter–unit relationships, at least within the last decade. The multinational (MNC) 
headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature seems to be the only literature that can provide 
an updated source of information about vertical inter–unit relationships; albeit in 
internationally diversified corporations. This literature is deemed to be useful as: 
 First, it can inform the study of any diversified organization (related or unrelated 
diversification); not only the internationally diversified organization
1
. 
 Second, most of the MNC headquarters–subsidiary literature is built on theories and 
literatures that are commonly applied to the study of organisations in general. For 
example, ideas such as subsidiary initiatives (Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson, 1998) 
have its roots in the work of Bower (1970) on resource allocation, while the study of 
subsidiary innovation (Nobel and Birkinshaw, 1998) is motivated by Knight’s (1967) 
work on firm innovation. In addition, the MNC headquarters–subsidiary literature 
draws heavily on economic and organizational theories such as the agency theory 
(O’Donnell, 2000), resource dependence theory (Mudambi and Pedersen, 2007), and 
network theory (Forsgren, Holm, and Johnson, 2005). With its richness, the MNC 
                                                             
1 Issues such as autonomy, formal and normative control, and resources allocation are evident in almost all 
divisional and diversified organizations. The only issue not relevant to the non-internationally diversified 
organization concerns country differences, although institutional difference might be still relevant. 
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headquarters–subsidiary literature provides a deeper and a sophisticated understanding 
of vertical inter–unit relationship issues; given the current academic and the economic 
attention devoted to MNCs. 
The headquarters-subsidiary relationship literature shows the vertical inter–unit relationship 
as one that is characterised with heightened potential conflict and political games although 
cooperation represents its core raison d’etre.  
Based on the issues identified in the literature, the concept relationship quality is suggested in 
the next chapter; not necessarily as a remedy for a difficult relationship but as inspection tool 
that could help in identifying and understanding reasons, conditions, demands, and 
preferences of parties to the relationship. The marketing literature is then briefly accessed in 
order to understand the term “relationship quality” and show how it is used in different 
contexts. This literature tends to view relationship quality as a social resource; and it is the 
perception of this social resource that affects the stability of the relationship and other 
relationship outcomes. This is the premise of social exchange theory. However, since power 
relations are seen as an integral part of the vertical relationship, power–dependence theory, 
which draws on the tenants of social exchange theory, is summarised before the feature of an 
apriori research framework is outlined.  
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2.2 Vertical Inter–Unit Relationship in the General Organisational Literature 
This section aims to uncover the importance of studying vertical inter–unit relationships in 
intra–organisational contexts through exploring the general organisational literature. 
However, in doing so, a general paucity of discussions about vertical inter–unit relations is 
noticed. This is attributed to the possibility of placing an over–emphasis on new 
organisational forms as a supposed alternative to traditional hierarchies; ignoring the vertical 
dimension that could be inherent in these forms. After arguing that vertical relationships are 
likely to be relevant to any organisation that has a purpose, builds on group effort (whatever 
the name of the form is), and requires management; the discussion then moves to highlight 
theories that could explain vertical inter–unit relationships. This is to show that studying 
vertical inter–unit relationships is not only still relevant, but also addresses vital unresolved 
issues. This section is, therefore, sub–divided into two main sub–sections. The first attempts 
to establish the contemporary relevance of vertical relationships, and the second moves a step 
further to highlight why it is still not only relevant but also important to study these 
relationships.  
2.2.1 Vertical Inter–Unit Relationship: the Ignored Relationship  
Within the last decade, there has been what could be described as a dearth of studies 
concerned with vertical relationships between units except for the headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship literature stream.  Perhaps one of the key reasons behind this dearth is the general 
shift in the organisational literature towards the discussion of newly developed organisational 
forms. Federalism, teamwork organisation, the virtual corporation, the reengineered 
corporation, the knowledge company, the ambidextrous organisation, the high commitment 
work system, the boundaryless company, the hybrid organisation, and the transnational 
solution are some of the newly suggested forms that have “pervaded the scholarly 
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community” (Child and McGrath, 2001: 1135). Other forms include the modular organisation, 
spinout corporation, cluster organisation, learning organisation, perpetual matrix (Daft and 
Lewin, 1993), the latent organisation (Starkey, Barnatt, and Tempest, 2000), and temporary 
organisational forms (Bakker, 2010). 
The fundamental premise in these organisational forms is an emphasis on decentralisation 
instead of centralisation, distributed instead of centralised power, harmonising leaders instead 
of controlling ones, and flat structures and team–working instead of hierarchy. These 
organisations are also portrayed as flexible, horizontal, relationship–based, empowering, self–
organising with structure independent from assets and  permeable or fuzzy boundaries (Daft 
and Lewin, 1993; Child and McGrath, 2001). The focus is on innovation rather than 
efficiency and adaptation; tolerance rather than absorption of uncertainty (Child and McGrath, 
2001). 
Such features could, implicitly or sometimes explicitly, promote the idea that vertical 
relationships in general and hierarchical authority specifically have become irrelevant. The 
irrelevance of discussing vertical relationships in an intra–organisational context is further 
emphasised by the growing body of literature on a particular form; the network organisation. 
A review of the network literature (and related terms) conducted by Borgatti and Foster 
(2003) shows that the last two decades are characterised by an exponential increase in the 
network research which mainly emphasizes lateral relationships, reciprocity and mutual gains, 
social controls (trust and embedded social relationships) as governance mechanisms in place 
of hierarchical authority or pure price–based transactions2 (Larson, 1992). 
                                                             
2 Traditionally economic exchanges were either done through markets or hierarchies. Markets tend to be 
governed by prices while firms tend to governed by hierarchical authority. Hierarchical governance structures 
are used to manage internal, repetitive, investment-specific transactions. Prices govern straight forward, non-
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The discussion of the network organisation has its roots in the 1980s when the either–or 
approach of either markets or hierarchies was no longer appealing or adequate to explain 
contemporary organizational forms. For example, Ouchi (1980) described what he called a 
“clan” governance which is a hybrid of markets and hierarchies and characterised by 
reciprocity, vertical authority (unlike markets), and common values and beliefs. In a similar 
vein, Miles and Snow (1986) described the network as a form of organization which 
emphasizes flexibility as response to the changing competitive environment, but the network 
organization was still seen as a hybrid form of markets and hierarchies. However, it is 
Powell’s (1990) work that positions networks as a distinct organizational form that is neither a 
market nor a hierarchy. Powell (1990) argues that boundaries between a firm and a market 
have become blurred with an increase in contractual relationships entered into by 
organisations that are neither similar to the arm length market nor to the hierarchical 
relationship. A network organization is hence suggested. Market and hierarchical transactions 
are seen as two poles of an economic exchange continuum (Powell, 1990; Dunning, 2002), 
and networks lie somewhere in the middle on this continuum. 
Nonetheless, uncertainty remains about whether a network is a collection of semi–
autonomous firms, or a distinct mode of governance, or an organization with new features of 
self–governance and flatter hierarchies (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). Borgatti and Foster (2003) 
argue that despite the widespread discussion of networks and their acknowledged flexibility, 
their ontological status is not clear. There are still  some questions about the exact nature of 
network governance, the circumstances under which this form of governance will be most 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
repetitive, non-investment specific transactions. Hierarchical transactions were originally market transactions but 
they were internalized by the firm to overcome uncertainty and opportunism (Williamson, 1975). Each method 
has its own inherited cost and certain situations where it is most likely to occur (Williamson, 1975). A further 
discussion of Williamson’s (1975) transaction cost economic theory will be presented later in this section. 
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likely to occur, and settings under which it will be most effective (Jones, Hesterly, and 
Borgatti, 1997). Despite this lack of clarity, inter–organizational research emphasizes the 
governance and pattern of interconnections dimensions of networks simultaneously.  Different 
definitions suggest different meanings, and different studies typically have different foci. Yet, 
generally the organizational network literature implies the prevalence of this organisational 
form which is normally contrasted to traditional hierarchical or market transactions. This 
becomes a little puzzling since the Coesean
3
 classical view of intra–organizational governance 
is based on the presence of hierarchy and power (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004a). 
While it is beyond the scope of this research to critically evaluate the network literature, it can 
be deduced that the strong emphasis on the network paradigm and the other new 
organisational forms is a contributing factor to the lack of attention devoted to vertical inter–
unit relations. Yet, the important question is whether the prevalence of networks truly makes 
the study of intra–organisational vertical relationships irrelevant.  
There are several reasons to reply in the negative: 
 First, control is one of the primary managerial functions as each organisation needs 
directing towards the set of goals it aims to achieve (Bennis, 1959). Indeed, control is 
the key distinctive feature of organisations (Clegg, 1994). Even though it might not be 
a perfect control, it will result in differential power relationships among the 
organisational members (Clegg, 1994). Once there is a unit, or a group of individuals, 
or even an individual in charge of control, vertical relationships will emerge; 
regardless of the control mechanism employed (whether behavioural or output 
                                                             
3 This is a classical economic theory upon which the transaction cost economic theory is based, articulated 
originally by Coase (1937). 
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controls) and regardless of the organisational form, structure, or mode of  governance
4
 
(see Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2002). 
 Second, any organisational form requires a structure (even though this may be 
partially informal). Being the organisational anatomy, structures are the platform of 
organisational power and decision making (Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, Fielding, and 
Porter, 1980). Since any structure will result in a structural advantage of some parts of 
the organisation over the others, vertical relationships will continue to exist
5
.  
 Third, there are still unresolved questions about whether the network form changes the 
internal distribution of power and privilege (Hinings and Greenwood, 2002). The 
network literature itself does not deny the need for a lead orchestrating member (Child 
and McGrath, 2001), yet it gives an implicit and sometimes, explicit indication that 
intra–organisational vertical relationships are irrelevant; leaving us with unanswered 
questions about how this orchestrating member is going to lead. While the network 
form suggests lateral relationships among semi–autonomous units, in intra–
organisational relationships; autonomy for the structurally disadvantaged unit remains 
“loaned not owned” (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999: 56; Mudambi, 2011). In 
spite of viewing it as reducing the central power (Clegg, 1994), delegation (or other 
similar terms such as decentralisation) could be actually argued to enforce the idea of 
central power as it emphasises the premise that it is the centre which grants (or not) 
part of its authority; depending on whether the subordinate meets (or not) the centre’s 
conditions.  
                                                             
4 The process of control in hierarchical organisations has been described as setting goals and making sure that 
these gaols have been achieved via monitoring, evaluating, and providing feedback (Ouchi, 1978). However, 
control is not the same thing as structure. Organisational structure is seen as “the enduring characteristics of an 
organization reflected by the distribution of units and positions within the organization and their systematic 
relationships to each other”, following James and Jones’ definition (1976: 76). 
5 On the persistence of hierarchical orders in organisations and societies see Diefenbach (2013). 
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 Fourth, empirical research suggests that under certain circumstances hierarchies can 
outperform horizontal structures (Afuah, 2001) and that firms usually rely on hybrid 
forms of governance where they combine features of hierarchies with features of 
markets (Larson 1992). This means that firms in real life do not abandon vertical 
relationships as much the current theoretical literature assumes.  
It can be, therefore, deduced that the replacement of the hierarchical form by another 
organisational form does not mean the disappearance of legitimate authority or vertical 
relationship, yet it could nonetheless mean a change in the latter’s scope or nature (Rajan and 
Zingales 2001; Rubery, Earnshaw, Marchington, Cooke, and Vincent, 2002)
6
. Since anarchy 
is not one of the suggested organisational forms, since the essence of management in any 
organization is about controlling, leading, and organising, and since any organisation requires 
a structure to enable the realisation of its goals; vertical relationships will continue to exist. 
Such relationships are present whenever there is a power advantage that is granted by dint of 
the organisational structure; whatever the name of the organisational form or the control 
mechanism employed. This argument is supported by Courpasson’s (2000) concept of “soft 
bureaucracies” where a legitimate authority still prevails but it does not necessarily use 
means such as coercion to exercise its authority; it might use other softer sophisticated 
strategies and practices. The presence of a central (but not necessarily a single) legitimate 
authority is still persistent even in the presence of political games and multiple 
decentralisations (Courpasson, 2000).  If one adopts the network terminology, in an intra–
organisational network a vertical relationship will arise from legitimised authority granted to 
managers in order to coordinate the collective effort; and inter–organisational networks 
                                                             
6 This will be discussed in further detail in this chapter. 
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vertical relationships could arise from the structural position of some network members such 
as their centrality to coordinate the organisational activities.  
2.2.2 Theories of Vertical Relationships 
Considerations of the theories that could be related to the explanation of vertical intra–
organisational relationships is motivated by the question whether the study of vertical 
relationships is now unnecessary or whether there are areas that still remain open for further 
research. The following discussion of theories is not exhaustive; it just briefly presents the 
key underlying ideas behind each theory to indicate its main focus and reported shortcomings. 
This is done deliberately as this section is mainly concerned with the question why it is 
important to study vertical relationships; rather than providing a detailed critical review of 
each theory.  
2.2.2.1 Bureaucracy 
The study of modern administration and organisation continues to be informed by the work of 
Max Weber, the well–known sociologist whose ideas are described to lie somewhere in the 
middle between Hegel’s idealism and Marx’s materialism (Weiss, 1983). According to Weber 
(1970), authority can derive legitimacy on three grounds; tradition, charisma, or rational–
legality
7
. It is the latter authority that results in bureaucracy and bureaucratic organisations. 
Weber positioned bureaucratic organisations as the way forward towards modernity because 
bureaucracy was suggested to outperform other organisational forms due to its efficiency 
(Rudolph and Rudolph, 1979; Clegg, 1994; Hinings and Greenwood, 2002). 
Specialisation and division of labour, hierarchical authority, formality and extensive rules, 
separation of management and ownership, and the use of technical competency as a base for 
                                                             
7 For a more recent analysis and critique see Aguilera and Vadera (2008). 
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hiring and promotion are the key attributes of bureaucracy. Bureaucratic authority implies that 
organisational privilege to control and coordinate will be distributed rationally as ownership is 
divorced from control; the latter representing a distinct managerial task (Hinings and 
Greenwood, 2002). Meyer (1968) further highlights that bureaucratic authority is impersonal 
as it is based on the authority of the office–holding and on norms and regulations rather than 
persons or personal wishes. However, Hall (1963) views these attributes as a dimension along 
which organisations could vary rather than being a bi–polar dichotomy.  
Nonetheless, Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic authority has encountered considerable 
criticism; ranging from questioning its exact meaning to questioning its value and superiority. 
Blau (1963), for example, notes that the term authority used by Weber suggests that 
subordinates show at least a minimum degree of willingness to submit; as when people in 
authority resort to punishment to exert influence, authority would lose its value. However, 
according to him, authority will inevitably include an element of coercion as subordinates will 
always have at least a fear of coercion if they do not comply. Authority, therefore, is seen by 
Blau (1963) not only as a legitimised structural power but also as a power that is structurally 
and socially embedded in the fabric of the organisational accepted norms and values.  
From another angle, Weber envisions that with the excessive bureaucratization of the modern 
organisation, humans will be similar to cogs entrapped in the bureaucracy machine (the iron 
cage). Hence, the world will lose meaning, and rational actions will be responses to the 
uncertainty that is posed by the meaningless world (Clegg, 1994)
8
. The idea of 
bureaucratization was described as crushing the human element inherent in organisations at 
the expense of emphasising the realisation of a common goal. For example, Bennis’s (1959) 
                                                             
8 In this vein, Clegg (1994) argues that perhaps bureaucracy can be also emancipating as it is the (only) way of 
organising effort toward a common goal and a direction.  
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work on leadership criticises the theory of bureaucracy for not considering the human 
dimension in either subordinates or managers. This is because the theory presumes that 
subordinates are unpredictable and passionate and it is only through a machine–like, 
impassionate, impersonal, and rational authority that their behaviour can be moulded to serve 
organisational goals. 
More important are the criticisms directed to whether bureaucratic authority is truly the most 
efficient way or not. This is in spite of Weiss (1983) questioning of the preciseness of the 
translation by Talcott Parsons of both Weber’s terms “rationality” and “ideal type” and in 
spite of Clegg’s (1994) argument that Weber’s ideas were more generalistic and were not 
meant to be as narrowly interpreted by organisational theorists as they are. Weber’s thesis 
depicts formal authority as the unidirectional source of power in the organisation. Rudolph 
and Rudolph (1979) argue that Weber’s bureaucracy tends to underestimate the strong 
possibility that the use of authority will result in resistance and conflict (i.e. the use of 
authority will be resisted by the organisational members’ power once there is incongruence in 
motives and orientations; which they suggest as the likely scenario). Therefore, they argue 
that bureaucracy as such could be claimed not be technically superior as organisations are 
rarely characterised by harmony. Clegg (1994: 167) asserts that “where there is organisation 
there will be resistance, as well as power, contradiction induced by control, rationalities 
instead of rationality and passions as well as interests”.  In a similar vein, Aghion and Tirole 
(1997) distinguish between formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the 
effective control over decisions) and argue that subordinates might have real authority that 
can be derived from a multiplicity of sources (e.g. the expertise of the “knowledge worker”). 
According to them, formal bureaucratic authority is likely to be influential if the holder has 
access to the right information which is not an easy condition to achieve. 
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2.2.2.2 Transaction Cost Theory 
Extending the Coase’s seminal analysis (Coase, 1937), transaction cost theory has been one of 
the influential theories that is used extensively since Williamson’s (1975) seminal book, 
Markets and Hierarchies (David and Han, 2004). The transaction is the key unit of analysis 
and how to conduct transactions efficiently is the key goal of the theory (Williamson, 1975, 
1985, and 1991). The theory suggests that transactions could take place through either 
hierarchies or markets, and later through hybrid arrangements (Williamson, 1991). Markets 
are controlled by prices and are characterised by low risk, low asset–specificity, arm length 
transactions which tend to be less frequent. Hybrid arrangements (such as strategic alliances) 
are forms that take some of the features of markets and hierarchies as they emphasise 
flexibility and provide more incentives than hierarchy but also offer more administrative 
control than markets (Tsang, 2000). Hierarchies are used when market transactions are 
internalised (internal organisation) where control takes place through managerial fiat. With 
the transaction cost as the primary concern, hierarchies are suggested when the exchange 
costs are higher if performed in the open market compared to being performed inside the firm 
(Tsang, 2000). Hierarchies are favoured when the transaction frequency, asset specificity and 
uncertainty increase so that potential problems of opportunism, conflict, information 
asymmetry could be resolved internally through the power of legitimate authority. Hierarchies 
are presumed to be more efficient under these conditions compared to negotiation with other 
autonomous counterparts, and therefore the theory is used to study organisational phenomena 
such as vertical integration and multidivisional structures (Dow, 1987; Carter and Hodsgon, 
2006).  
This theory tends to over–emphasise the efficiency aspect at the expense of value creation 
(Tsang, 2000); this is in spite of Dow’s (1987) doubts about the grounds upon which 
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hierarchical authority is argued to be more efficient than markets. According to Dow (1987) 
the theory does not explain why certain governance structures are likely to persist. Taking this 
line of argument further raises questions about the circumstances under which certain 
governances will cease to exist (the conditions under which hierarchies will become less 
efficient or the conditions that would limit further vertical integration (Gibbons, 2005; The 
Economic Sciences Prize Committee Report, 2010).  
Criticisms have been directed also to the administrative authority advocated in hierarchies. 
Indeed, what characterises a firm or an organisation is the presence of authority and control 
(Dow 1987; Gibbons, 2005). Dow (1987) emphasises that neither ownership nor performance 
monitoring are the characterising features of an organisation as it is the employment relations 
not the ownership of human or physical capital or monitoring as such that makes the 
organisation identifiable from other market transactions. Yet, Dow (1987: 24) poses the 
question of “who guards the guardians?” considering the possibility that authority itself might 
be opportunistic as managers could pursue a self–interest agenda. Again, this theory blames 
the supervisee not the supervisor and assumes the former’s opportunism. At the same time, it 
admits that workers can be exploited by bosses and that hierarchy is the mechanism towards 
reaping the gains of such exploitation (Williamson, 1980, 1985; Dow, 1987). While workers 
might resist, the hierarchical authority is powerful enough to stop such resistance 
(Williamson, 1980; Dow, 1987). Therefore, the theory is argued not to pay enough 
consideration to organisational politics and intra–firm power dynamics; this motivates Dow 
(1987: 31) to call for “an autonomous theory for internal strategic behaviour”. Transaction 
cost theory is, in short, criticised for not considering the inescapable social dimensions of 
economic exchanges and the underlying motivations and contexts that shape the choice 
between market and hierarchy (Granovetter, 1985; Martinez and Dacin, 1999).  
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2.2.2.3 Agency Theory  
While there are similarities between transaction cost theory and agency theory (Barney and 
Ouchi,1986; Eisenhardt, 1989a), transaction cost theory is concerned with the boundaries of 
the firm while agency theory is concerned with the contract governing the relationship 
between the agent and the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
Concerned with the question of how to ensure that the agent acts in the best interest of the 
principal, agency theory comes to shed some light on intra–firm dynamics after economic 
theory’s long tradition of treating the firm as a black box (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory highlights the inherent self–interest behaviour in organisational transactions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), which leads to the emergence of agency problem(s). Agency problems 
occur when the parties involved in a certain transaction (more precisely the principal and the 
agent); 
1-  have different goals, 
2-  or when the principal cannot (due to difficulty or impracticality) assure that the agent 
is following his/her agenda, 
3- or when the principal and the agent have different attitudes towards risk (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
By providing assumptions about people (e.g., bounded rationality), organisations (e.g., goal 
conflict), and information (e.g., treating information as a commodity); the theory aims to 
suggest the most efficient contract to govern the principal–agent relationship (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989a). This theory was argued to have supporting empirical 
grounds and to provide pioneering ideas to organisational thinking about risk, uncertainty, 
incentives and information system (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Eisenhardt (1989a) argues that agency 
theory could share some similarities with the political organisational models which highlight 
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the goal and interest incongruence, although the latter resolves problems via incentives and 
the former resolves problems via negotiation, bargaining, and coalition.  
However, this theory was sometimes criticised for its narrow unilateral focus as it gives little 
attention to possibly agents that could be exploited by principals (Perrow, 1986) or who could 
be in an advantageous power position compared to the principal due to the latter’s contingent 
limitations (Shapiro, 2005). Perrow (1986) also criticises the theory for its unconditional 
assumption about the unfavourable behaviour of the agent
9
. Agency theory tends to assume a 
misbehaving agent who needs to be either monitored, or incentivised, or penalised for not 
following the “righteous” directions of the principal10. This theory also gives primacy to the 
interests of the principal. 
2.2.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is based on the work of 
Emerson (1962) pinpointing that dependence shapes power relations
11
. Unlike the previously 
discussed theories, the resource dependence perspective is more sociological than economic 
as it pays more attention to power relationships than efficiency or rationality. It is described to 
be one of the more comprehensive organisational theories as it does not only focus on power 
(which tended to be ignored by other theories), but it also takes into consideration the role of 
external environment and environmental uncertainties (Davis and Cobb, 2010).  
The theory stipulates that organisations are embedded in a social context; hence, organisations 
are dependent on the external environment which makes them not completely autonomous. 
                                                             
9 For a rival view on the behaviour of the agent see the stewardship theory which assumes cooperation rather 
than conflict (Donaldson, 1990; Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). 
 
10 For more comprehensive reviews see for example Eisenhardt (1989a) and Shapiro (2005). 
 
11 The power-dependence theory will be explained in further detail in Chapter 3. 
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Such dependence brings in a number of environmental contingencies and uncertainty that 
could threaten the organisational survival. Therefore, organisations have to attempt managing 
their dependence. These attempts might be fruitful (or not) and might result in creating a new 
pattern of (inter)dependence. Organisational interdependence results in the creation of power 
relationships; both internally and externally (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Resource dependence theory views the organisation as an open system that is dependent on its 
external environment, but nonetheless it can control this dependence to increase its power and 
reduce others’ power over it (Hillman, Whithers and Collins, 2009). In this theory, the basis 
of power is neither the structure nor the hierarchical authority per se; a higher power position 
will be held by whoever possesses strategically important resources or possesses solutions to 
external uncertainties. Power is determined by the control over critical and scarce resources. 
However, resource dependence theory views power as shaped and defined by the social 
context; this is because what is seen as critical or scarce resources is usually socially 
constructed (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
As put by Davis and Cobb (2010: 27), the core advice of the theory is to “choose the least–
constraining device to govern relations with your exchange partners that will allow you to 
minimize uncertainty and dependence and maximize your autonomy.” The theory brings to 
attention the different tactics and strategies organisations have in order for them to manage 
their dependence, increase their autonomy, and pursue their interest (Davis and Cobb, 2010).  
Being externally focused, most of the tactics of this theory are centred on the external 
environment (except for executive succession). Yet, many of its propositions remain 
applicable to the internal organisational environment. The reason lies on the way 
organisational boundaries are depicted and the way organisations are conceptualised. Pfeffer 
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and Salancik (1978) argue that organisational boundaries are defined by the organisations’ 
relative ability to control other social entities with respect to other actors. Therefore, these 
authors argue that control is never absolute; it remains as a competitive area that is only 
stabilised in the short and medium–term through the institutionalisation of roles and other 
control mechanisms. The organisation thus becomes what it actually controls. Due to 
conflicting demands and uncertainties they have to confront, organisations will increasingly 
become similar to political structures where power dynamics dominate (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Therefore, this theory recognises power, dependence and autonomy as organisational 
realities (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Furthermore, Mudambi and Navarra (2004b) view 
firms as having internal capital markets where power dynamics are similar to those in the 
open market. 
However, while resource dependence theory is described to be as one of the richest 
organisational perspectives (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), this theory is not without 
criticism. It is argued to be used as a metaphor rather than being subject to significant 
theoretical advances (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) criticism 
of the theory has four key grounds. First, that the theory does not distinguish between two 
types of dependence; power imbalance (asymmetry) and mutual power as it groups both 
concepts under the term interdependence. Second, as being both normative and positive, it 
tends to mix predictions of what the organisation should do and what it can actually do
12
. 
Third, the boundaries of the theory are not clear. Fourth, while the theory is dyadic in nature, 
empirical investigations of the theory usually consider the unilateral dependence of one actor 
and seldom study interdependence; hence the study of power imbalance in particular was rare.  
                                                             
12
 Tactics do not always take the organisational ability to act into consideration. For example, while constraint 
absorption is suggested by the theory to be effective under any form of interdependence, Casciaro and Piskorski 
(2005) assert that mutual dependence motivates constraint absorption while power imbalance hinders constraint 
absorption. 
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Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) give special attention to merger and acquisitions maintaining 
that they represent a tactic where the valuable external resources are totally absorbed by the 
organisation, and therefore, it is a unique tactic. Merger and acquisitions aim to either to 
absorb competitors or manage sources of supply or to diversify so as the dependence on the 
standing organisational arrangements is lessened. However, they suggest that in the case of 
mergers and acquisitions, the constraining party might have less motivation to be absorbed 
and hence lose its power; since it is already in an advantaged power position. Casciaro and 
Piskorski (2005) argue that the theory is useful in explaining unilateral tactics employed to 
reduce or restructure organisational dependencies (like finding alternative suppliers), but other 
tactics that require involving other parties in the process of absorption were not fully 
explained (like coopetition and merger and acquisition). They suggest that Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (1978) use of interdependence as an umbrella term for power imbalance and 
mutual power causes the theory to have some empirical and analytical limitations. They also 
note that the theory fails to explain the power dynamics after merger and acquisition 
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Moreover, the theory does not emphasise the dynamic aspect 
in the intra–organisational environment particularly with regards the different forms of 
interdependence and the evolution of interdependence (Hillman et al., 2009).  
Based on this brief presentation of theories, one could conclude that we still have some 
unresolved issues with regards to intra–organisational vertical relationships. While theory of 
authority, transaction cost theory, and agency theory take the unilateral side of the structural 
power holder (i.e, the organisational formal authority); resource dependence theory is more 
comprehensive and it can shed some light on the intra–organisational dynamics through 
wearing the lens of power rather than that of rationality or efficiency. Yet, the latter theory is 
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argued not to pay attention to the different forms of interdependence and thus important 
power dynamics and intra–organisational evolutions are not fully captured.  
2.3 The Headquarters–Subsidiary Relationship Literature 
Possibly the only contemporary literature that deals explicitly with vertical inter–unit 
relationships is that on headquarters–subsidiary relationships. It focuses on vertical 
relationships in internationally diversified organisations (the specific case of multinational 
corporations). This literature provides an in–depth analysis of the vertical relation and its 
related issues. The MNC literature has been influenced by discussions about the network 
organisation which is assumed to outperform traditional hierarchies (Egelhoff, 2010). This 
has led to viewing the MNC as a transnational corporation (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), or as 
a differentiated network (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1997). This, in turn, influences the way vertical 
relationships are viewed. To address the recent conceptualisation of MNCs and the impact of 
this conceptualisation on the vertical relationship, the present section is divided into two main 
sub–sections dealing first with the conceptualisation of the MNC as an organisation, and 
second with the headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature. 
2.3.1 The Conceptualisation of Current MNCs: a Network or a Hierarchy? 
It is commonly accepted that in multinationals, the business unit/subsidiary is hierarchically 
linked to the firm (or its headquarters) because the “firm” chose to internalise such 
subsidiary’s activities (Buckley and Casson, 1976). One could, thus, assume the relationship 
between headquarters and subsidiaries to be similar to that of a typical hierarchical 
organisation, but in the light of the current “network wave”, analysis of this relationship could 
become less straightforward; yet thought–provoking. 
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There is some confusion associated with the term network as there is no unified definition of 
whether the term is used to describe the structure of an organization, or the governance 
mechanisms employed, or both. Despite this ambiguity, most international business scholars 
conceptualise the MNC as one form or another of a network organisation. MNCs have been 
regarded as networks since many authors started to note the similarities between intra–and 
inter–organisational settings (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004 a,b; 
Mahnke, Ambos, Niel, and Hobdari, 2012).  
One of the key reasons behind the indisputable prevalence of thinking of MNC as a network 
is the development of subsidiaries. The MNC is regarded as a network as subsidiaries become 
difficult to control and they develop their own external relations in their host environments 
when they mature. However, the key question for the purpose of this study is: what is the role 
of vertical relationships in such networks? To address this question, the following section first 
looks to the issue of control in MNCs and the view of the MNC as a network organisation and 
then assesses the role of vertical authority in MNCs.  
2.3.1.1 Control Mechanisms in MNCs 
The relatively recent MNC literature reveals a shift of emphasis from formal control 
mechanisms to informal ones (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Paterson and Brock, 2002). 
Informal governance mechanisms are advocated as formal ones are seen as less effective in 
integrating and coordinating dispersed “mature” subsidiaries (for example see Prahalad and 
Doz, 1981a,b; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). Subtler mechanisms are emphasised in place of, or 
coupled, with formal controls due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the MNC and due to 
the difficulty of controlling subsidiaries. Thus, the MNC is described as one form or another 
of a network. According to Schmid, Schurig, and Kutschkler (2002), calls for conceptualizing 
the MNC as a network began more than three decades ago with ideas such as diversified 
 
 
26 
 
MNCs (Doz and Prahalad, 1991), heterarchical organizations (Hedlund, 1986), and 
transnational corporations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Yet, the discussion of MNC networks 
does implicitly shed light on the premise that intra–organizational relations will still have an 
inherent vertical dimension represented by the power of its headquarters. Headquarters have a 
justified structural power to coordinate and integrate the dispersed units of the “network”, 
whether using formal or informal means, or a combination of coordination and control 
mechanisms.  
2.3.1.2 The Business Network Perspective 
Viewing the MNC as a network is supported by another recent stream of literature. This 
stream emphasizes that MNC headquarters and subsidiaries are seen as embedded in a 
business network, stressing a complicated pattern of connection. Although this idea has its 
roots in the 1980s (e.g., Prahalad and Doz, 1981a), it has been recently developed by Nordic 
scholars (for example: Forsgren, Holm, and Johanson, 2005; Forsgren, 2008). In this 
perspective, the MNC is viewed as a multi–centre network organization (Tseng, Yu, and 
Seetoo, 2002) or a federation (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2007; Forsgren, 2008) of 
internal and external relations. Intra–organizational networks represent relationships among 
the MNC internal units such as sister subsidiaries and between headquarters and subsidiaries; 
and inter–organizational networks represent relations with external units such as suppliers, 
customer and various stakeholders. Therefore, each MNC subsidiary presents a distinct 
network as it is embedded and engaged in a different set of local relationships; in addition to 
its corporate relationship (Tseng et al., 2002). Such relationships represent what is called the 
subsidiary context which is important for both the subsidiary and MNC operations (Tseng et 
al., 2002). This view is interesting because it enriches our understanding of the current state of 
vertical relationships. It does not deny the formal authority of headquarters, yet, by focusing 
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on the subsidiary’s value in the internal MNC network and its embeddedness in the external 
network, subsidiaries are seen to possess power.  
This recent literature suggests that while hierarchical power is still evident, it is significantly 
different from the traditional view of hierarchical power where the boss knows best and that is 
why s/he orders and followers should obey. In this view, MNC headquarters is neither a 
stand–alone unit nor having a unidirectional power (Schmid et al., 2002). Subsidiaries also 
have power deriving from their local business context knowledge which the headquarters 
lack. Headquarters thus becomes only one player amongst others. It possesses hierarchical 
power that emanates from its legitimate formal authority granted to it to coordinate the 
various units. Headquarters might also have some knowledge and other resource power. Yet, 
this is not an absolute or an ultimate power. The power of the headquarters is constrained by 
its limited knowledge of the specific contexts of subsidiaries or by other sources of 
subsidiaries’ power13 (Forsgren, 2008). However, which source of power will be more 
significant remains an unanswered empirical question (Forsgren, 2008) given the distinction 
between formal authority and actual influence (Forsgren et al., 2005).  
As Mudambi and Navarra (2004b) put it, the military–like formation of organization has 
loosened to give way to what resembles a political coalition. Unlike the traditional views on 
vertical relationships where subsidiaries are seen as passive agents, and do not have any 
power except this power delegated to them by headquarters (discretion), Mudambi and 
Navarra (2004a) argue that subsidiaries can bargain not only with other units (intra–firm 
                                                             
13 While knowledge is the most widely discussed source of power for the subsidiary, other sources of bargaining 
power according to Mudambi and Navarra (2004b) include subsidiary’s experience in the organization, the level 
of subsidiary control over its operations, and the external orientation of the subsidiary. 
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competition) but with the headquarters itself. This in turn creates another source of autonomy 
other than discretion.   
Based on these premises, most of the recent literature treats the MNC as a network form of 
organization and governance. Nonetheless, the over–emphasis on the network perspective 
tends to conceal the role of headquarters in the MNC (Egelhoff, 2010); and hence the role of 
vertical relationships
14
 (although to a much lesser extent compared to the general 
organisational literature).  
Returning to the key question posed in this section of whether the MNC is a hierarchy or a 
network; one could argue that MNC does not fit in the traditional hierarchy categorisation, but 
there remains an important vertical element in MNC represented in the role of headquarters. 
Whether the presence of subtler control mechanisms and the recognition of subsidiary power 
make for an intra–organizational setting called a network or not will depend on whether the 
definition of network is sufficiently flexible to accept the presence of vertical authority, 
whether this be weak or strong, “soft” or “hard”, implicit or explicit15.  
What can be emphasized here is that the form of vertical relations that we are witnessing 
currently in MNCs is distinct from our traditional view of vertical relations, where 
hierarchical authority used to be treated as a unidirectional source of power.  Recognising 
                                                             
14 Building upon network literature contributions, IB scholars tend sometimes to focus on the intra-
organizational lateral and horizontal relations (i.e between units enjoying the same structural power), and 
marginalising or sometimes criticising headquarters’ vertical authority. Intra-firm value creation (Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998), knowledge transfer (Tsai, 2001), coopetition and knowledge sharing (Tsai, 2002), knowledge 
ties among sister units (Gynawali, Singal and Mu, 2009) are only some examples of the benefits suggested by 
the presence of horizontal ties, which tend to be an alternative focus of attention to vertical ties in some recent 
academic discussions. 
15 Further to this, one could question whether MNCs described as networks actually exhibit the full features of a 
network (Wolf’s (1997) investigation, for example, found that very few multinationals could be described as 
“pure” networks or “transnational corporations”).  
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subsidiaries’ power has encouraged a search by headquarters for supplementary sources of 
power to support their hierarchical authority. The use of softer control mechanisms is seen as 
nothing more than a coping strategy to supplement hierarchical structural power with 
additional “softer and social” power to better control and coordinate these seemingly stronger 
subsidiaries. As noted by Paterson and Brocks (2002); the softer control mechanisms affect 
only the perception of power and control but they do not affect the exercise or the amount of 
control. This trend does not mean that vertical power does not exist; it just means that such 
vertical power faces an increasing challenge and that new forms of implementing it have been 
developed (Child, 2009).  
One could, thus, view vertical relationships as containing different degrees of top–down 
power where the traditional hierarchy represent the orthodox and the highest extent and 
networks have a lesser; yet varying; extent of legitimised authoritarian power; but vertical 
relationships do not disappear in networks. Recognising subsidiaries as having increased 
power does not mean that the headquarters have lost its structural power; it just means that 
power relationships within the organisation have become more complex. Vahlne, Schweizer, 
and Johanson (2012) recognise this hierarchical role of headquarters in the MNC network 
which they view as a schizophrenic role due to the arguably loosely coupled nature of 
dispersed subsidiaries alongside the vertical responsibility of headquarters to coordinate and 
support such subsidiaries. Concepts such as the “intervention hazard” of headquarters in 
MNC networks (Foss, Foss, and Nell, 2012) stress the idea that headquarters has the 
legitimate right to intervene in decision making of a subsidiary when it sees that this is 
necessary (although this might cause a hazard (Foss et al., 2012)). Surprisingly Foss et al. 
(2012) propose that the higher the implementation of a network form, the higher the 
frequency of headquarters’ intervention (for good causes such as reducing slack associated 
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with autonomy or to reap the benefits of subsidiaries’ value creation, or for other reasons such 
as reasserting its power on seemingly powerful subsidiaries). For Foss et al. (2012) 
hierarchical authority is not confined to the narrow definition of centralisation or setting 
goals, it is more  about avoiding costs associated with externalities that could emerge from 
subsidiary autonomy such as coordination failure and moral hazards (i.e. loss of general 
control). Nell and Ambos’s (2013) empirical research confirms that headquarters will 
continue to have a special and a central position in the MNC network that makes it different to 
any other player. This is simply because headquarters have a role that cannot be performed by 
other organisational units; and to perform this role it needs a vertical authority. Headquarters 
still have authority over subsidiaries due to its different responsibility. Perhaps the role of 
headquarters has changed from a brain to a heart (Chiao and Ying, 2013), but the role of the 
heart is still to align and coordinate. One could argue that networks, thus, represent an 
evolutionary change in the MNC organisational form due to the recognised power of 
subsidiaries and highly dynamic environments but they are not a radical change where 
something has been invented to replace of the vertical authority, following Greenwood and 
Hinings’s (1996) terminology.  
2.3.2 Headquarters– Subsidiary Relations: the Contested Terrain 
After this brief discussion about the nature of the MNC, one can pose the question: how do 
vertical relations look like as discussed in the headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature? 
When trying to answer this question, one could see two different pictures; one picture 
highlights what should be done (the normative picture) and another picture that attempts to 
depict what actually happens (the realistic picture).  
In the normative picture, with increased diversification, the headquarters’ role is to harmonise 
and integrate the resources and initiatives of the different subsidiaries it oversees (Ambos and 
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Birkinshaw, 2010). Headquarters are to help in planning, support functions and in knowledge 
transfer among subsidiaries (Foss et al., 2012); they are to guide subsidiaries to deliver the 
best strategy and to use the benefits these subsidiaries bring to the MNC (Scott, Gibbons, and 
Coughlan, 2010). Subsidiaries, on the other hand, are the main organizational innovators, 
initiators, and entrepreneurs. There are a considerable number of studies emphasizing the role 
of subsidiaries as the main driver for organizational evolution and development of strategic 
direction (Anderson and Pahlberg, 1997). Following Bower (1970) and Noda and Bower 
(1996), strategic initiatives usually emerge from the (subsidiary) managers since the 
(headquarters’) managers lack such front–line knowledge. Subsidiaries are accepted as the 
main contributors to the organization rather than headquarters. They are the main source of 
organizational knowledge (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004b), innovation (Almeida and Phene, 
2004), initiatives (Birkinshaw et al., 1998; see also Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2010), and 
recently strategic creativity and entrepreneurship (Scott et al., 2010).  
However, there is another realistic picture that both underlies and complements this idealistic 
one. The realistic picture stresses that the headquarters–subsidiary relation is not as 
harmonious or simple as it seems. The academic literature highlights that neither headquarters 
are perfect integrators nor subsidiaries perfect innovators. While the normative picture could 
be based on some conceptual work, Ambos and Mahnke (2010: 405) argue that even for some 
of the empirical findings, there is some research bias as many studies are based on 
subsidiaries described as the centre of excellence, lead units, or value adding subsidiaries. 
This, as they argue, could risk “overstating the marginal and ignoring the common practice”. 
The headquarters–subsidiary relationship is suggested to be a complex one. This is because 
the relationship is influenced broadly by two unsettled, yet, interrelated issues; the definition 
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of the headquarters and the subsidiary roles on one hand and the MNC internal management 
on the other hand.  
2.3.2.1 The Definition of the Headquarters and the Subsidiary Roles 
There has been a notable change in the conceptualisation of the headquarters and the 
subsidiary roles. Headquarters shifted from being viewed as knowing to being ignorant and 
sometimes from being value creating to value destroying. Subsidiaries, on the other hand, 
moved from being seen as a follower to the strategic initiator and from an ignorant 
implementer to key knowledge holders. The key factor behind the shifting roles is the 
evolving subsidiary power and its recognition, as explained above.  
2.3.2.1.1 Headquarters’ Changing Role 
Previously most of the literature contended, sometimes implicitly, that headquarters will take 
the role of a superior knowledge holder to integrate and coordinate activities of subsidiaries 
internally and to market them externally (Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012). As highlighted by 
Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, and Holm (2012), the headquarters have important roles as it manages 
organisational efficiency (adopting transaction cost economics perspective), helps realise 
synergies (adopting resource–based view), and supports the other organisational units 
(adopting business network view). Headquarters are assumed to add value or to reduce loss 
(Chandler, 1991).   
Yet, only very recently, researchers started to question the role of headquarters (for example: 
Ambos and Mahnke, 2010; Egelhoff, 2010; Dellestrand and Kappen, 2011; Nell, Ambos, and 
Schlegelmilch, 2011; Collis, Young, and Goold, 2012; Foss el al., 2012; Nell and Ambos, 
2013). The reason is that all of the previously mentioned roles require a knowledgeable 
headquarters. Since subsidiaries could have more knowledge about their external environment 
than headquarters, headquarters might lack the knowledge to perform their roles. Therefore, 
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the traditional headquarters’ role might not be justified due to its inability to add value16 
(Ambos and Mahnke, 2010; Egelhoff, 2010; Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012). Niel and Ambos 
(2013) study draws attention that headquarters are not adding value by the merit of their 
structural position, they only add value when they have the necessary knowledge
17
 and such 
knowledge is usually costly to obtain because it requires headquarters to be embedded into the 
subsidiary environment. The same argument is stressed by Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martin 
(2011) where headquarters may not only lack the required knowledge about subsidiaries but 
also they may not know which knowledge is needed; a situation which they call “sheer 
ignorance”. Headquarters intervention thus might be detrimental to the subsidiary 
performance and innovation as it is based on normative expectations by headquarters’ 
managers rather than real knowledge (Ciabuschi et al., 2011).    
However, fewer other studies suggest that the lack of knowledge might be only part of the 
story. Headquarters might also have an intrinsic irrationality (Piotti, 2012). Moreover, 
headquarters’ intervention might not be always for “benevolent” reasons. Foss et al. (2012: 
253), for example, argue that while headquarters’ intervention might be motivated by good 
intentions of creating value, but they sometimes intervene just to show some powerful 
subsidiaries “who the boss is”. Foss et al. (2012), therefore, highlight the role of normative 
integration and procedural justice not only to protect against subsidiary opportunism but also 
to protect subsidiaries from headquarters intervention hazard. Other suggested problems 
                                                             
16 Niel and Ambos (2013) regard value added as the positive difference in the subsidiary performance that occurs 
due to the headquarters’ intervention which would not have otherwise occurred if the subsidiary is a stand-alone 
entity.   
17 It is acknowledged that knowledge limitations do not necessarily prevent headquarters from performing a 
synergy-creating role. Headquarters can have power to secure resources or opportunities that are not accessible 
to individual subsidiaries in general. However, having knowledge enhances the headquarters’ ability to add 
value. Moreover, this strand of literature tends to focus on knowledge as a key strategic asset to its possessor. 
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associated with headquarters interventions include “bounded reliability” (Verbeke and 
Greidanus, 2009) and “radical uncertainty” (Forsgren and Holm, 2010).  
Headquarters are sometimes seen as organisational units which have responsibility for the 
whole organisation excluding themselves (Collis, Young, and Goold, 2007). Although there 
are other definitions, this definition assumes that headquarters have no self–interest. However, 
one could question if this is really the case; particularly from the subsidiary perspective. 
Headquarters could be possibly seen by subsidiaries as redundant units or “residual claimant 
to all rents” (Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012: 222).  
2.3.2.1.2 Subsidiary Power 
Questions about the recognition of the changing role of headquarters reflect the evolution of 
subsidiaries. There are three key interrelated drivers that might lead to subsidiary 
development (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). These interrelated drivers could be related to the 
multinational itself (e.g. restructuring, internal competition, or resources availability), to 
subsidiary choice, and to the local environment. Due to the development of subsidiaries, 
Rugman, Verbeke, and Yuan (2011: 254) highlighted that the literature have moved from 
accepting subsidiaries as “mere operational instruments” to headquarters to recognising them 
having their own unique charters;  and thus they became the key unit of analysis in a growing 
number of studies (Buckley and Strange, 2011). 
Subsidiaries are seen as possessing increasing power. There are various definitions of power 
to the extent that the term is being used in a confusing manner (Uphoff, 1989). However, one 
of the most widely used definitions is that of Dahl (1957) which views power as the 
determination of behaviour of one actor by another. This definition focuses on constraining 
others; however, it holds an obverse meaning of power; it is the (self) capacity to make 
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choices with fewer constraints (Poggi, 2001). As the powerful unit, by determining the 
behaviour of other units, it is reducing the constraint on its own behaviour. Poggi’s (2001) 
broader definition of power is adopted in this study. Since an organisation is built upon 
interdependence among its constituting subunits; and since each unit is at best 
semiautonomous (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the capacity to reduce some of the constraint 
resulting from such interdependence is seen as potential power
18
. Power is sometimes 
conceptualised in more “productive” terms (Courpasson, 2000) as the ability to realise 
outcomes (Clegg, 1989), but this is also dependent on the capacity to make free or less 
constrained choices.  
Power is argued to have different dimensions. For example, Kaplan (1964) described three 
dimensions of power; weight (probability of behaviour determination), domain (number of 
actor that are likely to be affected by other’s determination), and scope (range of behaviours 
that are likely to be influenced by others’ determination). More importantly are the sources of 
power. Subunits are argued not to have power per se (as power is relational), but to possess 
sources of power (Uphoff, 1989).  
Focusing on the power of organisational subunits, Crozier (1964) suggests that power is 
related to uncertainty. In a study of a French tobacco manufacturing plant, the maintenance 
group in the plant had power as they had the ability to cope with uncertainty and their tasks 
were not routinized. Yet, Crozier (1964) suggests that the routinisation following the 
rationalisation of the work of the maintenance department will reduce this subunit’s power in 
                                                             
18 Power is seen in this study as a capacity (Tushman, 1977; Buchanan and Badham, 1999) that when exercised it 
becomes an influence or an exercised power. Power is also seen as relational rather than an abstract property of 
the organisational units/social actor following Emerson’s (1962) conceptualisation.   
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future incidents
19
. However, Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings (1971) present a 
more comprehensive picture through the strategic contingencies' theory of intra–
organizational power. Prior to their work, there was little study of the power of organisational 
subunits. Their theory suggests that because of division of labour and interdependence among 
organisational subunits, different contingencies will give more relative power to some 
subunits. In particular, they suggest that the greater the ability of the subunit to cope with 
uncertainty, the lower the substitutability of its contribution, and the higher its centrality to the 
workflow (represented in pervasiveness and immediacy); the greater the power of that subunit 
within its organisation
20
.  
Focusing on more recent studies of the MNC, subsidiaries are argued to be powerful if the 
other organisational units are dependent upon them; emphasizing the premise that dependence 
is the key base of power. Since subsidiaries are embedded in their local context, dependence 
on subsidiaries increases particularly in areas dealing with subsidiary knowledge and 
technology transfer (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, and Kappen, 2012). Based on the French and 
Raven’s (1959)21 typology of the sources of power; Schotter and Beamish (2011b) argue that 
coercive and reward power are less relevant in the headquarters–subsidiary relationship, while 
information and expert power will be the most significant. In a similar vein, Najafi–Tavai, 
                                                             
19 Hickson et al. (1971) disagree with Crozeir (1964) by arguing that routinisation as such does not reduce the 
future power of the subunit. They argue that there are two types of routinisation; by forecasting or absorption and 
through preventive routinisation. Only in case of preventive routinisation (preventing the uncertainty), 
routinisation will decrease the future potential power of the subunit but not in case of forecasting (coping by 
information) or absorption.  
20 Their propositions can be linked to the general premises upon which the power–dependence (Emerson, 1962) 
and the resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) theories are based.  
 
21 One of the most widely used typologies of the personal sources of social power is that of French and Raven 
(1959). According to them, sources of power can be reward, referent, expert, coercive, and/or legitimate power. 
These sources can be based on economic resources, social status, information, physical force, legitimacy 
respectively (Ilchman and Uphoff, 1969; Uphoff, 1989). Uphoff (1989) argues that this typology is 
comprehensive, rigorous, balanced, and parsimonious.   
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Giroud, and Andersson (2013) suggest that the relationship between the subsidiary’s 
possession of strategic resources (mainly knowledge resources and local relations) and its 
influence is mediated by the subsidiary’s extent of reverse knowledge transfer; which stresses 
the point that influence is gained from centrality and from interdependence rather than just 
possession of resources.  
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011) draw a comparison between four main sources of 
subsidiary power: bargaining power, systematic power, resource dependence power and 
institutional power. Their conclusion is that out of the four sources of power, resource 
dependency power is the most effective and the most cited. Bargaining power is unstable and 
depends on the managerial skills and the ownership of resources. Systematic power is derived 
from the subsidiary position in the configuration of the value chain, yet they argue that the 
sustainability of this type of power could be questionable in the long run. Institutional power 
is when subsidiaries use the host institutional environment as an excuse to evade the 
headquarters’ authority. They consider institutional power to be strong and sustainable due to 
the stability of the institutional environments. However, resource dependency power is 
emerges from the development of specialised knowledge, experience, or technology which the 
other parts of the MNC need. This type of power is argued to be strong and sustainable (as it 
is difficult to imitate based in Barney’s (1991) resource–based view).  
Subsidiaries have thus moved from being seen as passive implementators of the parents’ 
strategies to key sources of knowledge and from powerless to powerful units. However, 
recognising subsidiary power makes subsidiaries to be seen sometimes with suspicious eyes 
by headquarters; shifting them from profit seekers to rent seekers (Mudambi and Navarra, 
2004b; Mudambi, 2011); and from innovators to empire builders (see Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw, 2008).  
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Although the literature has started to recognise the MNC as a political coalition, and 
subsidiaries as having power, many writings still do not regard the subsidiary power as a 
legitimate power.  It is a power that is looked at distrustfully as it carries many “unlawful” 
intentions. The possibility of having subsidiaries that resist headquarters authority for 
presumably legitimate reasons such as lack of knowledge, or poor decision making by 
headquarters, or genuinely different, yet benevolent objectives is rarely considered. Most of 
the literature considers headquarters to have the legitimate right to control subsidiaries, and 
therefore research effort has been directed towards advising headquarters on how to control 
and exercise its power on the powerful subsidiaries (for example see Dörrenbächer and 
Gammelgaard, 2011). Schotter and Beamish (2011b) argue that the traditional view of 
headquarters–subsidiary conflict blames the subsidiary for its opportunistic behaviour, rent 
seeking, and selfish demands. According to them, it has been only recently that conflict has 
been conceptualised as result of institutional duality and information asymmetry.  
2.3.2.2  MNC Internal Management  
2.3.2.2.1 Autonomy–Control Dilemma 
The previous discussion indicates that headquarters’ control or subsidiary autonomy has been 
a subject of special attention (Gates and Egelhoff, 1986; Paterson and Brock, 2002). 
Manolopoulos’s (2008) systematic review of subsidiary roles shows that such roles are highly 
influenced by the MNC internal management and hence the subsidiary’s relationship with 
headquarters with particular reference to autonomy. Autonomy is both an input and an 
outcome into the process of subsidiary development (Paterson and Brock, 2002).  
Control and autonomy can be regarded as an issue that never settles in the MNC environment 
or in diversified organisations in general. Autonomy itself is a dilemma; what is the best level 
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that allows the headquarters to align the different subsidiaries (and control them) while not 
harming subsidiary initiative (Ambos, Asakawa, and Ambos, 2011) is a long–standing yet 
unanswered question. However, this is only part of the autonomy–control dilemma.  
Control is problematic because it can be resisted by subsidiaries which become powerful. It is 
such resistance that is the main reason why headquarters want to exercise control.  
Headquarters might exert further control when it fears the accumulation of subsidiary power 
(Ambos et al., 2011) or attempts at empire building (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Moreover, developing subsidiaries might want to build up slack resources that are not subject 
to the control of the headquarters. As this might affect the efficiency of the MNC’s internal 
market (Paterson and Brock, 2002), the headquarters will attempt to exercise further control 
on such subsidiaries. This is further complicated by the inimical relationship between 
innovation and control and the need for headquarters to have innovative subsidiaries. It is 
generally argued that the lower the subsidiary autonomy, the lower its innovation (Asakawa, 
2001; Mudambi and Navarra, 2007). Mudambi (2011) also pinpoints that high integration 
might lead to low subsidiary innovation as this innovation can be inhibited by the “corporate 
immune system”22 23.  
More importantly, research suggests that subsidiaries also take autonomy for granted. When 
headquarters intervene or reduce subsidiaries’ autonomy, subsidiaries start to resist because 
they perceive it as an attack from headquarters; it is the “loss aversion”, the undesirable loss 
of status quo (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991; Foss et al., 2012).  
                                                             
22 The idea of subsidiary initiative/innovation being resisted by the “corporate immune system” of the MNC is 
originally introduced by Birkinshaw and Fry (1998).  
 
23 However, in some cases, Huemer, Bostorm, and Felzensztein (2009) argue that in some cases control can be 
used to increase subsidiary initiatives, if they are motivated by headquarters. 
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Such resistance cannot be ignored as those who have the right to control might sometimes 
become less powerful than the subjects of control (Ambos et al., 2011), for example due to 
increased dependence on subsidiaries. The possibility that subsidiaries become powerful 
enough to demand more autonomy and resist headquarters control adds complexity to the 
internal management of MNCs. Schotter and Beamish (2011b) proposed that subsidiaries are 
likely to resist the parent’s initiatives in case where these initiatives negatively affect 
subsidiary autonomy, local competitiveness, internal organisational power, resources and 
capabilities, product/service mix, alliances with subsidiary partners, or the financial position 
of the subsidiary.  
2.3.2.2.2 Headquarters–Subsidiary Conflict  
Resistance by subsidiaries is also sustained by the presence of conflict that could be inherent 
in vertical relationships. Conflict generally can refer to irreconcilable objectives (Boulding, 
1962) or disagreement between social actors (Roth and Nigh, 1992; Pahl and Roth, 1993). 
Piotti (2012) uses Pondy’s (1967) broad definition of conflict in which one organisational 
member consciously stops the other members from achieving their goals (although not 
necessarily doing so on purpose).  Kaufmann and Roessing (2005) indicate that conflict 
situations could arise in the case of interaction between two or more parties, if these parties 
are interdependent but their goals are incompatible, or when there is informational asymmetry 
between them.  In addition to power–dependence, conflict can also arise due to heterogeneity 
in members’ background, communication problems, conflict of interests, need for autonomy, 
or sharing resources (Pahl and Roth, 1993). The headquarters–subsidiary relation is thus a 
relationship that can exhibit high level of conflict given that subsidiaries have independent 
and dependent needs (Roth and Nigh, 1992; Pahl and Roth, 1993). Piotti (2012) argues that 
conflict is typical in headquarters–subsidiary relationships, both at the macro and the micro–
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levels. At the macro level, conflict might result from institutional and cultural differences. At 
the micro–level, conflict might result from the actors’ interactions in the presence of different 
interests and rationalities. Similarly, Schotter and Beamish (2011a,b) highlight the 
intertwining nature of organisational and interpersonal conflict suggesting the multi–level 
nature of conflict.  
One important and key role of headquarters is budget or resource allocation (Bower, 1970). 
This role in particular can generate a lot of tension (Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012) as it 
means that the headquarters draws on the performance of the units it oversees, which may 
themselves be unwilling to cooperate for various reasons. The headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship might be antagonistic not only because of difficulty in coordination but also 
because headquarters and subsidiaries might disagree on the goals, processes, or the terms of 
the relationship (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011). Subsidiary managers could be seen 
as both profit seekers (they want to maximize profit drawing on external environment) and 
rent seekers (they aim to maximise their share of the profit generated and limit the transfer of 
rent to the other organizational units through bargaining power) (Mudambi and Navarra, 
2004a,b). Subsidiaries’ rent seeking behaviour could develop as a defensive reaction to 
headquarters’ rent seeking behaviour (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004b); and therefore the 
parties to the vertical relationship could have inherently opposing objectives and interests.  
Conflict might also arise due to different perceptions. Studies by Schotter and Beamish 
(2011a,b); and Schmid and Daniel (2011) suggest that conflict is likely to arise in the case of 
perception gaps and miscommunication between headquarters and subsidiary. According to 
Schmid and Daniel (2011) perception gaps could be embodied in distribution conflicts, goal 
conflicts, or process conflicts.  
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Moreover, conflict and power dynamics might arise as a result of the existence of different 
identities.  Identities are not confined to national ones, as in Kovishnikov’s (2011) study on 
the dynamics between Russian and Finnish cultures, but it can include professional or social 
identities in general. Ybema and Byun’s (2011) study shows the role of cultural identities in 
the micro–political processes that could take place in MNC.  Different identities can result in 
an “us” and “them” distinction; attributing what is seen as the “right” behaviour usually to 
“us” while attributing the perceived “wrong” doings to “them” (Kovishnicov, 2011; Ybema 
and Byun, 2011). Therefore, Ybema and Byun (2011:318) suggest that identity discourses are 
very subjective; they are “colored by emotions, moral judgements, and political or economic 
interests”. Such identity discourses are indicative of power games among the conflicting 
parties (Koveshnikov, 2011)
24
. 
2.3.2.2.3 Conflict and Power 
It is suggested that some headquarters–subsidiary conflict is almost inevitable (Roth and 
Nigh, 1992). However, not all conflict is necessarily dysfunctional (Schotter and Beamish, 
2011a); it just creates important organisational dynamics in which the results could be 
unpredictable.  
Conflict is not a new phenomenon. For instance, information distortion, which is one main 
source of conflict, has long been recognised as an issue in vertical relations (Burns, 1954; 
Carley and Lin, 1997). What adds a new dimension to the study of vertical relationships is the 
recognition of subsidiary power where information distortion is seen as a micro–political tool 
used by the subsidiary to emphasise self–interest, as highlighted by Taplin’s (2006) study. 
                                                             
24 His argument is based on the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, Turner, 1985 and 1999) in which identities 
are constructed through discourses and narratives. 
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The relationship between conflict and power is germane. While more research effort should 
be devoted to studying the relationship between conflict and power, power is usually regarded 
as an antecedent or a cause or an object of conflict (Blazejewski and Backer–Ritterspach, 
2011). Conflict is seen as a necessary condition for power (Baldwin, 1978).  Differential 
power could cause conflict to arise and conflict could result in a redistribution of power which 
makes the relationship between them bidirectional (Blazejewski and Becker–Ritterspach, 
2011). Moreover, competition between powerful parties increases the potentiality of conflict 
(Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, and Kappen, 2012), and conflict is not easily resolved when the two 
parties of the relationship are powerful as this complicates negotiations (Piotti, 2012; 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006). 
2.3.2.3 Headquarters–Subsidiary Politics 
Both the evolving roles of headquarters and subsidiaries, and the difficulty in managing the 
MNC internal environment due to issues of control, potential conflict, and  power battles 
make the MNC seems like a “contested terrain” (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006: 256). 
Since both headquarters and subsidiaries could have different goals; and both of them could 
be powerful, yet, interdependent (Schotter and Beamish, 2011a,b); the relationship between 
them becomes a fertile ground for political behaviour. Such political behaviour is fostered by 
headquarters structural power and subsidiary resistance based on its different sources of 
power; since the input and output in any political process is power (Uphoff, 1989).  
Many signs of political behaviour can be seen in intra–organizational settings. Burns (1961: 
257) views a certain behaviour as being political “when others are made use of as resources 
in competitive situations”. According to Tushman (1977: 207), “politics refers to the structure 
and process of the use of authority and power to effect definitions of goals, directions, and 
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other major parameters of the organization”. Dörrenbächer and Geppert (2006: 256) view 
organizational micro–politics (intra–organizational politics) as attempts to influence social 
structures and human relations motivated by “securing options, realizing interests, and 
achieving success [which] however take place in a contested terrain”25. Dörrenbächer and 
Geppert (2006) argue that micro–politics can be part of the day–to–day operations in MNCs. 
Budgeting, career development, reorganizing, and strategic initiatives are examples of routine 
or innovative political games which can take place in vertical relationships (Dörrenbächer and 
Geppert, 2006). They suggest that even the change in organizational design or corporate 
strategy is induced not only the by institutional or environmental pressures but it can also 
reflect organizational micro–political dynamics (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006). As just 
discussed, political behaviour can be driven by resource conflict, or interest conflict, or 
identity conflict (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006 based on Rothman and Friedman’s (2001) 
classification of conflict in a political organisation). 
This political atmosphere might suggest that decisions are not taken on grounds of rationality 
or efficiency, but they are instead based on bargaining, negotiation, and compromise 
(Tushman, 1977). The headquarters–subsidiary relation could thus become one of competition 
rather than cooperation (Roth and Morrison, 1992; Paterson and Brock, 2002). Subsidiary 
managers act politically to increase their competence, introduce initiatives, attract resources, 
and develop mandates (Williams, 2011). According to Williams (2011), subsidiary managers 
attempt to increase their power base via knowledge sharing, proactive behaviour, and 
normative integration
26
. These are socio–political interactions that are meant to influence the 
                                                             
25 According to Dorrenbacker and Gammelgaard (2011: 32), micro political bargaining power refers to 
“situations in which subsidiaries exercise their influence on headquarters through a combination of their own 
initiatives, issue selling, strategic information politics and manipulative behaviour”.  
26 His study conceptualises the use of these elements in a passive or a negative manner (by resisting headquarters 
rather than using it positively by for example showing compliance) in order for subsidiaries to gain power. 
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distribution of power (Williams, 2011). Mudambi and Navarra’s (2004a) economic model is 
based on the assumption that some business units could be even more powerful than their 
headquarters, to the extent that headquarters cannot extract any resources form these units for 
redistribution. Such subunits may control the transfer of resources–the bargaining power of 
these units will determine the appropriation of rent. Political dynamics might also emerge if 
subsidiary resistance to headquarters initiatives harm the headquarters’ vital interests (Geppert 
and Dörrenbächer, 2011).  
Indicators of the political dynamics inherent in this vertical relationship could be traced by 
observing the theories in use. While many scholars have adopted agency theory to study the 
relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries in the light of information asymmetry 
between them (for example: Kaufmannn and Roessing, 2005; Pederson and Mudambi, 2007), 
more scholars are now adopting the resource dependency perspective due to the political 
nature of the relationship (Birkinshaw and Ridderstrale, 1999; Luo, 2003; Pederson and 
Mudambi, 2007; Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, and Kappen 2012; Najafi–Tavai et al., 2013).  
It should be noted, however, that the extent of subsidiaries’ power can differ; some 
subsidiaries have high bargaining power by the virtue of their centrality in the organisation 
while other subsidiaries have minimal power. A subunit’s political strength is dependent on 
its power (Tushman, 1977) and power relations are context specific, subjective and dynamic 
(Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011). They are context specific as they are “institutionally and 
culturally shaped but not determined” and they are subjective as they are “interactively and 
discursively constituted by actors with specific identities and interests” (Geppert and 
Dörrenbächer, 2011: 27).  
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Nonetheless, political behaviour research is still fragmented and sometimes neglected 
(Mudambi and Navarra, 2004 a,b; Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011). This is due to the 
sensitivity of the issue which makes it a difficult field of investigation (Child, Elbanna and 
Rodrigues, 2010; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006). Moreover, people tend not to regard 
themselves acting politically (Burns, 1961). 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, a review of literature related to vertical inter–unit relationships was presented. 
This has included the general organisation studies’ literature and the headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship literature. The discussion reveals that vertical inter–unit relations can be 
contentious and political in nature. The next chapter builds on the discussion presented in this 
chapter to introduce the concept of vertical inter–unit relationship quality and to outline an 
apriori framework to guide its study.  
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CHAPTER 3: VERTICAL INTER–UNIT RELATIONSHIP 
QUALITY 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter brought out two key points. First, vertical authority is still a feature of 
most intra–organizational settings, even though it might differ in scope and appear to be more 
complex and subtle. Vertical relations do still exist particularly in large and complex 
organizations where complexity necessitates the presence of some degree of control to 
integrate the different subunits. This is evident in diversified or divisional organizations 
where there is a corporate level, divisional level, and a business unit level and in MNCs where 
there is a headquarters and a subsidiary level. Once power is granted by merit of the 
organizational structure and once some units have structural authority (whatever the control 
mechanism is) over the other units, this indicates the presence of vertical relations. Informal 
control mechanisms can be used contingently, yet, this does not mean the absence of 
hierarchical power and authority. Vertical control (normative or formal) is what stops the 
organization from becoming anarchic, something that tends to be ignored when discussing 
intra–organizational network governance (Child, 2009).   
The second point that can be highlighted from reviewing the headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship literature is that it is not only the higher level unit (or headquarters) that has 
power, but the lower level units (subsidiaries) are increasingly recognised as having power as 
well. The power of the latter arises from their context–specific knowledge. It can also 
emanate from their strategic importance, centrality to the rest of the organizational units, 
experience, or other contingent sources of power. This is what makes vertical relations in 
contemporary organisations more complex. The top–down perspective alone is no longer 
valid, nor a purely bottom–up approach; rather there is a continuous process of negotiation 
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and strategic bargaining where each party (the higher and the lower level units) attempt to 
maximise its long–term benefit from the relationship. 
This chapter, therefore, builds on the previous chapter to introduce the concept of vertical 
inter–unit relationship quality (VIRQ). The rationale for introducing the concept is presented. 
This is then followed by suggesting an apriori framework that builds upon the premises of 
social exchange and the power–dependence theories as well as the discussed literature.  
3.2  VIRQ 
3.2.1 VIRQ: the Rationale 
In the light of the previous chapter, vertical relationships are considered as ones in which 
members are seen at most as semi–autonomous. This is because all members need to maintain 
legitimacy to be included in a given relationship (or an intra–organizational network). Their 
actions have to be seen appropriate and acceptable by the other network actors. Put simply, 
there is a price of inclusion in any collective structure; such inclusion costs some autonomy 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, the higher level and the lower level units accept this 
price, because the benefit of maintaining the long–term relationship is assumed to be higher 
than the cost. 
In addition, while political competition can be a feature of vertical relationships, it is a 
relationship that should be characterised by cooperation for the overall organisational goals to 
be achieved. Mudambi (2011) noted that a vertical inter–unit relationship is one of both 
cooperation and competition (he likens it to the bi–form games suggested by Brandenburger 
and Stuart, 2007)
27
.  
                                                             
27 The idea that competition and cooperation are two complementary aspects is well documented in many 
sociological studies. Mintzberg (1979), for example, depicts organisation as playgrounds for both cooperation 
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This makes a vertical relationship more like a political game. It is a contested relationship of 
conflicting interests and both of the conflicting parties can be powerful, yet, they are 
constrained by maintaining and sustaining the relationship because its long–term benefits is 
assumed to outweigh its cost. 
In this contested climate and political “battlefield”, it seems important as well as interesting to 
have a closer look at the quality of vertical inter–unit relationships. Focusing on what 
constitutes favourable vertical inter–unit relationships may provide a chance to listen to voice 
and preferences of the parties to the relationship; especially those of the lower level which 
tends to be generally less heard. This in turn might help to shed more light on the traces of 
conflict and might further our understanding of the reasons that underlie politics in the 
vertical relationship. Does relationship quality in this context provide one of the possible 
solutions to reduce the dysfunctionalities that are very likely to arise?  Could relationship 
quality help in creating a win–win rather than a win–lose situation? In the light of changing 
organisational dynamics, could the higher level motivate the lower level through building 
favourable relationships?
28
 Insofar as organisations are argued to be integrated by 
psychological forces, perceptions, attitudes, and motivations (Katz and Kahn, 1978); what 
role can favourable relationships play in the light of the politics and changing roles that have 
been highlighted? If the powerful party sets the rule of the game and defines perceptions and 
expectations (Coleman, 2006); what happens when the two parties to the relationship possess 
rival sources of power and what factors would underlie their perceptions? 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and conflict, therefore any analysis that fails to take into consideration both of these perspectives and the 
dynamic interplay between them provides only part of the story.  
28 The question of how to motivate subsidiaries is a longstanding question posed by Kim and Mauborgne (1993) 
but remains as an unanswered one (Foss et al., 2012). 
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Motivated by a desire to understand further the current complexity of vertical relations, I aim 
to find out what VIRQ means, what constitutes good relations and what constitutes poor 
relations, what factors affect the presence or the absence of good relations and what factors 
are affected by their perception. These all seem important yet unanswered questions. To the 
best of my knowledge, the study of VIRQ needs to go further than being an incidental 
suggestion in the headquarters–subsidiary literature which is linked to the improvement of the 
relationship outcomes (for example: Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Johnston and Megnuc, 
2007; Ambos et al., 2011). 
A key question is “why relationship quality?” I suggest that relationship quality serves at least 
two purposes. The first is to build a favourable work atmosphere conductive to better 
performance and enhanced cooperation. The second purpose of relationship quality is as a 
strategic tool for its possessor to access more resources or obtain power. This is building on 
the premise that good relations are seen as relational capital to their possessors (Dunning, 
2002). Relational capital is part of the broad concept of social capital which could be seen as 
the social glue that brings an organization’s loosely coupled and sometimes conflicting units 
to an integrated and collective action through common understanding and favourable 
relations
29
. Relational capital is a subtle source of power. Much of the relational capital 
literature implicitly or explicitly suggests that relational capital is used as a platform for extra 
power to gain stronger positions in political arenas. The relationship marketing literature, 
                                                             
29 Despite wide discussion of the social capital concept in the organizational literature, it is usually treated as an 
external capital that is possessed only through stepping outside the boundaries of the organization. Relatively 
few studies have focused on intra-organizational social capital. There is a notable gap in research on intra-
organizational social capital in vertical relations, as most of the empirical organizational social capital research 
has focused on relations among horizontally-linked units. The reason why most research tends to ignore internal 
social capital can be attributed to the assumption that organizational “networks” and their embedded resources 
that lie within their boundaries are fully controlled organizational properties. Yet, this can be a false assumption 
as organisational control is neither easy nor perfect. There is always a need to consider how to get the best 
potential of what the organization already has.   
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which mainly employs a similar perspective of relational capital, suggests that relationship 
quality with customers will ensure customer loyalty and retention. The idea is simply based 
on creating a social alliance with one of the key external stakeholders (in this case customers) 
to win some competitive market wars. Likewise, the idea of building and maintaining 
relationship quality in business–to–business relationships aims to create long–term 
commitment among the business partners. Some joint ventures and strategic alliances are 
based on the same premises for exchanging and accessing resources (for example Wever, 
Martens, Vandenbempt, 2005) or turning a competitive threat, or an environmental or 
institutional pressure into an ally to gain more power; and minimise the opportunistic 
behaviour of that ally by creating relational capital (for example Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 
2000). Firms also create relational alliances with the government to have some control over 
their environment. Oliver’s (1997) study suggests that organizations which have high 
relational qualities with their institutional and task environments are more likely to have 
higher performance.  
Therefore, it is posited not only that relationship quality is needed to create harmony and 
integration
30
, and enhance performance, but that it can also be a strategic asset to its possessor 
to expand some boundaries or to secure an opportunity or to win a strategic manoeuvre or to 
change the rules of the game to its benefit.  Relationship quality is thus seen as a means and 
an end; since organisational integration and harmony as well as gaining more power can be 
both seen as means and ends
31
.  
                                                             
30 Creating harmony could be a feature in non-zero sum political games rather than zero-sum ones. 
 
31 A further possible question could thus be: do managers purposely build and maintain good vertical relations to 
exploit this strategic asset whenever the opportunity arises? 
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As relationship quality is a concept that has not been investigated in the context of vertical 
inter–unit relations, other relevant literatures will be briefly highlighted in order to show the 
treatment of relationship quality in other contexts and to enable me to build up on their work, 
whenever possible. Although its context is different, the marketing literature is a useful 
source
32
.  
3.2.2 Relationship Quality in Other Relevant Literatures 
Relationship quality is a concept that is used widely in the marketing literature, particularly in 
relationship marketing. The core premise in relationship marketing stresses that building 
favourable and committed relationships with customers will result in their satisfaction and 
loyalty. Hence, customers themselves would become another marketing tool through their 
positive word–of–mouth and publicity (Kim and Cha, 2002). Relationship quality in the 
marketing literature is based on subjective perceptions and evaluations of the service or the 
product providers. However, the attributes that constitute the marketing relationship quality 
might be less subjective since there is almost a general understanding of what constitute 
“good” or “poor” relations.  
In business–to–consumer marketing, the seminal study of Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990) 
views relationship quality as being composed of customers’ trust and satisfaction in sales 
people due to the ability of the latter to reduce customers’ uncertainty. Many studies adopt 
their conceptualisation, although, they may add to or modify their constructs of trust and 
satisfaction. Bove and Johnson (2001), for example, regard relationship quality as composed 
of only trust and commitment.  
                                                             
32 An elaborative or a critical review of the relationship marketing literature (or other literatures that deal with 
relationship quality) is beyond the scope and the purpose of this study. Only a flavour of the marketing approach 
to relationship quality is presented; this is in order to broadly illuminate how relationship quality is dealt with in 
that context. 
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In the business–to–business marketing, Boles, Johnson, and Barksdale (2000) support Crosby 
et al. (1990) constructs, while Naude and Buttle (2000) argue that relationship quality is 
composed of four different combinations of trust, need fulfilment, supply chain integration, 
power, and profit and Mohr and Speckman (1994) view favourable relationships between 
partners as made up of trust, commitment, coordination, communication, and joint problem 
solving. Rauyruen and Miller (2007) advocate that relationship quality is a higher construct 
comprising trust, commitment, satisfaction, and service quality. Wilson and Jantrania (1996) 
conceptually suggest that trust, satisfaction, compatibility of gaols, structural and social 
bonds, investments and relative level of alternative relationship investment are the elements 
that make up favourable relationships. 
Although relationship quality is regarded as a meta–construct variable, and although it has 
been conceptualised differently by different studies, there seems to be a general consensus 
that it is composed mainly of trust, satisfaction, and commitment (Smith, 1998; Baker, 
Simpson, and Siguaw 1999; Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Ulaga and Eggert, 2006). These are 
seen as interrelated rather than independent variables (Hennig–Thurau, Gwinner, and 
Gremler, 2002). Trust in this context usually refers to honesty and benevolence (Crosby et al., 
1990), while commitment refers to an on–going need to preserve an important relationship 
(Garbarino and Johnson, 1999)
33
.  
This literature postulates that quality of relations is based on an exchange process and it is the 
quality of the exchange process that is the key factor in determining the quality of the 
relations (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Therefore, the context and the nature (value) of the 
                                                             
33 Commitment in this context is argued to be composed of three components: instrumental (investment); 
attitudinal (psychological or affective side), temporal (that the relationship exists over time) (see Kumar, Scheer, 
Steenkamp, 1995a; Garbarino and Johnson, 1999). 
 
 
 
54 
 
exchange are integral elements in understanding relationship quality. This is why satisfaction 
with the elements of the exchange process is a crucial component as shown in the above 
constructs. In this vein, Ulaga and Eggert (2006) posit that the relationship value is an 
antecedent to the perception of relationship quality and that the relationship value is a stronger 
predictor of satisfaction compared to trust and commitment. Following the same line of 
thoughts, Hutchinson, Wellington, Saad, and Cox (2011) establish that relationship quality is 
affected directly by relationship value and indirectly by a combination of relationship benefits 
and relationship sacrifice
34
.  This shows that relationship quality is context–specific because 
each exchange has different value, conditions, and terms. 
The consequences of relationship quality are seen to cluster around relationship continuity 
and positive publicity. Crosby et al. (1990) suggest that relationship quality creates a long–
lasting relational bond that anticipates the future of interaction. Kim and Cha (2002) found 
that the higher the perceived relationship quality, the higher the probability of relationship 
continuity and the higher level of purchases. Rauyruen and Miller’s (2007) findings suggest 
that relationship quality leads to customer loyalty  (buying intension and attitudinal aspects), 
and that out of the different dimensions of relationship quality (trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, perceived service quality); satisfaction and service quality positively influence 
purchase intensions
35
.  
                                                             
34 Different studies used different antecedents such as sales person expertise and relational selling (Crosby et al., 
1990), ethical orientation and sales’ people expertise (Lagace, Dahlstrom, and Gassenheimer, 1991), seller’s 
experience, relationship duration, customer and seller’s orientation (Bejou, Wray and Ingram, 1996), equity 
(Boles et al., 2000), and customer and relational orientation and service attributes (Kim and Cha, 2002). 
 
35 While these findings are significant, the marketing literature generally tends to favour quantitative over 
qualitative techniques (see Haytko, 2004 as an example of the few qualitative studies in this field). This opens up 
a promising research avenue for further qualitative investigations which might be very insightful. 
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The concept of relationship quality is used in other business literatures such as the leader–
member exchange literature (for reviews: Graen and Uhl–Bien, 1995; Liden, Sparrowe, and 
Wayne, 1997; Henderson, Liden, Glibkowski, and Chaudhry, 2009; Zhou, and Schriesheim, 
2009) and recently the employee–firm relationship (from an internal marketing perspective) 
(Tan, 2009; Herington, Johnson, and Scott, 2009). Although not necessarily explicitly 
expressed, the core idea of relationship quality remains the same across the different 
literatures; relationship quality is a social resource that is exchanged between parties to the 
relationship in a social exchange process (that might be also an economic one). The context of 
the exchange process affects the perception of the attributes of this social resource. Based on 
how the parties to the relationship perceive this social resource, another episode of social 
exchange will occur.  
However, the context of vertical relations between the units of an organisation is different 
from that considered in the above literature.  
 First it is not a voluntary or a transactional–based relationship, it is an enduring 
relationship that is imposed on the lower level (which also receives benefits from that 
relationship) and involves a highest level of investment from the organisation 
(internalisation). This makes its termination neither a desirable nor an easy option.  
 Second, it is between vertical units, which makes the relationship has two dimensions; 
an organisational (inter–unit) and an interpersonal (between the actors who are agents 
to these units) dimension
36
. 
 Third, as elaborated, it is a relationship where differential power plays a significant 
role, although both parties to the relationship could be powerful.  
                                                             
36 This makes vertical inter-unit relationships significantly distinct from the study of the leader-member 
exchange relationships and from the business-to-consumer relationship. However, it can have some common 
features with the business-to-business relationships, especially where one party is more dependent on the other 
such as in asymmetric supply chain relations as will be noted in Chapter 9. 
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 Fourth, it is a relationship that is normatively expected be harmonious and functional 
in spite of the seeds of conflict and dysfunctionality that could be present.  
Since the context is significantly different from these in which relationship quality has been 
previously examined, one would expect the attributes of relationship quality in vertical inter–
unit relations also to be different. One obvious implication of the absence of the voluntary 
element in the relationship is that relationship commitment, for example, might play a 
minimal role unlike the marketing literature. Elements of satisfaction might be also unique. 
Moreover, the meaning of relationship quality from the perspective of the relationship parties 
might be highly context–specific. 
Based on the uniqueness of the context and the expected different attributes and meaning 
attached to relationship quality in vertical inter–unit relationships, consequences of “good” or 
“poor” relations are also expected to be different and multi–levelled (inter–unit, interpersonal, 
and organisational consequences).  
Since relationship quality is treated as a social resource and power is an integral element in 
this exchange process, the following section discusses social exchange and power–
dependence theories to highlight their core assumptions and in order to derive an apriori 
framework for the study of VIRQ.  
3.3 VIRQ: an Apriori Framework 
3.3.1 Social Exchange and Power–dependence Theories 
The relationship between social exchange and power–dependence relations is germane. 
Enduring economic relations have an undeniable social dimension which inevitably results in 
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one form or another of social exchange
37
. Enduring economic and social exchange 
relationships create interdependence between the involved parties. Such interdependence 
indicates the presence of power relations. As the value of the exchanged resources between 
the involved actors might differ, interdependence might take one of two forms; it is either 
symmetric or asymmetric interdependence (balanced or unbalanced power relations); 
although in all cases there is mutual dependence. 
Since vertical authority grants its holder a differential power position, and since both the 
parties to the vertical relationship can possess different sources of power; and since both the 
parties to the relationship are presumably interdependent. I shall focus on relationship quality 
as a social resource that is exchanged within a framework of power–dependence relations. 
Therefore, this study builds mainly on the work of Emerson (1962) on power–dependence 
relations
38. Emerson’s (1962) work provides the foundation for a general framework to study 
social exchange relations in the light of balanced and unbalanced dependence. As power–
                                                             
37 There are several distinctions to be made between purely economic and purely social exchange relations. The 
former usually refers to transaction-based short–term material exchanges; while the latter refers to long-term 
social based exchanges in which attitudinal factors such as trust and commitment can play a role (Blau, 1964; 
Song, Tsui, and Law, 2009). Nonetheless, I support the view that social exchange relationships will inevitably 
emerge in enduring economic exchanges; since both the duration and the repetition of the exchange create social 
interactions among the social actors involved. It is a common practice among organisational behaviour scholars 
to view the employment relationship as having a social and an economic side; and sometimes seeing the 
relationship between these two sides as a continuum of different possibilities (for example, see Settoon, Bennet, 
and Liden, 1996; Song et al., 2009). Scholars employing different constructs such as perceived organisational 
support (for example: Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, and Sowa, 1986; Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002), 
leader-member exchange, psychological contracts (see for example Rousseau and Parks, 1993; Coyle-Shapiro 
and Conway, 2005) regard social exchange as the core element in employment relationships (Dabos and 
Rousseau, 2004).  
 
38 Emerson made other contributions on power-dependence relations, however, most of his later work tended to 
focus on these relations in networks rather than dyadic relationships. His work with Cook (1978) suggests that 
power-dependence relations are best studied in networks rather than isolated dyadic relationships. While this 
study focuses on the dyadic relationship between the actors representing the vertical relationships; it is suggested 
that this is not an isolated relationship as both actors are embedded in a wider network. This is supported by the 
argument highlighted earlier concerning the external embeddedness of subsidiaries (a further elaboration of the 
actors’ relations and their impact on the exchange processes is provided in Chapter 6). Focusing on the analysis 
of the dyadic relationship is assumed to be more useful given the study objectives and its exploratory nature; yet 
it is acknowledged that the relationship parties are not isolated. 
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dependence theory is based on social exchange theory, the latter will be first presented before 
discussing Emerson’s (1962) postulates.  
Social exchange theory is argued to be “one of the most influential conceptual paradigms in 
organisation behaviour” (Cropanzano and Michell, 2005: 874). This theory could be traced 
back to the work of five key scholars; Thaibut and Kelly (1959), Emerson (1962), Blau 
(1964), and Homans (1974), although each scholar has a different perspective (for reviews see 
Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). In his review and critique, Emerson (1976) 
views social exchange theory as a frame of reference (within which several theories can be 
lodged), rather than a theory. The core idea of social exchange theory is that social behaviour 
is exchanged; where positive behaviour is rewarded. The flow of resources is contingent upon 
the flow of value obtained (rewards) which makes social exchange similar to economic 
exchange but involving social transactions as well (Emerson, 1976).  
There are several points that should be emphasised about social exchange relationships. 
First, social exchange relationships are distinct from transactional economic relationships 
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976)
39
.  
Second, reciprocity is central to social exchange relations
40
, to the extent that Blau (1964) 
defines social exchange relations as contingent upon a rewarding reciprocation; or otherwise 
relationships would not continue. Gouldner (1960) suggests that reciprocity is a universal 
norm that stabilises social systems and relations and can sometimes initiate them. Cropanzano 
and Mitchell (2005) regard reciprocity as an individual orientation, a norm, or a folk belief 
                                                             
39 Although repetitive economic exchange can involve social exchange relations, as mentioned above. 
 
40 There are other factors on which social exchange relations could be based including rationality, group gain, 
competition, status consistency, and altruism  (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005); however, reciprocity is almost 
an agreed up on premise in all enduring social exchange relationships.  
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that establishes fairness in exchange relationships. Reciprocity can be either positive (a good 
action stimulates indebtedness or an obligation that stimulates its repayment), or negative (an 
eye for an eye, or an injury for an injury), or generalised reciprocity (a good or bad action is 
not necessarily paid back directly to the actor who originally initiated it, but it can affect a 
wider network of actors). The different types of reciprocity are based on the immediacy of the 
return, their equivalence, and the interest of actors initiating them (see Gouldner, 1960; Uhl–
Bien and Maslyn, 2003). For instance, positive reciprocity is motivated by mutual interest, 
negative reciprocity is motivated by self–interest, and generalised reciprocity is motivated by 
other interest (for the general good) (Uhl–Bien and Maslyn, 2003). Immediacy and 
equivalence of the value in reciprocation are more context–specific, yet negative reciprocity is 
argued sometimes (particularly in equal or lateral relationship) to have high equivalence and 
immediacy compared to positive reciprocity or generalised reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Uhl–
Bien and Maslyn, 2003). Several empirical studies support the role of reciprocity in 
relationship development and maintenance
41
 (Uhl–Bien and Masyln, 2003).  
Third, social exchange relations assume actors’ interdependence. Such interdependence gives 
rise to power relations (Emerson, 1962 and 1976). Blau (1964) treats social exchange and 
power as two distinct phenomena. Social exchange, in his conceptualisation, refers to 
voluntary actions which are only motivated by expected returns while power relations involve 
resistance. Homans (1974) puts forward the view that some exchange relationships could be 
seen as a subset of power relationships. Baldwin (1978) supports Homans’s view arguing that 
                                                             
41 Most of the work conducted in organisations views the exchange process as a reciprocal exchange rather than 
a negotiated exchange (the latter tends to refer more to economic exchanges), particularly in the relationship 
between employees and the organisation. Relationship quality is particularly seen as a reciprocal exchange rather 
than a negotiated one, because first of all it represents an exchange of a social resource. Second, its terms and 
conditions and even its meaning are not predetermined and negotiated prior to the vertical inter-unit relationship. 
It is a by-product of the vertical relationship (for comparison between negotiated and reciprocal exchanges see 
for example Molm Peterson and Takahasi, 1999 and Molm, 2003).  
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power without cooperation and exchange without conflict are rare and extreme situations and 
therefore social exchange can generally involve some power conflicts. However, it is 
Emerson (1962 and 1972) who explicitly advocates that social exchange relations are based 
on personal ties in which the relative power of actors plays a key role. To him, social 
exchange creates dependence and it is the structural dependence between actors that provides 
the base for power relations. Therefore, the social exchange relationship can be viewed as one 
of power–dependence. Based on his propositions, the analysis of power and social exchange 
have latter become a common practice in sociology and organisation studies
42
 (see Cook, 
Cheshire, and Gerbasi, 2006). 
Power–dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) postulates that the power of (A) over (B) is 
determined by the dependence of (B) on (A). Dependence, in turn, is defined by the 
motivational investment of B in the goals mediated by (A) and the availability of alternatives 
for (B) outside the (A–B) relationship. Power is conceptualised in terms of resistance of (B) 
that could be overcome by (A). Power, in this theory, is seen as potential; it refers to a 
structural capability. This means that the exercise of power is distinct from its ownership 
(Emerson, 1972; Lawler and Yoon, 1996). However, Emerson (1972) uses behavioural power 
to refer to the power in use or exercised power (see Cook et al., 2006)
43
. 
Emerson (1962) suggests that exchanges in power–dependence relations could result in one of 
two scenarios between the exchange parties; balanced power (symmetric) or unbalanced 
(asymmetric power). According to Emerson, balanced power relations do not neutralise 
                                                             
42
 The power–dependence theory provided the basic foundation of the resource dependence theory advanced by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). This theory was discussed Chapter 2.  
 
43 Power in use can be manifested, for example, by the inequality of distribution of returns, or by the presence of 
exploitation (Molm et al., 1999).  
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power. Although a pattern of “dominance” might not appear, the two parties to the 
relationship might still exert considerable control over each other. However, since power 
relationships could be balanced, they could be also unbalanced.  The study of the balance of 
power brings in three points to attention: power asymmetry which refers to the difference 
between the dependence of (A) over (B), the cohesion of the relationship between A and B 
(total power which is the average of their dependence) and finally the structural changes that 
leads to balancing the power relations (Emerson, 1962). The latter point is the essence of the 
power–dependence relations, as the stability of the social structure is always the focal 
outcome. 
Emerson suggests that balanced power relations are likely to be more stable. It is the 
unbalanced power relations that are likely to be unstable as the disadvantaged actor will opt 
either for cost reduction or for balancing operations (his propositions are based on 
manipulating the conditions that contribute to the state of actors’ dependence). Cost reduction 
involves a change in values; social, moral, or economic; in order to reduce the “pain” of being 
in a disadvantaged power position. It is like a coping mechanism that does not shift 
unbalanced dependencies but could stabilise valued relationships by changing perceptions. 
Balancing operations involve shifting the causes of dependence via reducing or increasing the 
motivational investment or increasing or denying alternative source, based on the power 
position of the actor. Reduction of the benefits offered by the disadvantaged actor is well 
documented in the sociology literature; however, there has been less empirical work in this 
area apart from experimental research (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Molm et al., 1999) 
Based on the previous discussion, one can conclude that social exchanges occur in enduring 
economic transactions within a framework of balanced or asymmetric power between actors. 
Power relations affect the nature of the social exchange process, which in turn affects the 
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stability of the structure of the relationship through the (un)stabilising mechanism of 
reciprocity. Applying this to vertical inter–unit relationships, one could regard relationship 
quality as a social resource that is exchanged in the vertical inter–unit relationship within a 
framework of different states of interdependence between the higher level and the lower level 
units. The (value) of this social resource can vary as it can be perceived as favourable or 
unfavourable; and therefore the nature of the social exchange process could vary resulting in a 
positive or a negative reciprocity
44
. However, the nature of this social resource (its meaning 
and its constituents) is not yet defined. Moreover, along with the state of actors’ 
interdependence (referring to their power structure), there could be many contextual factors 
that affect the perception of this social resource. As this research is exploratory, initial 
suppositions (based in part on the literature) about the nature of relationship quality (the social 
resource) and its relevant antecedents and other concomitants are made. These propositions 
are meant to be used as a guide during the process of data collection. This study devotes its 
primary consideration to the lower level unit perspective as it tends to be less heard but also 
because the evolution of the subsidiary unit is assumed to create strong tides in the vertical 
relationship. However, the higher level perspective will not be ignored and is seen as an 
important completion of the vertical relationship picture.  Attributes of VIRQ are expected to 
be similar for actors in both the higher level unit and the lower level unit, but that the 
antecedents and the consequences of the perception of the relationship quality may quite vary; 
given the different power positions. The meaning and the attributes of VIRQ will thus be 
explored from a dyadic perspective. However, the antecedents and consequences of the 
                                                             
44 While generalised reciprocity could be very relevant (as will be shown in Chapters 5, 6 and 7), more emphasis 
is put on positive and negative reciprocity as the main concern in this study as the focus is placed on the vertical 
relationship dyad rather than the wider network. 
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perception of VIRQ are only explored from the lower level unit’s perspective45. The 
following section presents propositions that are then used to construct a primary framework 
for the study
46
. 
3.3.1.1 First: VIRQ as a Social Resource 
In order to identify the primary meaning and the constituting attributes of VIRQ, different 
relevant literatures were explored including the headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature 
(as the primary source of relevant information).  
Despite the richness of the MNC headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature, and despite 
the variety of governance modes it suggests, I could not find an empirical account of VIRQ. 
Previous studies suggest headquarters–subsidiary relationship quality only at the conceptual 
level. For example, Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) suggest that headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship quality will affect subsidiary initiative. Johnston and Megnuc (2007) suggest that 
future research should focus on the relationship between headquarters–subsidiary relationship 
quality and autonomy (as a central issue in headquarters–subsidiary relations). Yet, what 
relationship quality means and what it is composed of in this context remain to be unanswered 
questions.  
Two points may be made about the relational aspects of the intra–organisational vertical 
nexus. First, the socio–psychological atmosphere seems to be important to attain favourable 
relationships. Second, the headquarters–subsidiary relationship has a significant functional 
side that needs to be satisfied before the relationship can be judged as “good” or “poor”. 
                                                             
45 Exploring the potential antecedents and consequences of the perception of VIRQ from the higher level’s 
perspective is seen as a promising direction for future research. 
 
46 Propositions and the apriori framework are based on the lower level perspective as the key study focus. 
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Reflecting on the first point, Kostova and Roth’s (2003) conceptual work on social capital in 
the headquarters–subsidiary relationship context pinpoints that the relational dimension 
reflects the nature of the relationship between a focal actor and other actors; as indicated by 
the focal actor's beliefs and attitudes toward others. Such beliefs and attitudes are not only 
confined to trust and trustworthiness but also extend to norms and sanctions, obligations and 
expectations, identity and identification. These behaviours and attitudes are argued to create a 
psychological atmosphere conducive to positive collaborative behaviour and mutual support 
(Kostova and Roth, 2003). 
Reflecting on the second point, Dunning (2002: 478), viewing favourable relations as an asset 
or a capital; considers relational capital as "the stock of a firm's willingness and capability to 
access, shape, and engage in economically beneficial relationships, and to sustain and 
upgrade these relationships”. Dunning (2002) confirms that relational capital is more 
empathetic and emotionally based. However, he argues that relational capital is highly 
context–specific and depends on the structure of the relations among different involved actors. 
Such structure depends on the raison d'etre of the relationship (Dunning, 2002). Therefore, the 
attributes of a given relational asset are unique to the purpose of this relationship.  
Based on these two points, it can be deduced that relationship quality is primarily about the 
creation of socio–psychological states conducive to the attainment of a relationship objective. 
Relationship quality could be seen primarily as the assessment of the extent to which the 
relationship meets the expectations and needs of the focal unit as well as the assessment of the 
perceived relationship atmosphere.  
In a search for attributes, some of the previous empirical research that measured relationship 
quality in other contexts is suggestive. Relationship quality is most commonly represented in 
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terms of satisfaction and trust (for example, business–to–business, business–to–consumer 
relationship marketing, firm–employee relationship strength); although trust is sometimes 
used as a one–dimensional concept.  
Conceptually, commitment, state of conflict resolution, communication quality, identification 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002), feeling of closeness (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002), and 
trust–based relational ties (Tsai, 2000) are seen as additional possible attributes that could 
shape relationships and affect the value of relationship quality (whether positive or negative). 
In a few instances in the headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature, it has been suggested 
that relationship quality is composed of mutual trust, effective communication, satisfaction 
and commitment (for example, Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Johnston and Menguc, 2007). 
In addition to the above mentioned attributes, perceived justice could be added as a dimension 
because the exercise of vertical power could create a climate of unfairness. Kim and 
Mauborgne (1993: 503) introduced the term procedural justice to the headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship which is regarded as “the extent to which the dynamics of a multinational 
corporation's strategy–making process are judged to be fair by the top managers of its 
subsidiaries”.  They suggest that a perception of injustice could not only have a negative 
impact on the attitudes of the managers of subsidiaries (such as commitment, satisfaction, and 
trust), but it might also negatively affect the subsidiary compliance with the headquarters’ 
decisions.   
Based on this apriori definition and apriori dimensions, the following proposition is 
formulated. This proposition is used as guidance for the study of VIRQ from both higher level 
unit and the lower level unit perspectives.  
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P1: The attributes of VIRQ are likely to be composed of the following: strength of 
personal ties, strength of inter–unit ties, trust, the lower level’s identification47, state of 
conflict/disagreement resolution, fairness, satisfaction, communication quality, and 
relationship importance
48
. Strength of personal ties, strength of inter–unit ties, trust, the 
lower level’s identification, state of conflict/disagreement resolution, and fairness are 
likely to reflect the socio–psychological atmosphere of the relationship. Satisfaction, 
communication quality, and relationship value are likely to reflect the functional side of 
the relationship and the relationship expectations
49
.  
3.3.1.2 Second: VIRQ Concomitants (Adopting the Lower Level Unit’s Perspective) 
3.3.1.2.1 Predictors of VIRQ 
Based on the previous discussion of social exchange and power–dependence theories, it is 
claimed that the context of the vertical relationship affects the way relationships are 
perceived. Building on the headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature presented in 
Chapter 2 and social exchange relations discussed in this chapter, it is suggested that power 
represented in actors’ interdependence can be an important contextual factor. It has been also 
demonstrated that the lower level’s autonomy/control is an important factor in determining 
the intensity of political games in vertical relationships. As shown in Chapter 2, conflict arises 
sometimes due to underlying power relations. Conflict is more likely to emerge due to 
different goals or perception gaps between the different parties to the vertical relationship. 
                                                             
47 Identification is only relevant to VIRQ from the lower level unit’s perspective. 
 
48 The suggested dimensions are likely to form a reflective scale rather than a formative  index due to the  
interrelations between the individual items (for example, trust, satisfaction, and perceived justice) and because 
variations in operational relationship quality is likely to be reflected in perceptions of satisfaction, trust and 
perceived justice (for a review of formative and reflective indicators see Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001; 
Javris, Mackenzie, and Podsakoff, 2003; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006). 
 
49 The definition, the operationalization, and the specific items used to measure these postulated attributes of 
relationship quality are provided in detail in Appendix II.  
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Therefore, the congruence of goals and perceptions can play a significant role in shaping 
perceptions about the quality of relations (this will be called cognitive congruence).  
A. Interdependence between the Actors of the Vertical Relationship  
Interdependence is one of the premises upon which organizations are built (Subramaniam and 
Watson, 2006). Organisations are dependent on their sub–units (which they have internalised) 
to deliver some agreed upon outcomes that are then translated into value chain activities. Sub–
units, in delivering their outcomes, depend on tangible and intangible organizational 
resources. The degree of interdependence will vary depending on the degree of integration 
and coordination required in the organization (Subramaniam and Watson, 2006). 
Interdependence is mutual for organisational relationships to continue, but the state of 
interdependence will be either balanced or unbalanced.  
More important is how to understand the interdependence between the actors involved in a 
vertical relationship. In the MNC context, Forsgren et al. (2005) view subsidiary dependence 
on headquarters as embodied in the headquarters’ importance for the subsidiary operations 
and business context. However, headquarters as well are dependent on their subsidiaries (this 
dependence can increase such as in the case of passive stars or constellation stars according to 
Subramaniam and Watson’s (2006) typology).  
From the subsidiary perspective, Kostova and Roth (2002: 218) define subsidiary dependence 
as “the belief held by subsidiary managers that the subsidiary relies on, and is contingent on, 
the support of the parent organization for providing major resources, including technology, 
capital, and expertise”. Kostova and Roth (2002) highlight that subsidiary dependence 
reflects the asymmetry of the hierarchical power in the headquarters–subsidiary relationship 
as dependence implies subordination and control. They suggest, based on institutional theory, 
subsidiaries which depend highly on their headquarters are more likely to comply with the 
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headquarters’ mandates, although their empirical results did not support this proposition. 
They argue that such compliance is regarded as a coercive rather than a mimetic adaptation; 
this is regardless of the potential benefit of that mandate (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Forsgren 
et al. (2005: 136, 158) found empirically that the greater the subsidiary dependence on 
headquarters, the greater the headquarters control and actual influence on the subsidiary. In 
their analysis, they stress that subsidiary dependence on headquarters affects subsidiary 
knowledge sharing as headquarters could “force” subsidiaries to comply with their mandates. 
Therefore, subsidiary dependence on headquarters could be associated with passive feeling on 
the side of the subsidiary and a lack of control over the subsidiary’s direction. Subsidiaries 
with highly dependent headquarters, on the other hand, might perceive the relationship as 
exploitative; in turn subsidiaries might question the legitimacy of the vertical relationship as 
well as its fairness. For a relationship to be favourably perceived by its involved actors, its 
benefit should outweigh or at least balance its cost. Therefore, it is expected that: 
P2: In general, the state of the balance of interdependence will affect the perception of 
VIRQ. Asymmetric interdependence will affect the perception of the relationship 
negatively, while balanced interdependence will affect it positively
50
. 
 
B. Autonomy versus Control 
Control is highly related to the idea of power. Child (2005) argues that control in 
organizations could be achieved through power; whether this power emanates from resources, 
expertise, authority or the ability to reward desirable performance through the control of 
                                                             
50 One key point in this study is whether the state of the balance of interdependence affects the perception of 
VIRQ, and if so, how it might affect this perception. In addition to its novelty in the study of VIRQ, the different 
states of interdependence have rarely been considered in previous empirical research. Indeed, the resource 
dependence theory is mainly criticised because it does give sufficient attention to the implications of asymmetric 
interdependence (see Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). 
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material resources. Autonomy, as the obverse of control, is usually seen as represented by the 
authority to take decisions; whether this authority arises from a delegated or an acquired 
power (O’Donnell, 2000; Young and Tavares, 2004)51.   
Understanding the factors that affect and are affected by autonomy is a classic research area 
(Dill, 1958). In the headquarters–subsidiary literature, issues of control versus autonomy have 
been receiving increasing research attention in the last two decades (Johnston and Megnuc, 
2007). Young and Tavares (2004) argue that autonomy is linked to almost all aspects of the 
headquarters–subsidiary relationship such as power and trust. Young and Tavares (2004) also 
point out that the subsidiary’s performance is a cause and effect of subsidiary’s autonomy, 
although this area requires further research. Johnston and Megnuc (2007) suggest a quadratic 
inverted U–shape relationship between subsidiary size and its autonomy. They argue that size 
is negatively correlated to autonomy at the beginning. As the subsidiary matures and develops 
specialised resources, it will gain more power and thus its autonomy will increase. This 
continues only till the subsidiary reaches an inflection point, where the subsidiary resources 
increase as well as the complexity of its management. In such case, there will be a greater 
need for coordination with headquarters, and hence more interdependence and decreased 
levels of autonomy. They highlight that their results represent a reflection of the resource 
dependence theory in the intra–organizational “network”. 
Different authors have suggested different mechanisms of control and used different 
terminologies to refer to similar, if not the same, mechanism (see Hazring, 1999:18-19). 
However, Hazring’s classification (1999) seems to be comprehensive. Hazring (1999:21) 
                                                             
51 According to Young and Tavares (2004); the distinction between decentralization and autonomy is that the 
former refers to is a delegated power from the higher authority while the latter can result from either 
decentralisation as a delegated power or acquired power.  
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classified control mechanisms based on two criteria. The first is direct/explicit versus 
indirect/implicit and the second is personal/cultural (socially oriented) versus 
impersonal/bureaucratic/technocratic (based on “instrumental artefacts”). Based on these 
categories, Hazring (1999) pointed out four mechanisms of control: personal centralised 
control, control by socialisation and networks, bureaucratic formalised control, and output 
control. These different control mechanisms were suggested to be linked to two organisational 
characteristics and two environmental characteristics (Hazring, 1999). The organisational 
characteristics are related to the size of the subsidiary unit and the extent of interdependence 
between/among the organisational units. As for the environmental characteristics, control 
mechanisms are suggested to be affected by the extent of environmental uncertainty and 
complexity. This study focuses on the perception of control (or autonomy as an obverse to 
control) rather than the nature of the control mechanism used. The reason is that different 
organisational and environmental conditions will make some mechanisms more suitable than 
others. Therefore, the nature of the mechanism as such might or might not affect the 
perception of the quality of vertical relations. What seems to be important is whether this 
mechanism is suitable to the governed unit and its context or not, which tends to be 
subjectively judged
52
.  
As a central issue in vertical relationships, and as a compelling desire for most mature lower 
level units, autonomy is expected to be positively related to the lower level unit’s perceived 
VIRQ. Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilenius, and Arvidsson, (2000) argue that the good side of 
control is that it coordinates the different interdependent activities in the organization; 
however, it can be perceived by subsidiaries as manifestation of lack of trust. Control is 
                                                             
52
 A detailed account of the reason why the perception of control rather than the control mechanism as such is 
used as a focal variable in this study is presented in Chapter 6 which discusses some of the empirical findings 
(pages: 213-221).  
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perceived negatively by the lower level units’ managers as they view it as unnecessary 
interference (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). Chini et al. (2005) highlight that autonomy–control 
issues are the most obvious triggers for organizational tension as they reflect the power–
dependence structure within organizations. Hence:  
P3: the higher the degree of autonomy the lower level unit perceives it has, the higher 
its perceived quality of relationship with the higher level unit. 
C. Cognitive Congruence  
Cognitive congruence refers to the extent to which the actors understand each other and share 
the same vision. Differences in understanding, incompatibility of goals, and lack of shared 
visions are likely to underlie conflict between the vertical relationship actors. Hence, 
cognitive congruence is expected to affect the perception of VIRQ. In this research, the focus 
is placed on two main sub–categories of cognitive congruence. The first is the shared 
understandings and views which refer to the extent and the scope of perception gaps between 
parties to the vertical relationship. Shared understandings and views is further divided into 
perception gaps regarding the lower level unit’s role and regarding the understanding of its 
environment. The second is the extent to which the vertical relationship actors share the same 
vision. 
1.  Shared Understandings and Views 
Research conducted in the MNC Headquarters–subsidiary context highlights the presence of 
perception gaps between headquarters and their subsidiaries (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; 
Asakawa, 2001; Chini, Ambos, and Wehle, 2005). Perception gaps can range from simple 
differences in interpretations to differences in understanding the subsidiary role (Birkinshaw 
et al., 2000); and hence disputes in deciding on the suitable action or strategy can be a likely 
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possibility. Such perception gaps exist because of the different contexts that vertical 
relationship parties are embedded in; this is not necessarily confined to cultural or country 
differences.   
The headquarters–subsidiary relationship is “a mixed motive dyad” with conflicting interests 
and goals; therefore, convergence in perceptions is not the most likely scenario (Ghoshal and 
Nohria, 1989; Birkinshaw et al., 2000: 322). This is because the vertical relationship parties 
have different references, experiences, and world views (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). Perception 
gaps also arise because of the imperfect flow of information as knowledge is sticky and 
managers have bounded rationality (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Chini et al., 2005). The two 
dyads do not only have access to different information but they interpret this information very 
differently (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Chini et al., 2005). Birkinshaw et al. (2000) also 
highlight that because of the decreased dependence on headquarters as subsidiaries develop, 
headquarters can find itself in a situation where it no longer knows what subsidiaries are 
doing.    
Perception gaps have been operationalised differently in different studies (for example 
Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Asakawa, 2001; Chini et al., 2005). Yet, generally, perception gap is 
a broad term that can be used to denote differences in perceptions between the higher level 
and the lower level units. Perception gaps are operationalised in this study as the extent to 
which vertical relationship units fail to have a shared understanding of the lower level unit’s 
role in the organization as well as its business environment.  
1.1 The Lower Level Unit Role 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) emphasise that in MNCs, the roles of subsidiaries can result 
from headquarters’ assignment, or subsidiary strategic choice, or reflect environmental 
determinism. Birkinshaw et al. (2000) suggest that the subsidiary role is a negotiated one 
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based on the subsidiary’s power. They operationalize perception gaps as “the extent to which 
subsidiary managers overestimate the strategic role of their subsidiary vis–a`–vis 
headquarters’ managers (subsidiary role overestimation for short)” (Birkinshaw et al., 2000: 
322). They argue that three scenarios could emerge based on this operationalization: (1) either 
subsidiary management perceive their role as more strategic than headquarters management 
perceive it and in this case it is called subsidiary overestimation; (2) or subsidiary managers 
see their roles less strategic than headquarters perceive it (subsidiary underestimation); or (3) 
there is a little gap between headquarters and subsidiary perceptions. Birkinshaw et al. (2000) 
found a significant relationship between headquarters’ control and the presence of perception 
gaps but they also found that perception gaps are not related to headquarters–subsidiary 
coordination. 
 1.2 The Lower Level Unit Environment  
Research concerning the environment has received wide attention by strategic management 
and organization theory scholars. Although the term “environment” could simply refer to the 
climate in which the organization operates, additional analyses of environmental properties 
and characteristics become challenging (Dill, 1958; Bourgeois, 1980; Lenz and Engledow, 
1986). Lenz and Engledow (1986), therefore, look to the environment from different lenses 
and each lens has its implication on the concept’s meaning and influence of the environment. 
However, what could be stressed that environments have an undeniable impact on the strategy 
of the organization and its subunits. Dill (1958) argues that the perception of the environment 
affects a business unit’s actions. In a diversified organization, one would expect the presence 
of different environmental pressures on different units, and also different interpretations by 
managers. This point has been stressed in the MNC literature: that headquarters will not be 
aware of many of the context–specific conditions of the subsidiary and that is what makes the 
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relationship problematic in the first place. However, this is not confined to vertical relations 
across national boundaries. While in many cases the higher level and the lower level units 
could be located in the same country, because of diversification, the perceived (and 
sometimes the objective) environment and some of the institutional pressures bearing on each 
party could vary. Many lower level units have to deal with different suppliers, customers, 
competitors, regulatory agencies than those their higher level units deal with
53
. Given the 
structural link between the vertical dyads, this could create some tension if there are 
perception gaps affect the way the two parties understand each other’s business context and 
requirements.  
Birkinshaw et al. (2000) argue that perception gaps in general have important implications for 
the MNC management, as the drive for autonomy will be a natural consequence for having 
different world views. Yet, because research about perception gaps is still sparse (Birkinshaw 
et al., 2000), the consequences of the presence of perception gaps are still unclear (Chini et 
al., 2005). However, existing evidence suggests that the presence of high perception gaps is 
related inversely to the quality of relationship. Chini et al., (2005) point out that such gaps 
cause dysfunctional conflict, unnecessary friction, sub–optimization of decisions. However 
they also maintain that it is unwarranted to conclude that a lack of perception gaps will give 
rise to satisfaction (Chini et al., 2005). Birkinshaw et al. (2000: 325) suggest that in the case 
of subsidiary role overestimation, headquarters will reject its initiatives and proposals as they 
will be deemed time wasting or seen as attempts at “opportunistic empire building”. This 
could seriously affect the relationship between the two sides, and it might lead some key 
                                                             
53 The context understudy (UK University-based Business Schools) was influenced by two main institutional 
frames; the host university and the Business School wider environment. The two institutional frames 
sometimes placed conflicting institutional pressures on the business schools studied. A detailed account of the 
institutional duality faced by University-based Business Schools and its implications is provided in Chapter 6 
(pages: 190-221). 
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managers to leave (Birkinshaw, et al., 2000). Based on this, the following proposition is 
advanced: 
2.  Shared Vision 
Shared vision “embodies the collective goals and aspirations of the members of an 
organization” (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998: 467). In a headquarters–subsidiary relationship, a 
shared vision could create a healthy atmosphere based on mutual understanding, so that the 
headquarters and the subsidiary each appreciate and understand the other’s needs. This in turn 
can foster their strategic and operational cooperation and integration. Li (2005) argues that 
compatibility between the parties to the vertical relationship is a necessary exchange 
condition; as such compatibility makes communication effective. Therefore, lack of shared 
vision can be a main obstacle in the way of cooperation and integration (Li, 2005).   
These considerations regarding cognitive congruence give rise to the following proposition: 
P4: the higher the cognitive congruence represented by low  perception gaps between 
those at different organisational levels regarding the lower level unit’s role and 
environment (lack of shared understandings and views) and high shared vision, the 
higher the level of relationship quality perceived by the lower level unit
54
.  
D.  Autonomy and Cognitive Congruency 
Mudambi and Navarra (2004b) assert that although autonomy is a central issue in many 
studies, most of the literature tends to ignore why subsidiaries value autonomy. As 
highlighted by Birkinshaw et al. (2000), the drive for autonomy is a natural consequence of 
having different world views. 
                                                             
54 As will be discussed in Chapter 6 (pages: 201-212) and Chapter 8 (Table 8.16 which shows the statistical 
significance of the predicting variables), shared vision as such is not a strong predictor of VIRQ as visions can be 
very broad and differently interpreted by the different relationship actors. Shared understandings and views 
seemed to be more significant in predicting VIRQ. 
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Birkinshaw et al. (2000) affirm that subsidiaries are by definition controlled if their actions 
are consistent with the priorities and expectations of their headquarters. Therefore, there is a 
negative association between the presence of perception gaps and autonomy, since 
headquarters will be expected to decrease subsidiary autonomy in the case of high perception 
gaps or lack of shared visions. They suggest that the relationship between control, perception 
gaps, and subsidiary cooperation with headquarters can be seen as a vicious circle. It is 
therefore posited that: 
P5: the higher the cognitive congruency, the higher the degree of perceived autonomy 
by the lower level unit. 
P6: low autonomy of the lower level unit will strengthen the negative impact of lack 
of cognitive congruency on the lower level unit’s perception of relationship quality 
(i.e, moderating effect) and vice versa. 
 
3.3.1.2.2 The Consequences of the Perception of VIRQ 
The perception of VIRQ is likely to result in reciprocity by the lower level unit. Positive 
reciprocity will involve activities that are beneficial to the both parties in the vertical 
relationship (i.e. the higher level unit and to the lower level units) as they are motivated by 
mutual interest (such as cooperation). The opposite can happen in case of negative reciprocity. 
In negative reciprocity, the lower level unit might engage in activities that could be 
detrimental to the other party to the vertical relationship. In lateral relationships, negative 
reciprocity could affect the structure and the stability of the relationship. However, the latter 
might remain doubtful in vertical relationships as these relationships are ones where one of 
the relationship parties is initially more powerful than the other. Therefore, this remains to be 
seen. It is posited that:  
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P7: the positive perception of relationship quality by the lower level is likely to result 
in positive reciprocity by the lower level unit and vice versa.  
Based on the previous apriori positions, the following research model can be framed. As 
mentioned, this model is used as a research guide for the exploratory qualitative data 
collection stage rather than a model that seeks validation.  
Figure 3.1: An Apriori Framework to Guide the Study of VIRQ 
 
3.4 Literature Review Summary 
Chapter 2 and this chapter present an attempt to further understand vertical inter–unit 
relationships and the factors that affect and are affected by it as discussed in the relevant 
literatures. This has involved a review of some of the general organisation theories and 
literature, the headquarters–subsidiary relationship literature, relationship quality in the 
marketing literature, and finally the social exchange and the power–dependence theories. 
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Based on this review, some understanding of vertical inter–unit relationships and their 
dilemmas was developed. VIRQ is suggested as a promising research area that has hardly 
been explored, although its study could bear potential significant contributions. The literature 
review chapters are concluded by a general apriori framework that would be used to guide the 
exploratory qualitative investigation as will be highlighted in Chapter 4 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the philosophical orientation and the key methodological 
considerations that have been taken into account while designing this study. It starts by 
discussing the philosophical ideas that guide this research inquiry into VIRQ and its various 
concomitants. It then continues with a note about the research context – UK University–based 
Business Schools (UBBS). This is followed by a description of the research strategy which 
applies a mixed methods approach. The qualitative investigation is described first, along with 
the process of data collection and data analysis, and then the quantitative investigation stage. 
4.2 A Reflection on Philosophical Orientations 
Without a robust philosophical training, selecting a specific philosophical stance while 
rejecting others has been not a straight–forward decision. For some time, I thought of myself 
as a pragmatist, where my search for a solution justifies the means for reaching it. This belief 
did not persist for long, not least because of the many discussions about what I believe in and 
what pragmatists are perceived to think
55. Realising that I am not a “pure” pragmatist, I 
started to question myself more deeply: what is it that I believe in, what is knowledge and 
what is reality? Posing these questions and trying to explore answers helped me to at least to 
know what I am not. Clearly the answers entail that I do not stand for any of the “pure” social 
science philosophical classifications, I am neither a pure positivist nor a pure postmodernist 
(although my understanding is and will continue to be subject to improvement and 
                                                             
55 In general, pragmatism is a pluralistic and practical-oriented view that is mainly guided by the research 
questions and what tends to work (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Pragmatism refers to the philosophical 
orientation that decisions about knowledge, explanations, methods, and procedures are made based on their 
applicability and practical success (Potter, 2000). Pragmatism is criticized by its failure to distinguish between 
knowledge and truth (Potter, 2000). However, to pragmatists, truth is argued to represent what works at the time 
(Creswell, 2007).  
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adjustments).  In this section, I will present my thoughts
56
 and show how these drove me to a 
philosophical zone of comfort. 
In answering these philosophical questions, I started with the ontological perspective
57
 (what 
is the nature of reality?). I tend to think that reality exists independent from our knowledge of 
it, but at the same time there is not a single hegemonic reality, particularly with respect to the 
social world as the social subjects can construct their own realities. Reality can be socially 
constructed perhaps into many complementary or even contradictory versions. Yet, it is 
external and objective but can be reproduced into our social actions in different ways, at least 
partially. For instance, I might ask respondents at a higher level and a lower level  of an 
organisation the same question about the same event, but I can get two different, yet honest, 
answers. Their perceptions are thus socially, culturally, and historically constructed but the 
event itself is independent and there are real mechanisms governing its existence as well as its 
perception; regardless of what is my understanding, or the understanding of the lower level or 
the higher level respondents. 
Moving to epistemological considerations, I tend to think there is an ultimate truth (although 
it can be multi–layered, multifaceted, and multi–dimensional) that we, as humans, strive to 
know. Whether we can know it or not; is a different question. Truth seems to be something 
that satisfies our needs as humans, completes our deficiencies and rectifies our limitations; it 
is always something that complements our weakness, in order to be better human beings and 
to live a less “deprived” life. For instance, if we feel that we are unwell, we will find truth in 
                                                             
56 The ideas and the terminologies used have been influenced by various readings. 
 
57 According to Potter (2000), epistemology is concerned with theories of what knowledge is, what sources of 
knowledge are, what the criteria for judging “real” knowledge are. Ontology, on the other hand, refers to the 
inquiry into the nature of existence or reality, or the philosophical description of what is believed to exist (Potter, 
2000 and Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). 
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seeking a cure, but whether the medicine that we take is the “true” cure or not; that is another 
question. Likewise, if vertical relationships are contentious, true knowledge will be 
represented in finding better ways to manage them, but whether we find these ways or nor and 
whether the new ways are actually “better” or not; these remain as separate questions. True 
knowledge is thus judged by its problem solving capacity. Meanwhile, our understanding of 
knowledge and truth is not only relative and subjective but also limited. It is limited by the 
limitations of our knowledge.  
These philosophical tendencies, while still developing, are found to be nearer to the realm of 
pragmatic–critical realism (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). A realm that emphasizes the 
presence of objective deep reality, ontologically; relativity and subjectivity of observations 
about the social world while acknowledging human’s cognitive limitations, epistemologically; 
and a realm that judges the veracity of knowledge in terms of what tends to work although 
what tends to work is subject to an on–going enhancement process.  
Critical realism is a distinctive school of philosophical thoughts identified first by Roy 
Bhaskar in his book about the philosophy of science, A realist Theory of Science (1975) 
(Frauley and Pearce, 2007). It was further developed through the work of Bhaskar (1978, 
1986, 1989), Archer (1995), and Sayer (1992) (Collier, 1994; Frauley and Pearce, 2007). 
Bhaskar’s philosophy is based on combining ontological thoughts from transcendental realism 
and critical naturalism (Collier, 1994). In a nutshell, critical realism rejects confusing 
epistemology with ontology; establishing a distinction between what is real and what we 
know (Fairclough, 2005). Hence, critical realism rejects empirical realism which “identifies 
real with empirical” (Sayer, 1992: 70), calling this mistake an “epistemic fallacy” (Bhaskar, 
1978: 36). This is unlike the epistemological stance of positivists who advocate the objectivity 
 
 
82 
 
of the representation of reality
58
 (see Johnson and Duberley, 2000).  Critical realism, on the 
other hand, accepts epistemic relativism (the social construction of knowledge) which is 
partially similar to the postmodern views but unlike postmodernists, it sees reality to be 
deeper than being the result of social construction. Critical realists, therefore, reject both the 
positivistic and post–modernistic epistemological stances. While language and discourse are 
significant to critical realist, “truth must be more than the output of a language game yet it 
cannot be absolute” (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 151). This is because human agents have 
cognitive and linguistic limitations that limit their access to deeper forms of reality (Johnson 
and Duberley, 2000).  Critical realism also rejects judgemental relativism, suggesting that all 
representations of the social world can be equally credible (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; 
Fairclough, 2005). Put simply, critical realism suggests that no knowledge is more superior to 
the other and it is only with referring to the deeper independent form of reality as a common 
referent that competing theories can be judged (Fairclough, 2005).  
Nonetheless, it is the ontological orientation of critical realism that makes it distinct from 
other philosophical orientations and from other forms of realism. The difference seems to lie 
in the phrase “deeper reality” used above or “depth realism” as referred to by Collier (1994: 
31). Critical realists advocate that reality is objective and independent of our knowledge of it. 
More importantly, reality is deep and it is usually the deeper layers of reality that tend to be 
independent of our knowledge and less accessible to empirical investigation. In his earlier 
work, Bhaskar (1978) differentiated between transitive and intransitive dimensions of inquiry. 
The transitive dimension refers to socially constructed knowledge that is empirically 
accessible to investigators while the intransitive dimension refers to a deeper underlying 
                                                             
58 Positivism advocates objective epistemology which entails that reality is objectively and accurately accessible 
to investigators through empirical research queries equally in the natural and the social worlds (see Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000).   
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structure that tends to exist independently of our knowledge of its existence. Later, he 
accepted that reality is stratified into three domains:  an empirical domain that is accessible to 
the social agent, an actual domain where events occur, and a real domain where structures 
and mechanisms causing the emergence of the other two domains exist (Bhaskar, 1989). 
Collier (1994) explains the three domains suggesting that for every event, there is a generative 
mechanism. Generating mechanisms refer to the real and the series of events refer to the 
actual; and the empirical refers to experiences represented by the social agents. Collier (1994) 
notes that neither the actual is fully capturing the real (as events can be partial representations 
of the mechanisms) nor all events can be experienced. In addition, Collier (1994: 43) clarifies 
that the generative mechanism does not have to be a mechanical one; it can be “an animal 
instinct, an economic tendency, a syntactic structure, [or] a Freudian ‘defensive 
mechanism’”.  
Reality, therefore, pre–exists the social construction of human agents, but human agents can 
also manipulate social reality (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Fairclough, 2005; Frauley and 
Pearce, 2007). According to critical realist perspective, the role of the human agent cannot be 
ignored as it is through human representations and discourse that independent reality can be 
reproduced and constructed (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Fairclough, 2005). In addition, the 
external reality can either enable or constrain human action (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; 
Fairclough, 2005). However, since there is a role for human agency, having a complete and an 
objective access to knowledge is unlikely (Johnson and Duberley, 2000).  
Critical realists give prime attention to the underlying structures that generate events and 
hence generate social actions (human agency) (Collier, 1994; Fairclough, 2005; Frauley and 
Pearce, 2007). For them, it is the structure that gives things the power they possess (Collier, 
1994). Collier (1994: 6) asserts that “we may have knowledge, not just of actions but 
 
 
84 
 
characters; not just of historical events but of social systems; not just of family likenesses but 
of the molecular structure of DNA”. Critical realism views the social structure as a condition 
and an antecedent to the social action which tends to be “reproductive and transformative” 
(Frauley and Pearce, 2007: 18). The guiding mode of reasoning (methodology)
59
 in critical 
realism is retroduction (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Frauley and Pearce, 2007). Retroduction 
is primarily concerned with exploring and providing an explanation of the social structure and 
the emergent social actions and the effects of the human agency; it is an orientation that 
promotes discovery (Fairclough, 2005; Frauley and Pearce, 2007)  
In this philosophical stance, establishing causation is based on an understanding of the causal 
generative mechanisms which are rooted in the deeper level of reality. Interpretation, as well 
as abstraction, to understand the phenomena and its underlying mechanisms are key tasks for 
researchers adopting this philosophical lens (Sayer, 2000). Johnson and Duberley (2000: 155) 
assert that “central to critical realism’s project is the abstract identification of the structures 
and mechanisms which, although not directly observable, underlie and govern the events of 
experience and hence explain why regularities occur”. Unobservable structures can be 
inferred from what can be observed or seen or measured at the empirical level (Frauley and 
Pearce, 2007) and therefore investigators can attempt to study these structures and predict 
their powers (Collier, 1994). By way of illustration, Frauley and Pearce (2007) cite the 
example of power relations which are not seen but can be inferred from their effects. As 
Fairclough (2005: 923) points out, for critical realists “social research proceeds through 
abstraction from the concrete events of social life aimed at understanding the pre–structured 
                                                             
59
 Frauley and Pearce (2007:15) distinguish between methodology and methods in that the former refers to 
“modes of reasoning and explanations” while the latter refers to the different data collection techniques. 
Research methodologies or strategies stem from the philosophical orientation on what is knowledge and what is 
the nature of reality; they allow us to “conceptualise the production of knowledge and our objects of 
investigation ...” (Frauley and Pearce, 2007:15). 
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nature of social life, and returns to analysis of concrete events, actions and processes in the 
light of this knowledge”. 
These premises are in line with the main purposes of this study as the study seeks to explore 
the meaning, the attributes, the antecedents and the concomitants of VIRQ and to provide an 
explanation for the causal mechanisms underlying the perception of relationship quality. Data 
collection and analyses are generally guided by these premises. Attributes of relationship 
quality are perceived to be accessible at the empirical domain through the representations of 
respondents.  Deriving the meaning, however, requires more abstraction. It is mainly guided 
by the context of the case study events (see Sayer, 2000), but it can be also assessable at the 
empirical level and can be inferred from the different experiences and events (see Chapter 5). 
What causes the perception of  VIRQ to be favourable or unfavourable; or in other words 
what are the conditions necessary for VIRQ to be perceived favourably represent the question 
that is concerned with the antecedents. This question deals with the underlying structures and 
mechanisms that cause variations in the perception of relationship quality. These structures 
are inferred through the experiences and the discourse of the interviewees, which also 
supported the apriori presumptions derived based on the literature review (Chapter 3).  As will 
be seen in Chapter 6, the key causal factor “power” is seen to be related to variations in the 
balance of interdependence between the vertical levels. Establishing causality is based on 
interpretation, abstraction, and reasoning and not only the observation of repeated regularities 
(Sayer, 2000).  The social action emerging from the structures affecting the perception of 
relationship quality is also explored via shedding light on the concomitants and the 
consequences of the perception of relationship quality. This is crystallised in the critical role 
of reciprocation (and the choice of its modes) as will be discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 
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also shows how the choice of the reciprocation mode (the social action) can affect the 
presumed structures (the state of the balance of interdependence).  
However, Johnson and Duberley (2000) question how can critical realist be sure about their 
knowledge claims (or any knowledge claims) if they doubt empirical realism and ask for 
digging deeply into the underlying causal powers of the social reality (in transitive reality) 
while admitting that deeper levels of reality might not be directly accessible through the social 
construction of human agents? To avoid the pitfalls of empiricism, rationalism, and 
superidealism, they suggest that Sayer’s (1992) view on the veracity of knowledge can be an 
informative addition; they called it “pragmatism” (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 157). 
Pragmatic critical realism does claim an epistemic advantage but it judges knowledge by its 
practical adequacy. This means that if the generated knowledge approaches or matches the 
external independent reality under investigation, then this reality will reinforce the produced 
knowledge claims and confirm them. If the produced knowledge is imprecise in accessing the 
external reality, such knowledge would not be practical or useful (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000). This entails that pragmatic critical realists are goal orientated. Judging the veracity of 
knowledge in this view is neither self–referential (as in the postmodernist view) nor objective 
(as in the positivism view). From the pragmatic critical realism perspective, knowledge 
represents tendencies and it might not match the objective reality and therefore it is always 
subject to critical questioning and improvements
60
.  
Pragmatic critical realists can use multi–methods in seeking knowledge as they believe in 
epistemic subjectivity where no method is superior to the others, yet all have their advantages 
and disadvantages (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). Sayer (2000:19) argues that a wide range of 
                                                             
60 Critical realists advocate that claims about reality can be always improved or refuted (fallibility) (Collier, 
1994).  
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methods can be used depending on the “nature of the object of study and what one wants to 
learn about it”. Different methods can be thus used in complementarity.  
This study relies mainly on qualitative methods applied to comparative case studies. 
However, it uses quantitative methods in the form of a survey as a complement the qualitative 
method, not seeking an understanding of VIRQ and its concomitants, but to see whether the 
patterns and propositions suggested by the case studies prevail in the wider population of UK 
UBBS. Understanding causation and seeking deep understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation is approached through analyses of the qualitative evidence from comparative 
case studies. This is because statistical techniques on their own do not “expose” the generative 
causal mechanism (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 169), but only indicate measurable change 
(Sayer, 2000), which is important for giving findings more credibility. Moreover, as some 
aspects of the social life are irreducibly qualitative
61
 (Sayer, 1992), not all propositions are 
transformed into testable hypotheses as they refer to processes that cannot be quantified (see 
Chapter 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
61 Sayer (1992) suggests that these must not be quantified because the results will be less meaningful. 
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4.3 Research Context: UK University–based Business Schools 
 “… forty years ago running a Business School was something that a senior professor 
might well take as a matter of duty shortly before retirement. Nowadays deans almost 
constitute a profession in their own right, a cohort with unique and specialist skills ...” 
(Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007: 55). 
 
There is not one reason behind the change in the role of deans of Business Schools. 
Everything is changing, including the changing role of Business Schools themselves and the 
increased pressures placed upon them not only from different but sometimes competing 
stakeholders.  
The history of UK Business Schools (BSs) is not a long one; UK BSs started to grow only 
recently. According to Ivory, Miskell, Shipton, White, Moeslein, and Neely (2006)
62
, there 
were no UK UBBSs until 1965. Formal management education in the UK was first motivated 
by the desire of the post war Labour Government to enhance professionalism and efficiency 
of British managers (Ivory et al., 2006). With the foundation of the privately funded 
Administrative Staff College at Henley in 1946, management education was first formally 
offered. The British Institute of Management (BIM) was then founded in 1948 where Lyndall 
Urwick, its chairman, recommended a creation of a new diploma for practicing managers. 
However, both firms and universities continued to view the value of management education 
sceptically throughout the 1950s.  
In the 1960s and due to the British public concern about the future of British productivity 
compared to that of other industrialised nations, the debate of formal management education 
came to the fore again.  The National Economic Development Council (NEDC) recommended 
                                                             
62  AIM report on the historical context and future scenarios of UK Business Schools. 
 
 
89 
 
the establishment of a British equivalent of the Harvard Business School. In the mid–1960s, 
the Robbins and Franks reports paved the way to offering business education in higher 
education institutions (Williams, 2010).  Based on Lord Franks report, two Business Schools 
were to be established one in Manchester (Manchester Business School – MBS) and the other 
in London (London Business School – LBS). “These would be housed within universities, but 
would also retain a degree of autonomy from them, and would be funded jointly by the public 
and private sectors” (Ivory et al., 2006: 8). The vision was similar to a partnership between 
industry and universities; a partnership that was challenged by inherent suspicion between 
two worlds that are generally separated by a gulf of scepticism. Nonetheless, by early 1970s, 
business education was being offered in “37 British universities, 45 polytechnics, five 
independent colleges, and approximately 150 colleges” (Ivory et al., 2006: 8). By the start of 
this millennium, there were about 120 UK BSs (Ivory et al., 2006). Most of them are 
University based.  
This brief note about the development of UK UBBS has important implications. The history 
of Business Schools shows that they were originally established for businesses but located 
within universities as a place of knowledge production. Business Schools had thus two 
targets: to serve the needs of business and to be academic schools; bridging a gap between 
arguably two incommensurable worlds. Being in the middle, Business Schools became 
subject to criticism from universities, from businesses, and even from its own people (e.g., 
Pfeffer and Fong, 2002; Mintzberg, 2004). Starkey and Tempest (2005) summarise these 
criticisms in 6 points as shown in the following box. 
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Box 4.1: Criticisms Directed to Business Schools as Summarised by Starkey and 
Tempest (2005:70). 
 
1. “that the Business School was little more than a trade school; 
2.  that in transforming itself into not being a trade school, Business School research 
has become divorced from the real concerns of business; 
3. that Business School education and training does not have positive effects on the 
careers of its graduate; 
4.  that the knowledge produced by Business Schools is self–referential and irrelevant;  
5. that in responding to customer needs the Business School has become too market–
driven and, in the process, knowledge has been dumbed down; and 
6. that the Business School has not only failed to deliver knowledge that enhances firm 
and national competitiveness, but has also been a major source of the wrong sorts of 
knowledge for management, fostering a short–term, risk–averse orientation (Cheit, 
1985) and even new management thinking and practices that have led to 
contemporary business and social crises.” (Starkey and Tempest, 2005:70) 
 
 
In their host universities, throughout their short history, Business Schools were trying to be 
something more than trade schools in order to legitimise their position. Business Schools, for 
example, received funding from the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Council to provide 
more academically oriented research so as to move beyond the trade school accusation 
(Starkey and Tempest, 2008).  This opened doors to the behavioural and economic research 
undertaken by BSs (Starkey and Tempest, 2008), but resulted in an interesting irony (Starkey 
and Tempest, 2005). Such rigorous inclination has made Business School’s research more 
divorced from practice as Business Schools started to produce knowledge that was not of 
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immediate relevance to managers. Business Schools became overly concerned with research 
rigorous considerations at the expense of practicality.  
Yet, even when shedding some of their practical orientation, Business Schools did not win in 
trying to legitimise themselves into their host universities. Their research practices are indeed 
sometimes regarded sceptically by their host universities for the lack of relevance and impact 
of its research on practice (Starkey and Tempest, 2005), and sometimes due to the inter–
disciplinary nature of the research (Pettigrew, 2001). Apart from finance and economics, 
Starkey and Tempest (2008) argue that Business School research does not have a predictive 
impact; something which other disciplines gain their credibility from. According to Pettigrew 
(2001), with the exception of finance, management research has drawn on other social 
sciences disciplines but it has not given much back. 
Business Schools are recognised for their economic power rather than their academic power 
in universities (Starkey and Tempest, 2008). They are seen as the cash cows which are more 
inclined to business than to being a school (Starkey and Tempest, 2008).  Business Schools 
are also criticised for the curriculum design of Masters in Business Administration (MBA) 
education; a degree that is argued to be a unique educational innovation of Business Schools 
and “perhaps the most successful degree in history” (Starkey and Tempest, 2008: 380), but 
also one that tends to be “insufficiently integrative, failing to develop wisdom, leadership, and 
interpersonal skills..” (Starkey and Tempest, 2008: 381). Moreover, rankings (mainly 
Business Week and Financial Times rankings) are argued to have made their undergraduate 
and postgraduate teaching as well as their philosophy too customer (business) focused 
(Starkey and Tempest, 2005). All these factors have led them to become more divorced from 
their University environment, in spite of their research effort. 
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Business Schools are thus “stuck in the middle”. They are in an uncomfortable, yet potentially 
desirable and a beneficial, position between the strong traditions of universities as knowledge 
production sites and between their inescapable roots in the world of business that tend to 
favour pragmatic capitalism. Business Schools are hence subject to criticism from two 
different camps, proponents of rigorous knowledge and proponents of pragmatic values. They 
do not perfectly fit into any of these camps. They position themselves in the middle in the 
hope of getting the best of both worlds, but this has led to questions as well as pressures from 
both sides.  There are also a number of pressures from professional institutions (e.g., 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, Chartered Institute of Marketing) and 
accrediting bodies (AACSB, AMBA, EQUIS) to which Business Schools have to relate 
(Davies and Thomas, 2009).  This is in addition to the general pressures that Business Schools 
have to share as being part of the University (for example:  the impact agenda raised by the 
HEFCE (see Pettigrew, 2011)). This could be one of the reasons why the role of Business 
School senior management team, particularly deans, is not an easy one. Particularly in the 
case of University–based Business Schools, deans have to deal with a number of competing 
demands and sometimes irreconcilable pressures (Davies and Thomas, 2009).  
However, critics of Business Schools have suggested ways forward. Most recent publications 
on the future of Business Schools emphasise that building upon their relationship with their 
host universities can be their way forward, not merely to secure legitimacy but also to sustain 
and improve their position internally within their universities, nationally by focusing on the 
public agenda and research with impact, and globally in relationship to their international 
competitors. There have been many recent calls urging Business Schools to engage in 
interdisciplinary research (see for example Ferlie, Currie, Davies, and Ramadan, forthcoming) 
and in new modes of knowledge production that build on internal and external networks, with 
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the relationship with host universities and their various disciplines being central (see for 
example Tranfield and Starkey, 1998; Starkey and Madan, 2001; Huff and Huff, 2001; 
Harvey, Pettigrew, and Ferlie, 2002; Starkey and Tempest, 2008; Starkey, Hatchuel and 
Tempest, 2009). In a recent Financial Times report, Professor Christoph Loch, the newly 
appointed Dean of the Judge Business School (University of Cambridge) and the former Dean 
of INSEAD
63
 stresses that there are things that University–based schools can do that their 
standalone peers cannot do; stressing his strategy to build a research oriented school that rests 
upon the “Cambridge Phenomenon” (Bradshaw, 2012). He asserts that “the Business School 
needs to have its own identity to compete in the Business Schools market, which is quite cut–
throat. At the same time it [the University] has research excellence that we don’t want to be 
detached from” (Bradshaw, 2012).  Another Financial Times report suggests that UBBSs are 
in a better competitive position compared to standalone ones because the former can build 
upon the strength of being part of a wider University network, with the increased demand on 
management courses from other disciplines and with the increased necessity for management 
students to learn about other disciplines. According to that report, this has made favouring 
independence old fashioned (Bradshaw, 2011).  
The vertical relationship of a Business School with its Higher University Authorities is thus 
crucial for both parties because of the high interdependence between them. Nonetheless, this 
relationship is not an easy one. Business Schools are subject to various competing pressures; 
their host universities look on them sometimes suspiciously but they need their financial 
contribution; Business Schools need to have a strong distinct identity in order to compete with 
their peers but at the same time need to be integrated and to draw upon strengths from their 
host universities; Business Schools need to contribute to their host universities but at the same 
                                                             
63 A major independent Business School. 
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time ensure that they have enough surplus for reinvestment, if they want to remain 
competitive. 
The reasons for focusing on UK UBBS as the context for a study of vertical organisational 
relationship quality include the following: 
 It is a well–defined institutional field. This is expected to provide more credible 
findings as such findings can be better compared and analysed (see Hinings and 
Greenwood, 2002).  
 The relationship between Business Schools and their host universities represents a 
vertical relationship occurring within the context of related diversification. This is 
another key reason for choosing this context as diversification allows the lower level 
unit to have specialised knowledge that its higher level does not possess, making the 
former potentially powerful.  
 Business Schools tend to be important due to their economic power and therefore they 
expect to be heard in their host universities. This is expected to shed light on the state 
of vertical relationships when the lower level unit is not a mere implementator of the 
higher level’s agenda, but has some source of power (mainly economic centrality).  
 Finally, choosing a relationship that might not be an easy one is expected to provide 
deeper and more valuable insights on both arenas; the theoretical and the practical.   
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4.4 Research Strategy 
Research strategy is concerned with the way the research aims and objectives are met. As 
introduced, the key questions in this study are concerned with identifying:   
 The meaning of VIRQ  
 The attributes associated with the meaning and the concept of VIRQ. 
 The likely antecedents that affect the perception of VIRQ. 
 The likely concomitants and consequences associated with the perception of VIRQ.  
There are two general research strategies (methods): a qualitative strategy and a quantitative 
strategy. Each of which has different assumptions and uses. Qualitative strategies emphasise 
the context specifity and seek to find meanings underlying social objects or phenomena. 
Quantitative strategies, on the other hand, emphasise the quantification of observations, 
mostly to enable the generalisation of the findings (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Many authors view these two strategies as incommensurable as they are rooted in to a broader 
and a deeper paradigm division. Qualitative research is broadly argued to follow an 
interpretivist epistemological orientation which views the social world from the view point of 
its participants. Interpretivists regard social entities as an outcome of the different interactions 
of the concerned participants (constructionist ontological orientation) (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). In this view, people can attribute meaning to their environment by their involvement in 
such environment. Thus, the qualitative research strategy is suggested as a research method 
that sees the social world from the eye of people participating in it, hence stressing the 
importance of linking data with social reality (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Quantitative research, 
on the other hand, is broadly associated with positivism (Gill and Johnson, 2010), which tends 
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to view the social world in the same way it views the natural world; where everything is 
objective and accessible to the investigator.  
However, these two strategies are seen in this research as complementing and supplementing 
one another; rather than competing. Since each strategy can serve a different purpose as 
demonstrated above, both of them can be used in a complementary manner. This is in line 
with Max Boisot’s analysis of knowledge generation64. The core idea in Boisot’s Culture–
Space (C–Space) Framework is that the structuring of knowledge enables its diffusion. In the 
Information–Space (I–Space) Framework, he asserts that structuring (codification and 
abstraction) of knowledge will affect the extent and the pace of its diffusion and that 
knowledge cannot be diffused, absorbed, and hence applied unless it is structured. However, 
the application of codified and abstracted knowledge would potentially mean that it is subject 
to modification. Such modification opens doors to relying on raw data and information to 
generate new codifications and abstractions for the new knowledge to be diffused. Therefore, 
there is an interplay between knowledge structuring and knowledge diffusion. Boisot’s 
conceptualisation of knowledge generation indicates that theory–building inductively and 
theory–testing via deductive approach are both necessary requirements of the same 
knowledge–creating process. Knowledge generation thus demands both the building of 
knowledge constructs (through codification and abstraction) from qualitative information and 
testing of such constructs through quantified measures applied to larger samples in order to 
ascertain codes to their generalizability or predictive power
65. Based on Boisot’s C–Space, 
                                                             
64 Based on the Epistemological Space (E-Space), Culture Space (C-Space), and Information Space (I-Space) 
frameworks (see Boisot, 1987, 1995, 1998 and Child, Ihrig and Merali, forthcoming). 
65 Complementarity between different research methods is also stressed by Currall, Hammer, Baggett and 
Doniger (1999) where the qualitative studies are used for theory building and the quantitative studies are used for 
theory testing and evaluation. 
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John Child depicted the relationship between theory building (from qualitative data) and 
theory testing (based on quantitative codes) in terms of a knowledge cycle as shown in Figure 
4.1 below.   
Figure 4.1: The Relationship between Theory Building and Theory Testing as Adapted 
from Max Boisot’s C–Space. 
Diffusion
Intent to generalize 
theories 
Theory testing
On varied samples
Searching  for new specific qualitative 
data in the light of the results of testing
Theory building
Codifying concepts
Codified
Uncodified
Undiffused Diffused
Knowledge
Knowledge
 
Source: John Child based on a framework by Max Boisot. 
 
The idea of using the two research strategies in combination is not new. Bryman and Bell 
(2003: 265–66) argue that in real life, the lines between qualitative and quantitative strategies 
tend to be more blurred and rather more complex than many have recognized as qualitative 
research sometimes adopts some features from quantitative research and vice versa. They 
argue that practically many researchers tend to use the two strategies in the same project. 
Qualitative and quantitative research are both means for investigation, both can be used to 
investigate a behavior or a meaning, test a hypothesis or generate a theory; using numbers or 
words (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Combining both methods is argued to be associated with 
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some benefits, as it gives both static and dynamic pictures of the social phenomena under 
consideration and deals with the issue of generalization; where mixing the two methods 
rectifies the weaknesses inherent in each of them when used separately (Bryman and Bell, 
2003; Gill and Johnson, 2010). This is the main idea behind the development of mixed 
research methods by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) who position mixed methods as a 
distinct strategy (typically combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches). 
 
In this study, both qualitative and quantitative strategies are used as they serve different 
purposes. The qualitative stage is to find out the meaning, the attributes, the underlying causal 
mechanisms behind the variations in the perception of VIRQ, and the emergent implications 
of this perception through an exploratory but deep investigation. Once a satisfactory 
understanding of the concept, its concomitants, and the underlying powers that affect its 
perception is obtained, findings can be tested quantitatively for further validation on the wider 
population. Nonetheless, many of the qualitative aspects are not examined quantitatively due 
to the inappropriateness of doing this. Qualitative investigations provide rich and deep data 
which sometimes cannot be examined quantitatively (for example: processes). This does also 
not violate the premises of critical realism which acknowledge that different research methods 
can be used if they sufficiently address the question at hand (i.e., that the methods used do not 
claim they can do something they are not designed to do). The decision to use mixed methods 
is thus guided by practical and pragmatic reasons but it does not violate the general 
philosophical orientation of critical realism. 
 
Research designs according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2007: 58) "are procedures for 
collecting, analyzing, interpreting and reporting data in research studies". Creswell and 
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Plano Clark (2007) suggest four different classifications of designs for mixed methods 
research; namely, triangulation, embedded, explanatory, and exploratory designs. 
Triangulation design aims to complement both qualitative and quantitative evidence for one 
particular topic. The rationale is that each set of qualitative and quantitative evidence has its 
own weakness, and using both of them to examine a certain topic will complement and hence 
help validate each other (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Embedded designs, on the other 
hand, are used when one data source has a supportive secondary role relative to the other. The 
need for this design arises when different research questions are answered by different 
approaches (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). The explanatory design is a two–phase design 
that starts with quantitative data collection and analysis, and then qualitative data is used to 
explain or build upon the quantitative evidence (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Finally, the 
exploratory design is also a two–stage design.  It starts with qualitative investigation and its 
results are used to develop the quantitative method. This design can be used to develop a 
measure, instrument, guiding theory, or framework, or it can be used when variables are 
unknown. It is also important to explore a phenomenon in–depth and then measure its 
prevalence. Variants of this design are the instrument development model and the taxonomy 
development model. In the former, the researcher qualitatively examines a certain 
phenomenon with few participants where their views are taken to develop a scale for the 
quantitative survey instrument. The latter is more concerned with identifying important 
variables, emergent theories, or developing a taxonomy, which will be tested in the second 
quantitative stage (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). 
 
This study has some features of both the embedded correlation model design and the 
exploratory design in its both variants; however it tends generally to follow the exploratory 
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design. This is because in any mixed method design, the embedded model can be of 
relevance. It has an embedded feature because it is a two–stage study, where the qualitative 
analysis is used first to give some understanding of the concept and its concomitants and then 
the quantitative investigation is used to build on the results of the qualitative findings; where 
the quantitative investigation plays a relatively less dominant role relative to the qualitative 
approach. An embedded correlation model design is also used to unravel how causal 
mechanisms work (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). However, this study tends to be more 
exploratory in nature as many of the variables and their operationalizations, as well as the 
relationships between these variables are unknown. This makes the qualitative stage essential 
in unraveling these important aspects and gives a secondary but a complementary role to the 
quantitative stage, which only seeks to support the credibility of the qualitative findings. 
 
The objective of using mixed methods is to first understand the social world as seen by people 
involved into it, then summarize the main aspects of this social object into constructs, 
establish evidence that measures each construct, and use the developed constructs in the 
quantitative stage.  A "mid–point on the axis of realism" is thus adopted as suggested by 
Bryman and Bell (2003:293). It is believed that the first qualitative stage of the research 
would result in one possible representation of the social reality, and the second quantitative 
stage would test to what extent it applies and prevails. As emphasized, the main reason behind 
using a multi strategy research (or mixed research methods) is not triangulation (although it is 
used occasionally in Chapter 6), but complementarity and facilitation (Bryman and Bell, 
2003).  
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4.5 The Qualitative Investigation  
Due to the nature of the research questions, this study builds extensively on qualitative 
methods. In general, research can be categorized into exploratory, descriptive, or an 
explanatory research, based on the main purpose it serves (Riley, Clark, Wilkie, and Szivas, 
2000). While these categories can be overlapping, this research is mainly of an exploratory 
nature as to the best of my knowledge no previous research has investigated the concept of 
VIRQ and its concomitants in general, and in UK UBBS in particular. This study thus aims to 
provide some fresh insights into vertical inter–unit relationships, while also having descriptive 
and substantial explanatory sides (as it attempts to unravel relevant causal relationships).  
 
The qualitative stage builds upon the apriori framework derived from the literature review 
(Chapter 3) where it uses it to guide the data collection process. Specifically, there are two 
main objectives for this stage. The first is to identify and verify the attributes that make up for 
the concept of VIRQ from the perspective of both of the higher level and the lower level units 
and to develop an instrument to measure this concept. The second is to understand the 
meaning (based on the attributes and the context), the likely antecedents, and concomitants 
associated to the perception of the quality of vertical inter–unit relationships. The qualitative 
stage thus relies on case study investigation, where 15 case studies, representing 15 different 
vertical inter–unit relationships between BSs and their Higher University Authorities (HUA), 
were conducted. In order to meet the first objective (i.e., attributes of relationship quality), the 
focus was on qualitative interviews where case studies were used to set the boundaries for 
data collection. This is because identifying the attributes associated with relationship quality 
tends to be more abstract in nature. However, questions which focused more on the context 
specificity of each case were used to find an answer for the rest of the research questions 
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(meeting the second objective about the meaning and the likely antecedents and concomitants 
of relationship quality)
66
. To achieve both objectives, the study design relied on comparative 
case study evidence. 
4.5.1 Comparative (Multiple) Case Study Design 
Case study research entails an intensive, deep, and contextually sensitive contextual 
investigation of a certain phenomenon (Gill and Johnson, 2010). Yin (2003:13) defined a case 
study as the examination of a phenomenon in its real life context when there are no clear 
boundaries between the phenomenon and its context (i.e., the phenomenon affects its context 
and the context affects the phenomenon). A case study is "concerned with the complexity [of a 
social phenomenon] and the particular nature of the case in question" (Yin, 2003:13). The 
in–depth and extensive investigation of the unique feature of a particular setting is the main 
distinctive characteristic of this research design
67
. The object of study can be an organization, 
a location, a person, or an event. The case is thus "an object of interest on its own… [and a 
case study] is an in–depth elucidation of it" (Bryman and Bell: 2003:54).  
The cases chosen for study can be critical, revelatory, extreme, or unique cases. A critical case 
is chosen to confirm or refute a certain hypothesis or for theory testing purpose. A revelatory 
                                                             
66 Usually qualitative research as a research method is confounded with case studies and qualitative studies as 
research designs. In clarifying this confusion, Hakim (1987: 8) highlights that qualitative research can be 
referred to as a research method when referring loosely to any research that produces quantitative evidence. 
However, qualitative studies, case studies, or ethnography are different forms of research designs that are part of 
the qualitative method as an overall research method/strategy. From this perspective, a qualitative study as a 
design is "concerned with obtaining people's own account of situations and events with reporting their 
perspectives and feelings" (Hakim, 1987: 8). Qualitative studies are concerned with the attitudes, motivation, and 
behaviour of people as well as their interpretations and perspectives about events and objects. However, they are 
not concerned with individuals; they are rather concerned with patterns of attitudes and behaviour (Hakim, 
1987). This is a central focus of the first research question regarding the attributes of VIRQ as the aim is to 
understand the attributes in a general and a rather abstract form (as will be shown in Chapter 5). Yet, for the 
other research questions, the context specificity of the case study and evidence from different responses, when 
possible, are used in order to "[obtain] a rounded image of a situation or event from the perspectives of all 
[informed] persons involved…" (Hakim, 1987:8-9).  
 
67 This is called an idiographic approach which is concerned with context specifics unlike the nomothetic 
approach which is concerned with the generalizability of findings beyond the boundaries of the study’s settings 
(as in quantitative cross-sectional designs, for example). 
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case is deployed to investigate a new social phenomena or to induce some novel theoretical 
propositions. An extreme or a unique case is chosen when the research questions are 
concerning why and how it is unique (such as cases of extreme success and failure) (see Yin, 
2003). For the purpose of this study, and since the study is mainly exploratory, revelatory case 
studies were chosen. Chosen cases are meant to represent the different variations that exist in 
the vertical relations of UK UBBS to enable the derivation of propositions. Hence, 
comparative or multiple case study design is employed.  
Comparative designs generally entail using "more or less identical methods for two or more 
contrasting cases" aiming at enhancing the understanding of the same social phenomena in 
different settings through identifying patterns and seeking explanations of similarities and 
differences (Bryman and Bell, 2003:58–59). Comparative research can be of a quantitative 
(e.g., cross sectional designs) or qualitative nature (e.g., multiple case study designs) (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). Multiple case studies are likely to result in more valid frame breaking 
theoretical propositions and improve theory building (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Eisenhardt, 
1989b). However, multiple case study research is not without its critics. They argue that the 
use of multiple case studies will distract the researcher's attention from contextually specific 
factors, and that the focus will be placed on the emergent patterns of similarities or 
differences. This entails depriving case study from its distinctive characteristics of studying 
phenomena in a real life context and having an open–ended approach, as the researcher will 
rather focus on contrasting the cases under study (Bryman and Bell, 2003). To avoid falling 
into this criticism, each case was considered individually first, along with its emerging 
patterns and its context; this was the primary step in the data analysis. The second step 
involved comparing the different cases and the different emerging patterns. Yet, it should be 
emphasized that the context per se was not the key concern of the study. This study asks 
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questions regarding the general attributes and meaning of VIRQ and looks for the 
mechanisms that affect its perception and the impact of its perception, where the context is an 
auxiliary (yet a significant) element in deriving the interpretations and propositions. Therefore 
comparative case study designs were seen as the most appropriate research design for the 
qualitative stage.  
4.5.2 Data Collection 
Prior to conducting case studies in December 2010, a small pilot study was conducted in 
January 2010. The purpose of this pilot study was to understand the context and to pilot the 
measure suggested to reflect the attributes of VIRQ. This pilot study involved 6 in–depth 
semi–structured interviews with both the higher level and the lower level boundary spanners 
at one Business School. These pilot interviews helped greatly in redefining the attributes and 
reducing the number of items in the suggested measure as will be shown in Chapter 8. The 
results of the pilot interviews were later confirmed through the case study evidence and 
further piloting. Each pilot interview lasted for at least an hour.  
For conducting case studies, this study employed semi–structured interviews as they can give 
the required flexibility while keeping the interview focused on the issue of interest
68
. Also, the 
use of semi–structured interviews enhances comparison between the different cases which is 
necessary to enable answering the research questions (Bryman and Bell, 2003). As noted by 
Bryman and Bell (2003:362), qualitative interviewing seeks to unravel events “by asking 
interviewees to think back over how certain series of events unfolded". This is very relevant to 
the purpose of this study as the comprehension of VIRQ and questions of how this 
relationship improves or deteriorates and the consequences of that are believed to be best 
                                                             
68 Interview guides used are presented in Appendix IV and V. 
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manifested through a retrospective approach explaining what happened, at least in the recent 
history, based on the scope of knowledge of each respondent.  
To answer the research questions, a context in which organizations are diversified yet there is 
a vertical inter–unit relationship was sought. This sector was the UK UBBS for the previously 
mentioned reasons. Most of the BSs in the UK regard themselves as operating in a common 
sector as they deliver very similar educational services ranging from undergraduate to 
executive and professional education. However, they are also embedded in a wider University 
context which poses challenges as well as opportunities as highlighted above. Most UBBSs 
find themselves with a need to satisfy and cope with pressures from two different institutional 
environments; the University environment and the BSs’ wider environment. Being embedded 
in a wider University context, the senior management team of the BS has a vertical 
relationship with the University senior officers. This vertical relationship is the unit of 
analysis in this study and the different boundary spanners representing this vertical inter–unit 
relationship are the study’s key informants. 
In the qualitative stage, 15 cases of different UK UBBS were studied. This represents around 
13% of the total population of UK UBBS. To ensure the representation of different UBBSs in 
the exploratory qualitative study, a tier system based on quasi–objective as well as subjective 
criteria was used. BSs were classified according to their research and executive education 
performance
69
. These two criteria were chosen based on advice from some experts and 
professional bodies associated with the UK BSs (the Association of Business Schools– ABS 
                                                             
69 The AIM report classified UK BSs into three categories based on six criteria: their reputation, research, type of 
teaching, teaching volumes, financial margin from teaching, and the broader social function (Ivory et al., 2006). 
Because collecting objective data about all of these criteria was not practical and because more objective criteria 
were more desirable in covering the different range of UK BSs, only the research profile and the European MBA 
ranking (as a prime example of post graduate education) were used as two criteria in dividing UK BSs into 3 
main categories.  
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and the Association of MBAs – AMBA). In order to apply these criteria, the Financial Times 
MBA global ranking (in years 2009, 2010, and 2011) as well as the 2008 Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) ranking were used (as shown in Table 4.1). After the 
classification was complete based on these two broad quasi–objective criteria, the results of 
the classification were independently verified by two experts who have been working in the 
BS sector for more than 30 years. In recruiting the case studies, consideration was taken that 
all the tiers are represented so as to gain an understanding of the vertical relationship; 
considering the different characteristics of BSs.  
A letter was sent to senior officers of the selected BSs, typically the Dean and, when present, 
the associate deans. With their approval, another letter was sent to the HUA of the respective 
BS. Interviewees were encouraged to suggest other potential interviewees that have 
information about this vertical relationship, particularly if they are in a boundary spanning 
role. 
Focusing on the vertical inter–unit relationship, interviewing senior staff at both the 
University level as well as the BS level in each tier was attempted. For the lower level, this 
has typically included the Dean or the Head of each BS, and in most cases (in 11 out of 15 
cases) members of his/her team if the Dean is not the only key person in the relationship. For 
the higher level, this varied from one case to the other.   
For three out of the four top tier case studies, the Dean (Head) of the BS related directly to the 
Vice Chancellor (VC), therefore the response rate was low with respect to the higher level in 
the first tier (see Table 4.2). Interviewing corporate elites becomes particularly difficult as 
they reach the top of the organisational hierarchy.  
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For the second tier, I interviewed the senior management team in the business who closely 
related with a higher intermediate level as well as senior University officers who represent the 
higher level. This has typically involved deans, associate deans from the lower level and pro–
vice chancellors or heads of faculties/ colleges from the higher level. The vertical relationship 
in this tier seems to be diversified rather than concentrated in few boundary spanners and this 
is reflected in the number of interviews conducted at both levels (see Table 4.2).  
For the third tier, the relationship tended to be centralised through the Dean /Head of the BS 
which was also reflected in the number of interviews. The higher level for such tier tended to 
be the VC in most cases, some of whom proved inaccessible to interview and this has been 
reflected on the number of the interviews conducted at that level.  
In total, 54 interviews were conducted representing 15 case studies with 43 interviews at the 
BS level (the lower level in the vertical relationship under study) and 11 interviews at the 
University higher level (the higher level in the vertical relationship). With the perspective and 
the dynamics of the lower level being at the heart of this study and with due effort exerted 
towards maximising the representation of different BS and increasing the number of 
respondents without jeopardising confidentiality, the number of interviews and cases were 
perceived to be satisfactory to the purpose for the study given its exploratory nature. 
Interviews mainly relied on open ended questions, but a survey which included the attributes 
of VIRQ was also used to pilot and pre–test the suggested measure (as will be discussed in the 
next section). This has allowed the triangulation of evidence which was later used in data 
analysis. In addition to the interviews, data collection also relied, although to a much lesser 
extent, on documentation and on websites. Documentations and websites were used to 
understand the governance structure of the respective cases and to obtain the necessary 
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background information. In addition, some interviewees provided certain documents, as 
supplementary sources, to clarify or stress their point of view.  
Qualitative data collection started in December 2010 and lasted till January 2012. However, 
for a given case study, the temporal space between the different responses was kept as short as 
possible in an attempt to control for the time factor. Typically, each interview lasted for 
approximately an hour; however, some lasted for two hours as interviewees were encouraged 
to reflect on experiences and views on the vertical relationship. There were two objectives for 
conducting the interview. The first was to investigate the interviewees’ experiences and views 
about VIRQ and its concomitants. The second was to pilot the suggested measure of the 
concept of VIRQ and to get feedback on how to improve it. Piloting the measure was done 
after the discussion with the respondents about their experiences and views, so that the 
attributes mentioned in the measure does not affect their answers on the other questions 
including identifying what they think are the right attributes, and the antecedents, and the 
concomitants.  This meant that the measure for VIRQ from the lower level’s perspective was 
piloted 43 times with each case study’s interview; this is in addition to other 6 pilot interviews 
that just focused on the measure prior to conducting any case studies and on understanding 
the research context (vertical relations in BSs).  
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Table: 4.1: Data Collection Profile 
Tiers 
(As defined by 2008 RAE 
performance and its FT MBA 
ranking for either in 2009, 2010, 
or 2011). 
 
 
Total  
Population 
Cases 
Studied 
Percentage 
of case 
studied of 
its total 
population 
Survey 
Responses 
First Tier  
 
RAE>/= 60 points for 4* and 3* 
research and ranked by the FT 
in the top  global MBA ranking  
11 4 36% 4 
Second Tier  
 
RAE>/= 35 points for 4* and 3* 
research but less than 60 points. 
37 5 13.5% 10 
Third Tier  
 
RAE< 35 points for 4* and 3* 
research 
38 5 13% 10 
Unclassified 
(as it is not ranked by the RAE 
or not offering executive 
education) 
28 1 3% 26 
(anonymous 
respondents) 
Total 
 
114 15 13% 50 (43.8%) 
 
Table 4.2: Interviews Conducted 
Tier Number 
of cases 
studied 
Number of Interviews Conducted Total 
  The Lower level in the 
Inter–unit Vertical 
Relationship (The 
Business School Level) 
The Higher Level  in the 
Inter–unit Vertical 
Relationship 
(The University or the 
Intermediate University Level) 
 
First Tier 
 
4 9 1 10 
Second Tier 
  
5 23 8 31 
Third Tier  
 
5 9 2 11 
Unclassified 
Tier 
1 2 – 2 
Total  
 
15 43 11 54 
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4.5.3 Data Analysis  
Based on the pilot studies conducted prior to conducting case studies, the attributes associated 
with the measure of VIRQ were refined and a better picture about the research context was 
formed. After collecting case study data, interviews were fully transcribed (except for few 
parts which were thought to be totally irrelevant), then coded. The coding scheme that 
emerged was partially based on the literature review and the apriori framework but was 
mainly derived from the collected data. Data analysis was conducted manually where excel 
sheets were used and each excel sheet was concerned with answering one of the research 
questions. An inter–rater reliability of the coding scheme was confirmed independently by 
ascertaining the views of an experienced academic. In addition, around one third of the codes 
and a sample of their relevant quotations were presented to another researcher after explaining 
the purpose of the study to her. The coding scheme was seen reliable as there was a 
significant overlap between our interpretation of codes and their relevant quotations (we 
disagreed on only one quote out of 75 quotes).  Each chapter of the findings is concerned with 
answering one of the research questions and it describes in more detail the followed process 
of data analysis.  
It is argued that the value of the case study is based on how well the study is focused (Hakim, 
1987). However, a general concern in case study design is its external validity (Hakim, 1987). 
Because of the very nature of this design, the generalizability of the resultant findings cannot 
be claimed. Statistical generalization should not be and is not the objective of this research 
design. However, a degree of theoretical, rather than statistical, generalization can be made 
(for example: generalization of abstract theories, frameworks, propositions, or concepts); what 
is important is the quality of these theoretical propositions and arguments (Bryman and Bell, 
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2003). Whether these propositions are valid or not depends on the how well the findings 
closely fit the data collected (Eisenhardt, 1989b), and therefore the process of data analysis is 
a key factor in determining the quality of the derived propositions or frameworks. 
The process of data analysis followed was very detailed and exhaustive as will be discussed in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. It follows different guidelines (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989b) but those 
advanced by Morse (1994) seem to generally cover its flow.  
In accordance with Morse (1994) suggested guidelines for qualitative research are 
comprehending, synthesising, theorising, recontextualising. Pilot studies were used to 
understand the context before any case studies were commenced. The literature review and 
the apriori framework were then used to provide guidance to the process of data collection 
rather than providing a specific theoretical lens on the data, and it was through pilot studies 
and the different case studies that some understanding into the research setting could be better 
gained (comprehending). Collected data were then examined and emergent themes and 
categories were identified (synthesising). This was followed by the process of theorising, 
where possible explanations of the data were established. As the process of data collection 
proceeded, certain explanations were further supported giving more confidence in the 
established theorisation. The established explanations were then abstracted in the form of 
more general propositions (recontexualisation)
70
.  
4.5.4 Evaluation Criteria  
While there are some authors that use validity and reliability to assess qualitative research 
similar to the quantitative research assessment criteria (for example, Silverman, 1997), some 
advocate different evaluation criteria for qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Gill 
                                                             
70 Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provide a very detailed account of the last two steps in data analysis; theorising and 
recontextualising. 
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and Johnson, 2010). Lincoln and Guba (1985) replaced internal validity with credibility, 
external validity with transferability, reliability with dependability, and objectivity with 
confirmability. Credibility is based on providing feedback to respondents and making sure 
that the researcher understanding matches that of the respondents. Although a comprehensive 
formal feedback to the respondents has not provided yet, establishing credibility for the 
findings was attempted during the process of data collection then partially after the findings 
were reported. While conducting interviews, the answers of the interviews were reiterated to 
check whether my understanding matched what they meant. Also depending on more than one 
informant and attempting to take into account more than perspective from the same case and 
to triangulate evidence were helpful in providing some confidence on the credibility of the 
data collected. In addition, with new case studies, after conducting the formal interview, the 
key findings from the previous cases were told to the new interviewee to comment to on them 
with respect to his/her experience where the feedback given informed further theorising and 
propositions’ building71. 
Transferability is concerned with whether the findings are transferable to the social setting 
under study and to other social contexts. One way to do that is to provide sufficient “thick 
description” so that both the research subjects and other researchers can judge the 
transferability of the findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:247). Applying this criterion, derived 
propositions were all supported by illustrative quotes and their underlying explanations. 
Dependability of qualitative research can be established by providing a detailed account of the 
research procedures (an audit trail) so that other researchers can judge the conceptual 
                                                             
71 The findings were also presented to a cohort of BS deans/ associate deans and heads of departments in 
conjunction with the ABS. Most of them (around 12 each representing a different school) confirmed and agreed 
with the observations and conclusions drawn. Moreover, some of the findings were presented to 3 Business 
Schools academics, although informally, and the feedback was supportive of conceptualisations and reported 
conclusions. 
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development of the research, the research process, and its findings. Confirmability can be met 
if the researcher provides a detailed account of the methodological procedures and a self–
critique of these procedures (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Gill and Johnson, 2010). As this study 
reports the details of data collection procedures and data analysis, both criteria of 
dependability and confirmability can be met. 
4.6 The Quantitative Investigation 
After qualitative data collection, and based on the propositions derived from qualitative data 
analysis, a survey was designed in order to test the validity of the propositions for the wider 
population of UK UBBS. A survey is a data collection technique, which usually relies on 
quantitative data, and in most cases seeks to evaluate or generalise theoretical hypotheses 
(such as those based on qualitative evidence) on a wider population (see Groves, Fowler, 
Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, and Tourangeau, 2009).  
Qualitative propositions, based on the case study evidence, were transformed into testable 
hypotheses, when possible (see Chapter 8). In order to enable hypothesis testing, a number of 
research variables were utilised. Most variables relied on multi–item measures with 7–point 
Likert scale questions, except categorical or open ended questions. The literature has been 
used whenever possible to obtain suitable measures. In depending on previous literature to 
derive the selected measures, similarity to the study context was given primary consideration 
(the research depended mostly on studies dealing with headquarters–subsidiary relationship).  
Only in cases where the use of previous literature was not possible due to perceived 
unavailability or unsuitability to the research context, new measures have been developed as 
informed by the case study evidence. Perceived Business School net dependence, orientation 
towards the Business School sector, shared understandings and views, inter–personal 
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relationship quality, intension to leave, expected performance, and VIRQ were newly–
developed measures.  Particularly the latter measure (VIRQ) was of high significance to this 
study as it is seen as the central construct with all the other variables being either its 
antecedents or consequences, and one of the key study objective was to attempt to develop a 
scale for measuring it
72
. Measures of perceived autonomy, shared vision, subjective 
performance and affective commitment were adapted from previous studies.  
Both the developed and the adapted constructs were extensively tested for their suitability and 
their comprehensibility at two phases prior to the quantitative data collection. First, while 
conducting the case study interviews, respondents were asked to reflect on a primary designed 
questionnaire including the relevant items and to comment on:  
 The suitability of the measures to the context.  
 The comprehensibility of the items included in the questionnaire. 
 The face and construct validity of the measures and their sufficiency to the study 
purposes.  
Commenting on the face validity of the developed items was considered suitable given the 
nature of the respondents who have a rich academic background in relevant fields, and also 
have the practical experience and knowledge to comment on the questionnaire items. Based 
on thorough reflections from 43 respondents, the questionnaire items and variables were 
revised before the final questionnaire was designed.  
                                                             
72 Inter-unit vertical relationship quality is dealt with in further detail in Chapter 8 to show attempts of the scale 
development. 
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Second, prior to the quantitative data collection and the distribution of the survey and after the 
first pilot study
73
, the revised questionnaire (in its final on–line form) was piloted for the 
second time where 6 respondents were asked to answer the questionnaire and comment on its 
suitability, items, questions’ sensitivity, and the time it takes to be filled in. The 6 respondents 
were all part of a vertical inter–unit relationship in BSs but they were not included in the final 
survey.  The two phases of piloting included the different study variables, however, for the 
VIRQ construct, the process towards its development will be discussed in further detail later 
in Chapter 8. 
The constructs and their corresponding items that were used in designing the final 
questionnaire along with their operationalizations and sources are presented in Appendix I.  
                                                             
73 These typically included former Deans of Business Schools and other heads of departments or program 
directors who are/were part of a vertical relationship with the University higher authorities.  
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4.6.1 Procedures of Data Collection and Analysis 
Based on the previously highlighted variables and measures, an online survey
74
 was 
undertaken targeting the whole population of UK UBBSs. The distribution of the survey was 
administrated with the help of the Association of Business Schools (ABS) and the survey was 
directed to the Deans/Heads of BSs. Respondents were assured of confidentiality given the 
relative sensitivity of the research topic.  In order to encourage responses, the option of 
sending a summarising report of the study results to the participant schools was offered.  
The use of an online survey was seen appropriate due to its efficiency and the flexibility it 
offers to the respondent and the researcher compared to a postal questionnaire (Ray and 
Tabor, 2003; Dillman, 2007), and due to the nature of the respondents who are highly 
educated and therefore can handle online self–completion questionnaires.  
Quantitative data collection first started at the beginning of July, 2011 when I had some 
assurance about the patterns of data that were emerging from the qualitative study and the 
suitability of the variables and their measures to the research context. While due effort was 
made to increase the response rate, the latter was relatively low despite the use of following 
up and reminder emails. This was attributed to the time in which the survey was sent. Data 
collection was initiated again in January 2012 at the start of academic term; but this time 
using personalised emails, addressed by name to the Head/Dean of BSs. The technique 
proved to be successful with responses jumping from 15 to 50.  
4.6.2 Quantitative Data Analysis  
Quantitative data were analysed using SPSS version 19, where missing data were statistically 
treated prior to any data analysis (using the Expectation Maximisation Method). After 
                                                             
74
 Survey Monkey Website was used to design and distribute the questionnaire (www.surveymonkey.com). 
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checking the descriptive statistics of the different variables, statistical techniques used varied 
typically with the different objectives. For attempts of the scale development, exploratory 
factor analysis was used as well as other validity and reliability tests. For testing the 
hypothesised relationships, correlation models as well as hierarchical regression models were 
used. The details of the quantitative data analysis and statistical testing procedures are 
provided in Chapter 8, which also shows the different validity and reliability tests used to 
support the credibility of the findings. Due to sample size limitations, however, some tests 
could not be performed such as confirmatory factor analysis and hence the external validity 
of the VIRQ measure cannot be assessed. As discussed, the quantitative analysis is 
complementary to the qualitative one. The sample size limitation suggests that more 
quantitative testing should be performed in different contexts before the generalizability of 
the results can be claimed, as will be discussed in Chapter 10.  
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS (1) 
What is the Meaning and the Attributes Associated with the Concept of 
VIRQ? 
5.1 Introduction  
The main focus of this chapter is to address the first research question concerned with the 
attributes that comprise and the meaning associated with VIRQ from the perspectives of the 
higher level (HL) unit and the lower level (LL) units. This question is addressed by 
conducting 54 in–depth semi–structured interviews representing 15 different case studies of 
vertical inter–unit relationships; 43 interviews with the LL units’ respondents and 11 
interviews with the HL units’ respondents.  
A semi–open coding process75 of the transcribed interviews was perused. Some of attributes 
attached to relationship quality in the business–to–business relationship marketing literature 
were identified. Before conducting the case studies, the relevant attributes were collected, 
analysed, and tested for face validity in a primary pilot study in January 2010. The pilot study 
involved six in–depth semi structured interviews with key boundary spanners representing 
the vertical inter–unit relationship in one of the case studies. Based on the pilot study, some 
attributes were discounted or added, while others were confirmed. Insights from the pilot 
study were partially considered in the coding process. However, the coding process has 
tended to be primarily open as I have been more concerned with the themes emerging from 
the data due to the partial relevancy of the reviewed literatures. Based on this semi–open 
coding process, a primary coding scheme has been developed. This was then followed by 
collapsing some of the similar codes to avoid unnecessary repetition. 
The final coding schemes for the LL and HL units are shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure (5.2) 
respectively. 
                                                             
75
 Coding here refers to the process of classifying and categorising the qualitative data. 
 
 
119 
 
Figure 5.1: Coding Scheme Used for Data provided by the Lower Level Respondents 
 
Figure 5.2: Coding Scheme Used for Data provided by the Higher Level Respondents 
 
This chapter draws a distinction between three interrelated concepts; the attributes, the 
meaning, and the perception of the VIRQ. The following table (Table 5.1) shows the 
difference between these three concepts.  
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Table 5.1: Difference between an Attribute, a Meaning, and a Perception 
Attribute Meaning Perception 
According to the Oxford 
Dictionary, an “attribute” refers 
to “quality or feature regarded 
as a characteristic or inherent 
part of someone or something”. 
It can refer to “an object 
associated with and serving to 
identify a character, personage, 
or office” (The Free 
Dictionary). Attributes are the 
identifiable or the “felt” 
properties of the ideal 
relationship that can be 
measurable. However, it does 
not refer to the overall meaning; 
it just refers to an associated 
character or a property of the 
meaning. Hence, it can give an 
incomplete or probably a 
deformed picture about the 
essence of the object 
understudy, if taken 
individually.  
 
A “meaning” in the Free 
Dictionary refers to “the sense 
or significance of a word, 
sentence, symbol..” or “the 
purpose underlying or intended 
by speech, action… etc.” It can 
denote “the inner, symbolic, or 
“true” interpretation, value, or 
message” (The Free 
Dictionary). A meaning thus 
refers to the essence or the 
significance of an object or an 
expression. 
 
The meaning can be more 
implicit and therefore it requires 
a degree of sense making and 
inference. 
 
A perception of VIRQ refers 
here to the perceived 
assessment of its associated 
attributes and the extent to 
which its underlying meaning is 
realised. 
 
This chapter covers the analyses of both the attributes and the meaning of VIRQ, while the 
perception of VIRQ is covered in Chapter 6. This is one of the contributions of this study as 
most of the reviewed studies of relationship quality in the marketing literature tend to focus 
on the attributes without inferring the meaning of relationship quality in a given context.  
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This chapter builds on cross–case study analysis rather than within–case study analysis in 
order to derive the common attributes and the underlying meanings as shared across the 
different cases. It aims to provide abstracted attributes and general meaning. This chapter is 
therefore divided into two main sections.  The first section reports the attributes and the 
meaning from the perspective of the LL unit respondents while the second section reports on 
the attributes and the meaning as seen by the HL unit’s respondents.  
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Section I 
5.2: Attributes and Meaning of VIRQ from the Lower Level Unit’s Perspective 
5.2.1 VIRQ Attributes  
In this section, the meaning and the attributes attached with a perceived “favourable” or 
“unfavourable” relationship are discussed in the light of the data collected. To understand the 
attributes and the overall meaning, interviewees from the LL unit were asked the following 
questions: 
 What would the idea of relationship quality or a favourable relationship mean to you? 
 What attributes you think would make up for a good vertical relationship? 
 Could you describe an incident which you consider a representative of a good 
relationship? 
 Could you describe an incident which you would consider a representative of a poor 
relationship? 
 How would you describe the relationship between your BS and the HL within the last 
one or two years (depending on the knowledge of the respondent of the relationship 
history)? 
 What aspects do you find most satisfactory and what aspects do you find least 
satisfactory in the relationship? 
5.2.1.1 Personification of the Relationship 
While the purpose of the interview and the focus of the questions were on the inter–unit 
relationship between the Business School (BS) and its Higher University Authority (HUA) 
(hereafter called the Lower Level (LL) and the Higher Level (HL) units of the vertical 
relationship) respondents tended to personify this “institutional” relationship. Responses 
show a tendency towards reference to a certain person or a group of people who mentally 
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represent this inter–unit relationship to them. Such personification is evident in almost all 
responses obtained when asking about the relationship with the HLU. Individuals 
representing the vertical relationship to the BS are therefore an inseparable part of the 
institutional relationship; to the extent that a change in those individuals meant a change in 
the perception of the vertical inter–unit relationship itself. However, such personification 
tends to be represented in the key powerful people, or sometimes the individuals who are 
believed to possess the highest ability to initiate or withhold change in a given status quo. 
Therefore, the personality of that person/group of people in power tended to have a profound 
impact on the way the institutional relationship was perceived and expressed.  
“…a lot of it [the inter–unit relationship] is personal as opposed to 
constitutional. I was hired by a different VC ... and there was 
a certain set of understandings at that point ..[..].. We now have a new VC 
and those understandings have changed.”   
The vertical inter–unit relationship, thus, becomes the relationship between the key people 
from both sides who are likely to possess the highest structural power (normally the Dean of 
the BS and the VC or the PVC representing the HUA). The vertical inter–unit relationship is 
a relationship between individuals who are agents for the units they represent.  Such 
relationship inevitability involves an element of power that could be manifested in the ability 
to restrict or enable an action through the different mechanisms of control or through the 
power of decision making. 
5.2.1.2 Relationship Intrinsic Characteristics 
Since the relationship tends to be personified either in a group of people or in key 
individual(s) who have the most power on the terms of the relationship, the relationship tends 
to have some intrinsic “social” characteristics. All the respondents have placed an emphasis 
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on the relationship intrinsic characteristics when they were asked about the attributes of an 
ideal vertical inter–unit relationship. Such intrinsic characteristics tend to reflect the “soft” 
perceptual aspects of the relationship. 
5.2.1.2.1 Mutual Trust 
Trust was the most common and most highly appreciated attribute of a favourable 
relationship. Many respondents have expressed trust as the key element in an ideal 
relationship, while some respondents identified trust as synonymous to an ideal relationship. 
However, the way respondents expressed and conceptualised trust was sometimes different. 
Trust was manifested in four different facets; goodwill trust, competence trust, integrity trust, 
and finally the quality of being trusted.  The LL unit respondents have indicated that there 
was a need to be granted the trust of the HL unit as this meant that they would have more 
discretion or autonomy.  Similar to having trust, being trusted could be further divided into 
trusting the goodwill and the competence of the LL. 
5.2.1.2.1.1 Goodwill Trust 
Goodwill trust is related to the reputational characteristic of an entity. It is based on a track 
record of previous encounters where one party of the relationship has been dependent on or 
vulnerable to the other. Goodwill trust can therefore be based on a history of keeping 
promises, saying the “truth”, being open and transparent, avoiding manipulation… etc.  It is 
closely related to the concept of integrity. To have a goodwill trust, integrity must exist
76
.  
“We do not entirely trust them as opposed to continue to keep to promises that have 
been made. I think there is some history of things has been agreed [on] and then 
                                                             
76 The difference seems to be in the ability to build a track record or credible profile based on previous 
encounters or experiences which is based, at least partially, on integrity.   
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overturned … […]... I think that one hasn't got a hundred per cent confidence that 
things will not be taken forward the way you would want ….” 
“I did trust the VC that he was going to deliver the things he said that he was going to 
give me and he did. So he has been true to her word, it is as simple as that really. So 
yeah, trust is the single biggest [attribute].” 
A relationship that is characterised by trust has, therefore, relatively less suspicion 
[concerning] the intentions of the other party to the relationship as the history of previous 
encounters or the track record enhances the predictability of having a “positive” or a desirable 
futuristic outcome. Suspicion is thus a feature of unfavourable relationship. 
Trust was generally accompanied by openness. In order for the LL people to have trust in the 
HL, the latter should be open about the reasons and the motives underlying decisions or non–
decisions. The LL people look for genuine reasons and motives via transparent 
communications. Such open and transparent communications that underlie trust provide the 
basis for building common purposes and common understandings where LL unit moves from 
ambiguity and passive obedience to active participation. 
“Then you have to trust as well that the reasons that you have been given are genuine 
reasons. We need to do this because we have to meet X targets, we need to do this 
because this school is doing badly and you are in a position to do better. But the trust 
is irrelevant if you have not got the openness. If it is a closed system where the VC 
comes and says we want you to do this, do it, then in that sense trust does not matter.” 
5.2.1.2.1.2 Integrity Trust 
Integrity, honesty, frankness were also stressed as key elements in an ideal relationship.  
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“Relationship quality would mean to me a reasonably open and honest exchange of 
high integrity information that both parties can believe to be true with a degree of 
confidence.” 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, integrity could refer to honesty or completeness. It is, 
therefore, based on uprightness, morality, and ethical soundness. An interaction that involves 
a perceived element of selfishness or perceived to be driven by self–interest at the expense of 
the other party to the relationship is deemed to negatively affect integrity trust. Self–interest 
behaviour can increase the chance of manipulation and decrease openness and transparency 
between the relationship actors. Interactions motivated by the self–interest of one party can 
result in unfair transactions or unjustified decisions being imposed on the less powerful party 
to the relationship.  
“... but also trust in the sense that if we agree something to deliver, we have to deliver 
it. Equally, if we deliver it and that offers resources, these are not taken away. That 
happened quite a few times, i.e. you do this, and then we will give you the resources 
later. Well, we did it, and then the resources never appeared.” 
5.2.1.2.1.3 Competence Trust 
The third identified facet of trust was related to trusting the ability of the HL people to act in 
the best interest of the LL unit. While both goodwill and integrity trust seem to share 
common grounds, competence trust is somehow distinctive in that it does not question the 
intensions, rather it focuses on the ability of the HL people.  
Questioning the competence of the HL people was manifested in different ways starting from 
questioning their general management philosophy to questioning their ability to take the right 
decisions at the right time. Lack of competence trust is partially caused by lack of common 
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understanding or non–unified interests that make the LL people doubtful about the ability of 
the HL people to take the appropriate decision.  
“For example, we have a certain problem and to tackle it you need to do this and that, 
so that is pretty straightforward. So the reasoning is absolutely crystal clear…[..]..  
Everybody knows it, and what has happened.  Nothing...  Nothing.  Why?  This is 
terribly complex but probably the reason is there is no [senior] who is prepared to 
put on reason on the table and demand that it is met, rather it is in the [senior]  
interest to say: ‘So what do you guys want to do about it!’. Because it then becomes 
somebody else's problem. That is a result of inability, lack of strength associated with 
that inability..[..]..for that you need somebody to stand up and be decisive.” 
“I guess one of the problems is that it sometimes takes a long time to make the 
decisions and they do not understand that we need decisions made so move on things. 
I want them to challenge us, so if we are going with a business case I expected to be 
challenged ... [..].… But once you've done that then I expect them to come to a 
decision fairly quickly and not get involved in all sorts of reasons and delays, which 
does sometimes happen and that is problematic.” 
5.2.1.2.1.4 Being Trusted   
All respondents emphasised the quality of being trusted, sometimes even more than having 
trust in the HL people, as a key attribute in an ideal relationship. While the mutuality of trust 
is often desirable, being trusted was closely tied to the concept of autonomy and discretion to 
take control.  The trust of the HL people is therefore a key aspiration for all the LL units 
represented in the study; whether such trust is exemplified in certain key individuals in their 
capacity as representative for the respective LL unit (for example, the head of the BS) or at 
the institutional level (for example, trusting the school as a whole to meet or exceed 
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performance targets). Similar to trust, the concept of being trusted was subdivided into 
competence and goodwill, although it was hard to draw a definite line between them at many 
instances.  Given that goodwill is based on a certain profile or a track record, lack of 
confidence in the competence can affect the goodwill of a certain entity/individual and vice 
versa. However, having trust in the competence of the LL unit seemed to be more central to 
the LL unit as its track record should be built on deliverables and achievements. 
“..[..]… I don't think they are trusting us. We feel a lack of trust and respect at the 
minute.”  
“….[..].. but if I were the PVC, I would have left the individuals schools to decide 
about it. ..[..]..  but it indicates that they don’t have full confidence in the way schools 
are operating and so on.” 
Interestingly, being trusted is an attribute that is earned before it is granted. It is a sought after 
attribute that is within the hands of the LL unlike the other attributes.  Representatives of the 
LL unit consciously recognise the importance of being trusted and that it is reciprocated by 
having autonomy and support from the HL unit. Therefore, representatives of the LL unit 
consciously build and develop that kind of trust (see Chapter 7). Sometimes, the 
representatives do not only rely on the deliverables of their unit to build a credible profile but 
they also resort to emphasising their personal abilities and experiences in their attempt to gain 
the trust of the HL people.  
“… also a quality in terms of having confidence in me as the head of the [school], or 
the head of the [school] to be able to deliver on that. So if I sense that either the PVC 
or the VC did not have confidence in me that would be very difficult. I got to deliver 
and I go to convey the way which I am delivering and they have got to appreciate 
that..[..].. So if I didn't think I had that confidence it would be very very difficult.” 
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However, this also implies that if the highly priced credibility is not met by reciprocal trust 
and hence autonomy and support from the HL, this could result in poor relationship as 
expectations are not met. Not being trusted is usually seen negatively as it can lead to 
unnecessary interference, micromanaging, or in extreme cases spying.   
“… so that is perhaps the strategy that is being pursue; to keep an eye and not to give 
us too much autonomy, just in case we make mistakes, there is a  lack of trust in terms 
of what we might do.”  
5.2.1.2.2 Mutual Openness  
The previous discussion suggests mutual openness as a key attribute in a sought after 
relationship. The link between openness and trust is strong as the relationship between them 
can be bidirectional. Trust can be an antecedent to openness and vice versa. Usually, the 
mention of openness is mixed with the flavour of trust and the mention of trust has the 
flavour of openness; particularly if such openness could potentially be misused. In case of 
potential negative consequences, being open involves potential vulnerability to the other 
party. Therefore, similar to trust, openness is subdivided into being treated with openly as a 
LL unit (will be referred to as downward openness) and the ability of being open with the HL 
(upward openness). It is mutual openness that contributes to favourable vertical relationships. 
5.2.1.2.2.1 Downward Openness 
Almost all the interviewees focused on openness as a key element in a sought–after 
relationship.   Openness is stressed as it does not only underlie trust, but it implies a level of 
shared understanding necessary in any collaborative relationship. Openness is seen as a key 
element in a productive working relationship as the ability of realising synergies and support 
is sometimes contingent on this quality.  
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“... So if the PVC was not open, this [working on a collaborative project] wouldn't 
have happened.” 
Along with communication openness in general, most respondents highlighted the 
importance of being given the reason why certain decisions are taken or not taken. Such 
explanation changes the status of decisions from being imposed to being justifiable and 
“understood”. It is such explanations that turn the quality of openness to transparency.  
“I think the most important aspect of it is openness, we recognise that is that the 
specific interest of the school and the interest of the University can coincide. So for 
example, there will be occasions when it will be in the interest of the University for 
the BS to take more students, say for example, when we might as a school feel we 
don't want to take any more students than we planned. So I think the crucial thing 
here is openness, so we know as early as possible that is going to happen and that the 
representatives of other parts of the University explain to us why that is necessary...” 
A political or an unhealthy relationship is thus characterised by lack of transparency and 
elevated suspicion between the two parties of the relationship. Such suspicion increases 
opaqueness and reduces transparency as the involved parties have different and sometimes 
hidden agendas, where transactions are motivated by conflicting interests. Transparency is a 
key element in a productive vertical relationship. Transparency is a step beyond openness as 
openness refers to a free exchange of information, but transparency refers to sharing the 
underlying reasons and causes in a way that the two parties to the relationship have similar 
access to the same information. This can then enable building a common perception provided 
interactions are seen to be mutually fair. 
“I think we would like to have a less suspicious relationship than what we have. It is 
quite a political environment that you are not sure of the subtext…[..]… In terms of 
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cross subsidising, you would like to have the conversations openly rather than just 
cover the resource flows in confusion so you can't quite trace it. You know, it is about 
transparency.” 
5.2.1.2.2.2 Upward Openness: Being Open with no Fear of Repercussions 
While being treated with openness implies having common understanding and a common 
frame of reference and while it eases up some of the hierarchy inherent  to vertical 
relationships by providing justified rather than imposed decisions (or non–decisions), being 
open is usually accompanied by the lack of fear from the other party to the relationship. 
Respondents highlighted their need to be open with their “seniors” or the HL people while 
not fearing the consequences. In a way, this refers to a supportive relationship as opposed to a 
suspicious relationship. The link with trust could be easily induced as such openness could be 
built on the goodwill of the two involved parties and perhaps an element of competence trust. 
Goodwill in terms of un–opportunistic and unselfish intensions from both parties and an 
element of competence trust in terms of trusting the ability of the refuge to protect the 
refugee. 
“Well, it [relationship quality] would mean to me [that] I would be able to say to the 
VC well I got caught up, or I have got a problem here. Basically, to me it's about 
being open and he [the VC] knows what happens and I can chat with him about 
what's going on in a constructive sense. Not like a naughty school boy going to the 
headmaster for a good thrashing… [..].. So it is not a kind of going for kind of 
Spanish Inquisition, you have not done this and that… [..]... I think it is been able to 
actually sensibly to talk about bad news, or things that have not gone so well. It is not 
a case where you start to hide and say oh God..[..]..So I think it is being able to put 
your cards on the table and see, look, this is what's going on. And by doing so, you 
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are not undermining your own position with the VC because he is well aware of 
various things that go on.” 
Fear could characterise coercive relationships where the follower fears the consequences of 
non–obedience. Nonetheless, there is also the fear of general risk that can equally affect both 
parties to the vertical relationship; yet it tends to be more sensed by the LL unit. Fear can 
inhibit the ability of the LL unit from being open whether such fear is being manifested in 
silence, twisting facts, or passive obedience. Regardless of the way of its manifestation, fear 
is not a characteristic of a healthy relationship nor good management as it makes what is 
essentially a two–way relationship  a unidirectional one. 
“… and the other problem, I think is that [the person representing the HL unit] very 
frequently gets very angry in meetings at individuals and so one of the consequences 
is that colleagues at the top team are unwilling to voice their opinions or [get] 
anxious about voicing their opinions, so they tend to look to see what [his] position is 
first before voicing opinions, and what that does is of course creates very ineffective 
vertical relationship, because the quality of communication and discussion and 
debate is dramatically reduced. ..[..]..  the quality of vertical relationship is really 
affected by that because it means that there is not an openness of discussion and 
debate and sharing of information and it leads to defensive behaviours around the 
University where people are faking good rather than having honest open discussion 
about the functioning of the organization.” 
Openness is nurtured by shared aspirations and understanding. Therefore, what could also 
underlie the lack of openness is the existence of different agendas or different priorities. 
Differences in aspirations make openness more of an unproductive effort that unnecessarily 
increases the vulnerability of the party being open.  
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“There is this residual suspicion, because, if you like, the way things operated 
previously as to one can and cannot say…” 
5.2.1.2.3 Fairness 
Mutual trust and openness with the sub–quality of transparency could be some of the 
concomitants of fairness. Fairness is more likely to be perceived if one party to the 
relationship trusts the other and thinks that the other party has been open and transparent in 
sharing information and causes. According to all of the respondents, fairness has been 
identified as another key attribute of an ideal relationship. 
“The attribute of a good relationship quality must be fairness in that we are seen to be 
treated fairly…” 
Perhaps the stigma of BSs as main income generators in their universities has made this 
attribute more prominent. The stereotype of a “cash cow” or a “cross–subsidiser” has been a 
key and a common issue across the different cases as the very concept of a cash cow implies 
exploitation; hence it contradicts with the quality of being fair.  
“We are a cash cow. We never get any of it back and in a sense, that has been true for 
some years.” 
In vertical relationships, fairness is based, at least partially, on sharing similar views. A given 
decision or transaction can be fair from the perspective of one party to the relationship but not 
necessarily from the other’s perspective. Fairness, therefore, requires openness and 
transparency to provide convincing arguments as to why certain decisions have been made 
and how such decisions are being “justified” (made to appear just). Yet, understanding the 
different perspectives is not a guarantor to the perception of fairness. Perceived fairness also 
requires the appreciation of the different reasons and positions. 
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“That is why the [change in the] financial regime was so important, because the fact 
that we're paying a percentage of gross [income] meant that we are cross subsidising 
other parts of the University, so somehow we have to stop doing that….[..].. I mean 
we have not asked for anything, we just want them to stop robbing us. As they saw it, 
we are making these outrageous demands for more money.” 
Nonetheless, the concept of fairness remains ambiguous. Does fairness refer to equitable 
non–discriminatory decisions and transactions or it involves attributes beyond equality? Is 
blind equality fair? Is it about transparency? Most of the respondents emphasised the BS 
difference from other schools in the University both in terms of its financial contribution and 
in terms of its different needs. In their view, the BS can generate more income than other 
schools because it offers “premium” services to its students. This makes the synonymisation 
of fairness with equality or transparency in itself unfair. Fairness in the view of the LL unit’s 
respondents’ extends beyond blind equality to include an appreciation of the difference in 
positions and needs.  
“Now that was for all the schools in the faculty. We have been treated just like any 
other school in the faculty. I mean the difference between the BS and the other schools 
that we have a lot of management and professional people of our own, so we did not 
rely on the University. For example, we are the only school in the University to have 
its own marketing department …[..]..But then, we were hampered by being kind of 
micromanaged, by people who do not know anything about the subject...[..].. Yes I 
think they wanted to treat all the schools the same and be seen to be treating all the 
schools in the same way, but I'd think that kind of relationship did not work for the 
BS… [..].. We were contributing very high amount of the University to pay for the 
services that we hardly ever used because we run our own. So we were paying twice 
in effect.” 
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5.2.1.2.4 Clarity and Straightforwardness 
Relevant to the concept of openness is the concept of straight forwardness and clarity.  
Openness is a characteristic of information exchange, however, straightforwardness or clarity 
is related to personalities, processes, or procedures. The exchange of information can be open 
but the overall process might be unclear or ambiguous. However, straightforwardness and 
clarity as well as openness are interrelated as straightforwardness/clarity could enhance 
openness and vice versa.  
“So I think they've got the responsibility of giving is very clear strategic direction.” 
“I suppose it was frustrating getting used to the new system, you don’t know what was 
needed. Submitting paperwork was rejected because it wasn't what was needed, but 
there was no clarity what was wanted ...[..]… So that created delays and as I said 
frustrations. The time to process say staff appointment seem to be elongated because 
of the back and forward asking of questions, because those cases go to meetings that 
would happen once every two weeks. And at times once a month, then you can 
imagine how long it will take to get a vacancy agreed and the difficulties that then 
creates in being able to run your operations.”  
Lack of straightforwardness can be also a personal attribute (of the boundary spanner who is 
taking part in the vertical relationship) that moves into the institutional arena if such person is 
in a position of power. 
“I had bosses whom you never knew what they were thinking. Much easier to have 
people who just open and straight forward and if they are angry unhappy, you know 
that they are angry unhappy, you don’t have to guess.” 
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5.2.1.2.5 Support 
A relationship that is characterised by support has been also identified as an ideal 
relationship, as suggested by all respondents.  
“It is a very good relationship we have an immense amount of support from the 
University, they have been extremely supportive for everything that we have been 
doing in terms of providing the financial  resources that allowed to BS to keep going 
and flourish …[..]..Ideally a good relationship is very working relationship, in which 
one feels one is supported by the University.” 
5.2.1.2.6 Collaboration 
Another relatively important aspect in an ideal relationship is to have a collaborative 
relationship that is based on partnership and teamwork rather than hierarchy.  Ten out of 43 
respondents explicitly stressed the need for a collaborative vertical relationship. A 
collaborative relationship is based on consultation and joint decision making rather than 
orders or imposed decisions. Collaboration towards a common goal could be the cement that 
holds a relationship as it is based on the notion of sharing which does not only relief the 
sharpness of the hierarchy but also helps building shared views and understanding.  
“I think that the big issue for the University downwards is [that] the University top 
team presents issues, discusses issues in a mode that is collaborative, so you don’t 
feel that there is a kind of bullying going on, that they are using their power to push 
things through at the [BS] level.” 
5.2.1.2.7. Professionalism and Respect 
Other attributes that have been highlighted by the respondents of the LL unit included 
professionalism (mentioned by only three respondents) and mutual respect (mentioned by 
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four respondents). Professionalism is expressed in terms of avoiding the involvement of 
negative personal emotions in the relationship.  
“[Example of a poor relationship] the PVC was responsible for deans there, and it 
was just an [all–out] warfare... It was personal; it had gone beyond reason. So it was 
an opportunity to point score, put down, compete, and it was destructive. You know 
the BS did not get heard when it should have done just as a consequence of the 
personal relationship. That was not based on professional conflict, and it has broken 
down.” 
5.2.1.2.8 Satisfaction  
All responses reflected a form of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the relationship; both in 
the course of the conversation as well as in answering the question about the description of 
the state of the relationship. Phrases such as “it is good” or “it is fine” imply a reflection of 
satisfaction. There was a more explicit expression of satisfaction when respondents expressed 
it in terms of “yes, I am satisfied or I am not”. The facets of satisfaction tended to reflect the 
previously mentioned attributes, particularly openness and support. Respondents tended to be 
dissatisfied with excessive control or lack of fairness.  However, (dis)satisfaction was 
generally associated with the (dis)ability of realising a desired impact or outcome.  In 
addition to reflecting the previously mentioned intrinsic characteristics, satisfaction also 
reflects a conscious calculative process comparing the relationship benefits with the 
relationship cost; and the relationship constraints with the relationship empowerment. This 
last point will be highlighted in further detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
“Yes [I am] very much satisfied, I think it is a very good relationship, a very good 
balance and very supportive relationship.” 
“I was a bit disappointed. It is quite frustrating..” 
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5.2.1.2 Relationship Power Distribution 
The previously mentioned intrinsic characteristics are reflected in another dimension, namely 
whether the relationship is a power–over or a power–with one (cf: Follet, 1924; Gohler, 
2009). This level still describes the perceived intrinsic characteristics of the relationship; but 
in terms of the relative power distribution between or among the actors of the relationship. 
The previously mentioned set of social attributes can be seen as associated with power 
distribution. This section is concerned primarily with the perception of power distribution as 
a key attribute in determining the quality of vertical inter–unit relationships.  
5.2.1.2.1 Power–Over  
A relationship which is characterised by power–over is a relationship where one party holds 
or controls the other’s aspirations or ability to do something that would have been otherwise 
attempted.  A power–over relationship is thus referring to a relatively more powerful 
relationship actor that exerts undesirable control over the other. Constraining in its very 
essence, a power–over relationship is where the party exercising power over the other is more 
concerned with its own needs in a way that could affect the other party unfavourably.  In 
power–over relationships, power–over dominates over empowering, imposition and control 
dominate over effective consultation, monopolising dominates over sharing, and unilateral 
ideas dominate over synergetic thinking.  These are relationships in which power is relatively 
concentrated at one side.  
All respondents (except one) identified constraints imposed by the HL unit; however the 
presence of mere constraints does not indicate that relationships as ones of power–over. 
Power–over is a property of power distribution. Moreover, every relationship has its own 
constraints and therefore power–over is a relative not an either–or dimension. It is rather a 
general characteristic of the relationship in which the hands of one party are relatively 
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paralysed due to the power exercised by the other party in the relationship, whatever the way 
and form of such power exercise.  
All respondents referred to a perceived sense of power–over/ power–with in their vertical 
relationship, although power–over was more commonly perceived (this is not surprising 
given that the very essence of vertical relationships imply inequality in power distribution. 
However, a hierarchical quality tends to be felt in some relations more than others). In many 
instances, power– over was explicitly articulated as imposition, lack of sufficient autonomy, 
latitude, cooperation, or integration. Power–over relationships are typically described as 
unilateral one–way “relationships”. 
“My perception is that we increasingly had to compromise rather than [integrate 
decisions]….[..].. The way we are making decisions in this University now is we are 
not seeking integrated decisions, but actually, there is a much higher degree of top 
down command and control which is inhibiting integration of decision making so 
there is not an openness of discussion, and exploration of positions, and exploration 
of context in order that we can then come to a collective decisions about the most 
effective and innovative way forward. ..[..].. It is very much more command and 
control and what that is leading to is a great deal of compromise and I think low 
quality decision making as well.”  
While the previous quotes refer to the tendency of some relationships to be unfavourable to 
the LL unit in terms of their power distribution, they also infer that the very process of power 
distribution lies within the hands of the HL unit not vice versa. The HL makes decisions 
either in an integrated or an excluding manner when it decides to; it consults and listens to the 
LL when it decides to; it gives some autonomy and takes the context into consideration when 
it decides to.  
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5.2.1.2.1.1 Power Concentration  
However, other respondents referred to a more explicit form of power concentration at the 
HL unit. Power concentration in vertical relationships can be represented in certain 
individuals by the merit of their structural positions (for example the VC or PVC) or it can be 
represented in certain powerful groups. Speaking about power concentration in the hands of 
the person(s) holding the most senior position(s) in the relationship was common as 
suggested by different respondents. This can be related to the point highlighted earlier about 
the personification of the relationship. However, at its worst form, this could create a form of 
organisational “pharaonism”77 where the arrogance of seeing the wider picture blinds the 
eyes from seeing the contextual specificities and deafens the ears to listening to others’ 
voices.    
 “I think within the University setting, clearly the VC is god …[..]..  I use example of 
where some VCs would see themselves as little emperors or gods. You are not here to 
question, you are here to do X and Y.” 
“It is perhaps going back to an arrogance that the management of the University 
believes they know better in many instances about the BS and the management of the 
business and of course this is unlikely to be the case. Let me [give] an example. The 
[HL person] took a very important decision about the BS without consulting the 
management of the BS and we then had to fight the decision for some months to 
overturn it and what that was a very difficult process. But the idea that the 
management of the University will make decisions about the BS without consulting the 
BS. So in my mind that is extraordinary” 
                                                             
77 Apart from being an Egyptian cultural ideolog, pharaonism is sometimes used to refer to the concentration of 
power in the hands of a single group or person and to refer to the adverse implications of such power 
concentration.  
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Moreover, the perception of power distribution tended to differ with the change in individuals 
holding the key senior positions. This could imply that power–over could reflect some 
personal characteristic tendencies of people holding key positions. 
“It is an interesting cultural difference because our previous VC, she was a very 
strong woman, and I think she created an impression of being a bit of a bully and I 
think there was a bit of resistance to her because she was felt to be too forceful 
whereas the present VC tends to be rather more relaxed, there is a feeling of greater 
collaboration with him…”  
Even when the relationship is not explicitly described as hierarchical, power distribution 
inequalities can be hidden behind the silky curtains of the so called un–hierarchical flat 
organisation.  
“Well it is hierarchical, it is not a strong hierarchy in orders, but there are these 
distinct groups for sure ...[..]..  The ultimate power of course is with the University as 
against to the school. This is a very flat in institution but it's not just a question of a 
flat or not. It is a question of what goes on within this flat form. Yes, power lies with 
the centre.” 
5.2.1.2.1.2 Consequences of Power Concentration 
Respondents have also highlighted a number of consequences when they perceive the 
relationship as power–over. Having less power or authority than the position requires leaves 
the holder of such position in a state of frustration due to the perceived inability. This is 
normally more common in the LL unit. In such situations, these power limited people search 
for the unconventional ways to gain some of the required authority; including different 
influencing techniques (see also Chapter 7).  
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“When I was dean, I characterise my position of that time as primarily having no 
power whatsoever within that system. I had no authority and really the only way I 
could get things done was either by blocking things which you could do by influencing 
people. So it was very much an influencing job and the danger with that system is that 
you end up being a post box..[..]… They [deans] did not really have autonomy, they 
had no real authority. They had very limited power and the real power in the 
University, so the dean was in the middle of nowhere.” 
In one case, the ability of the LL people to set strategic directions for themselves was 
partially degraded because the LL unit was deprived such authority for a long time.  
“He [the head of the strategy group] commented in response to a question that as we are 
making a bit of surplus now, how would you want to spend it and he said we are kind of 
got out the way of making decisions about that kind of things and it was so interesting 
comment that they got so used to sort of follow policies and not having any kind of slack, 
that they sort of forgotten how to make strategic decisions and I think this is a real 
problem.” 
5.2.1.2.1.3 Power–With  
A power–with relationship is where power is perceived to be relatively more favourably 
distributed but not necessarily equally distributed. Unlike power–over relationships, power–
with relationships are based on partnership, cooperation, collaboration, and synergetic 
sharing. These are essentially empowering relationships where the perception of dominance 
is relatively lower and where the mutual benefit of the relationship parties motivates joint 
actions and decisions.  
Having the voices of the LL people heard, having their input into consideration, and having 
them represented in key decision making boards create a perception of mutual empowerment 
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and a lesser sense of hierarchy. The very process of collaboration towards mutual interests 
(that are not necessarily similar but mutually beneficial) can unlock some of the concentrated 
power at the end of the HL unit. 
With relatively much fewer quotes than power–over, most respondents tended to associate 
power–with relationship with a high quality relationship or with relative satisfaction. Power–
with has been expressed in terms of different manifestations of the concept of sharing such as 
devolved power, joint decisions, and working together (as opposed to working for them). In 
addition to building shared views between the parties to the vertical relationship, power–with 
also breaks the arrogance of “seeing the wider picture” inherent in power–over relationships. 
“I would say I have a quality relationship if: a. I can influence the decisions of the 
University, b. If the University made decisions that we are informed by them ...[..].. So 
it is a symbiotic relationship really.” 
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5.2.1.3 Relationship Instrumentalities  
The previously mentioned intrinsic characteristics (both the relationship “social” attributes 
and the relationship power distribution) are manifested in a third level of the relationship 
characteristics; the relationship instrumentalities. The intrinsic characteristics are translated 
into a constraining and/or empowering relationship to the LL unit; and the presence of 
constraints or enablers implies certain relationship intrinsic characteristics. Therefore, both 
the relationship intrinsic characteristics and the relationship instrumentalities are presumed to 
be highly associated. For example, a relationship with low levels of mutual trust, openness 
and fairness, and a perceived high level of power–over is expected to be a constraining one to 
the LL unit and vice versa. This section is devoted to discussing some of such manifestations 
as reported by the respondents.  
5.2.1.3.1 Relationship Constraints 
Respondent have pointed out the presence of relationship constraints alongside certain 
relationship “enablers” or support that the LL unit receives by the merit of the relationship. 
However, all respondents (with only one exception) have stressed certain relationship 
constraints both when they were asked about the aspects that they found least satisfactory in 
the relationship and also through the course of the conversation in general. Quotes about 
relationship constraints have the highest number and the longest word count compared to all 
other quotes.  
A key question is “constraints on what?” Any relationship has its constraints by the merit of 
the inclusion in the relationship itself; this can be referred to as the relationship cost. 
However, the relationship should be also sufficiently beneficial to the relationship parties 
otherwise they are incurring unjustifiable costs. Being beneficial implies that the relationship 
synergies are enabling or empowering the relationship parties to deduce certain direct or 
indirect benefits that they would not have realised otherwise, given a certain cost. Such 
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benefits could come from their internal (benefits from within the relationship) and/or external 
environment(s) (benefits realised outside the relationship– similar to the concept of power–
to).  
A within–relationship constraint is a manifestation resulting from the distribution of power 
within the relationship (for example, it can be manifested in unfair distribution of the certain 
benefits after such benefits have been already internalised and became a property of the 
relationship itself). An external–relationship constraint is related to constraints beyond the 
boundaries of the relationship. It can be explained in the loss of certain external benefits that 
would have been otherwise achieved if a given relationship actor is free from the relationship 
(for example, constraining the ability of one party to the relationship to do something related 
to its external environment). However, both within–relationship and external–relationship 
constraints can be highly interrelated as a given distribution of power within the relationship 
can result in certain ability to act in the external environment. Likewise, the ability to derive 
benefits from the external environment can affect the distribution of power within the 
relationship. Both types of constraints have been highlighted by the respondents.  
As mentioned before, relationship constraints are closely related to the idea of distribution of 
power (power–over or power–with relationships). The very word constraint has been used in 
many instances as synonymous to exercised power. However, constraints in this subsection 
are outcomes of the perceived intrinsic characteristics discussed above. This subsection thus 
focuses on the results or the outcomes certain perceptions rather than the perceptions 
themselves. 
Within–relationship constraints could reflect the degree of latitude of the LL within the 
relationship. Examples of the lack of the required latitude can range from imposition of minor 
bureaucratic procedures or some structural constraints to lack of financial autonomy.  A 
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perceived lack of sufficient financial autonomy was reported in almost all the cases studies 
(except one). The shades of the lack of financial autonomy were also seen on other different 
aspects of the relationship and were accompanied by much dysfunctionalities.  
“But for me, at this point of time, the biggest constraint is that the University actually 
doesn't let us get on and manage within our envelope of resources. That is a huge 
problem.” 
“We are constantly constrained by HR provisions clearly in recruitment. We are 
recruiting about [X number] more faculty each year. Every single one of those has to 
go through some committee. But we recently for example we wanted to recruit the 
building manager is this year,  it was just rejected, even though we had some money 
to support the post and the need for post , somebody somewhere is saying you know 
you don't need that somebody is second guessing.” 
External–relationship constraints are typically reflections of the within–relationship 
constraints as the internal constraints become manifested in the LL’s ability within the wider 
environment (and outside the vertical relationship). Perhaps, internal constraints which tend 
to be related on the LL unit’s ability to function as desired within its own external 
environment are perceived more adversely than other internal constraints that have less 
extended impact, or perhaps the LL unit tended to focus on the external–relationship 
constraints more in their discourse to justify their frustration. Due to the perceived lack of 
autonomy, the LL stressed that they were not able to adequately satisfy their different the 
needs of their stakeholders or realise their full potential.  
“We want greater autonomy in decision making. To give you an example, if you want 
to employ a cleaner to do extra three hours’ work, for example we want to extend the 
contract to do extra three hours’ work, we can't, you have to go to the faculty to ask 
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permission to do that, which is just crazy. If you look at all the accreditation bodies 
like EFMD, the EQUIS accreditation, one of the first things they investigate is the 
autonomy of decision–making and at present we have got far less autonomy then we 
would desire, it hinders us in our day–to–day operations.” 
5.2.1.3.2 Relationship Empowerment (Benefits)  
Rather than being constraining, ideally any given relationship should be helpful to both 
parties to the relationship. Togetherness inherent in the very concept of a relationship creates 
additional ability to the relationship parties; they are able to do something together that they 
won’t have been able to do individually. A good relationship is thus ideally empowering. 
Similar to relationship constraint, relationship benefits are instrumental manifestations of the 
previously discussed intrinsic characteristics. All respondents have identified that their 
vertical relationship has its beneficial side (even though the extent of the relationship benefits 
is relative and should be taken into context. This will be elaborated in further details Chapter 
6). Relationship empowerments can also impact the perception of the different relationship 
intrinsic characteristics. Both strategic potential benefits and short–term or already realised 
benefits were stressed by the different respondents. 
 “It is a very good relationship we have an immense amount of support from the 
University..[..]…, right from the beginning, the University has been extremely 
enthusiastic about establishing [the] BS, and clearly keen to see this as a world–class 
institution, and via the [intermediate level], they have been extremely supportive for 
everything that we have been doing..[..].. it has been very supportive in terms of the 
financing of the BS, the BS has started some X years ago and the University were 
critical in providing the financial resources that allowed to BS to keep going and 
flourish, it takes advisory support ..[..]... In a numerous way we benefit from the 
relationship” 
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“… it is a very kind of supportive relationship and we do have one–to–ones and I do 
ask him [the VC] for things, sometimes he says no, but equally you see things in terms 
of what is being delivered and he has put quite a lot of investment in to the BS in a 
number of important ways. So that is good...[..].. Basically you can get on and do 
whatever you want to do.” 
5.2.1.4 Summarising Propositions 
 VIRQ is a higher order construct that is composed of multiple, yet interrelated five 
dimensions; trust, openness, fairness, support, and satisfaction.  Trust, openness, 
fairness, support, and satisfaction are likely to be the key intrinsic social attributes that 
make up for VIRQ.  
 From the LL perspective, the perception of the relationship instrumentalities (being 
empowered or constrained) is dependent on the perception of the power distribution in 
the vertical relationship. The perception of the power distribution in the vertical 
relationship is likely to reflect the perception of vertical inter–unit relationship social 
intrinsic attributes. 
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5.2.2 VIRQ Meaning: The Lower Level Unit’s Perspective 
The different attributes attached to the VIRQ can be used to infer the underlying meaning of 
the quality of vertical inter–unit relationship. Taken together, the previously mentioned 
attributes of a high quality relationship crystallise into one important underlying meaning; the 
desire for strategic influence. The LL respondents have stressed mutual trust while placing 
particular emphasis on the quality of being trusted. Being trusted carries in its folds reciprocal 
autonomy from the HL unit as trust becomes a subtle and disguised control mechanism.  The 
LL respondents also expressed the need for mutual openness. Openness and transparency 
imply that there are no hidden pretexts. Therefore, such qualities enable the LL people to 
better assess and comprehend situations and be in a better position to influence decisions 
based on the developed and enhanced understanding. Being open with no fear of 
repercussions also enhances the scope of influence of the LL people as fear does not hold 
them from voicing up their views.  
The LL also laid emphasis on fairness implying that the meaning of fairness denotes special 
appreciation to the context specifities within a general framework of equality. Focusing on 
the appreciation of difference is a way of expressing the need for some latitude; different 
units do need different treatments and therefore equality itself becomes unfair. Likewise, 
clarity and straightforwardness provide better basis for influence as they enable a form of 
mental control over the dynamics of a given situation. An informed opinion is likely to be 
more listened to than an opinion that is based on speculations or assumptions. Moreover, the 
messiness of non–clarity can distract the LL people by creating an intentional or 
unintentional state of ignorance leaving the latter wondering what exactly is needed to be 
done.  
The LL respondents pointed out to the need for support from the HL unit. This is deemed to 
be one of the key, if not the key, reasons behind accepting the structural power of the HL 
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unit. Support in this sense becomes an empowering mechanism for the LL unit within its 
wider environment (in this case relative to other Business Schools) as well as within its 
narrower environment (the University). This attribute can reflect the desire for influence by 
improving the ability within and outside the relationship (power–to and power–with). While 
collaboration also reflects the desire for empowerment, it indicates that a valued vertical 
relationship is when hierarchy is not felt. Collaboration implies working together towards 
mutual benefits rather than one party working for the benefit of the other. It implies a sense of 
togetherness and therefore mutual influence not dominance. 
However, the idea of the desire for latitude and influence is more obvious looking at the 
power distribution in the vertical relationship. The LL respondents verbalised the need for a 
perceived egalitarian power relationship and expressed dissatisfaction with power–over 
relationships where the HL unit tends to retain supremacy. The relationship instrumentalities 
plainly conveyed the frustration with the HL unit’s dominance and showed the desire of the 
LL unit for autonomy and empowerment (see examples of relationship constraints and 
relationship benefits). 
Alongside with the previous inferences, the LL respondents expressed the need for additional 
influence on the terms of the relationship more explicitly in all the cases studied. The need 
for additional influence is seen in quotes demanding further autonomy or latitude; or quotes 
expressing frustration with the relationship constraints and the excessive control of the HL 
unit. 
 “Sometimes we just want to tell them to leave us to do what we want to do.” 
Realising that vertical relationships essentially embody power differential relationships, 
respondents from the LL unit expressed their need for having some influence on the 
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relationship as well as their own destiny by calling for a “heterarchy” in a gesture of 
renouncing the advantageous power position of the HL unit.  
“First it [an ideal relationship] is least as vertical as possible in the sense that we are 
seen as a strategically important node in the University and of equal value to other 
parts. I think the University could probably learn a lot from modern heterarcial 
companies which are not hierarchical in terms of how can these parts feel 
strategically important, able to learn each other, can operate, without being dictated 
to by a centre or several centres. So….The ability to have a control over your own 
destiny is equally important, and to come on with plans for them to be supported 
rather than being dictated to in a top down way.” 
“I would like a sense more that we have a bit of freedom that we do what we would 
like to do …[..]... I would like our BS to have a sense of its own destiny if you like 
rather than having parts of the University somehow second rated and I think we are 
moving towards that.” 
The desire of the LL unit to have a degree of influence in the vertical relationship was 
accordingly seen in quotes refuting the hierarchical power of the HL unit or stating that a 
good relationship is when they are left to do what they want freely. Moreover, respondents 
articulated the need for having influence by expressing the need for their voice to be heard 
and considered. Whether formally or informally, all the cases studied showed that the voice 
of the lower  level unit is needed to be considered in the decision making process as a way of 
exercising some influence on the terms of the relationship and consequently on their destiny. 
“[Relationship quality] is the opportunity to be heard and listened to seriously when 
there are serious problems they are not been ignored…” 
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Formal mechanisms are usually based on representation in key decision making boards. 
Informal mechanisms are usually based on favourable person–to–person relationships but not 
necessarily purely friendly inter–personal relationships (see Chapter 6).  
“There is directorate as they call it here and it is what it says on the tin. So I think the 
voice of the deans is not quite as prominent as it should be because we are not part of 
that inner core of four or five people, which again in a lot of institutions the Deans 
are part of the main the core decision–making, strategic decision–making team.  I 
mean we do feel a bit of sort of left out and we feel we are underrepresented and we 
should be a part of the main …[...].. strategic decision–making… in terms of strategy 
formulation.” 
“I am not on [the key decision making board]. And that for me is the single most 
important sticking point. I have to know what decisions have been made, what the big 
picture is, and what changes are being proposed to the structure of the University. 
Those decisions are made by the VC and senior leadership team that I'm not part 
of.  That is problematic because I represent a very big piece of the University 
revenue.” 
In many instances the voice of the LL people was not heard because it is part of a faculty (an 
intermediate HL) and only that faculty is represented in the key decision making process. 
This can reflect that, in a way, in order to be influential; the LL unit has to have a direct 
contact with the key power holders.  
 “[Relationship quality] is one in which we have got is instant access to the executive 
board of the University, to the VC and the PVC, so as to educate them and help them 
to understand.” 
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Being represented in key decision making boards is not enough to having the voice of the BS 
heard. In many instances, respondents were not satisfied because the board dynamics and 
internal politics do not allow their opinions to be taken into consideration. In other words, the 
representation becomes fake and ineffective. 
 “It is very large [the top executive team], it is 16 people, ridiculous size. There is a 
small group of 6 that make day to day decisions, so the other 10 somehow [come] 
after that decision making loop, so they don’t feel they are part of the core decision 
making and yet they are designated as the top team.” 
 “I am on the executive committee of the University as all the other deans, but this 
does not mean they are really part of the senior management, the senior management 
is really made up of a little tiny group….[..].. they basically take all the decisions 
which then are put in front of the executive committee of the University as if we are 
going to make a decision about them. If it comes there, the decisions are actually 
made.” 
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Section II 
5.3 Attributes and Meaning of VIRQ from the Higher Level Unit’s Perspective 
5.3.1 VIRQ Attributes 
The HL in this study is represented in the University whether directly or through an 
intermediate level mostly a faculty or a college level.  This level is advantaged over the LL 
by structural power; it has authority over the other party in the vertical relationship. To 
understand the HL unit’s perspective on the vertical relationship, key boundary spanners 
representing the HL unit were interviewed. In total, 11 in–depth interviews were conducted 
with key boundary spanners responsible for the vertical relationship (Vice Chancellors (VC) 
or in most cases Pro/deputy Vice Chancellors (PVC)). Interviewees were asked to reflect on 
the attributes that make up for a good relationship or a poor relationship and to articulate the 
meaning of an ideal relationship (or relationship quality) from their own perspective. 
Most of the HL people who agreed to participate in the study perceived a certain degree of 
importance associated with the BS in their University. In other words, responses tended to 
reflect opinions on relatively important (powerful) BS as perceived in their University 
environment.  
5.3.1.1 Personification of the Relationship  
Similar to the LL analyses, senior people in the HL tended to personify the relationship with 
the LL unit in terms of their relationship with their contact people. The BS was mostly seen 
as its dean or head or whoever they deal with given their role.  
HLR
78: “By and large, my ability to work with the BS is dependent on the good 
relations I have with the people I contact with and I have to do things on trust…” 
                                                             
78
 Higher Level’s respondent. 
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5.3.1.2 Relationship Intrinsic Characteristics 
In response to questions about the factors that contribute to making up the attributes of an 
ideal relationship or through the course of the conversation, respondents identified a number 
of factors they would aspire for in their relationships with the LL unit.  
5.3.1.2.1 Mutual Trust 
Interestingly, most respondents stressed similar attributes to those which were highlighted by 
respondents from the LL.  Mutual trust was one of the key highlighted attributes. All 
respondents stressed the notion of trust in good or productive relationships.  
HLR: “I think a good relationship is about being in a situation where both sides trust 
each other so I want to be in a situation where I can trust the head of the school to get 
on and take detailed decisions that they need to take and I can know that that person 
is really doing a good job… [..]..But equally I want them to think that they can trust 
me to represent their interests to the higher University, trust me to argue on the behalf 
of [our faculty] against other faculties because there are all sorts of suspicion.” 
Trust can reduce perceptions of impositions and suspicion which can potentially harm 
cooperation and information flow. However, in some instances the HL respondents suggested 
that trust can be based upon personal and informal relationships that develop within the 
vertical inter–unit relationship. These personal or informal relations are usually basis for 
mutual understanding. 
HLR “I have a very good relationship with both the heads of schools [..].. , and I 
think they  recognise that I understand what they're trying to deliver and I need them 
to deliver, and they understand what I need to deliver and they are confident that I 
will deliver it. And I think there is robustness of those conversations and actually 
quite a good personal relationship between myself and the heads of Department and 
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the School which make those conversations much easier. I find it very straightforward 
and very supportive and that is why it is at a personal level working well, and 
organisational relationships are about personal relationships at heart, aren't they!” 
5.3.1.2.1.1 Granting Trust 
The previous quotes refer to mutual trust. However, while a shared understanding as shown 
in the previous quote is potentially beneficial, a shared understanding is not sufficient for 
trust to be granted. The perceived competence and ability of the LL still play a crucial role. 
HLR: “I think they are getting a lot of students, they do have an outward face. I think 
that the head of the BS still does not understand how to manage that outward facing 
element and I don't think that the management team is necessarily functioning,  not 
that they don’t get on well together, but that they don’t necessarily work effectively 
together.” 
Respondents highlighted that they are keen to build and maintain productive and constructive 
working relationship with the LL unit. They stressed that it is in their best interest to have a 
successful LL unit (BS) and therefore they are willing to support it.  However, such support is 
contingent on the BS’s ability to be worth the support. In other words, the ability of the BS to 
meet or exceed the targets set by the HL unit is a basis for trust. The trust that the LL unit 
develops is then reciprocated back by the HL unit in terms of support (usually manifested in 
terms further financial investments or in terms of further autonomy).  
It seems interesting to shed the light again on the blurry lines between the LL unit and its 
leadership. The case studies suggest the following process: the BS develops trust by meeting 
or exceeding certain targets through its different staff members, then the BS leadership gains 
trust for their ability to direct the school towards the University goals, and then the BS as a 
whole benefits from the perceived credibility of its leaders.  Such rewards are not necessarily 
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directly beneficial to any of the staff members or the leadership, rather, they are “generalised” 
benefits to the whole institution. The BS gets rewards for being trust–worthy, yet it is 
important to stress that such trust depends on their compliance (see also Chapter 7).  
HLR: “We have just recruited some of the highest paid professors in the campus [for 
the BS], if we do not have the confidence in the BS, the University would not have 
invested in those posts. But because we want to support the BS and I have that 
confidence in the BS that I can persuade to the VC do it.  And that is a very clear 
example of relationships that are really working.  And the more you get win–wins, the 
stronger as the relationship you gets …[..]... I said to the [BS before]  if you want to 
achieve what we all need to achieve, you've got to start delivering the kind of things 
that you say that you're going to do and stop doing stupid things....[..].. It is important 
to have the right leaders and I said you have a reputation of being unreliable and not 
doing what the University needs you to do, you got to carry on doing that and then 
you will get the consequences or we work together to make sure that you do deliver 
the things that we have agreed that you will deliver and there are going to be gains 
for you as academics individually and collectively if you do that.”  
5.3.1.2.2 Openness and Open Communication  
In general, the HL unit has stressed the idea of mutual openness in their relationship with the 
LL unit as a key indicator of a good relationship. Openness, from the HL perspective, was 
expressed in their ability to justify the reasons why they have taken certain decisions, so such 
decisions become justifiable rather than “purely” imposed. This is one of the key 
requirements of the LL as highlighted in Section I.  The HL people provide such explanations 
to gain the respect of the LL people in order to “win people over”. It is thus a way to enhance 
subtle control over others. This respect can be also a basis for trust development. 
 
 
158 
 
HLR:  “So I think you can win people over by again treating them with respect. If you 
always try to shut them down, you would not have the [right] argument. That is when 
you lose respect from people, if you don’t know what they say. So it is about you 
explain why you're taking certain decisions...” 
Interestingly, quotes from the HL unit generally placed more emphasis on the openness of the 
LL unit, which has been often referred to as “honesty”. The narrative of the HL unit was 
more focusing on the quality of having an “honest communication” from the LL unit rather 
than vice versa. Unlike the LL unit that clearly articulated the need for them being able to be 
open with their HL unit with no fear of repercussions; the HL people, possessing the 
structural power in the vertical relationship, seemed to have less concerns about 
repercussions. 
Open communication can create an atmosphere of clarity and collaboration. Continuous and 
effective communication is a key enabling mechanism for openness. However, sometimes 
isolation and avoiding communication of one party to the relationship with the other can 
create a situation of lack of openness, and hence, misinterpreted or imprecise perceptions.   
HLR: “I went to meeting [...]… in the BS, in which all the professors [were there]. I 
have walked into the meeting and then very soon after the beginning of the meeting, 
some members there in the BS saying: oh the University is holding us back, the 
University is stopping us doing this, the University this, the University that, we should 
join with another University. And I am thinking and actually saying but we are the 
University
79
. So if it is really happening, we should do something about it and that 
seemed to me poor quality. If I were made a VC, one of the things that I would do is 
that I would make the BSs to have spent more time in the other schools. When I go 
                                                             
79 Underlined quotations indicate emphasis by the interviewee. Quotations in bold indicate emphasis on an 
important statement expressed by the interviewee. 
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back to the BS, I find mis–information about the University and feeling, particularly 
amongst the senior colleagues, that the University is holding the school back which is 
totally incorrect, but that is the perception. It is quite an isolationist prospective.” 
While the previous quote reflects a situation of misinterpreted information resulting from 
perceived isolation (miscommunication), perhaps the HL unit perceives this situation 
negatively not only because of miscommunication but also because this has created a 
situation where it became harder  for the HL unit to integrate the BS due to inherent 
suspicion.  This can indicate a partial loss of control over the LL unit. Interestingly, it also 
shows that the HL unit does not like to be perceived as being dominating. 
5.3.1.2.2.1 The Un–Informed Boss 
Related to the concept of openness is the transparent flow of information. Intentional or 
unintentional information blockage is a situation that could create potential tension in the 
vertical relationship. The HL people can find themselves in a situation of the “uninformed 
boss” due to miscommunication, which implies a partial loss of control on the dynamics of 
the situation. In addition to potential dysfunctionalities, being an informed authority can 
indicate crossing the hierarchy inherent in the vertical relationship; usually perceived as lack 
of respect from the HL people. 
HLR: “To my mind examples of low quality are usually when communication 
channels are not fully utilised, so you find out about things through the back door. 
..[..]..  So I would find out that someone [I am responsible for] in the BS has gone 
about something without telling me and that can lead to difficult or awkward 
situations where things you should know about and other people think you should 
know about, you don’t know about. Again tolerance! From some perspective OK fine, 
happy you did it; let them get on with it. But from other perspective, there is might be 
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a bit of sensitivity of the positions of others whom you think they might need to know 
out of courtesy or respect. You ought really to let them know...” 
Lack of information about the LL unit is thus dysfunctional, frustrating, and sometimes 
embarrassing to the HL people. However, adding some informality and personal closeness in 
the vertical relationship can enhance openness and the free flow of information and views.  
HLR: “I would just meet heads of schools over a lunch once a month, that would be a 
chance for us to share thinking, think about any question they have… [..]…Most 
heads of schools that come to these lunches because they felt it was useful for sharing 
ideas and sharing information about the faculty.” 
As highlighted in the previous quote, the frequency of communication (whether formal or 
informal) can help creating an atmosphere of openness paving the way for shared views.  
HLR: “… and I think now there is a much clearer understanding..[..].. And we are 
only able to do that because we meeting so regularly and developing those personal 
relationships and building of a sense of collectivety in what we're trying to do as a 
[faculty] board.” 
5.3.1.2.3 Fairness 
The HL people also stressed the idea of fairness in vertical relationship; however their 
interpretation of fairness tended to vary amongst themselves and also in relation to the 
interpretation made by the LL unit. Some have viewed fairness in terms of setting common 
standards to the units they govern, but meanwhile allowing for a degree of flexibility. 
HLR: “Well, I try to have common standards and then I adjust that a little bit, but not 
too much I suppose. But my public line is we're all in the same University, we are all 
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in the same faculty. In practice, I deviate from that a bit but I probably don't deviate 
from that as much as the [BS] would like me to.” 
For others, fairness meant the idea of involvement and giving the LL unit the chance of 
listening to their voices, but not fairness in terms of the balance of power.  Vertical 
relationships indicate an artificial structural intervention into distribution of power that can 
stop such relations from being fair power–wise.  
HLR: “It [the relationship] has to be fair in the sense that people have to have 
discretion to put forward their point of view. We have to have a kind of transparent 
process for making a decision. Whether it is fair in terms of the balance of power, I 
suppose we have the ultimate decision and I think in our situation the major issue that 
the [faculty] or the University is going to have the final say, but that is what you 
would expect in any large organisation. And I think in an academic environment, you 
are relying on individual academics to be creative in their research and teaching and 
then we have to give them a fair amount of discretion but we make decisions...” 
5.3.1.2.4 Clarity  
Clarity is also an important attribute of a good vertical relationship. Providing clarity in the 
relationship is usually perceived to be the responsibility of the HL unit.  Such clarity can be 
provided by the help of some formalisation. In other instances, clarity can reflect a feature of 
the communication process itself. 
HLR: “High quality [relationship] has happened through the research development 
group where you are getting a group of people working together to get to a consensus 
about strategy or about financial support for research for the University. Sometimes, 
because you made the structures clear about what people should be doing, what 
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people should be aiming for, and how they should work together, so in some ways the 
more the formalised the process the more the quality of the relationship.” 
5.3.1.2.5 Collaboration 
In spite of the concentration of power at the end of HL unit, the HL people expected the 
relationship to be collaborative with the LL unit and to be mutually empowering.  
HLR: “I think at the moment, we are at the University, we need them but they also 
need us to enable them to develop. So I think it comes out from collaborative 
relationship at the moment I think.” 
5.3.1.2.6 Satisfaction 
Most responses reflected a sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance and 
the transactions with the LL unit. The HL tends to be most satisfied when it seemed to direct 
the LL unit towards its goals as shown in the previous quotes. It also seemed to be satisfied if 
the relationship is bringing some direct or indirect benefits to the HL unit or when the LL unit 
shows good citizenship behaviour.  
HLR: “Good relationship mean that I might ask them to be a part of a visit or to host 
a visit and I get a sense of ‘yes we will do it, it is not going to be necessarily of a 
benefit for us but we understand why we are doing that for the University’.” 
5.3.1.2 Relationship Power Distribution 
The power–over / power–with distinction is less apparent when looking into responses of the 
HL people. Most of the previous quotes show that the HL unit has some power advantage in 
vertical relationships, although the HL people prefer relationships to “look like” being 
collaborative as this is a better mechanism of achieving control and commitment. 
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With the power distribution in the favour of the HL unit, positive exchange relationships 
were synonymous to good relationships when the LL unit tends to have some sources of 
potential power. Negotiated exchange relationships are used by the HL unit in order to direct 
the LL unit towards a mutually beneficial outcome when it seems that other modes of control 
are less efficient. It can be inferred that if the LL unit is less powerful, negotiated exchange is 
less likely to be explicit.  
HLR: “I think you have to have an exchange relationship. I think we have to able to 
support them in what they want to do because they are successful and equally they 
are willing to accept what we want on the basis it is just for a limited time period. I 
think there might be situations where you don’t have an exchange relationship where 
the [faculty] would say you must do this or you must do that but also we are academic 
institutions, and academics don’t like to be managed. I think you have to approach 
changes where you can on the basis of some kind of exchange of resources. It is quite 
difficult to instruct academics to do things…” 
Typically, the HL people have not focused on constraints; yet, resources have remained to be 
the most contentious issue even when the HL people have the final say. 
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5.3.2 VIRQ Meaning:  the Higher Level’s Perspective 
Similar to the LL unit, the meaning of VIRQ revolves around the concept of exercising 
influence on the LL unit. This is implicitly derived from the identified attributes or explicitly 
articulated in the discourse and narratives of the HL people. The previously mentioned 
attributes indicate that the HL people need to trust that the LL unit is working according to 
their agenda, delivering what they want, and meeting their expectations and targets. The HL 
people need to trusted and respected by the LL unit so that decisions of the HL people are 
less resisted. The HL people are looking for relationships based on open communication and 
honesty, particularly from the LL unit. This puts the HL people in a better position to take 
decisions as the lack of sufficient information can be threatening to both the quality and the 
process of decision making (i.e, if the HL people are not well–informed, their decisions can 
be easily challenged by the LL unit). Even the concept of fairness is confined to the narrow 
interpretation of having their voices heard but not to reflect fairness on the balance of power. 
The HL people want the LL unit to cooperate and collaborate with them, and when traditional 
mechanisms of control towards such collaboration do not fit the context (academia), the HL 
people resort to softer control mechanisms of building shared views and understanding via 
formal and informal communications or by resorting to explicit negotiated exchange which 
can be mutually beneficial.  
Different responses show indicators of advantageous structural power position in the 
discourse of the HL people.  
HLR: “I will make a judgement on how far the BS has got the message at the end 
when I see what they produce for me.” 
HLR: “I think in general schools go along with what they are asked to do even if they 
disagree with it. So there is a level of compliance. There is a hierarchy. And even as 
 
 
165 
 
a University and managerial issues, hierarchy does matter, but probably if you ask 
people then they say it doesn’t but it does. I think here it does have an impact and that 
means that there is a level of compliance.” 
HLR: “The BS is dependent on the University …[..].. My belief is the BS will not be 
able to be a top BS unless it does work with the University both in terms of branding 
and resources.” 
The HL’s respondents explicitly stressed their need to control and to have some kind of 
influence over the LL unit. However, this is not motivated by the mere desire for control but 
it is seen as part of their remit to make sure that the LL unit is functioning well; this is 
because they are accountable for its performance. Two key factors were associated with the 
desire for control. The first was the fear of risk and that is why trust is a key factor in 
determining the quality of relationships. The second is the “knowledge” notion of “we know 
more” or “we see the wider picture”.   
The preferred state of the LL unit becomes thus to comply with the vertical power and not to 
cross the hierarchy. Listening to the voice of the LL unit can be an addition to the knowledge 
of the HL people, but it is also a way to legitimise the HL’s structural power by inferring that 
decisions are not entirely imposed; they are supported by their knowledge power
80
.  
Nonetheless, control based on claiming knowledge can itself be a basis for ignorance. At its 
extreme, claiming knowledge can potentially lead to arrogance and arrogance can prevent 
accepting any different or additional knowledge. 
HLR: “You know it is not a mentoring relationship, it is more supervisory, it tends to 
be more directed. Simply because the PVC sees the bigger picture, he attends the 
                                                             
80
 Here, a distinction could be made between “real” knowledge and perceived knowledge.  
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University board meetings, he sees the strategic direction and in a sense he is trying 
to bring everyone to that direction.”  
HLR: “… but if I do disagree, I have the power to say no, you [head of the BS] won’t 
do that. So I think if you interview head of the BS, he would say he would like to have 
complete control of his budget, he doesn’t have complete control on his budget.  He 
has the effect of pretty close to complete control of it, but they really don’t have 
complete control of it. I do.  For me that works very well, for him I don't actually 
think it works badly. I suspect if he was doing my job I'm sure he will do it my way, 
because he deals with other heads. But in his job he would prefer he is just giving a 
budget by the beginning of the financial year and I would ignore him until the end of 
the financial year and he tell me what it does. But I cannot risk that because if I have 
(X) departments and (X) heads overspend then I have overspent, and I have to answer 
to the VC. So I have to know how it is going.” 
The HL unit thus strives to maintain control over the LL unit via various mechanisms; some 
of them are direct and some of them are less direct or subtle based on the different situation 
contingencies. Ranging from discussions, formal or informal meetings, negotiation, or even 
imposition and directing to human resources control or control via building shared views; the 
HL unit does its utmost effort to ensure that it can influence and control the LL unit. Human 
resources control is particularly important for key roles (especially the head of the LL unit). 
Individuals occupying such key roles tend to personify and represent the institutional 
relationship as previously highlighted. 
HLR: “…at the moment we have no dean, because we have got to get the right 
person.  A person who can support the BS but also supports the University….” 
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Not only different context contingencies give rise to different control mechanisms but the 
former can also constraint the control desires of the HL unit. At times when the LL unit is 
powerful or when the exercise of control would affect the long–term relationship negatively, 
the desire for control is manifested more tactfully. In some universities, the BS is powerful 
enough to deprive its higher authority from some of its desired control.  
HLR: “We have this phrase in this University of the tail wagging the dog .. [..]..So in 
relationship to its size, the BS flexes its muscles, I am expressing that metaphorically 
but it is exercising its influence, I would say, more than any other parts of the 
University.” 
5.3.3 The Contest for Influence 
Presenting the attributes attached to an ideal relationship as well as presenting and deriving 
the meaning associated with the concept of VIRQ based on the opinions of both parties to the 
relationship indicate that both parties desire the same thing; power and its associated 
character of strategic influence. In the vertical relationship, the LL unit is not entirely 
subservient to the HL unit, nor does the former unconditionally accept the latter’s structural 
power. Respondents from LL unit firmly stressed their need to have their say on the 
relationship, or in other words, to influence the relationship. The LL and the HL units are 
therefore engaged in a strategic contest for influence. Sometimes the noise of the contest is 
muted by mutual interests and sometimes such contest tends to be more heated. Most 
respondents referred to different instances representing different influence contests (see also 
Chapter 7).  
“We as faculties were post boxes in my characterisation, we had no authority 
whatsoever. You can see that the power really lay at departments with budgets in the 
centre. Much of the authority lies in the centre. The [BS] in my view is challenging 
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that view in the last 2.5 years, we still have a long way to go. Is it better? Yes, the 
school has more ability to build itself… [..]..Is everyone in the school happy with 
that? No, because it is period of organizational change and quietly rapid 
organizational change. Does it give us the potential to do things much better than we 
did before?  Yes. Have we got there yet? No because in a highly centralised 
University where that centralisation almost as a command and control structure has 
been inbred for 10 years or so , it is hard to change that…” 
In the contest for strategic influence, there are different interest groups that can be potentially 
involved, extending the scope of the contest and the number of the contesters. Different 
groups within the wider institution (i.e. the University) develop certain benefits and build 
certain vested interests based on a given status quo. Changes to the status quo would thus 
potentially harm them and this is why the contest is usually strategic although it can have 
many operational and short–term implications. Moreover, it’s the agents of the lower or the 
HL units who engage in the contest on the behalf of the units they represent. Therefore, the 
contest can have some temporary or long–term pauses when one or both of the agents 
change; giving rise to a truce. In most cases, respondents reported a change in the inter–unit 
power dynamics after a change in one of the agents representing the vertical inter–unit 
relationship; particularly after the joining of a new VC (possessing the highest structural 
power in the relationship). 
5.4 Summary  
While this chapter discussed the key attributes attached to VIRQ as stressed by the LL and 
the HL respondents, and while it attempted to construct the meaning relying on direct 
quotations as well as inferences based on the presented attributes, the chapter leaves two open 
unanswered questions. If the underlying meaning of VIRQ is to have influence; the first 
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question is influence on what.  Is it on the terms of the relationship, or on the other party of 
the relationship, or influence beyond the relationship? The second and the key question is to 
what extent is that influence required. In other words, what is the degree of influence that can 
create a perceived favourable vertical inter–unit relationship? The HL unit desires the 
maximum amount of influence possible by the merit of its structural power. Yet, the LL unit 
sometimes resists. Since influence is a contested “resource”, Chapter 6 will attempt to answer 
these questions by focusing on the perception of the LL unit respondents through cross–case 
and thorough within–case study analyses. 
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CHAPTER 6: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS (2) 
What are the Antecedents that are Likely to Cause Variation in the 
Perception of VIRQ? 
6.1 Introduction  
Further to the quest to uncover the meaning and concomitants of VIRQ, this chapter aims to 
answer the research question concerning the predictors likely to be associated with the 
perception of VIRQ. 
In attempting to answer this question, the qualitative findings were examined to make some 
relevant observations. Not only do such findings shed light on the key predictors, they also 
revealed interesting associations among the predictors themselves. The emerging associations 
were then used to answer the question raised in Chapter 5; namely when will a given vertical 
inter–unit relationship be perceived favourably or unfavourably by the LL unit? The 
predictors, along with the relationship quality perceptions, were then jointly used to clarify 
some of the ambiguities associated with the meaning of relationship quality. 
This chapter has four objectives.  First, it aims to identify the likely antecedents that can 
shape perceptions of VIRQ. In doing this, a comprehensive discussion of the antecedents 
identified is presented in Section I. Second, possible interrelations among the different 
antecedents are discussed in Section II. Third, the impact of the different antecedents, along 
with their different inter–linkages, on the perception of VIRQ is presented in Section III. 
Fourth, this chapter aims to complete the VIRQ meaning construction in the light of the 
relationship perceptions and the antecedents identified. As seen in Chapter 5, if VIRQ, as 
perceived by LL respondents, is concerned with influence, then a key question would be 
influence on what and how much influence seems to be satisfactory. Answers to these 
questions are approached in Section IV.  
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While the four sections cast light on different aspects of the vertical relationship, if there is 
one overarching theme in this chapter, it revolves around the construct of the balance of 
interdependence. The balance of interdependence is found to affect most of the aspects 
related to the vertical relationship. This chapter builds primarily on the qualitative views of 
the LL unit to meet the objectives previously highlighted. In doing so, both cross–case study 
and within case study analyses were incorporated.   
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Section I 
6.2 Proposed Antecedents 
Five possible antecedents can be identified based on the case study analyses. Respondents 
were asked to describe their vertical inter–unit relationships in detail. Moreover, they were 
asked to reflect on the extent to which they are (dis)satisfied with the different relationship 
terms. The following antecedents emerged from such descriptions of the vertical relationship.  
I. The perceived balance of interdependence between the LL and the HL units.  
II. The LL unit orientation under the pressures of institutional duality. 
III. The perceived cognitive congruence/disparity between the LL and the HL units. 
IV. The LL unit’s perceived control/autonomy. 
V. The inter–personal relationship among the key boundary spanners representing the LL 
and the HL unit in the vertical relationship. 
 
The following subsections investigate these antecedents based on the case study evidence. 
The comprehensive explanation of the different antecedents should pave the way for an 
understanding of three key issues. Firstly, why are these particular antecedents focused upon? 
Secondly, how do they tend to affect the perception of VIRQ? Thirdly, why do there tend to 
be associations and inter–linkages among the different antecedents? 
 
6.2.1 The Perceived Balance of Interdependence 
All relationships are based on a form of interdependence. However such interdependence can 
be either symmetric or asymmetric (Emerson, 1962). Symmetric interdependence is where 
the two parties of the relationship depend on each other in an equal or balanced way. 
Asymmetric interdependence is where the two parties to the relationship depend unevenly on 
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each other. From the perspective of either of the relationship parties, asymmetric 
interdependence can result in one of two situations; positive asymmetric interdependence 
where a given party to a relationship is more dependent on the other than vice versa; and 
negative asymmetric interdependence where that given  party is less dependent on the other 
than vice versa.   
Focusing on the vertical relationship, three scenarios are possible. These are positive, 
balanced and negative interdependence. These three different scenarios are explained in the 
following table.   
Table 6.1: the Three Possible States of the Balance of Interdependence based on the 
Perspective of the LL Unit. 
State of the Balance of 
Interdependence 
Description 
Positive 
Interdependence 
In positive interdependence, the LL unit is more dependent on the HL 
unit than vice versa. While positive interdependence can be triggered by 
the mere presence of greater need, regardless of the source or nature of 
such need, positive interdependence tends to be common in the case of 
“developing” LL units. These are LL units which are still maturing, due 
to the relative newness or relative lack of capacity. In the case of 
developing LL units, the HL unit is also dependent on the LL unit but 
comparatively the former receives more benefit from the latter. 
 
Balanced 
Interdependence 
The LL unit can be in balanced (inter)dependence with its HL unit. This 
is normally the case for “emerging” LL units that have already matured 
into stronger ones. These LL units both provide and receive benefits to 
and from their HL units though in a balanced manner. 
 
Negative 
Interdependence 
In negative interdependence, the LL unit is less dependent on its HL unit 
than vice versa. This is typically the case with “developed” LL units 
where the balance of dependence has shifted in favour of the LL unit, 
reflecting the actual and/or the potential strength of that unit. 
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While the three different scenarios of interdependence can reflect different stages of growth 
or capacity building, they can also echo other contingencies such as the strategic objectives of 
the parties to the relationship, the wider environmental conditions inclusive of its threats and 
opportunities, the experiences of the relationship parties, and macro and micro institutional 
norms and regulations. More specifically, the alignment or divergence of strategic objectives 
as well as the very nature of the strategic objectives can shape certain needs. Not only shared 
visions/goals can shape interdependencies; a mutuality of benefits can sometimes play a 
pivotal role. In addition,  the wider environment continuously poses certain threats or 
opportunities that may shape and reshape interdependence relationships (for example, the 
change in the funding structure in universities made BSs more powerful in their University 
environment due to their ability to generate comparatively high revenue inflows and this has, 
in turn, increased the need for a well–managed BS). The experiences of the relationship 
parties also influence their perceptions as to what is valued and what is needed, while the 
micro and macro institutional norms and regulations also frame interdependence relationships 
(for example, the legal implications  that could emerge if a BS decides to claim 
independence, the normative need of a University to provide business education at a given 
standard, the micro institutional culture, regulations, and the history that could profile certain 
dependencies).  
The balance of interdependence is thus not only predicted by the growth or maturity of the 
LL unit, although this can be one of key antecedents; it is also about perceived needs that are 
shaped and continuously reshaped by many different factors. Such needs are argued to be 
perceptual as they are based on the calculations of the parties to the vertical relationship. 
These calculations are based on assumptions developed from different experiences and 
expectations. Moreover, the balance of interdependence does not only involve tangible needs; 
there are many intangible relationship benefits that are less objectively quantifiable. These 
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range from the brand equity to a potential feeling of security provided by the merit of the 
relationship membership.  
In addition to perceived need, another key influence on the balance of interdependence is the 
perceived ability or the power of the other party to meet such needs. This ability can be either 
actual or potential or both.  Both the perceived need and ability to meet the need are used in 
this section to discuss the different states of the balance of interdependence based on the LL 
unit’s perspective (see Figure 6.1).  The importance of the balance of interdependence as a 
key antecedent to the perception of VIRQ is that it results in a calculative relationship based 
upon dynamic power interactions, which in turn determine definitions of a satisfactory 
relationship and a less satisfactory one. The state of the balance of inter–dependence is seen 
to be the key antecedent affecting the other antecedents and many of the perceptions and the 
behaviour of the parties to the relationship. 
Figure 6.1: The Foundations upon which the State of the Balance of Interdependence is 
Assessed. 
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As mentioned, the 15 cases studied reflected the three different scenarios of interdependence; 
positive asymmetric interdependence, balanced symmetric interdependence, and negative 
asymmetric interdependence. Given the LL unit’s position in the vertical relationship, the 
first two scenarios (the overall
81
 positive and the overall balanced interdependence) tended to 
be more common than the third scenario (overall negative asymmetric interdependence). 
Positive and sometimes balanced interdependence legitimate the authority of the HL unit. 
Balanced interdependence makes the LL unit relatively as powerful as the HL unit which 
allows room for manoeuvre and bargaining, although in a framework of mutual benefits. 
Tensions are more likely to emerge in the third scenario. Negative interdependence is where 
the LL unit is less dependent on the HL unit than vice versa and that can be frustrating to the 
LL unit as the legitimacy of authority of the HL unit becomes questionable, particularly in the 
case of conflicting interests.  The LL unit in the case of negative interdependence becomes 
even more powerful than the HL unit and therefore this needs to be reflected in the 
relationship terms (this will be further elaborated in Section IV in this chapter discussing the 
concept of fair influence).  
However, assessing the balance of interdependence for these cases was not a straightforward 
task. Three factors tended to complicate the process.  
First, there was in some cases an embedded layer of interdependence created by the presence 
of an intermediate vertical level. In 6 out of 15 cases, the vertical relationship was not just a 
relationship between the LL unit and the ultimate HL unit (i.e. the BS and its University); 
there was an intermediate level between them (mostly a Faculty or a College level). This 
resulted in bi–layered interdependence. Compared to cases of single–layered interdependence 
(where the HL unit is the ultimate HL, i.e. the University), bi–layered interdependence was 
                                                             
81 As will be highlighted throughout this chapter, there can be different layers of interdependence depending on 
the number of hierarchical levels between the LL and the ultimate HL in the vertical relationship.  
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not as easy to analyse since bi–layered interdependence can potentially suggest two different 
balances of interdependence within the same vertical relationship.   
Second, many vertical relations seemed to be in the process of evolving and developing, with 
positive interdependence starting to head towards balanced interdependence and balanced 
interdependence evolving into negative interdependence.  
Third, the assessment of the states of the balance of interdependence was perceptual as it is 
based on perceptual needs, perceptual abilities, and inherent calculative subjectivity as 
previously mentioned.  
Nonetheless, an assessment of the balance of interdependence was attempted by asking the 
respondents directly about which party needs the other party more. In addition to this, 
respondents were asked to express their opinions about the relative strategic importance of 
the parties to the relationship to one another. The assessment of the balance of 
interdependence was based on the need and ability, as previously discussed. To establish the 
overall state of the balance of interdependence, the different responses per case were 
compared, whenever possible, to reduce the bias of depending on a single perception. 
However, generally the more senior the respondent, the more strategically focused and 
overarching the responses were. 
Moreover, for all aggregate (inter–unit) data throughout this chapter, due efforts were made 
to ensure the minimisation of bias in assessment by considering within–case similarities and 
variations, if present. This was done by triangulation both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
For qualitative triangulation, the qualitative responses provided by different respondents 
representing the same case were compared, including both the perspective of the HL and the 
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LL units, whenever that was possible
82
. For the quantitative triangulation, the qualitative 
responses were compared to the corresponding survey results (same case), where possible.  
Based on this, the following table was constructed to represent the cases studied and their 
respective state of balance of interdependence.  
Table 6.2: A Summary of the Different States of the Balance of Interdependence as 
Suggested by Evidence from Case Studies. 
Case Layers of Interdependence Balance of interdependence  
(Ultimate HL) 
Balance of 
interdependence 
(Intermediate HL) 
C1 Single–layered Interdependence Negative –– 
C2 Single–layered Interdependence Balanced –– 
C3 Bi–layered interdependence Positive Negative 
Balanced 
C4 Single–layered Interdependence Positive –– 
C5 Bi–layered interdependence Positive Negative 
C6 Single–layered Interdependence Balanced ––– 
C7 Bi–layered interdependence Positive evolving to balanced Negative 
C8 Bi–layered interdependence Positive Positive 
C9 Bi–layered interdependence Positive Balanced 
C10 Single–layered Interdependence Balanced ––– 
C11 Single–layered Interdependence Balanced ––– 
C12 Bi–layered interdependence Balanced Negative  yet crossed
83 
C13 Single–layered Interdependence Positive ––– 
C14 Single–layered Interdependence Positive ––– 
C15 Single–layered Interdependence Positive ––– 
 
In total, nine cases have demonstrated single–layered interdependence while six cases 
showed bi–layered interdependence. These two different types of interdependence layers are 
presented in the following table.  
                                                             
82 In four cases, the qualitative evidence was based on a single respondent. However, this was deemed to be 
satisfactory for two reasons. First, that single respondent was the only person in his/her unit concerned with the 
vertical relationship and therefore there were no other boundary spanners who could reflect on this relationship 
with first-hand experience. Second, whenever the data were based on the views of a single respondent, that 
single respondent was the head of the LL unit, and therefore it is presumed that s/he was reflecting holistically 
on the relationship. 
 
83 Although there is an intermediate level between the ultimate Hl and the LL units in the formal organisational 
structure, this intermediate level does not have a “real” relationship with the LL unit as the LL unit considers its 
direct vertical relationship to be with the ultimate HL.  The formal organisational structure thus played a minor 
role and this was attributed to the strategic importance of the LL unit in this case. 
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Table 6.3: An Elaboration of the Perceived States and Types of the Balance of 
Interdependence in Cases Studied. 
Type of 
Interdependence 
Explanations based on evidence from case studies 
A. Single–layered 
Interdependence 
 
A.1. Positive Interdependence 
Out of the nine cases that demonstrated single–layered interdependence, 
four cases showed a positive interdependence.  These LL units tended to be 
young BSs (in post 1992 Universities) which operate in relatively stronger 
universities. The actual or expected potential power of the LL unit relative 
to its HL unit was low and therefore the LL unit’s need of the HL unit is 
greater than vice versa.  
C4: “So it is a balance, we got to be mindful we only exist because 
of the University, this is not the other way around. The BS needs the 
University and if you get to the point that we are bigger or better 
than that, that causes issues. Clearly we are part of the University 
and the University is not going to fall apart if the BS disappeared 
although we are big part of it [but] you've got bigger faculties 
which are more strategically, you could argue, more important than 
the BS, but I would say counters that the University needs a strong 
BS; financially and reputationally..” 
 
C13: “We are strategically important to the University. It has been 
sent quite clear that they see the BS as having the potential to lead 
the development within the University and it has been important in 
terms of its regional role, so the University clearly sees us as 
important for its future. On the other hand I can't claim that the 
whole of the University finances will fall or succeed on the basis of 
the BS finances. I know that it can be different in other universities 
where the BS is a cash cow that is not the case in this particular 
institution, so we are important to the University but the University 
is not entirely dependent on us. Likewise, because we have highly 
centralised set of services, then of course, to some extent, we are 
dependent on themselves …[..]…  I think it is important we are part 
of the University because it is part of our differentiation relative to 
private providers, so being part of the University does provide us 
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with certain credentials you wouldn't otherwise have.” 
 
Respondents in C14 and C15 strongly advocated that they only exist 
because of the University as they would find it very difficult to survive 
outside this relationship.  
 
A.2 Balanced Interdependence 
Four other cases demonstrated balanced interdependence where the two 
parties of the relationship more or less need each other equally. Balanced 
interdependence tends to be more common in more mature BSs. Well–
performing mature BSs tended to have ignificant financial power in their 
University, which tends to increase the University financial reliance on 
them. Meanwhile, many of these schools were not necessarily achieving 
academic superiority relative to their peer schools in their respective 
universities. This increased the LL unit’s dependence on their HL unit for 
the need of the former on the academic reputation of the latter. In many 
instances, the LL unit felt “safe” to be part of the University because of the 
potential financial or reputational benefits or potential cooperation 
opportunities.  This formula was seen by the respondents as representing 
approximately balanced interdependence, where the two parties to the 
relationship need each other more or less equally, albeit in different ways.  
 
C2: “… The money is still by far the most important thing. This 
means that [the University] can do lots of things it would not have 
been not be able to do, because we [the University] are not that big, 
I mean the total surplus of the University is likely to be this year 
about £X million, well more than XX% of that X million alone is the 
[BS] and we are only X% of the University, so you can see that our 
money is making a huge difference … [..]..   The future in British 
universities is pretty dangerous anyway and that University is 
actually one of the universities that has very good financial 
standing.. [.. ]..  I try to persuade people that this actually a very 
beneficial situation to be in, in the difficult times we have at the 
moment, because if I don’t contribute £X million next year, because 
recruitment falls off, or the government does what it is threatening 
to do with visas…[..]..; it does not make any difference to us, 
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because we don’t owe any body anything. We don’t have to have 
savings too, because we are part of the University, they have to 
carry us. ” 
 
C6: “If we fail, then the University fails. It [the BS] is one third of 
the University that we are running in academic terms; so if one 
third fails the two others have to pick the bill....” 
 
C10: “… So we are seen as a central part of support for University.. 
[..].. We finance other parts of the University so we are important 
for that reason. …[..]..  Financially, we are just very important to 
the University. Research profile, we are seen as second–class … 
[..].. We are highly dependent on the University and in terms of our 
relationship ..[..]..I have no aspiration to be autonomous to the 
University. We want to be a BS at the heart of the University; that is 
our strengths. You know in the BS, we are open to competition all 
over the place because we have very low barrier to entry. One of 
our strengths is that ..[..]..  we can offer a multidisciplinary 
approach and we work hard, that is quite important part of the 
offer…. [..].. So being part of a University gives us huge strength 
that perhaps other little private universities on its own don't have 
and it gives a point of differentiation, which is why, for me, it is very 
important that we project our position as a BS at the heart of the 
University, because it is a source of our frustration but it is also the 
source of our strength, no doubt about that. ..[..]..  I think they [the 
University] protect us as well, you know if we had bad time, our 
protection is within the University, in case we have any problems.”  
 
C11: “… In fact, there is part of the school alone that is easily the 
biggest contributor in terms of income across the University. The 
University would really struggle without that. We are very 
important on the undergraduate [side]. And we are only one of X, so 
alone that tells you that the University needs us all. ..[..].. [But] 
when for example we recruit overseas, we still a large [in] 
recruiting not because it is the X BS , but it is because it is X BS at 
the University of  X, there is no question about that..[..]..  We have 
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that complementarity of fitting together. At this point of time, there 
is a form of mutual dependence..[..].. Nobody in this school who 
thinks about this school really having UDI [Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence] or declaring UDI or something like that. I don't 
think anybody in the University seriously sees the school as 
anything other than an integral part of the University.” 
 
A.3. Negative Interdependence 
There was only one clear case of negative interdependence where the LL 
unit is less dependent on the HL than vice versa. Such cases are less 
common as normatively expected, particularly in single–layered 
interdependence. Negative interdependence reflects a LL unit with relatively 
greater power than its structurally “superior” HL unit, which puts the 
superiority and the legitimacy of that HL unit into question. Nevertheless, it 
is worth emphasising that the three balances of interdependence still show 
mutual interdependence. In the only case representing single–layered 
negative interdependence, the mutual interdependence of the parties to the 
relationship ensured its continuation. Both parties still need each other, but 
the difference is in the relative need and, consequently, the relative power or 
dependence.  
C1: “… In terms of the direction [of dependence], it is very much from 
the University being dependent on the BS rather than vice versa.” 
 
C1: “… If the BS vanishes overnight, I think that the University won’t 
survive and you can say that the University cannot afford to lose us.” 
 
B. Bi–layered 
(Embedded) 
Interdependence 
84
 
 
Bi–layered interdependence results in the creation of an additional 
intermediate layer of interdependence. Such an intermediate layer usually 
exists for organisational and structural reasons; thus it does not reflect “real” 
interdependencies. While the actual and the main interdependence remains 
between the ultimate HL and the LL units, the intrusion of an intermediate 
level is usually justified for coordination reasons. In 6 out of 15 cases, there 
                                                             
84 In the case of bi-layered interdependence, the role of the intermediate HL unit becomes vital in determining 
relationship perceptions as it represents the direct HL in the vertical relationship (unless it is crossed by building 
on the informal organisational channels). While the role of overall interdependence is not by any means 
discounted, this chapter builds primarily on the perception of the relationship with the direct HL unit, whether it 
is the intermediate or the ultimate one. All the following tables and the propositions are based on this premise.  
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was an intermediate level represented by a faculty or  college level. 
 
Justified in terms of efficiency and the challenge of management and 
coordination, different schools were clustered under a common 
college/faulty level. Instead of having a direct link to the University as the 
ultimate HL, LL schools were to conform to the intermediate level as 
representing and deriving authority from the ultimate HL.  While the 
intermediate level can be helpful for administrative and managerial reasons 
particularly with the increased number of LL units (schools), according to 
the cases examined, it can also result in two different perceptions from the 
LL perspective. If the LL unit is similar in its power and needs to its peer LL 
units governed by the same intermediate level, it would appear justifiable 
and legitimate to follow the standardised governance of the intermediate HL 
unit. Also, if the LL unit receives more direct or indirect benefits than costs 
from being part of this “secondary” vertical relationship, then the 
relationship will appear to be satisfactory. However, if the LL unit is more 
substantial or has different needs from its peer LL units, and if the 
intermediate HL unit does not recognise such needs or acknowledge its 
substantiality, then the LL unit would see the intermediate level as 
constraining or sometimes “redundant”85. 
 
Based on the six cases of bi–layered interdependence, respondents reported 
four scenarios of different interdependence types.  The following is a 
description of these four scenarios.  
 
B.1. Positive– Positive Interdependence  
One case showed positive interdependence with the two layers of the 
vertical relationship. Being in a low bargaining position and being very 
                                                             
85 On one hand, this highlights the need for common frames and understandings that keep governance relations 
continuous. On the other hand, this shows that the different potential power of the different LL units needs to be 
reflected in the vertical relationship. For an LL to be satisfied with a constraining vertical relationship, it must 
derive benefits from that relationship that outweigh or justify the cost of constraints. If such benefits are not 
enough to justify the cost of the relationship, then the stability of the relationship could be questioned.  
 
Therefore, two interrelated factors can be deduced as decreasing the benefits derived from the vertical 
relationship to form a case of negative interdependence. The first is the evolving power of the LL unit where it 
becomes strong enough not to dependent on the HL unit. The second is the lack of common understandings 
between the vertical parties to the relationship (this is referred to as cognitive disparity in this study and will be 
highlighted in further detail as the third antecedent for VIRQ). However, the lack of common understanding, 
common frames of reference, common goals, and means can be also triggered by the evolution and maturity of 
the LL unit, which allow for such divergence.  
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dependent on its ultimate and intermediate HL units, the respondent from 
this LL unit perceived that the support his unit gets from the ultimate level 
as one that can be only obtained through legitimising with the established 
structure and its conditions. In addition, the support the unit received far 
exceeded any costs, which caused the relationship to be generally perceived 
as a positive one, given its structure. 
C8: “It is a very good relationship; we have an immense amount of 
support from the University and the [faculty– the intermediate HL]. 
Right from the beginning, the University has been extremely 
enthusiastic about establishing [our] BS, ..[..].. and via the 
[faculty], they have been extremely supportive of everything that we 
have been doing…  [..]..  My view is that we derive far more benefit 
than the cost associated with the arrangement being part of 
the..[..]..University with its knowledge base, its resources, its 
educational standing, that is of tremendous benefit to the BS and we 
hope that we not only grow but to contribute to the rest of the 
University. So the benefit to us from that relationship far exceeds 
any issues or constrains associated with it...[..].. We are just one 
department in a major University….” 
 
B.2. Positive– Balanced Interdependence 
Another case reported a positive interdependence with the ultimate HL and a 
balanced interdependence with the intermediate HL units. In this case, the 
LL was highly dependent on the ultimate HL for its academic status, 
reputation and other relationship embedded resources. On the other hand, 
the LL unit provided a significant financial contribution to the intermediate 
HL, but it needed the intermediate HL for two interrelated reasons; gaining 
institutional legitimacy from the ultimate HL and reaping the benefits of the 
vertical relationship. The ultimate HL “resources” were only perceived to be 
accessible via accepting the authority of the intermediate level. Dependence 
normally increases when one actor does not have alternative options. The 
LL unit was not powerful enough in terms of its size or academic legitimacy 
to opt for a different structural arrangement. Therefore, the impracticality of 
alternative structural agreements made the LL respondents in this case 
perceive their interdependence with their intermediate HL unit as a balanced 
one. 
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Yet, it should be noted that this balanced (intermediate) interdependence 
only exists because of the presence of an HL interdependence; i.e. that with 
the ultimate HL.  The LL could not survive without the University’s support 
and therefore it resorted to accepting the University conditions with its 
structure of having a bi–layered interdependence relationship.   
C9: “….. The only way we can have more autonomy is that if we 
become a faculty in our own right or maybe with a small group of 
departments in a faculty. I do not think we are big enough at the 
moment to be a faculty on our own right. The faculty and always 
University level will argue that students come here because it is this 
University and because it is the ground of the University and to 
some extent that is true, but we deliver the programmes, we deliver 
the research… But in terms of broad statistical terms, for one 
[school] in the faculty that has X [schools] and we are delivering 
more than X% of income to that faculty, then faculty and therefore 
the University is very dependent. We are probably the biggest 
[school] and the biggest income here. The faculty is definitely 
largely and quite obviously very dependent on the school to be 
successful. If we do not hit our targets, then everybody suffers 
within the faculty…” 
 
B.3. Positive – Negative Interdependence 
Unlike single layered dependence, negative interdependence is not as 
uncommon in bi–layered interdependence where most of the LL units have 
seen the intermediate HL as “redundant” or defunct (in 4 out of 6 cases in 
total). Three cases reported positive interdependence with the ultimate HL 
and negative interdependence with the intermediate HL unit.  
In the first case, the constraints placed by the intermediate HL unit were not 
justified by the benefits derived from this vertical relationship. The LL unit 
had a strong potential power within its intermediate vertical relationship due 
to its size, reputation and financial contribution. However, it was relatively 
less powerful when it comes to the ultimate HL as they needed the 
University current support, potential support, reputation, and academic 
status. In terms of its relationship with the ultimate HL unit, the LL’s 
financial importance was challenged by the presence of more powerful peer 
 
 
186 
 
LL units. Those peers seemed to receive the attention of the HL as the 
University relied on them for its strategic development. 
C7: “The [faculty] depends far more on us, they depend on us 
financially, and they depend on us to exploit our brand name. What 
do I depend on the faculty for?! Nothing that I could not get if I was 
my own faculty. I am forced to depend on them, that is an 
interesting idea because of the structures, but I wouldn't wish to, so 
forced dependency.  We are massively important because of money 
and brand. But I will also tell you something, it is by far the least 
important academically, this University has a strategy of getting 
into [different areas] of research …” 
 
Similarly, the second case reported positive interdependence with the 
ultimate HL but negative interdependence with the intermediate HL unit. In 
terms of the relationship with the ultimate HL, the potential power of the LL 
unit was reduced by having other powerful rival peers (LL units) in the 
University. This tended to affect the strategic position of the   BS as a sole 
powerful player.  
 
Respondents in this case saw the intermediate HL as just part of the 
structure to which they had to conform in order to be legitimate in their 
wider University environment, which they immensely need. However, the 
intermediate HL as such did not provide any direct benefits to the LL to 
justify the cost the latter incurs in terms of bureaucratic and financial 
constraints.  
 
In relationship to the University, respondents clearly articulated that it is a 
case of positive interdependence. 
C3: “..[.. ].. But also it is important to recognise that being part of a 
University like this actually brings tremendous strength to the BS. 
So, if you don't work within the institution, then you are actually 
missing out on a lot of potential development that you could 
make…” 
In relationship with the intermediate HL, perceptions tended to vary. While 
all respondents in this case viewed the intermediate HL unit as defunct and 
not necessary, the legitimation and the satisfaction with relationship itself 
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tended to be seen differently. Some respondents were relatively more 
satisfied with the intermediate relationship as it was one way to realise the 
relationship benefits from the wider institution, while others were not as 
satisfied focusing on their discourse on the costs of this intermediate 
relationship
86
. While this stresses the important role of perception in general 
in shaping the respondents’ world, it also shows that the perception of 
dependence can affect the perception of control and autonomy. 
C3 group 1: “So I think in that sense, I think the limited autonomy is 
not because we are part of the [faculty].  It is because we are part of 
the University.  But it is the [faculty] which is the level that we deal 
with, so the [faculty] is perceived where the lack of autonomy comes 
from. But really, it is justified with the University as a large 
organisation, and the BS is an important part of it, but just one of 
many important parts. And I don't think I would be fair when I say 
that we should have too much autonomy. Because on the learning 
and teaching side, we award University of X degrees and I think 
that is where a lot of our reputation comes from rather than if you 
are a standalone BS, you will be fighting to build a reputation for 
that thing.” 
 
C3 group 2: “[…] The BS is phenomenally important to the [faculty] 
because it is very profitable. So if you would rate it in terms of 
whether the [faculty] depends on the BS, then yes. Because the BS 
brings in a lot of money, and there are a lot of aspects of the 
[faculty] that are not as profitable. Well, what do we rely on the 
[faculty] for!.. mmm! ... What happens now is that the University 
guidelines, guidance and policies come to us through the [faculty] 
so in that sense, you know, we get information from the [faculty] as 
to what is happening at the University level….[..].. and it is our 
means of influencing the University so communication from the 
centre of the whole organisation comes via the [faculty]…” 
 
                                                             
86 In this case, responses were split into two groups. One group viewed the intermediate interdependence as a 
balanced one, legitimising it by the overall benefit they receive from the University as a whole. The other group 
tended to view the intermediate interdependence as negative in terms of being unable to justify its costly 
presence. This split will be evident across the whole chapter and was deemed to be an interesting finding since 
intra-unit perceptions could be different. 
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The third case was not different from the previous two cases where there 
was a positive interdependence with the ultimate HL but a negative 
interdependence with the intermediate one. The need for the ultimate HL 
was significant as the LL unit needed the former’s reputation, and academic 
and financial support along with its strategic and operational resources. The 
LL unit has relatively low power within its University environment, not 
merely because of its mediocre financial or academic contribution, but also 
due to the strength of the other parts of the University.  
C5: “All of our students, they tell us when we do surveys that they 
come here, 1.  For the  University, 2. For the city, 3. For the school. 
So we are not kidding ourselves. Our reputation as a school is not 
as strong as that of the University..” 
 
However, in terms of the relationship with the intermediate level, it was seen 
as a redundant level in a “confusing institutional environment” as there were 
no perceived benefits realised from this intermediate relationship. It was just 
a costly one. In the three previous cases of negative interdependence, 
respondents stressed the artificiality of the embedded structural link.  
C5: “I think you have to think of this in the light of these 3 levels 
created relatively recently. It is not a clean piece of organisational 
design. It is quite messy, that creates a rather confused institutional 
environment...” 
 
The presence of redundant bi–layered vertical interdependence shows that 
some of the vertical interdependencies can be legitimate and some of them 
can be just an artefact of the organisational structure, which are seen as 
legitimate only when needed. In the previous three cases, the link with an 
intermediate vertical level was relatively recent, which emphasised the 
perception of such artificiality as the relationship came with an observable 
cost (usually decreased financial autonomy) rather than a recognisable 
benefit.  
 
B. 4. Balanced – Negative interdependence 
The last case of bi–layered dependence reported a balanced interdependence 
with the ultimate HL but a negative interdependence with the intermediate 
one. In this case, while the intermediate HL was formally more powerful, it 
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was crossed in practice informally where the relationship of the LL unit with 
the ultimate HL unit became the main vertical relationship. As the negative 
interdependence relationship was crossed, the perception of the overall 
vertical relationship tended to be favourable. 
C12: “… We are the largest department in the University, we are 
the largest revenue generation for the University.. [..].. The 
University is important for the brand of course, the 
interdisciplinarity, the fact that you can work with other 
departments, I do quite a lot of collaborative research with people  
in the X school, so that would not  be possible if you are a stand–
alone or private BS…” 
 
 
Based on the elaborative table above, the cases studied indicate that positive single–layered 
interdependence was usually associated with a favourable perception of relationship quality, 
while negative single–layered interdependence was associated with an unfavourable 
relationship perception (as the benefits derived were not perceived to justify the cost of 
control that the structurally HL unit imposes). For balanced as well as bi–layered 
interdependence, the perception of VIRQ tended to vary
87
.  
6.2.1.1 Summarising Propositions   
 
 In general, the balance of interdependence is likely to influence the perception of 
VIRQ by the LL unit, such that if the LL unit is positively interdependent on its HL 
unit, the former is more likely to perceive the VIRQ favourably in comparison to  if 
the LL is negatively or equally interdependent on its HL.  
 
                                                             
87 A more detailed account of the different possible scenarios of balanced and bi-layered interdependence is 
presented in Section III of this chapter. 
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6.2.2 Institutional Duality and the LL’s Institutional Orientation 
The second antecedent identified is concerned with the institutional orientation of the LL unit. 
In many diversified institutions, the LL unit can potentially refer to two different institutional 
environments; its internal institution (the vertical institutional relationship, in this case the 
University), and the institution of the sector in which it operates (in this case the wider BS 
sector). This can suggest a case of institutional duality, as has been discussed in the recent 
literature concerning headquarters–subsidiary relations in MNCs (see for example Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002). The two institutional environments can 
potentially impose different or conflicting pressures on the LL unit, unless they are aligned. 
Yet such pressures are not necessarily always conflictual. Sometimes the vertical institutional 
relationship supports conformity to the institutional pressures imposed by the wider BS 
sector, and sometimes the sector’s institutional pressures are addressed only via the help of 
the vertical institutional relationship.  
All the cases studied revealed the presence of two distinct institutional frames. In 9 of the 15 
cases (60%), it was reported that the two institutions can place competing pressures on 
them
88
. Cases which exhibited a strong perception of conflict between the requirements of the 
two institutions tended to compare themselves relative to the wider BS sector with its 
corporate links and closeness to the market, and to their successful peer schools which have 
relatively more autonomy due to the very way they are structured (for example: London BS 
and other European BSs (such as INSEAD) which are independent of universities). 
Respondents from these cases stressed the need for their school to conform to the pressures of 
the BS sector in order to remain competitive, acquire and maintain the necessary 
accreditations (such as AACSB, AMBA, and EQUIS), and to occupy a place within the 
                                                             
88 These 9 cases are the highlighted cases in Table 6.5. 
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rankings they seek positioning in (for example: Financial Time MBA or EMBA rankings), 
while simultaneously conforming to the pressures exerted by their host universities. Table 6.4 
shows a sample of illustrative quotes referring to the perception of institutional duality in BSs.  
Table 6.4: The Perception of Institutional Duality in UK University–based BSs 
Indicators of 
Institutional 
Duality 
Explanation Illustrative Quotes 
 “Wearing 
two hats”. 
BS leaders indicated that they 
have to “wear two hats”. Jobs of 
BS Deans involve two roles; one 
as leaders to the BS that has a 
distinct identity (with the wider 
sector of BSs), and one as leader 
to an academic department 
inside its host University.  
“I am actually off to a conference event this week 
in Lyon which is a sort of meeting to [meet] all 
the deans and directors of BSs maybe in Europe 
and from all over the world. So, I see myself also 
as interacting with other heads of BSs as well. 
And I think that is probably a unique part of 
being in a BS compared to any other schools, 
because if you are head of the school of physics, 
there is not an institution which is the 
Association of the Schools of Physics for 
example, whereas there is one for BSs. So I spend 
a lot of my time, if you like, as a director of the 
BS talking to other similar heads of BSs, but also 
spend a lot of my time as the head of the school 
within the larger University. And I think it is 
important to recognise those are probably two 
different jobs because the attitude you have in 
negotiating and discussing with people within the 
University inevitably has to be a little bit 
different from when you are talking to other 
heads of BSs …”  
 
A sense of 
alienation 
from the host 
Some universities tended to be 
less welcoming in terms of their 
treatment of BSs. One 
“Speaking about the position of the BSs, I think 
the big problem is that BSs have grown up 
afterwards. In other words, the BSs and the 
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University. respondent expressed his 
concern that BSs are “foreign” 
to their University environment. 
This was attributed to the very 
nature of BSs and their 
difference from the other 
academic departments and 
fields. Feeling alienated makes 
the tensions resulting from 
institutional duality more 
obvious and more antagonistic 
compared to a situation where 
the LL is more integrated in its 
internal environment. 
 
growth of business as a subject have grown 
tremendously in the last 30 years. So, essentially 
universities were designed for engineering, 
technology and science and all these sort of 
things, i.e. teaching.  And then the business 
faculty in 1970s was just very tiny. But then in 
the last 30 years, we have grown tremendously 
and BSs have grown and because we [as BSs] 
could not fit in, a lot of them have grown as 
autonomous entities because they could not fit 
into the existing structure. I think the problem is 
that we are a victim of our own success and that 
is where it lies – the exponential growth of 
business education in the last 20 – 30 years. And 
we need a different structure to the traditional 
University subjects which were well–established 
before us…”  
 
Seen with an 
eye of 
suspicion.  
In many universities, BSs were 
regarded with an eye of 
suspicion, or at least, confusion 
by their HUAs. Are they just 
like any academic department 
and should therefore be judged 
by their research output? Or, are 
they closer to the market due to 
the very nature of the BSs 
environment, and therefore they 
are expected to have a different 
output (for example, income 
generation and corporate links)? 
Deciding and prioritising 
between these two ends by the 
HL unit made respondents from 
BSs generally claim that their 
“There are a number of currents that we have to 
swim against. In the academy, there is a general 
bias against BSs. They are seen as too close to 
markets, too commercial, not academically 
driven, and all that; maybe less here because this 
is a research intensive place. So there is this 
legacy that creates suspicion. And indeed in 
some areas, we are closer to markets, that is part 
of our USP [unique selling point], we have to be 
closer to markets.”  
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HUAs do not understand their 
situation or position.  
 
“We are 
different”. 
Institutional duality has created 
a “we are different” discourse 
and attitude that were common 
in all of the cases studied 
(except one). BSs studied find 
themselves referring to two 
environments; they need to 
compete with autonomous BSs 
but within the constraint of the 
vertical relationship. Being 
different implies that the LL unit 
has a different frame of 
reference than that outlined by 
its higher level unit. 
“…[..]… and one of the things that we 
understand or increasingly understand is that the 
nature of what management and BSs and what 
they [the University people] seek us to do is often 
very different from what other conventional 
social science departments are seeking to do. We 
try to operate in a different kind of way..[..]… I 
think the problem at the faculty level is that the 
models they operate, that each of the schools or 
departments has to be the same. So I think there 
is reluctance at the faculty or the University level 
to have their departments operating or behaving 
in a different way from the others…”  
 
 
With all cases indicating the presence of institutional duality, it is argued that the perception 
of institutional duality in this sector (UBBSs) is very common and therefore the perception of 
the presence of the duality as such is deemed not to be a variable in its own right.  The 
consequences and implications of duality seemed to be more significant. Two consequences 
of institutional duality are of more interest in this section; namely the LL’s orientation and the 
duality neutralisation.  
6.2.2.1 The Lower Level Unit Orientation 
The orientation of the LL unit is related to the positioning of the LL unit relative to its two 
potentially competing institutional frames. It refers to the choice of the LL unit to a prioritised 
institutional frame, but this does not mean that the less prioritised frame is ignored. It is 
assumed that if the LL unit is more oriented towards its internal institution (the University) 
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and pays less attention to its positioning relative to its wider sector (the BSs’ sector), then the 
chance of perceiving the internal institution (or the HL unit) favourably is higher than if the 
LL is inclined towards conforming to its wider sector while viewing the HL unit as 
constraining such conformity. Orientation towards one of the two institutions is a function of 
many variables including the extent of dependence and the balance of interdependence, the 
bargaining power of the LL unit, the strategic objectives and aspirations of the LL and the HL 
units, the frames of reference (which peers are considered rivals, and which performance 
measures are more important?), and the level of maturity of the LL unit. Orientation choice is 
assumed to be based on strategic cost and benefit calculations. 
Some cases showed that the LL unit is more inclined towards one institution more than the 
other, highlighting the institutional orientation.  Such orientation can affect the perception of 
the vertical relationship in general. Inferences about the institutional orientation were made 
based on direct questions concerned with the frames of references of the LL unit (such as who 
would you identify as your peers, frames of reference, and competitors?); and through the 
course of the conversation. Tensions are more likely to surface if the LL unit finds it hard to 
reconcile the pressures coming from the two different institutional frames.  
“…. have you come across that book, [well] working here is actually like a Swedish 
public sector organisation which supports [the book’s] argument because of the need 
of legitimacy. The bosses of the organisation have to say all sorts of things to external 
stakeholders essentially to kind of please them and get the support and often the things 
they say to please these external stakeholders are absolutely nonsenses. In terms of 
internal operations and promises they made, they absolutely can't be kept and people 
end up breaking these impossible promises and this is a reality ..[..].. and it brings 
uncomfortable duplicities. There are these two environments [which are] impossible 
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to reconcile together and actually this is a lot of what we encounter and most of the 
schools encounter, but we encounter it a bit more in the BS because we have to follow  
the market logic. Otherwise, we just won’t be here.”  
6.2.2.2 Duality Neutralisation 
The presence of the duality in its own right is assumed not to affect VIRQ; it is whether such 
duality is a conflicting or an aligned duality that can make a difference in the perception of 
this relationship. The HL unit has a key role in shaping this perception as it can potentially 
align (or not) the demands it places on the LL unit.  Therefore, institutional duality can be 
perceived neutrally or negatively by the LL unit. Institutional duality is neutrally perceived if 
the pressures of the two institutions are aligned and are not conflicting or mutually exclusive. 
In such cases, the adverse impact of institutional duality is neutralised by alignment. Problems 
in the relationship arise if the pressures of the two institutions are not aligned or if they place 
conflicting demands on the LL unit, resulting in a negatively perceived institutional duality
89
. 
6.2.2.3 Institutional Duality and the Perception of VIRQ  
Reflecting on the LL unit’s orientation and the duality neutralisation, Table 6.5 summarises 
the perception of these antecedents across all the cases studied
90
. Negatively perceived (un–
neutralised) institutional duality was generally linked with prioritising the wider sector’s 
institutional frame over the vertical institutional relationship. Neutrally perceived institutional 
duality was linked with prioritising the vertical intra–University institutional relationship over 
                                                             
89 The consequences of an aligned or non-aligned institutional duality will be dealt with in further detail under 
the third antecedent- cognitive congruence. This section only briefly presents antecedents without fully 
considering their consequences, as the consequences of the different antecedents are highly inter-related.  
 
90 Two points were considered while constructing this table. First, the vertical orientation is not necessarily 
against conforming to the BS sector, it just refers here to the presence of alignment or neutralisation of duality 
adopted by the vertical institution. Second, the direct vertical relationship (whether it is the intermediate HL or 
the ultimate HL) was considered in constructing this table, as the state of embedded interdependencies seemed to 
be associated with the (non-)alignment of duality pressures.  
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the wider sector (except for (C2) and (C12)). It is generally suggested that if the LL unit is 
oriented more towards the wider BS sector rather than its University environment, and if there 
is a lack of alignment between the two environments, that will pose a higher chance of 
creating tension in the perception of the vertical relationship.  
As will be shown in Table 6.5, generally LL units which enjoy a relatively good position 
within their sector (mature BSs) tended to be oriented towards the BSs sector. LLs units 
which were still taking their first footsteps towards fitting into the sector were generally more 
inclined towards their vertical institutional relationship. These were typically younger or 
smaller schools. The choice of orientation was associated with the maturity of the LL unit in 
its wider sector (the BSs sector). However, the (non–)neutralisation of the duality was more 
associated with the balance of interdependence between the higher level (with its embedded 
layers) and the LL units, taking into account the level of maturity of the LL unit. Positively 
interdependent LL units tended to conform with the HL or the vertical institutional 
relationship, while balanced or negatively interdependent units tended to have more latitude. 
Only (C12) and (C2) were oriented more towards the wider BBs sector but because of their 
high potential power within their universities, there was a general
91
 alignment of the two 
institutional pressures.  
 
 
 
                                                             
91 In (C12), such alignment was not complete. However, in general, respondents in this case reported an overall 
satisfaction with the alignment, with only a few exceptions. The balance of interdependence in C2 and C12 was 
in favour of the LL units (balanced interdependence), which made the HL units incorporate the needs of the LL 
units, resulting in a general alignment of institutional pressures.  
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Table 6.5: Duality Neutralisation, LL Unit’s Orientation, and LL Unit’s Characteristics 
as based on the Case Study Evidence. 
Case Duality Neutralisation LL Unit’s 
Orientation
92
 
The LL Unit’s Characteristics 
C1 Negative The wider BS sector.  Mature BS 
 Relatively strong in its wider 
sector. 
 Very strong bargaining power 
within its vertical institutional 
relationship (the University with 
its embedded layers of 
interdependence). 
 
C2 Overall neutral 
 
(The alignment was part of 
the overall cognitive 
congruence which was 
enabled by the bond created 
by mutual benefits and 
balanced interdependence. 
The HL unit, due to the 
importance of the LL unit, 
integrated the need of the LL 
unit so that the latter can 
conform to pressures from its 
wider sector.) 
 
The wider BS sector. 
 
 
 Mature BS 
 Strong in its wider sector. 
 Relatively strong bargaining 
power within its vertical 
institutional relationship. 
C3 Negative The wider BS sector.  Mature BS 
 Averagely strong in its wider 
sector. 
 Very strong bargaining power in 
its direct vertical relationship 
(with the intermediate HL unit) 
yet relatively weak within its 
University as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
92 Orientation refers to the prioritised institutional frame. However, prioritisation does not mean necessarily 
excluding any of the two institutional frames. 
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C4 Neutral 
 
(The LL unit, due to its 
freshness in the wider BS 
sector and its weak 
bargaining power, has to 
conform to University 
pressures. The University 
also aligned some of the 
wider sector’s demands as 
the relationship was bonded 
by mutual benefits.) 
 
The vertical 
institutional 
relationship. 
 
 
 Young BS 
 Relatively weak in its wider 
sector. 
 Relatively weak bargaining power 
within its vertical institutional 
relationship. 
C5 Negative 
 
(The LL unit viewed its 
direct HL unit as unnecessary 
and, therefore, compliance 
was not seen as necessary 
either, particularly due to LL 
unit’s potential opportunities 
in the wider BS sector.) 
 
The wider BS sector. 
 
 
 Mature BS 
 Relatively strong in its wider 
sector. 
 Average bargaining power in its 
direct vertical relationship (the 
intermediate level) yet weak 
within its overall vertical 
institutional relationship 
University. 
C6 Neutral 
 
(The LL unit, due to its 
freshness in the wider BS 
sector and its weak 
bargaining power, has to 
conform to the University 
pressures. The University 
also aligned some of the 
wider sector’s demands as 
the relationship was bonded 
by mutual benefit.) 
 
The vertical 
institutional 
relationship. 
 
 
 Young BS 
 Relatively weak in its wider 
sector. 
 Average to relatively strong 
bargaining power within its 
vertical institutional relationship. 
C7 Negative The wider BS sector. 
 
 Mature BS 
 Strong in its wider sector. 
 Strong bargaining power within its 
direct vertical relationship yet 
weak to average in its overall 
vertical institutional relationship. 
 
C8 Neutral 
 
(The LL unit was more 
oriented towards its vertical 
institutional relationship due 
to its weak bargaining power, 
but more importantly due to 
the potential rewards 
embedded in that 
The vertical 
institutional 
relationship. 
 
 
 Young BS 
 Strong in its wider sector. 
 Relatively weak bargaining power 
within its vertical institutional 
relationship. 
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relationship. The higher level 
units also closely aligned 
demands from the wider 
sector to ensure that the LL 
unit is successful in its wider 
sector.) 
C9 Negative The wider BS sector. 
 
 Mature BS 
 Relatively strong in its wider 
sector. 
 Average bargaining power within 
its direct vertical relationship yet 
weak within its vertical institution. 
  
C10 Overall neutral with minor 
issues 
 
(Conformity to the vertical 
institutional relationship was 
more rewarding given the 
freshness of the LL unit in its 
wider sector. The two 
institutional frames were 
generally aligned as the 
relationship was bonded by 
mutual benefits.) 
 
The vertical 
institutional 
relationship. 
 
 
 Relatively young BS 
 Relatively weak in its wider 
sector. 
 Average bargaining power within 
its vertical institutional 
relationship. 
C11 Moderately negative The wider BS sector. 
 
 Mature BS 
 Average in its wider sector. 
 Relatively strong bargaining 
power within its vertical 
institutional relationship. 
 
C12 Overall neutral with minor 
issues 
 
 
(The alignment was not due 
to compliance, it was due to 
the relative strength of the 
LL unit which made it able to 
negotiate its terms within the 
vertical institutional 
relationship. The HL unit in 
turn, due to the importance of 
the LL unit, integrated the 
need of the LL unit to 
conform within its wider 
sector.) 
 
 
 
 
The wider BS sector. 
 
 
 Mature BS 
 Strong in its wider sector. 
 Strong bargaining power within its 
vertical institutional relationship. 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
C13 Neutral 
 
(Conformity to the vertical 
institutional relationship was 
more rewarding given the 
freshness of the LL unit in its 
wider sector. The two 
institutional frames were 
generally aligned as the 
relationship was bonded by 
mutual benefits.) 
The vertical 
institutional 
relationship. 
 
 
 Young  BS 
 Weak in its wider sector. 
 Relatively weak bargaining power 
within its vertical institutional 
relationship. 
C14 Neutral 
 
(Conformity to the vertical 
institutional relationship was 
more rewarding given the 
freshness of the LL unit in its 
wider sector. The two 
institutional frames were 
generally aligned as the 
relationship was bonded by 
mutual benefit.) 
The vertical 
institutional 
relationship. 
 
 
 Young  BS 
 Weak in its wider sector. 
 Relatively weak bargaining power 
within its vertical institutional 
relationship. 
C15 Neutral 
 
(Conformity to the vertical 
institutional relationship was 
more rewarding given the 
freshness of the LL unit in its 
wider sector. The two 
institutional frames were 
generally aligned as the 
relationship was bonded by 
mutual benefits.) 
The vertical 
institutional 
relationship. 
 
 
 Young  BS 
 Weak in its wider sector. 
 Relatively weak bargaining power 
within its vertical institutional 
relationship. 
 
6.2.2.4 Summarising Propositions 
 In general, the LL unit’s orientation, whether it to be towards the vertical intra–
University institutional relationship or the wider institutional sector, is likely to affect 
the perception of VIRQ.  
 The neutralisation of the institutional duality via alignment is likely to positively 
influence the perception of VIRQ and vice versa. 
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6.2.3 The State of Cognitive Congruence as Perceived by the LL Unit 
The third antecedent identified that can have a bearing on the perception of the VIRQ is the 
cognitive disparity or congruence between the LL and the HL units. This antecedent is 
concerned with the breadth and the depth of the gap in broad visions, goals and ambitions, 
frames of reference, views, understandings, and means between the parties to the vertical 
relationship. This is deemed to be one of the key antecedents as shared visions, goals, and 
means are not only vital governance mechanisms, they are also the cement of any well–
functioning relationship. While having common understandings and views can be an 
important antecedent to the perception of VIRQ, building common understandings can be also 
an outcome to the relationship perception so as improve its quality in the future encounters, 
this is because a healthy relationship is based up on mutual understanding. As a key 
antecedent, cognitive congruence was found to be highly related to the perception of all the 
other antecedents as well as to the perception of VIRQ. In general, cognitive congruence was 
closely linked to the positive attributes of VIRQ or an overall favourable perception of the 
relationship and vice versa. 
“... If you haven't got a shared vision, then it makes it very difficult to achieve 
openness and the trust. You have to have a shared vision and that has been quite 
pleasing…”  
“[The HL unit] was not passionate about [our] strategic objectives. I think the BS had 
achieved a great deal.  It had a clear idea where it wanted to go to. All of a sudden, its 
set strategic objectives were thrown at it. Strategically, there was an issue, 
operationally, there was an issue, and financially. And I think that causes a lot of 
upset amongst the faculty, and it was frustrating.”  
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As discussed in the Chapter 5, empowering win–win relationships are sought–after. 
Therefore, alignment, although not necessarily identity, of mutual interests has been identified 
by all respondents, in varying degrees of explicitness, as fundamental to a favourably 
perceived vertical relationship. Yet, such alignment is neither easy nor straightforward. What 
underlies this (non–) alignment are two different realms that can be very distant from each 
other. The more these two realms (the HL and the LL unit) are distant from each other and the 
more there is a lack of alignment between their broad and detailed views, the less harmonious 
the vertical relationship.  
The concept of sharing or non–sharing took multiple levels and forms. Cognitive congruence/ 
disparity, therefore, is a multi–faceted concept, according to which some of its different facets 
can be unrelated. According to the findings of this study, four different facets of cognitive 
congruence were identified. These are: 
1. Sharing the frames of reference (alignment/conflict based on the duality of 
institutional frames). 
2. Sharing the broad vision or the strategic goals. 
3. Sharing means and the practicalities for realising the vision. 
4. Sharing perceptions. 
Table 6.6 provides a detailed explanation of these different sub–constructs (see also Figure 
6.2). 
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Table 6.6: A Detailed Explanation of the Sub–Constructs Composing the Concept of 
Cognitive Congruence 
 
Construct  Explanation 
1. Cognitive 
Disparity/ 
Congruence 
based on the 
Duality of 
Institutional 
Frames 
 
Due to the aforementioned institutional duality facing the LL unit (the second 
antecedent), there tended to be some gaps in understanding between the HL and 
the LL units. In more than half the cases studied (9 cases), the LL unit blamed 
the HL unit for not understanding its environment or the pressures it faces. Such 
claims convey a questioning of the HL unit’s ability and legitimacy to “govern” 
the LL unit through the vertical relationship. “They don’t understand” or “we 
are different” can embody an unspoken resistance to a frustrating authority that 
does not, in many instances, prove to be constructive. 
From emphasising differences in the backgrounds of the people in power, and 
differences of experience stemming from disciplinary cultural divides (natural 
sciences versus social sciences), to differences in the frames of reference 
(market oriented versus public sector), the LL unit stressed its distinctiveness 
and the particularity of its position and the sector in which it operates. In three 
cases, the reason for the lack of understanding of the LL unit’s environment was 
attributed to the difference in background of the person/people possessing the 
vertical power. In some other cases, when shared understandings were 
perceived, respondents attributed it to the similarity of experience or 
background of the person/people representing the HL unit.  
“Another interesting thing about the PVC..[..].. that he is very much a 
natural scientist and so those from the social science and humanities 
would actually grumble about it, that he actually doesn’t understand us 
and that was actually quite an important part of our dialogue, that he 
does not understand us.”    
 
The lack of understanding attributed to the individuals’ background differences 
is only seen as a shallower manifestation of a deeper level of difference that was 
more obvious in other quotes; it is the duality of institutional frames as 
discussed above. The LL unit is working under two institutional frames that can 
be potentially conflicting. Not understanding the environment of the LL unit 
can be thus expected, unless the parties to the relationship exert extra effort to 
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build a shared understanding to align the requirements of the two institutional 
frames.  
 
Statements such as “They do not understand what the BS is about!” can be just 
the tip of the iceberg.  A market–oriented LL unit operating in a wider public 
sector institution, debilitated by its bureaucracy in the face of tough and 
sometimes global competition from more autonomous rivals, serving different 
types of clients who have particular demands, muddled by various levels of 
embedded and sometimes artificial dependencies; these are perhaps amongst the 
reasons for the perceived cultural divide and the subsequent sensitive vertical 
relationship. 
“They [the HL unit] do not understand why our students expect a 
higher level of services than the average students within the University. 
And the reason why our students expect that; because they're paying 
more fees and because they chose this BS. He [the student] could've 
gone to anyone of the three and half thousand in the world, it is a 
competitive environment. In other schools the fact that they have some 
professors of international repute is sufficient to attract students, in our 
world that is not the case…”  
 
Tensions arising from perceived cultural divides caused by the institutional 
duality can be further complicated by embedded dependencies within the 
vertical relationship, such as dependence on an intermediate HL unit or central 
services. This creates additional need and effort for building common views and 
understandings. Complaining about unnecessary dependence on the central 
services was very common. In many cases, respondents from the LL unit 
viewed their dependence on the central functional service providers as artificial 
and ineffective. They argued that they can provide better services to themselves 
in–house. They see themselves as different and they need this difference to be 
appreciated and understood. 
“… I do not think we are as fleet on foot as we could be. We are reliant 
on other people championing our cause, for example, the building that 
we are in is not a good building, it's not a signature building as many 
BSs have, and we have to argue for a long time [that] we need to have 
a better building. There is a lack of understanding because people from 
 
 
205 
 
other disciplines in social science have not been into or been around 
business and management schools. They don't see what other 
institutions have. So you persuade them with that and then you have to 
rely on them to pursue your course through the estates committees and 
other areas. So you are very much reliant on people outside the school 
to actually champion what you are seeking to do….” 
Consequently, cultural divides in such relationships, which should be 
empowering in essence, resulted in a wide range of dysfunctionalities.  
“…Much of the University was operating as an extension of the public 
sector. I think you do notice certain things for some services, you think 
you are in a post office. ..[..].. We are looking for a finance professor 
now for a year and half .. [..]..what we're looking for is not only person 
who got good research record and is a good teacher but also  kind of 
engaged with the corporate world. For the University, that is a bit of an 
irrelevance…[..].. it is a bureaucratic tick box, so they do not know 
that. It is just a bureaucratic guidance.  For us, it is essential to have 
that kind of capability not just a tick box!”    
 
Due to the strong cultural divide resulting from the duality of institutional 
frames, the HL unit was commonly required to treat this LL unit (the BS) 
differently and to learn more about the peculiarities of the LL unit, suggesting 
the need for continuous relationship learning. Relationship learning is based on 
active and thorough understanding of positions and differences beyond a mere 
egalitarian standardised governance relationship.  
“The responsibility of the faculty, I think there need to be a greater 
recognition of the degree of difference, you cannot treat each 
department in the same way..[..]... A one–size fits all solution is not 
going to work, you have got to recognise differences and you got to 
respond to these differences. It is an on–going tension...”  
 
It is worth mentioning that cases which reported relative or strong cognitive 
disparity resulting from institutional duality are the same nine cases which 
manifested a relative institutional misalignment and a different institutional 
orientation. The other six cases did not express a similar degree of difference 
and ensuing frustration.  
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2.  Sharing the 
Broad Vision  
 
LL unit respondents in all the cases studied, except three, explicitly stated that 
both the LL and the HL units agree on the broader vision or the strategic goals 
for the LL unit.  Whether it is described as “singing from the same hymn sheet” 
or “sharing the same high level’s goals”, the LL unit placed a noteworthy 
emphasis on the role that a shared vision plays in a positively perceived 
relationship. In essence, shared vision is what unifies and/or harmonises the 
actions of the different units.  One dean of a relatively small and young BS 
explained:  
“I think you have problems when you have some different agendas.  You 
know, in this BS, if someone wants to see us five–star research whistles 
and bells, EQUIS accredited. To me, then again, they don't really 
understand the nature of where we are, which is about links with 
business, professions, employability of our graduates..[..].. So that is 
where I think you have issues, if the alignment between the strategic 
direction of the new VC and the Dean does not fit.”  
 
Yet, the importance of shared vision does not only reside in the sought–after 
harmony, but also in the actualisation of tangible benefits to be reaped by the 
LL. Tangible benefits can be embodied in resource support for the strategic 
goals of the LL unit or in other relationship benefits.  
 “… [..] .. There is some degree of feeling of shared ambitions and the 
rest of it …[..]..  They do want us to be in the top BSs in the UK and 
they are giving us some resources to enable us to continue to be there.”  
 
Unsurprisingly, individuals played a key role in creating (or non–creating) a 
sense of shared vision. In most cases, an aligned strategic outlook was attributed 
to individuals in key positions, whether in the HL or LL units.  Shared vision is 
something that can evolve over the time, and it can swing between the poles of 
negative and positive extremes over time. It can be seeded by appropriate 
institutional mechanisms (for example: effective representation), nurtured by 
the open sharing of views and information, and reaped by realising its 
synergetic benefits. However, all the previous measures require both time and 
the appropriate individuals who have the willingness and the ability to so.  
 “Again, this has been a major shift in the last two or three years, so if 
you had asked me the same question two or three years ago, I would 
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think that we would have had completely different visions. So we 
developed our vision, other faculties developed their visions, the 
University developed their visions and none of them was tied up. So, if 
you had asked me that question three years ago, I would have said we 
all operate independently and the University operates independently. 
Again, I have to say that this is something that the VC has done very 
well.” 
 
Realising the significance of the role of individuals was more obvious in quotes 
which linked the control of human resources to the fulfilment of a shared vision. 
The selection of the heads of the LL unit (BS Deans) in some cases served the 
purpose of creating a shared vision.  
“100% [compatible vision]. The University’s primary ambition is to 
be ..[..].., the BS’s primary ambition is [entirely compatible with that]. 
Unless we achieve academic pre–eminence, the University won’t be 
able to achieve its objectives. And the University has aims in pursuing 
interdisciplinary research which do not sacrifice academic excellence, 
but nevertheless reaches out to the wider public and business industry. 
That is exactly what the BS is aligned to be. I don't think that this is 
entirely by accident. ..[..]..  and this is why I have been selected as the 
Dean...” 
 
There were three cases, however, where some of the respondents identified that 
the HL units do not share the same vision with their respective LL units. These 
were primarily attributed to five reasons: 
1. The lack of clear objectives at the HL unit level. 
2. The excessive bureaucratisation of universities. 
3. The communication distance between the organisational levels 
which makes the communication necessary for building a 
shared vision difficult. 
4. The impracticability of the alignment of goals due to 
institutional difference. 
5. Differences in the backgrounds of individuals in power.  
 
“…[..].. I am not very sure we share the same vision with the University 
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as an institution and part of that I think universities as a whole, I think 
universities have become increasingly bureaucratised and the nature of 
this bureaucratisation leads to a very functional approach to what goes 
on.  As a result, a concept such as vision, which could be seen as in the 
academic sense of vision, tends not to be seen by lots inside the 
institution because they have become ground down to the functional 
things they do. And so, in an ideal world, we should share the vision 
and share the means, but I don’t think that is necessarily true.. ”  
  
In all cases, the lack of a shared vision was seen as primarily dysfunctional. 
 
3.  Sharing the 
Means 
 
While responses about shared vision were positive in most cases, most 
respondents indicated that while they might share the vision, this does not 
necessarily mean that they share the means of realising the vision. The 
broadness of the strategic vision makes it flexible enough to be shared, but 
when it comes to the practicalities of achieving it, differences start to surface. 
This can be threatening to the realisation of the vision itself as the vision 
becomes nothing more than a mirage covering fundamental cultural and 
methodological divides. Lack of shared means can be, at least partially, 
attributed to the perceived institutional duality. 
“Well, perhaps shared vision but we neither share the means nor the 
practicalities of reaching the goal...[..]..  I think it is undoubtedly true 
as I already mentioned that we both want success. The [faculty] wants 
us to be successful. You know the head of [faculty] is judged on the 
success of the schools in his faculty and we want to be successful. So, 
there is a shared vision in that sense. Whether we both judge success to 
be the same thing, I guess that would be the issue…[..].. So here's the 
broad goals of success are shared, but we might achieve it in a slightly 
different way given the choice.”  
 
As with the other facets of cognitive congruence, lacking shared means was 
usually associated with practical dysfunctionalities. However, it was the 
interdependence that was holding the unsatisfied relationship parties together.  
“I think we would liken it to a discontented marriage. They tolerate us, 
we tolerate them. We get benefit from each other. But there is an 
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underlying set of misunderstandings. We undoubtedly think that they 
misunderstand things we are doing, and we think that we 
misunderstand things they are doing. So, they will have holidays when 
they close down the whole University, they will announce special 
teaching weeks, all of which are incredibly difficult for us to do. We 
have students who do not understand why these holidays are 
happening, why these special teaching weeks are taking place. We are 
trying to arrange MBA exchanges with international schools and then 
all of a sudden we have some weeks which are on teaching weeks in the 
middle of all that, so this is just a logistical nightmare ...”  
 
4. Sharing 
Similar 
Perceptions 
 
The fourth facet of cognitive congruence was the shared perceptions between 
the HL and the LL unit. Due to the perceived institutional duality, the perceived 
distinctiveness of the LL unit, and due to differences in experiences and 
backgrounds, the HL and the LL units tended to approach things differently. 
This has deepened the gulf between them, and made the relationship even more 
contentious. Perception gaps can be seen in all quotes across this section as it 
simply refers to different perceptions associated with the same subject/event. 
However, added to this, there tended to be some perception gaps that were not 
directly associated with institutional duality or the distinctiveness of the LL 
unit; they were just highlighting different views regarding the same matter.   
“I mean they [the HL unit] saw it as they had given money away to us 
and we saw it as they have stopped robbing us. I mean it is funny in a 
way that it is that gulf and it is still exists; a gulf of perception ...” 
 
Gaps in perception can have a strong bearing on the terms of any relationship 
that is based on cooperation and mutual support. Perception gaps can result in 
different and sometimes conflicting attitudes and decisions, even when the 
overall goal is shared.  
“I mean we are in a very good financial position at the moment as a 
University, as a BS we are in a very good financial position..[..].. We 
want to do a major investment in developing things over the next year 
to help the place. They are really frightened about spending this money 
and we put these plans in [time] and there are still trying to decide and 
they make it really complex. But really, unless we make a decision and 
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go for it, then already it will be too late because a lot of this money was 
about recruiting new members of staff. We are already too late to get 
them in place in September...[..]..  And we cannot afford it. ..[..].. You 
know, the plans have been approved..[..].. They agreed the need, but 
they are fussing. ..[..]..  so that is problematic..[..].. this is our budget, 
this is our agreed budget and this is over and above our agreed 
contribution. So, this is to me out of our own money but they see it as 
their money. It is not risk, but they see the money and worry about it. 
And to me, they are just risk–adverse whereas I think we have done a 
case, we have agreed to this, just let us get on with it please and I find it 
quite frustrating. So it is a perception of risk. I don't see it as a higher 
risk thing. It is a different perception of risk, so it is about perception.”  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Constructs Composing Cognitive Congruence 
 
 
Table 6.7 provides a summary of the perceptions of the different facets or sub–constructs of 
cognitive congruence as suggested by the case studies. The different states of the balance of 
interdependence were also incorporated in this table. Based on evidence from the case studies, 
there seems to be an association between the overall assessment of cognitive congruence and 
 
 
211 
 
the state of the balance of interdependence. Positively interdependent LL units tended to show 
higher satisfaction with the state of cognitive congruence compared to negatively 
interdependent cases. However, for balanced interdependent cases, respondents expressed 
general satisfaction in some cases and dissatisfaction in other cases, thereby splitting the 
results into two sub–groups93. 
Table 6.7: a Detailed Account of the State of Cognitive Congruence with its Different 
Facets along with the Overall State of the Balance of Interdependence as Indicated by 
Evidence from Case studies. 
Case Alignment of 
broad vision 
Shared means 
and 
understandings 
The 
alignment of 
institutional 
frames’ 
Perception
s gaps 
Overall 
satisfaction and 
assessment of the 
state of cognitive 
congruence 
Balance of Interdependence 
C1 Questioned No No Reported 
different 
perceptions 
Not satisfied 
 
Cognitive 
disparity 
Negative interdependence 
C2 Yes Yes (no 
complaints) 
 
Yes to a 
satisfactory 
extent 
Reported 
only minor 
different 
perceptions 
Satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Balanced interdependence 
C3  
2 
g 
r 
o 
u 
p 
s 
No No No Reported 
different 
perceptions 
Not satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
disparity 
Negative 
interdependen
ce with the 
intermediate 
HL unit. 
 
 
 Positive 
interdependence 
with the ultimate 
HL unit. 
Moderate 
alignment 
Moderate 
alignment 
Positive to 
Moderate 
alignment 
Reported 
minor 
different 
perceptions 
Slightly satisfied 
 
Moderate 
cognitive 
congruence 
 
Balanced 
interdependen
ce with the 
intermediate 
HL unit. 
C4 Yes Yes Yes No report 
of different 
perceptions 
Highly satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Positive interdependence 
C5 Yes (broadly) No No Reported 
different 
perceptions 
Not satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
disparity 
Negative interdependence with the 
intermediate HL unit. 
 
Positive interdependence with the 
ultimate HL unit. 
C6 Yes Yes Yes No report 
of different 
perceptions 
Highly satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Positive interdependence 
C7 Yes (broadly) No No Reported 
different 
perceptions 
Not satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
disparity 
Negative interdependence with the 
intermediate HL unit. 
 
Positive to balanced 
                                                             
93 Section III in this chapter provides a detailed account of this relationship and its different forms. 
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interdependence with the ultimate 
HL unit. 
C8 Yes Yes Yes No report 
of different 
perceptions 
Highly satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Positive interdependence 
C9 Yes (broadly) No No Reported 
different 
perceptions 
Not satisfied 
 
High cognitive 
disparity 
Balanced interdependence with the 
intermediate HL unit. 
 
Positive interdependence with the 
ultimate HL unit. 
C10 Yes No Yes Reported 
different 
perceptions 
Moderate 
satisfaction 
 
Moderate 
cognitive disparity 
Balanced interdependence 
C11 No No Moderate Reported 
different 
perceptions 
Moderate 
dissatisfaction 
 
Cognitive 
disparity 
Balanced interdependence 
C12 Yes Yes (broadly) Yes (broadly) No report 
of different 
perceptions 
Satisfaction 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Balanced interdependence 
C13 Yes Yes Yes No report 
of different 
perceptions 
Satisfaction 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Positive interdependence 
C14 Yes Yes Yes No report 
of different 
perceptions 
Satisfaction 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Positive interdependence 
C15 Yes Yes Yes No report 
of different 
perceptions 
Satisfaction 
 
High cognitive 
congruence 
Positive interdependence 
 
6.2.3.1 Summarising Propositions 
 Cognitive congruence is based on a satisfactory alignment of broad vision, means, 
frames of reference, and perceptions. 
 In general, the balance of interdependence can affect the state of cognitive congruence 
between the higher and the lower level units of the vertical relationship; such that the 
more the LL is dependent on its HL unit, the higher the perception of cognitive 
congruity between them. 
 In general, the state of cognitive congruence or disparity is likely to affect the 
perception of VIRQ, such that lower cognitive congruence across the organisational 
levels will be associated with lower perception of VIRQ. 
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6.2.4 Perceived Control 
The fourth antecedent identified to the perception of VIRQ is the perception of the HL unit’s 
control and the LL unit’s autonomy. Control is one of the primary tasks of management, 
therefore the authority of control is normally expected to be in the hands of the HL unit in the 
organisational structure (see also Chapter 2). However, while this is consistent with the wide 
perception of power–over vertical relationships, as discussed in Chapter 5, power–over/with 
perceptions are distinct from the specific perception of control or autonomy. While the former 
refers to the overall distribution and the style of exercising power in the relationship, the latter 
refers to the appropriateness of the governance of the HL unit as seen by the LL unit. The 
perception of power distribution can be one of the manifestations and consequences of the 
perception of control and appropriate governance
94
. 
This section is concerned with the perception of control or autonomy (i.e. how the LL unit 
perceives the governance and control of the HL unit, based on the appropriateness of the 
implications of such governance) and its relationship to the perception of VIRQ. 
However, before discussing the perception of control and its impact on the perception of 
VIRQ, and with the aim of providing a thorough presentation of the issues attached to each 
                                                             
94 For instance, the HL unit may decide to use its vertical authority to govern the LL unit in a certain manner 
(examples could include using bureaucratic or cultural control mechanisms or closely monitoring certain areas of 
input or output. The HL unit may decide to increase the vertical layers or decrease them or shift the reporting 
lines via restructuring). According to the specific and wider implications of such control mechanisms and such 
governance arrangements, the LL unit will form a certain perception of the appropriateness of the HL’s control 
and its devolved autonomy. Yet power distribution is not only a function of the appropriateness of HL 
governance. It also refers to where the power centres lie and whether power is concentrated or evenly distributed 
(for example, via effective representation in key decision-making committees). Moreover, power-over 
perception can be related to the high perception of appropriate or inappropriate control. However, power-with is 
not necessarily related to perceptions of autonomy, as a LL unit might have some autonomy because it is of less 
strategic importance, rather than due to it being necessarily empowered by an equal distribution of power in the 
vertical relationship. Power over/with is an attribute of VIRQ itself, while perceived control/autonomy is one of 
the antecedents to the perception of the quality of such relationships. 
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antecedent, Table 6.8 presents some of the issues pertinent to the control and its perception as 
evident in the cases studied.
95
 These issues are:   
1. Key factors that affect the expectation of autonomy by LL respondents. 
2. Areas of control as reported by LL respondents. 
3. Governance mechanisms as seen by LL respondents. 
Table 6.8: Issues Pertinent to the Perception of Control and their Explanation based on 
Evidence from Case Studies. 
Issues that can 
affect the 
perception of 
control 
Explanation based on evidence from case studies 
1. Key Factors 
Affecting 
Autonomy 
Expectations: 
The Role of 
Trust and Fear 
 
Since satisfaction with autonomy can be dependent on an underlying 
expectation, it is important to shed light on the preferred approach to 
governance as seen by the LL unit, as well as the factors that seemed to shape 
the latter’s expectations of autonomy. 
The LL respondents were not keen on standardised or “hands–on” governance 
approaches. They rather preferred trust–based “light–touch” or “hands–off” 
approaches. It is not “policing”, “micromanagement” or “dull uniformity” that 
is needed; rather the LL unit aspires to supportive, nurturing, and empowering 
governance. Whether this is sufficiently practical or not, the LL unit sought a 
governance philosophy that allows it to have control over its own destiny, while 
being empowered by the benefits and support of the vertical relationship, with 
the minimum possible level of relationship constraints.  
“In my perspective, the best way to engender effective and good 
relations in all schools is to come back to that light touch approach, to 
provide guidance and support where needed, and to encourage some 
appropriate autonomy and points of creativity, and not try one size fits 
all.” 
                                                             
95 It should be noted that it is the perception of control that is likely to affect the perception of VIRQ. The issues 
identified as pertinent are not likely to affect VIRQ; they can only have a bearing on the perception of control. 
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However, this idealistic expectation was challenged by many practical issues. In 
general, the case studies indicate that the control of the HL unit was usually 
associated with the two–faced coin of fear and trust. In two cases, respondents 
attributed the lack of sufficient latitude to the HL unit’s fear and risk aversion.  
“I think the other reasons were more about control. And I suppose there 
was a lot of politics really. There was a feeling that why, if this BS has 
gone its own way and [has more autonomy], what would stop the next 
big school, you know, coming up with a similar argument and saying 
we need [to have more autonomy] as well.” 
 
Many responses underlined that the LL unit tended to perceive a key formula 
for autonomy; trust is reciprocated by autonomy. Provided that the LL unit pays 
the bill to prove its trustworthiness, it expects to have more autonomy in return. 
This applies to competence trust as well as goodwill trust. 
“It is quite hands–off. At one level, it is hands–off provided that they 
[the HL unit] have confidence. I mean financially if you are in a mess, I 
think that they would be more ‘what are you doing’ sort of thing. But 
provided things are going on the right direction and financially we are 
on target or better than we are left alone really.” 
 
While the LL unit recognises the HL unit’s “right” to apply tight controls if the 
former is underperforming, unreciprocated autonomy for established trust 
seemed to be an unbalanced and an incomprehensible equation to the LL unit.  
 
2. Areas of 
Control 
 
For the practicalities of autonomy and control arrangements, respondents from 
the LL unit were asked to express the extent to which they were satisfied with 
their level of autonomy. They were also asked to rate on a scale from one to 10, 
where 10 represents high autonomy, their perceived autonomy in each of the 
following areas:  
 Reinvestment of their own surplus 
 Key faculty appointments 
 Teaching policy 
 Research policy 
 Students’ admission  
All the LL respondents were of the opinion that they are highly controlled in 
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terms of their finances. Highest levels of control tended to be perceived with the 
reinvestment of surplus. All respondents, except one, explicitly expressed that 
they do not have any “real”96 financial autonomy. Most decisions that involved 
significant cash inflow or outflow were highly controlled. Therefore, key staff 
appointments (or promotion) were, in a number of cases, highly controlled. In 
other cases, student admission numbers were decided predominantly by the HL 
unit. There has been generally moderate control levels in terms of the teaching 
policy (normally bureaucratic checks for quality assurance) and the research 
policy (the HL unit tended to focus on the ranking for the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) with almost no intervention in terms of which research areas 
to pursue. Therefore there was a perceived moderate level of control in this 
area).  
“… decisions are signed off centrally. You have got to agree with the 
University policies and procedures and financial procedures. 
Bureaucratic sort of checks and balances on what you do which can be 
annoying at times. There is a bit of double layering sometimes of the 
admin.  So you get two layers of sign off instead of one which can be a 
bit frustrating. I suppose the biggest debate generally is about how 
much the revenue that you generate you get to keep. So the debate is 
about what percentage of that goes back to the University vis–à–vis 
what remains within the [school].” 
 
3. Control 
Mechanisms 
and their 
Implications 
 
UK universities tended to be highly bureaucratic; a characteristic that was not 
appreciated by most of the BSs. Bureaucratic controls are one of the 
manifestations of centralisation and standardisation that the HL unit in this case 
was trying to maintain. At the time of data collection (2011–2012), there was a 
general trend reported by respondents in all the BSs studied, towards “attempts” 
                                                             
96In most cases, BSs were making a significant income contribution to their universities. However, these schools 
did not have control over such contributions. They were either allocated a certain budget by the HL (which 
controlled the overall financial returns) or required to pay to their vertical institution a certain percentage of their 
income. The budget arrangements or the “taxation” percentage were under continuous debate. In most cases 
where the LLs have a devolved budget, even when they have the overall budget approved, they still have to go 
through detailed bureaucratic and project-by-project approvals from the HL before they can take any decision. 
Moreover, some of the LL units which have their own budget centres did not have full authority over their 
budget, even after its general approval, as they have to go through the different bureaucratic procedures before 
being able to use such budgetary resources. Some of the LL units studied expressed that they are heavily taxed 
for central services that they do not use or need, as they have their own in-house services. Other LL units 
complained about being pressured to constantly increase their financial contribution to the centre regardless of 
the need for internal reinvestment necessary for their survival. 
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at more centralisation. The move towards centralisation was justified by the 
uncertainty in the Higher Education Sector in general and the pressures to 
become more efficient. Some respondents also referred to the centralisation – 
decentralisation cycles, highlighting that it was time for centralisation after a 
wave of decentralisation that had previously hit the sector. There was a 
noticeable trend towards centralisation of the functional services in all cases 
(except two). 
 
In six cases, control and coordination attempts resulted in restructuring. 
However, such restructuring has resulted in two opposite outcomes; giving 
more autonomy to the LL unit by granting it extra decision–making powers, or 
introducing an extra vertical layer between the LL and the ultimate HL units 
and hence depriving the LL units of some of its previously devolved autonomy. 
The latter, which tended to be more common amongst the cases studied, has 
resulted in the creation of an intermediate vertical level, as highlighted in point 
6.2.1 in this chapter.  
 
Dependence on an intermediate vertical level tends to be negatively perceived 
in general as it creates additional levels of interdependencies and hence 
additional constraints on the LL unit. If the intermediate level is new and brings 
more costs than benefits, it may be seen as a case of negative artificial 
interdependence by the LL unit, impacting adversely and perhaps inadvertently 
upon the quality of the vertical relationship.    
“The senior management of the University has made a decision [to the 
effect] that we need to have [faculties], once you have [faculties] in 
place they have got to have a reason to exist. Their reason to exist 
seems to be to kind of increase coordination across the schools, so that 
what they are doing really. And whilst I can see some benefits in that, 
and some good things will come out of it, there will be some negatives 
as well for the school in terms of having less power to make decisions 
ourselves …[..]..The school was more autonomous [before the 
introduction of the faculty]….[..]..  So there is a definite loss of 
autonomy with regards to things like bursaries and there is a drive, and 
there will be an increased drive, towards standardisation across the 
[faculty]….” 
 
 
218 
 
 
Coupled with bureaucratic controls, the HL unit set the performance targets for 
the LL unit, emphasising output controls. Output controls were preferred by the 
LL respondents as being a practical representation of the “light touch” 
approach. Output controls provide the LL unit with a relatively high degreenof 
autonomy. However, the use of output controls tended to be associated with the 
HL’s trust. 
“……………so you would expect the degree of devolved autonomy to 
be greater with performance. The output agreements model rather than 
the hands–on interference model….” 
 
Interestingly, there was less mention of cultural controls when respondents were 
directly asked about their perception of the way they were governed. This is not 
surprising if it is viewed in the light of the subtlety of cultural controls as 
governance mechanisms. This also indicates that the subtlety of some of the 
control mechanisms can result in their being positively perceived (as they 
become less explicit approaches to influence). Yet human resources (HR) 
controls were obvious in quotes like “the [HL] appointed me for this purpose” 
where control was maintained via the careful selection of key positions in the 
LL unit. HR controls aim to ensure the sharing of a common agenda via 
selecting key individuals loyal to that agenda. 
 
 
6.2.4.1 The Perception of Control   
Respondents linked their perception of control or autonomy to their satisfaction with the 
vertical relationship and the way they view it. 
 “I mean that people have been slightly unhappy that there is less autonomy, I mean I 
had a dispute with the [faculty] over the fact that they have taken our bursaries from 
us, but at the end of the day I had no power to stop that, and I think that is the problem 
is that the [faculty] has power to do those things so it will do it, so yes we do have less 
autonomy.” 
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There are a number of reasons why the perceived lack of autonomy or excessive control may 
be negatively viewed by the LL unit. First, it is related directly to the meaning of VIRQ 
partially constructed in Chapter 5. It results in a lack of influence on the LL unit’s destiny and 
choice. Second, it can have an adverse effect on the performance of the LL unit as a result of 
the loss of the required latitude and the limited choice. Third, it indicates that the HL unit does 
not trust the LL unit and therefore tight controls are pursued.  
6.2.4.2 Formal Control /Autonomy versus Perceived Control/Autonomy 
Most respondents also made a distinction between two types of autonomy; formal autonomy 
and actual practiced autonomy. Having formal autonomy does not guarantee its realisation. 
The opposite also applies; being under formal control does not mean that the LL unit is 
actually constrained. Formal control can be challenged in practice by the powers of 
informality and upward influence techniques, while formal autonomy can be constrained by 
hidden practical or procedural details. What remains important is how the control of the HL 
unit is perceived. 
“So, just taking the formal autonomy, we are as a school, we have our budget, you 
could spend it how you wish but informally you have all forms of expectations from us 
and also it is constrained.” 
“We had a period where [schools] were called devolved [schools], it was not quite 
clear what that the devolution meant. We had to agree on funding and financial plans 
with the University. ” 
Some LL units, although formally constrained, could achieve their desired outcomes based on 
their favourable relationship with the group of people concerned.   
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 “In terms of being able to create and generate our outputs, you have to operate 
through the PVC people, that is why there tends to be informal autonomy ...” 
 “So, in a sense, we are fully managed..[..]..  We negotiate various aspects on a 
project by project basis, staff by staff… [..].. but we get what we want” . 
Autonomy is thus not entirely based on formal arrangements, the areas of centralisation, or 
the standardisation of procedures. Autonomy is primarily perceptual. Perceptions of 
control/autonomy are based on the implications of the general governance and detailed 
attitudes of the HL unit. However, the implications of the governance mechanisms and 
attitudes are not the sole elements in determining the perception or the appropriateness of 
control. As will be elaborated in Section II, the perception of autonomy is also based on a 
number of contextual factors, including the degree of the balance of interdependence between 
the parties to the vertical relationship, the extent of cognitive congruence and the alignment of 
goals and means, and the degree of relationship formality between the key decision makers of 
the vertical relationship. Depending on these factors and their different combinations, the LL 
unit either neutralises the adverse impact of control or perceives control negatively, i.e. the 
LL unit will perceive it is excessively controlled or acceptably controlled. The perception of 
control is thus context–specific where the contextual factors play a pivotal role in shaping the 
appropriateness of the governance of the HL unit.  
Following this line of thinking, the following table (Table 6.9) presents the perception of 
control as evident in the different cases studied.  
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Table 6.9: Summarising the Perception of Control as Suggested by Analysis of the Case 
Studies.  
Case Perception of Control 
C1 Negative 
C2 Neutralised by some informality and the balanced interdependence 
C3 2 Groups Neutralised by the overall positive interdependence 
Negative 
C4 Neutralised by high cognitive congruence 
C5 Negative (High formal autonomy, yet, negatively perceived) 
C6 Neutralised by the balanced interdependencies and mutual benefits 
C7 Negative 
C8 Neutralised by the positive interdependence and high cognitive congruence 
C9 Negative 
C10 Moderately negative perception (There were areas of autonomy and areas of unjustified 
control.) 
C11 Negative 
C12 Neutralised by some informality and the balanced interdependence 
C13 Neutralised by the positive interdependence and mutual benefits 
C14 Neutralised by the positive interdependence and mutual benefits 
C15 Neutralised by the positive interdependence and mutual benefits 
 
6.2.4.3 Summarising Propositions 
 The general perception of control (as acceptable or excessive) is likely to have an 
impact on the perception of VIRQ by the LL unit.  
 Acceptable (neutralised) control is likely to be associated with a favourable perception 
of VIRQ. 
 Excessive (negative) control is likely to be associated with an unfavourable perception 
of VIRQ. 
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6.2.5 Inter–Personal Relationship between Boundary Spanners 
The fifth antecedent is the inter–personal relationship between the boundary spanners 
representing the two ends of the vertical relationship.   
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the inter–unit relationship tended to be personalised by 
respondents from both sides. Therefore, it was not surprising to find an association between 
the inter–personal relationship between the key boundary spanners and the way they perceive 
the vertical inter–unit relationship.  Unlike the other four inter–unit related antecedents, this 
antecedent sheds light on the inter–personal dimension of an institutional relationship. In that 
sense, it should be noted that inter–personal relationships are assets embedded within personal 
connections. Therefore, while they can have institutional benefits, they are not institutionally 
sustainable.
97
  
The term “inter–personal” relationship is used in this study to donate a “between–persons” 
relationship, and not just a social or a friendship relationship. It rather refers to the degree to 
which the personal element has permeated the vertical institutional relationship (positively or 
negatively). Attitudinal factors (such as loyalty, liking, sharing something in common) usually 
resulted in an informal or a more “easy–going” vertical relationship. Strict formality, on the 
other hand, was usually accompanied with negative or neutral perceptions of the vertical 
relationship. More importantly, when the boundary spanners express a perception of a 
favourable inter–personal relationship, they tend to express that in terms of inter–personal 
trust and inter–personal satisfaction between them and the other party to the relationship.  
Even without posing a direct question, many respondents described their inter–personal 
relationship during the course of the conversation as they were describing the vertical 
                                                             
97 Unless the relationship between the members concerned continues. 
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relationship itself. However, in other instances, respondents were asked to speak about the 
inter–personal relationship with the key boundary spanners with which they have the most 
contact; whether they trust and are satisfied with their relationship with them and whether 
they regard the relationship as a purely informal, a friendly–formal working relationship, or a 
strictly formal relationship.  
6.2.5.1 Factors Affecting the Perception of Inter–Personal Relationships 
Three factors were found to affect the perception of such inter–personal relationships based 
on the evidence of the case studies. These are the personal/background similarities, personal 
loyalties, and personal qualities. These factors are summarised in Table 6.10 (see also Figure 
6.3).  
Table 6.10: A Summary of Factors Affecting the Perception of Inter–Personal 
Relationship Quality as Indicated by Evidence from Case Studies.  
Inter–Personal or 
Background Similarities 
 
Personal Loyalty 
 
Personal Qualities 
 
According to respondents from 
four cases, similarity between 
the boundary spanners 
representing the two ends of the 
vertical relationship was one of 
the factors why the LL 
respondents tended to view their 
inter–personal relationship 
positively, and hence to view 
the vertical inter–unit 
relationship favourably.  
“Something to do with 
personalities, because 
Respondents in three cases 
implied that loyalty plays a role 
in the way they perceive their 
inter–personal relationship with 
the HL people and hence the 
vertical inter–unit relationship. 
Personal loyalties can alter the 
lens through which the vertical 
inter–unit relationship is seen. 
Such loyalty is commonly 
summed up in “the [PVC or the 
VC] appointed me” and 
therefore, I am implicitly 
Most of the quotes highlighted 
that the personal quality of 
individuals in the vertical 
relationship plays a leading 
role. “Clearly, if we have 
another VC in a few years’ 
time, it might be different” or “if 
the top management of the 
University changes, maybe the 
situation will be different”, not 
only because of the 
management philosophy but 
also because of the personal 
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[the head of faculty] 
and I both are 
predisposed to be risk 
takers rather than risk 
avoiders, also we are 
quite good at ideas 
generation..[..].. . I 
think, in that sense, 
personality is very 
important because we 
perform based on our 
personalities.” 
 
Similarity is one of the pillars of 
mutual understanding and 
mutual trust spanning across the 
personal as well as the inter–
unit arenas, with all their 
intersections. Such similarity 
can be a personal characteristic 
similarity or it can be a 
background similarity.  
 
However, the role of personal 
characteristics in both cases 
cannot be easily discounted. 
Personal characteristic and 
background similarities can also 
provide a basis for “liking” and 
that can contribute, at least 
partially, to the way the whole 
vertical inter–unit relationship 
is viewed and assessed.  
“Because I quite like 
[the person in the HL 
indebted to his/her person. This 
underlying trust (of being 
appointed to hold a certain 
position) is reciprocated back 
by loyalty via direct (personal) 
and/or more generalised 
(institutional) reciprocity. This 
is why trust can be seen as a 
governance and control 
mechanism, albeit a subtle one.  
“Given that he [the VC] 
appointed me, it is a 
strong relationship and 
very supportive and 
clearly if we have 
another VC and in a 
few years’ time, it might 
be different…” 
 
 
qualities and personal 
philosophies of individuals 
representing the inter–unit 
relationship.   
 
Sometimes, the vertical 
relationship itself is poorly 
perceived partially because of 
the personalities of people in 
power.  
“It's a combination. I 
mean no structure is 
ever perfect, you can 
always work your way 
around it. If you got the 
right people in place, 
you can make anything 
work. So it is a 
combination of extra 
hierarchy, more 
bureaucracy, and a 
person who had a 
particular view about 
what he wanted and 
that made life very 
difficult...” 
 
In other instances, personnel 
changes are seen as the way to 
change the vertical relationship.  
“Having the new 
[principal] in, we are 
changing the way of 
doing things, we are 
replacing people with 
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unit]. We share 
something and this is 
may be a little 
contributing part. He 
was at [X] University, 
he is [from a certain 
field], I was [from that 
field], he likes people 
from [X] University…” 
 
people from outside. 
That is symbolic of new 
ways of thinking, new 
ways of doing 
things… ” 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Factors Likely to Affect the Perception of the Quality of Inter–Personal 
Relationships among the Concerned Boundary Spanners Representing the Vertical 
Relationship  
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6.2.5.2 The Inter– Personal Relationship  
The previous factors (similarities, personal loyalties and personal qualities) are argued to 
affect the perception of inter–personal relationships.  Positive inter–personal relationships or 
relationships beyond strictly formal ones can be helpful in making the LL unit feel “at ease”, 
it can be helpful in placing the LL unit in a better position to express its needs and views, and 
to influence the relationship terms. Therefore, a favourably perceived vertical inter–unit 
relationship was sometimes associated with a favourable inter–personal relationship between 
the key boundary spanners.  
Both the friendly formal and the informal relationship are likely to be associated with 
positively perceived inter–unit relationship quality. Generally, respondents who negatively 
perceived the vertical inter–unit relationship tended to describe their inter–personal 
relationship as strictly formal, while those who have described the relationship in more 
favourable terms tended to see their inter–personal relationship with their key contacts in the 
HL unit as friendly formal or informal ones.  
Inter–personal relationships such as “getting on well” with the people representing the vertical 
relationship or having something beyond a strict formal relationship were expressed in many 
comments as one of the factors contributing to why a vertical inter–unit relationships are 
perceived favourably. Favourable inter–personal relationships usually implied the presence of 
inter–personal trust and inter–personal satisfaction between the involved actors. 
“[what aspects of the relationship do you find most satisfactory?] At a personal level, 
I do get on with the head of [faculty], not everybody does, but I do and with other 
heads of schools and I am able to work with just about all the stuff across the 
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[faculty], but some better than others.  But I think these[are] personal level 
relationships… “ 
Good inter–personal relationships are vital for mutual understanding, and understanding 
paves the way for trusted causes, justifiable behaviours, but more importantly to influence. 
Favourable inter–personal relationships are thus fostered by mutual trust and satisfaction 
between the parties representing the relationship. 
“… if it wasn't a good personal relationship then I think it would have been very 
difficult to actually try and persuade him [the VC] of our school needs and what we 
want because they [the University] have been very supportive and through him and 
the faculty, the VC provided the school with strategic development fund etc… So if 
that relationship didn't exist, and he didn't have the confidence in myself and the BS, I 
think it would be difficult to get any extra resources into the school.” 
Table 6.11 summarises key notes on the inter–personal relationship as suggested by the case 
studies’ evidence.  
Table 6.11: A Summary of the Inter–Personal Relationship Attributes as Emerging from 
the Case Study Evidence. 
Case Comments on the  Inter–Personal Relationship 
C1 Stressed the role of boundary spanners’ similarity or difference in enabling or halting 
building shared understandings. 
The role of personal qualities was also stressed. 
C2 Stressed the role of boundary spanners’ personal similarities in enabling building 
common understandings. 
C3 Stressed the role of boundary spanners’ background similarities and the role of 
personal qualities in creating common understandings. 
C4 Good working relationships were attributed to personal qualities. The role of personal 
loyalties was stressed. 
C5 The role of personal qualities was stressed. 
C6 Stressed the role of personal qualities and personal similarities and 
complementarities. 
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C7 Stressed the role of personal affinity. 
C8 The relationship functioned well based on a mutual benefit bond. Formality was 
enough to attain the support required. 
C9 Stressed the role of boundary spanners’ similarity or difference in enabling or 
impeding the building of shared understandings. 
C10 Stressed the role of personal qualities. 
C11 Stressed the role of personal qualities. 
C12 Stressed the role of friendly formal relationships and its impact on achieving the 
desired outcomes. Also stressed the role of personal loyalties. 
C13 Stressed the role of personal qualities. 
C14 The relationship was formal yet bonded by mutual benefits. 
C15 Stressed the role of personal qualities. 
6.2.5.3 Summarising Propositions 
 Personal qualities, personal and background similarities, and personal loyalties can 
affect the perception of the inter–personal relationship between the key boundary 
spanners in the vertical inter unit relationship.  
 The more favourable the perception of the inter–personal relationship (represented 
in inter–personal trust and satisfaction) between the key boundary spanners in the 
vertical inter–unit relationship, the higher the VIRQ.  
 Friendly formal or informal relationships are more likely to be associated with a 
favourable perception of the VIRQ compared to strictly formal relationships.  
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Section II 
6.3 The Interrelated Antecedents 
Interestingly, the different antecedents seemed to be interrelated, which created cause and 
effect interrelationships amongst themselves. Yet, such chains of cause and effect 
relationships seem to have a starting point; the balance of interdependence. The balance of 
interdependence appears to have an impact on the perception of VIRQ as a direct antecedent, 
but it also seems to impact it indirectly by affecting the rest of the previously discussed 
antecedents.  
6.3.1 The Balance of Interdependence as a Key Predictor 
6.3.1.1 The Balance of Interdependence and the LL’s Orientation  
The balance of interdependence appeared to leave its marks on the choice of the LL unit’s 
orientation and its subsequent alignment. Looking into the characteristics of the LL units in 
Table 6.5, a number of observations can be noted: 
 First, when the LL unit was highly dependent on the HL unit and had weak bargaining 
power within its vertical institutional relationship, its choices tended to reflect a high 
degree of conformity to that relationship. Conformity was evident in prioritising an 
orientation that was in line with its HL unit’s strategic outlook (whether this 
orientation is towards the BS sector or towards the vertical institutional relationship) 
and was associated with neutralised duality. Relatively weak LL units were more 
integrated, aligned, and compliant with the pressures of their HL unit, thereby 
reflecting positive interdependencies. On the other hand, LL units with high 
bargaining power were more likely to deviate, to an extent, from the line drawn by 
their HL units, reflecting balanced or negative interdependencies.  
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 Second, maturity is assumed to be a subset of the LL unit’s potential power.  Mature 
LL units were more likely to be orientated towards the BS sector, while younger ones 
seemed to prioritise orientation towards the vertical institutional relationship. This has 
also tended to reflect different dependencies. While being mature does not guarantee 
strong bargaining power, maturity itself can partially alter the state of 
interdependence. Maturity can grant the LL unit the confidence of knowledge power 
and the power of experience, while younger LL units may need to incur the liability of 
newness, paying the price for their first stumbling steps. Young subsidiaries are, in 
most cases, weak by default and lack the power of institutional experience. Young 
subsidiaries can therefore be relatively more dependent on their HL units.  
 Third, both C2 and C12 are no exception to the observation that the balance of 
interdependence affects the alignment of institutional duality (see footnote 87 in this 
chapter). The LL units in these two cases were not only mature and relatively strong in 
their sector, but were also relatively strong in their vertical institutional relationship. 
Hence, the alignment was based on the LL unit’s choice of prioritising the BS sector, 
not vice versa. It was the HL unit that had to accommodate the need of a very 
powerful LL unit, not the other way round. 
Three points can be deduced from observing the LL unit’s orientation and its relationship to 
the balance of interdependence.  
First, it conforms to the general premise that relative power gives its holder the luxury of 
choice. Relative power gives the holder relatively more options compared to its weaker peers. 
Yet, how much constitutes “relatively” remains an important question. 
Second, it seems that the balance of interdependence not only alters the previously discussed 
antecedents, but also plays a key role in the game of legitimation. Oliver (1991, 1992) 
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inferred that legitimation (or delegitmation) is a choice that has different degrees and forms. 
Since younger or weaker LL units tended to be more compliant and conforming to the vertical 
institutional relationship in their choices compared to their stronger and more mature peers, 
this may imply that the extent of legitimation is associated with the balance of 
interdependence, and hence the relative latitude of choice
98
. This could partially answer the 
question posed in the above paragraph.  
Third, based on such observations it can be also inferred that legitimation is not only a choice, 
and it not only has varying extents; it also has an aspiring nature. Stronger LL units were once 
more compliant when they were weaker. As they grew stronger, they were trying to “fit in” or 
comply with a wider and a stronger institution; the BS sector.   
6.3.1.2 The Balance of Interdependence and the State of Cognitive Congruence 
Similar to the choice of orientation, it also seems that the balance of interdependence affects 
the state of the cognitive congruence between the LL and the HL unit. With reference to Table 
6.6, positively interdependent or highly dependent LL units tended to have higher cognitive 
congruence than their balanced or negatively interdependent peers. The reason could lie also 
in the power of choice and legitimation. Positively interdependent LL units are likely to 
conform to the institutional frame they are highly reliant on, even in their visions and means. 
Their choices are limited by their desire to be legitimate within their vertical institutional 
relationship. That is why highly dependent LL units seemed to be more aligned and integrated 
with their higher level units than their stronger peers.  
On the other hand, less dependent LL units tended to have relative power in choosing their 
own routes and referent institutional frames. Consequently, it was natural to quote the 
                                                             
98 The extent of legitimation can be inferred to be dependent on the power of the LL unit in relationship to the 
state of the balance of interdependence. The more the LL unit is dependent on the HL unit, the more the former 
is likely to comply with the pressures of the latter and vice versa.  
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respondents of the LL units saying “they do not understand” referring to a HL unit’s different 
ambitions or means. However, the deviation of the LL unit was always calculated, reflecting 
mutual, yet different extents of dependence. 
“We shaped this investment plan twice now. And we are constantly reshaping it to fit 
their [the University] agenda. The same one but to fit their priorities...” 
“We have got to conform to it, we have got to conform to the vertical relationship, we 
cannot deviate from it, I think if I simply ignored it, they will get rid of me and get 
somebody else. So it is very critical to conform to that and to play the game within the 
set of rules and do the best you can.” 
6.3.1.3 The Balance of Interdependence and Perceived Control/Autonomy  
There were a number of quotes linking demands for further autonomy with the balance of 
interdependence. Positively interdependent LL units tended to perceive the level of autonomy 
they have more favourably than other LL units which had corresponded with their HL units in 
terms of their level of interdependence or even exceeded it. The following quotes show that 
the LL unit’s perception of high dependence outweighs its perception of the need for more 
autonomy. As was evident in a number of cases, the benefits derived from the vertical 
relationship were just enough to discount the other tensions in the relationship. This point is 
deemed to be crucial in determining which level of autonomy is appropriate, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
“… But I stress this, I personally, my view is too much is made of autonomy.  A lot of 
my colleagues may not share this view.  Personally, I think we talk about it a little too 
much, we got obsessed with it, and probably we should be focusing over things we 
have control over a little bit more.  So, as I said, I think it is too valuable to us and 
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that we are part of a broad University, I think there is something that we should be 
making more of. There are many institutions that would love to be part of a large .. 
[..].. University...” 
“I'm not obsessed with autonomy, I know some deans who work in spite of their 
organisations. I don't think it's silly, I think it is dangerous to be competing with your 
University. ..[..].. I have seen some very tough deans, who think that they are in 
charge of their own business, but they are not, they are employees of the University.  
And I never acted as an independent person, never! There is no point because I am an 
employee. That doesn't mean I'm overly deferential, it just means that I understand 
what my role is ...[...]...  I need and value working in the framework within which I 
work. I find it a little constraining, but I find it totally appropriate. It is difficult, 
sometimes I manage it really well, and sometimes I go with the flow, with the speed of 
the movement. Sometimes like a Canute which is standing and trying to stop the tide 
coming in but the sea does not stop, so you need to learn to go with the tide.”  
This quotation, the benefits derived were sufficient for the head of the LL unit to redefine his 
role as “an employee”, while acknowledging that “it is difficult” but that he does not have 
enough power to “stop the tide coming in”. That not only sheds light on the role of positive 
interdependence and the low bargaining power of the LL unit, it also shows how respondents 
can shape a different perception about the very concept of “autonomy”.  
In other cases, the benefits derived were enough to view HL unit’s control as a form of 
integration rather than as a constraint; shifting the perception of the vertical relationship from 
being authoritative to an empowering one. 
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“We are not constrained. We are a central part of the University and integration with 
the rest of the University is very important. And the University values it a great deal. 
So we have a great deal in terms of the latitude in how we manage our activity and 
how we are expected to function effectively as an independent organisation but we do 
so within the context of the wider University...” 
While the control of the HL unit was still constraining in all cases, it could be neutralised by 
the benefits obtained from the vertical relationship. 
6.3.1.4 The Balance of Interdependence and the Boundary Spanners’ Inter–Personal 
Relationship 
The balance of interdependence potentially impacts upon the inter–personal relationships 
among the key boundary spanners involved in the vertical relationship. Because they are 
highly dependent, the people of the LL unit usually initiate a friendly relationship with their 
key contacts in the HL unit. This not only provides a better basis for legitimation, it also is 
more conducive to building shared understandings.  
“I always go to the social do’s …[..]..  it is all part and parcel of showing that the BS 
is part of the University…” 
This works in the opposite direction as well. If the HL unit recognises the importance of the 
LL unit, it tends to carefully select the key people in the LL unit. This can be a basis for 
personal trust and similarity (see point 6.2.5).  
6.3.1.5 Summarising Propositions 
 The perception of the balance of interdependence, coupled with the LL’s level of 
maturity, is likely to be associated with the neutralisation of the institutional duality as 
seen by the LL unit in the vertical relationship.  
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 The perception of the balance of interdependence is likely to influence the perception 
of cognitive congruence/disparity between the HL and the LL units in the vertical 
relationship as seen by the LL unit in the vertical relationship. The more the LL is 
dependent on the HL, the higher the level of cognitive congruence between them. 
 The perception of the balance of interdependence is likely to influence the perception 
of autonomy as seen by the LL unit in the vertical relationship. The more the LL is 
dependent on the HL, the more likely the HL’s control will be favourably perceived 
(neutralised) by the LL unit. 
 The perception of the balance of interdependence is likely to have bearing on the 
perception of the inter–personal relationships between the key boundary spanners in 
the vertical inter–unit relationship as seen by the LL unit. The more the LL is 
dependent on the HL, the more likely the inter–personal relationships between the key 
boundary spanners concerned will be favourable. 
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6.3.2 The Neutralisation of the Perception of Control 
While the level of interdependence tended to impact the other antecedents, many of the 
antecedents tended to impact the perception of control/autonomy. The interpersonal 
relationship between the key boundary spanners, the state of cognitive congruence and the 
unification of the institutional frames tended to colour the perception of the HL’s control, and 
hence the perception of the VIRQ. 
6.3.2.1 Perceived Control and the Degree of Formality between the Boundary Spanners  
The relationship between the boundary spanners representing the vertical relationship can 
impact the perception of control. A trust–based inter–personal relationship between the key 
boundary spanners tends to affect the perception of control favourably, regardless of the 
formal state of that control.  
“Of course we would want more autonomy but the BS has a high amount of autonomy 
when it comes to appointments now. The Dean has got a good relationship with the 
VC so that kind of helps. And sure anyone will tell you that they want more autonomy 
in their hands but I don't think the BS would want to be anything other than part of the 
University. So we realise we have to cooperate...” 
Both positive interpersonal and balanced interdependent relationships tended to neutralise the 
adverse repercussions of control.  
6.3.2.2 Perceived Control and Cognitive Congruence 
More importantly, it was cognitive congruence that seemed to have a profound neutralising 
impact on the perception of control. Cognitive congruence is argued to affect perceptions of 
control in general, whether positively or negatively. Shared values and culture are key 
governance mechanisms that are suggested to harmonise and govern a relationship without 
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creating a high sense of use of authority or control. Therefore, cognitive congruence is itself a 
control mechanism. 
In one case, the alignment of the broad strategy was enough to build a positive perception of 
autonomy. 
“If you were saying that do I have somebody on my neck 24 hours a day saying what 
you're doing, then the answer is no. But in terms of shaking the strategy, then within 
the context of the University strategy, which isn't a problem for us because it fits what 
we want to do, it is very aligned, then in one sense we are aligned with an overall 
strategy that has been broadly endorsed, and there is very little of what you cannot do, 
which is good.” 
It might be worth noting that cognitive disparity is negative mainly because it imposes 
constraints on the LL unit without necessarily understanding its needs and its environment. 
This means that it is due to the lack of common understandings, perceptions, and frames of 
reference that the autonomy of the LL unit is limited. Interestingly, the perception of 
autonomy was sometimes based on the LL’s previous experiences or an active comparison 
with peer LL units in the sector. This can highlight the important role of the unified frame of 
reference.  
“So we are controlled through our budget, our budget is very tightly controlled but 
once they've been approved, [it is fine]. I have talked to other deans in other BSs and I 
think we have more autonomy than what you see in other BSs but it is controlled 
through budgets.” 
In one case, the concept of high autonomy was stigmatised by a previous bitter experience. 
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“...and in terms of our relationship, I am a very clear that, you know, I was with the 
BS when it was [more] autonomous and it was a painful time, I have no aspiration to 
be [more] autonomous from the University, we want to be a BS at the heart of the 
University, that is our strengths.”  
This stresses the importance of focusing on the perception of autonomy rather than focusing 
on control mechanisms as such, if the perception of the VIRQ is the key concern. This 
analysis shows that there were three key factors that tended to neutralise the negative 
perception of control. These were the balance of interdependence, the interpersonal 
relationships, and the cognitive congruence. 
 
6.2.2.3 Summarising Propositions 
 The perception of interpersonal relationship quality is likely to have a bearing on the 
perception of autonomy from the perspective of the LL unit. The higher the perceived 
interpersonal relationship quality, the higher the autonomy perceived by the LL unit. 
 The state of cognitive congruence is likely to have bearing on the perception of 
autonomy from the perspective of the LL unit. Cognitive congruence is more likely to 
neutralise the perception of control compared to cognitive disparity. The higher the 
perceived cognitive congruity by the LL unit, the higher it perceives autonomy. 
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Section III 
6.4 The Perception of VIRQ 
This section reports the associations of antecedent conditions on the general perception of 
VIRQ as reported in the cases studied. These are summarised in Table 6.12.   
Table 6.12: Summarising Different Perceptions Associated with VIRQ based on 
Evidence from Case Studies. 
Case The balance of 
interdependence 
The LL’s 
orientation 
The state of 
cognitive 
congruence 
The 
perception 
of 
autonomy 
The overall 
perception of 
VIRQ 
Overall 
interdepe
ndence 
Embedde
d 
interdepe
ndence
99
 
C1 Negative  ––– The wider BSs’ 
sector  
Cognitive 
disparity 
Negative  Negative  
C2 Balanced  ––– The wider BSs’ 
sector 
High 
cognitive 
congruence  
Neutralised Positive  
 
 
C3 
 
 
Positive  
Balanced  
 
 
 
The wider BSs’ 
sector 
Moderate 
cognitive 
congruence 
Neutralised 
perception 
of control  
Moderately 
positive 
Negative  High 
cognitive 
disparity 
Very 
negative 
perception 
of control 
Negative  
C4 Positive  ––– The vertical 
institutional 
relationship   
High 
cognitive 
congruence  
Neutralised 
perception 
of control  
Positive  
C5 Positive  Negative  The wider BS s’ 
sector 
High 
cognitive 
disparity 
Negative 
perception 
of control  
Negative  
C6 Positive  ––– The vertical 
institutional 
relationship   
High 
cognitive 
congruence 
Neutralised 
perception 
of control 
Positive  
C7 Positive– 
balanced 
Negative  The wider BS s’ 
sector 
High 
cognitive 
disparity 
Very 
negative 
perception 
of control 
Negative  
C8 Positive  ––– The vertical 
institutional 
relationship   
High 
cognitive 
congruence 
Neutralised 
perception 
of control 
Positive  
                                                             
99 In case of the presence of an intermediate HL.  
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C9 Positive  Balanced  The wider BSs’ 
sector 
High 
Cognitive 
disparity  
Negative 
perception 
of control  
Negative  
C10  Balanced ––– The vertical 
institutional 
relationship   
Moderate 
Cognitive 
disparity  
Moderately 
negative 
perception 
of control 
Moderate 
C11 Balanced  ––– The wider BSs’ 
sector 
High 
evolving to 
moderate 
Cognitive 
disparity 
Negative 
perception 
of control 
Negative evolving 
to moderate 
C12  Balanced  Crossed  The wider BSs’ 
sector 
High 
cognitive 
congruence  
Neutralised 
control  
Positive  
C13  High 
positive 
interdepe
ndence  
––– The vertical 
institutional 
relationship   
High 
cognitive 
congruence 
Neutralised 
control  
Positive  
C14 High 
positive 
interdepe
ndence  
––– The vertical 
institutional 
relationship   
High  
cognitive 
congruence 
Neutralised 
control  
Positive  
C15  High 
positive 
interdepe
ndence  
––– The vertical 
institutional 
relationship   
High  
cognitive 
congruence 
Neutralised 
control  
Positive  
 
Based on this table, a number of observations regarding VIRQ and its antecedents can be 
made. 
It can be noted that all positive interdependent LL units (C4, C6, C8, C13, C14 and C15) 
tended to view VIRQ positively. Whenever the balance of interdependence was perceived to 
be negative, the perception of VIRQ tended to be unfavourably (C1, C3 – group (2), C5, and 
C7). For balanced interdependence, the results tended to be split into two groups. The first 
group was (C2, C3 group (1), and C12) where the balanced interdependence was associated 
with a favourable perception of relationship quality. The second group was (C9, C10 and 
C11) where the balanced interdependence was associated with unfavourable or moderately 
unfavourable perceptions of VIRQ.  
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6.4.1 When the LL Unit is Positively Interdependent  
With regard to the positively interdependent LL units, they tended to have high levels of 
cognitive congruence, which in turn neutralised their perception of control, even when they 
were generally highly controlled through different control mechanisms. The relationship was 
generally supportive and empowering to the LL unit. It was bonded by mutual, yet possibly 
unequal rewards rebated to both the relationship parties.  
This indicates a key point. A positive interdependence relationship is a relationship where the 
benefits far exceed the costs from the perspective of the LL unit. These derived benefits then 
shape the rest of the relationship–related perceptions.  
In the positively interdependent cases, not only was the overall assessment of VIRQ 
favourable but also the perception of cognitive congruence as well as of control. As 
mentioned in Section II, positive interdependence can shape the choices of the LL unit as they 
start to conform to the institutional frame on which they are highly dependent. Both the HL 
and the LL units become unified by common goals or mutual benefits, and the positive 
relationship between them can even reinforce the continuous sustenance of cognitive 
congruence.  
Control is neutralised in such cases not only due to the impact of cognitive congruence but 
also because accepting control is a way of legitimation within the vertical institutional 
relationship in order to derive the desired benefits. Control thus becomes justified as a key 
source of empowerment. If one were to search for a key word describing the dynamics of the 
aforementioned interrelationships, it would be legitimacy. Legitimacy dominates the scene in 
positive interdependent relationships.  
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Figure 6.4: Summarising the Consequences Associated with Positive Interdependence 
 
6.4.2 When the LL Unit is Negatively Interdependent  
With regard to negative interdependence, not only was VIRQ perceived unfavourably, but so 
also were the state of cognitive congruence and subsequently, the perception of control. 
Negative interdependence relationships are relationships where the cost is negatively 
perceived as they are not met by comparable benefits. In negative interdependence cases, the 
LL unit did not need the HL unit as much as the latter needed the former. The bargaining 
power of the LL unit was high and its desires were not as constrained by the need for (active) 
legitimacy. Negatively interdependent LL units were more confident to choose a different 
orientation and to have different goals to their HL unit, resulting in high cognitive disparity. A 
negative perception of control then resulted from high perceptions of cognitive disparity.  
Lacking a common frame of reference along with excessive control from a structural authority 
that is not needed was seen as dysfunctional, constraining, and tormenting. In such cases, the 
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vertical inter–unit relationship evolved from an empowering relationship to a constraining one 
with relatively less reason to accept the constraints
100
.  
Figure 6.5: Summarising the Consequences Associated with Negative Interdependence 
 
6.4.3 When the LL Unit is in Balanced Interdependence 
For balanced interdependence relationships, the picture seemed to be less straightforward. 
Results for the balanced interdependent cases split into two groups representing two different 
scenarios. The first group of balanced interdependent cases tended to generally view VIRQ 
positively or at least as moderately positively. In these cases, the state of cognitive 
congruence was closely associated with the perception of VIRQ and the subsequent 
perception of control. Balanced interdependence requires that the two parties of the 
relationship need each other more or less equally, and therefore, both of them have high 
bargaining power in the relationship. Since both of them need each other equally, the bond of 
                                                             
100 Although this is not supported by the cross-sectional analyses, theoretically negative interdependence of the 
LL unit can also result in cognitive congruence where the HL unit aligns or integrates the needs of the LL unit 
due to the former’s dependence. The HL unit can also “create” new dependencies for the LL unit in an attempt to 
maintain the legitimacy of its higher structural position. This was not reported in this chapter as this chapter only 
focuses on a static view of the antecedents in order to enable the establishment of the interrelationships among 
the different variables under study. Most cases were in continuous evolution and Chapter 7 focuses more on the 
dynamics of the vertical inter-unit relationship as it is devoted to the associated consequences of the different 
VIRQ perceptions.  
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mutual benefits can make them align their goals and frames, resulting in a favourable state of 
cognitive congruence. 
However, since they need each other equally, the relative strength of both parties can also 
stand in the way of alignment, at least temporarily. This summarises the position of the 
second group of balanced interdependent cases. The need for legitimacy in balanced 
interdependence is relatively less and therefore the latitude of choice is relatively greater. 
High bargaining power can be associated with choice rather than submission, and different 
choices, on the part of equally powerful units, can be sources of tension if not aligned. What 
aspects to prioritise and what aspects to compromise on are broad examples of what these 
tensions can involve.  
Moreover, for balanced interdependent cases where the LL unit perceives the relationship as 
characterised by low cognitive congruence, the perception of control tends to be very 
negative. There are two main reasons behind this. First, not only does the state of cognitive 
disparity heighten the negative consequences of control, the relative power of the LL unit in 
this case also makes control much more uninvited. The control of the HL unit becomes 
unjustifiable and its authority becomes questionable as both parties become more or less 
equally powerful. Second, the HL unit, might consider that it needs to enforce further controls 
on this powerful LL unit before it becomes even more powerful. The HL needs this LL unit to 
be developed but, at the same, it fears its evolving power. This can result in a tightening of its 
grip on that LL unit. Unjustifiable control is thus joined sometimes by excessive control, 
harming the instinctive desire of the LL unit; empowerment from the HL
101
.  
                                                             
101 The scenario of excessive control could also be evident in cases where the LL is negatively interdependent.  
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Figure 6.6: Summarising the Consequences Associated with Balanced 
Interdependence
102
 
 
6.4.4 Summarising Propositions 
 Positive interdependence of the LL unit is likely to have a positive impact on the 
perception of cognitive congruence, neutralise the perception of control, and have a 
positive impact on the perception of the VIRQ. 
 The negative interdependence of the LL unit is likely to have a negative impact on the 
perception of cognitive congruence, the perception of control, and the perception of 
the VIRQ. 
 Balanced interdependence is likely to be associated with a neutralised perception of 
control and a favourable perception of VIRQ if the perception of cognitive congruence 
is positive.  
                                                             
102 The figure shows the possibility for two opposite scenarios based on the perception of the state of cognitive 
congruence.  
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 Balanced interdependence is likely to be associated with a negative perception of 
control and an unfavourable perception of VIRQ if the perception of cognitive 
congruence is negative.  
 In all cases, a favourable perception of the state of cognitive congruence is likely to be 
associated with a favourable perception of VIRQ.  
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Section IV 
6.5 The Construction of the Meaning of VIRQ – Inferences based on the Perception of 
VIRQ 
The previous analysis suggests that the perception of high cognitive congruence can mediate 
the impact of the balance of interdependence on the perception of the VIRQ. However, the 
state of cognitive congruence itself can be a function of the state of the balance of 
interdependence, which makes the latter the integral part of the vertical inter–unit relationship 
saga. The state of cognitive congruence, as discussed, is just a manifestation of the relative 
dependencies and legitimation manoeuvres embedded in vertical relationships.  
The previous analysis also shows that the perceptions of all the vertical inter–unit relationship 
variables are calculative in their very essence. They are based on perceptual calculative 
processes guided mainly by the balance of interdependence. The perception of VIRQ itself is 
one of the results of such calculation processes, along with the congruency of choices and 
perceptions and the perception of control.  
In all the cases studied, respondents referred to such calculation processes and explicitly or 
implicitly linked them to the perception of VIRQ. The calculation process tends to be strategic 
and pragmatic. The LL unit always “wins some and loses some”, but the balance should be of 
a net empowering benefit for the LL unit to be satisfactory.  
“My view is that we derive far more benefit than the cost associated with the 
arrangement being part of a major University with its knowledge base, its resources, 
its educational standing, that is of tremendous benefit to the BS and we hope not only 
grow but also to contribute to the rest of the University. So the benefit to us from that 
relationship far exceeds any issues or constraints associated with it.” 
 
 
248 
 
Empowerment, as mentioned in Chapter 5, is seen as the corner stone in vertical relationships. 
Vertical relationships are initiated with the purpose of empowerment and sustained by 
ambition for further empowerment. Empowerment increases the potential for influence on 
one’s destiny; the foundation upon which VIRQ is argued to be based.  
Taking this line of thinking further, if the purpose of the LL unit in the vertical relationship is 
to maximise its influence on its own destiny, then what are its available options?
103
 
Sometimes maximising such influence entails that the LL unit submits to the HL unit; limiting 
its influence to the empowerment it receives from such submission. In this case, having more 
influence on one’s destiny is being embedded in the vertical relationship with its current 
terms. In some other cases, having more influence may involve fighting for it. In other cases, 
having more influence on one’s destiny requires controlling others (spreading the span of 
influence over others). This poses a series of questions: what is the ceiling of the influence 
aspired to? What seems to be a satisfactory level? And more importantly, what underlies the 
lines underlying satisfaction with influence? 
These questions can only be answered looking at the overall perception of VIRQ along with 
considering its likely antecedents. It is suggested that answers revolve around the balance of 
interdependence. Neither empowerment nor influence are absolute; they are closely tied to the 
balance of interdependence.  
Reflecting on the options mentioned in the above paragraph, submitting to the terms of the 
relationships is very likely in cases where the LL unit is positively interdependent. This can 
be argued not to constitute passive submission; rather, it is based on active calculations of 
                                                             
103 The ambition for empowerment and influence as well as the scenarios presented also applies to both the HL 
and the LL in the vertical relationship. However, this section is more concerned with the behaviour of the LL 
unit as having less structural power.  
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what is empowering and what is not. In this case, the positive interdependence draws the lines 
of satisfaction.  
When the balance of interdependence swings in favour of the LL unit, the LL unit starts to 
have more power to demand further influence on its own destiny. This time influence on 
one’s destiny in the vertical relationship can extend as far as leaving its mark on the terms of 
the relationship itself (affecting the terms of autonomy and control, and distribution of 
resources). Changing the terms of the relationship can inevitably influence the positions of the 
different parties, and hence intentionally or coincidently affect the scope of control of others.  
The positive swing in the balance of interdependence in the favour of the LL unit justifies its 
expectations and legitimises its ambitions for more influence, where the concept of fairness 
starts to colour the scene. How much influence is satisfactory is thus a function of the balance 
of interdependence between the vertical relationship parties. The analysis of the different 
cases indicates that the LL unit was satisfied with the relationship insofar as the relationship 
was generally empowering where the LL unit enjoyed what is perceived to be a fair level of 
influence.  
Fairness in this context ties the balance of influence to the balance of interdependence
104
. A 
positive interdependence relationship, from the perspective of the LL unit, is an empowering 
one insofar as it receives more benefits than costs. The LL unit tends to be satisfied with the 
relationship, whatever its terms of control and its respective influence, as the balance of 
interdependence entails that control should be in the hands of the HL unit.  
                                                             
104 While this can be normatively expected in voluntary relationships, it could be less obvious in vertical 
relationships where the structural power of the HL unit can manipulate the settlement of the balances of 
interdependence and influence.  
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Balanced interdependence relationships can be more contentious as influence on the terms of 
the relationship starts to be a contested resource (particularly if the interests of the different 
parties to the relationship are not harmonious). The concept of fair influence entails that the 
LL unit should have a say in the terms of the relationship so that the balance of influence and 
the balance of interdependence reach a point of equilibrium.  
Negative interdependence relationships are relationships where the LL unit needs greater 
influence on the terms of the relationship than its HL unit in order to perceive the relationship 
as satisfactory, or as a relationship of fair influence.  
While the overall analysis supports this claim as discussed, the concept of fair influence was 
crystallised through direct quotes of 15 respondents representing 8 case studies. This is in 
addition to other quotations stressing the need for influence and fairness in the vertical 
relationship in general.  
6.5.1 The Concept of Fair Influence  
According to the findings, cost and benefit calculations reflecting the balance of 
interdependence tended to shape what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, what is fair 
and what is not, what is empowering and what is not. This calculation tended to affect 
perceptions of all the relationship variables, and perceptions tended to shape behaviours and 
actions. Perceptual calculations tended to frame the extent to which the LL unit pushes for 
autonomy as well as when it stops pushing for it. To the LL unit, the balance of 
interdependence itself thus creates or frees up the relationship constraints. 
In positively interdependent LL units, respondents preferred having “power–with” the HL 
unit to gaining autonomy. Whenever respondents from the LL unit perceived positive 
interdependence, quotations such as the following were common. 
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“You have autonomy but somewhere you have a gate. You cannot just do it, to be 
honest, you [would] be mad anyway. This would be a case of the BS completely doing 
its own thing. It will be suicide to think that you could do that, certainly in this day 
and age…” 
“I think, as the school, we were pushing hard for autonomy to start with, a little too 
hard to be honest… [..]…I think one of the advantages [here] is that we are part of a 
large historic traditional University. I think it is advantageous to us, it is attracting the 
students and all the rest of it. ..[..].. Again there is an idealistic viewpoint and there is 
the realistic viewpoint. In an ideal world, the school would be a budget centre and we 
would be solely in control of the revenue that we earn [and] the income we generate. 
That would be complete autonomy.  But as I say realistically we are part of a larger 
University….[..].. but back in the real world, we are constrained, we have to live with 
it, acknowledging the benefit of being part of large University...” 
The commonality of mentioning control and autonomy symbolises the desired influence 
which is constrained by positive interdependence. However, such constraints are fair given 
the positive interdependence, since it conveys valuable relationship benefits that would not 
have been obtained otherwise. Focusing on the balance of interdependence made respondents 
perceive VIRQ positively via reshaping their expectations for the LL unit. Whether or not the 
overall satisfaction reported in positively interdependent LL cases can be seen as one of the 
coping mechanisms to deal with restricted choices is perhaps an interesting question.
105
  
                                                             
105 In some cases, satisfaction with the balance of influence in positive interdependence relationships was not 
even intended by the HL unit, it was a by-product of an overall process of change; yet it seemed satisfactory. 
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For balanced or negatively interdependent cases, what tended to be perceived as a satisfactory 
relationship differed with the variation in what constitutes fair influence. The shift in the 
balance of interdependence in the favour of the LL unit made the latter more ambitious in 
terms of aspiration for influence. Balanced or the negative interdependence shaped different 
expectations for the LL unit and these expectations tended to frame what was deemed 
satisfactory and what was not.  
Some LL respondents tended to emphasise that what they get in terms of influence is what 
they deserve, and therefore they were satisfied about the fairness of the balance of influence.  
”… but basically it has taken nearly X years to repair the relationship and therefore 
to get more of the resources that I think we both deserve but also we need ...[..].. I am 
not in dispute with the University. There is nothing I want that I have not either got or 
is coming …” 
Some other units were less satisfied as based on their balance of interdependence; they said 
that they deserved more influence on their destiny; and subsequently on the terms of the 
relationship. Such LL units tended to emphasise their contribution and their strength in the 
vertical relationship, unlike the positively interdependent cases which tended to emphasise the 
power of the HL unit or the benefits they receive from the HL. 
“No [I am not satisfied with the relationship with the University] I would say, there is 
too much control from the University as a whole of the BS and too much exploitation 
of its resources ..[..]..  We have increased our contributions over the last X years to 
the University from X million to 2X million, we’ve increased our revenue by about 
XX% over that time…[..].. , that places huge strains on the BS in terms of its ability to 
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continue to operate and offer quality educational experience, and yes those have been 
sources of strain, I would say.” 
This is one example of the many quotes which stress the need for further influence (by 
demanding an increase in the scope of autonomy), but this demanded influence is justified by 
the contribution the LL unit brings to the vertical relationship. It is the balance of 
interdependence that entail that these demands are fair or legitimate. More importantly, 
satisfaction was reported in a number of cases when the relationship started to reflect fairness 
in the balance of influence associated with the respective balance of interdependence.  
6.5.2 The Meaning of VIRQ: a Summary 
Chapter 5 attempted to construct the meaning of VIRQ. However, it ended with two 
unanswered questions. If VIRQ means influence, what kind of influence is required (i.e. 
influence on what); and to what extent is that influence required (i.e. what is the degree of 
influence that will be satisfactory to the LL)? 
this chapter indicates that the LL units wish to influence their own destiny and desire to 
maximise their scope of influence. For the vertical relationship to be perceived satisfactorily, 
it should be generally be an empowering one, allowing the LL unit to increase its scope of 
influence on its own destiny by the virtue of the relationship.  
However, in ensuring influence over its own destiny, the LL unit might choose to conform to 
some or all of the terms of the vertical relationships terms, resulting in a constraint on its 
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choices. Equally, in ensuring influence, the LL unit might need to be able to influence the 
terms of the vertical relationship and/or the HL unit itself
106
. 
The second question posed at the end of Chapter 5 can be answered in the terms of the 
balance of interdependence between the parties to the vertical relationship. The concept of fair 
influence was introduced to reflect that the quality of the vertical inter–unit relationships is 
favourably perceived when the balance of influence is fairly tied to the balance of 
interdependence. From the perspective of the LL unit, the meaning of VIRQ thus becomes an 
overall empowering relationship where there is a general perception of a fair balance of 
influence between the parties to the relationship. It is the perception of the balance of 
interdependence that determines the perception of influence fairness. 
Fairness of influence focuses mainly on the relative power and dependence dynamics in the 
vertical relationship. Vertical relationships are full of pull and push dynamics that lead 
perceptions of interdependencies, influence, and fairness to be in continuous flux. Moreover, 
being “perceived” makes the settlement of any relationship less straight forward. The 
consequences of VIRQ, and how these consequences can lead to shifts in the balance of 
influence, and sometimes in the balance of interdependence, is the concern of Chapter 7. 
6.5.3 A Summarising Proposition 
 The different VIRQ attributes are likely to boil downs to one underlying meaning; 
achieving a satisfactory/fair balance of influence between the HL and the LL . 
                                                             
106 The vertical relationship draws the boundaries of this study; however, in practice, the vertical relationship 
does not limit the influence ambitions, as the desire for influence might extend to resources or entities beyond 
that relationship.  
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6.6 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to report the different antecedents that were likely to predict 
the perception of VIRQ and to complete the meaning construction of the latter. Five different 
antecedents were suggested based on thorough cross–case and within–case analyses. This 
chapter initially focused on providing a comprehensive description of the likely antecedents. 
The inter–linkages among the different antecedents were also discussed and the pivotal role of 
the balance of interdependence was pinpointed. The chapter suggests a number of 
propositions related to the antecedents of the perception of VIRQ. This chapter also attempted 
to complete the meaning construction associated with VIRQ by introducing the concept of fair 
influence. 
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CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS (3) 
What are the Consequences and Concomitants that are Likely to be 
Associated with the Perception of VIRQ? 
7.1 Introduction 
The importance of understanding the concept of VIRQ lies in comprehending the potential 
consequences of its perception. In this sense, VIRQ is seen as a social resource that is 
exchanged between the two levels of the relationship. Research on relationship quality in 
different contexts has strongly emphasized this premise (see for example Crosby et al., 1990; 
Eisenberger, et al., 2001; Maslyn, and Uhl–Bien, 2001). Therefore, a reciprocation process 
will take place based on perception of the nature of this social resource.   
This chapter builds primarily on the reciprocation of the LL units based on the way they 
perceive the quality of their vertical inter–unit relationship. LL reciprocation is the main 
concern of this chapter as it is the structurally weaker party in the vertical relationship. 
Therefore, the way it reciprocates, it is suggested, sheds light on novel areas, as LL 
reciprocation generally has less latitude compared to the HL unit. This chapter, therefore, 
builds on the opinion of the boundary spanners representing the LL unit. 
The case study evidence suggested that reciprocation expresses the potential power of the LL 
unit (embedded capacity). Yet, the way in which such potential power is manifested is found 
to be associated with the state of the balance of interdependence in the vertical relationship. 
The findings suggest that reciprocation mainly follows a calculative process based on rational 
cost and benefit analyses. Thus three distinct modes are likely to emerge; positive, negative, 
and tactful reciprocation; although there is no contradiction with the commonly used modes of 
reciprocity in the general organisational literature (direct, indirect, and generalised).  While 
positive and sometimes negative reciprocity tend to be more common in organisational 
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research,
107
 to the best of my knowledge, tactful reciprocation has not been discussed in the 
existing literature on organisations.  
The identified modes of reciprocation are, however, not mutually exclusive; they tend to 
reflect general tendencies rather than dichotomous choices. In many cases, some overlap 
between tactful and negative reciprocity was observed, yet there was a general tendency that 
tended to dominate in most cases which made categorisation possible.   
Furthermore, this chapter goes beyond the identification of the different modes of 
reciprocation to examine the potential impact of the different reciprocation modes on the 
stability of the power distribution structure (who influences what decisions) in the vertical 
relationship (for simplicity’s sake referred to as structural stability). The findings indicate that 
the different modes of reciprocation can result in structural stability, structural refinement, or 
structural instability. Each of these depends on how the LL’s boundary spanners and staff 
choose to manifest their potential power through reciprocation. This in turn is based on the 
way they perceive their empowerment and their scope of influence (VIRQ). Changes or 
stability in the structure of power distribution thus reflect the power dynamics between the 
parties to the vertical relationship. Yet, structural changes or stability are not necessarily 
related to changes in the formal organisational structure; the structure of power distribution 
can be changed either formally or informally simply by stabilising, gaining, or losing the 
desired scope of influence from a given vertical relationship. 
Based on the findings, positive reciprocation was usually associated with structural stability 
where the distribution of power in the vertical relationship is stable (in the short /medium 
term) as the parties to the relationship satisfactorily empower each other. Tactful reciprocation 
                                                             
107 See, for example, the literature on perceived organisational support (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 2001). 
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is a choice that reflects the strategic aspirations of the LL unit for a refinement of the power 
distribution in the vertical relationship. It was thus usually associated with structural 
refinement, although not necessarily via changing formal organisational structure. Negative 
reciprocation was associated with dysfunctional relationships due to the dissatisfactory scope 
of influence perceived by the LL unit and therefore the distribution of power itself becomes 
unstable, resulting in structural instability. Structural change in tactful and negative 
reciprocation is referred to as structural refinement and structural instability respectively as 
the former refers to a structural change that occurs via the pursuit of LL legitimation, while 
the latter is a by–product of a dysfunctional relationship.  
This chapter, therefore, sheds light on novel areas concerning the functionality of vertical 
inter–unit relations and provides fresh insights into the intra–organisational power dynamics 
reflected in the structural stability of the power distribution. Reciprocation based on the 
perception of VIRQ shows that the structural power of the HL in vertical relationships cannot 
be taken for granted as power is dynamic and reciprocal. However, the modes of reciprocation 
and the nature of the LL’s potential power would vary.  
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Section I 
7.2 Positive Reciprocation 
Positive reciprocation is when the LL unit responds to a positively perceived VIRQ in a 
positive way in order to maintain and maximise its already satisfactory scope of influence. 
This is described as reciprocation as the LL unit members use their potential power to 
reciprocate back to the HL. The LL’s reciprocation is based on the LL’s perception of VIRQ 
but also given the scope of the LL’s potential power. 
Positive reciprocation has been identified in a number of cases, but most notably in C4, C6, 
C8, C13, C14, and C15. The common features in these cases can be summarised as follows:   
1. The boundary spanners interviewed in these cases expressed high satisfaction with 
most of the VIRQ aspects. This includes a satisfactory level of influence (in general) 
and a satisfactory assessment of the relationship attributes (trust, openness, fairness… 
etc). Therefore, the relationship was seen as one of a positive or a favourable quality.  
2. These cases are the ones described to be in positive interdependence with their HL 
units (i.e., their need for the HL exceeds the HL’s need for them).  
3. These cases showed common features in terms of their reaction to the perception of 
favourable VIRQ. Such features can be summed up in using their potential power to 
show institutional legitimacy. The LL units showing positive reciprocation were, in 
effect, showing and maintaining their legitimacy within the vertical relationships. 
Legitimacy in positive reciprocation cases was seen by the LL respondents as a 
platform for achieving the desired influence and for being empowered. It was a 
rational choice given the positive perception associated with the VIRQ, but more 
importantly, given the positive interdependence of these LL units.  
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4. Such legitimacy was reflected on two overlapping levels. The first level was at the  
level of the boundary spanners of the LL unit and the second is the broader unit’s 
level.  Legitimation activities can also be categorised into two broad categories; 
compliance and active legitimacy.  Compliance legitimation involved meeting role 
obligations while active legitimation entailed doing extra–role activities (See table 
7.1).    
5. Both categories of legitimation activities were meant to maintain and maximise the 
already satisfactory scope of influence that the LL unit enjoyed.   
Table 7.1: Patterns of Positive Reciprocation Manifested via Compliance and Active 
Legitimation Activities. 
Legitimacy in positive reciprocation cases 
 The Boundary Spanner Level The Unit Level 
Compliance 
Legitimacy  
 Dual identification  
 Meeting expectations 
 LL unit integration and the 
unification of the vertical 
relationship levels. 
 LL unit meeting the HL’s 
expectations. 
 LL unit adoption of the HL’s 
agenda.  
 
Active 
legitimacy 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
 Extra–role activities to gain the 
trust of the HL.  
 
Compliance legitimation activities are activities expected within the role of both the LL 
boundary spanner and the LL unit itself. Therefore, in compliance legitimation, both the 
boundary spanners and the staff of the LL (as representing the LL unit) were performing their 
expected tasks. In active legitimation activities, however, both the boundary spanners and the 
other staff in the LL unit were doing extra tasks beyond what was expected of them (extra–
role activities). The aim thereby was to maintain and maximise the pre–existing favourable 
vertical relationship.  
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Both categories of legitimation were seen in positive reciprocation since such activities were 
reported as a response to a positively perceived VIRQ.  Both of the categories of legitimation 
activities reflect a rational choice made by the LL units to maintain the favourable 
relationship they have. These activities also reflect the potential capacity of the LL given their 
positive interdependence with their HL. Based on responses of the LL’s interviewees, the 
compliance legitimation activities will be first highlighted. This will be followed by a brief 
discussion of the active legitimation activities. 
7.2.1 Compliance Legitimation  
7.2.1.1 Dual Identification of Boundary Spanner 
On the boundary spanners’ level, the LL respondents who showed positive reciprocation 
expressed their identification with both the LL (the BS) and the HL units (the University). 
This is known as dual identification of the boundary spanners (cf: Richter et al., 2006). The 
duality of the identification of the key boundary spanners (usually the Dean/Head of the BS) 
was reported in all cases grouped under the positive reciprocation mode. It was seen by the 
respondents as a way of being legitimate within their vertical relationship so that they could 
maintain or increase their influence.  
“I [take] the corner of the BS but equally you are aware that ultimately you have got to be 
corporate.  Because, again if you are constantly, like a broken record, every time you say 
well the BS is this and we do not need that, you will not have much of a voice to make 
decisions.” 
7.2.1.2 The Unification of the Levels of the Vertical Relationship  
At the lower unit level, respondents suggested that because the relationship was favourably 
perceived, there was a sense of organisational integration whereby the different organizational 
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units, with their different vertical levels, were seen as a one entity; there was no “us and 
them” distinction.  
“We speak of the BS separate entity, it is not a separate entity, we are part of the 
University. It is not them and us; we are part of the institution. And there are 
compromises to be made really because there are limited resources. So you just got to 
make the most of what you’ve got.” 
“ ….I  don't act as an independent person who happens to have the privilege of 
working in the University. I am an integral part of the senior team and the direction of 
the University so I work closely with them all the time ... [..]..  because I am an 
employee. That doesn't mean I'm overly differential, it just means that I understand 
what my role is ...[..]... Because you should be working in harmony with your 
University, you shouldn't be six or seven independent arms…” 
These previous quotations illustrate LL’s respondents who chose to position the vertical 
relationship as one characterised by unity and integration.  Respondents in positive 
reciprocation cases actively sought legitimacy within their vertical relationship through 
integration.  
Yet such legitimacy was not only emphasised in terms of organisational integration, but was 
also reflected in all the choices and the behaviour of the LL unit members; showing positive 
reciprocation.  Working according to the HL’s agenda, supporting the HL’s position, and 
meeting the agreed upon obligations are only examples of maintaining and showing 
legitimacy.  Showing legitimacy sometimes involved a relatively passive acceptance of the 
institutional obligations. “I am an employee” is a statement uttered by a respondent from the 
LL unit that conveys signs of high conformity.  
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More importantly, due to the LL’s ability to generate revenue in the context of this research, 
the LL respondents emphasised that in order to be legitimate, they must be able to generate 
the resources their institution expected from them. Many respondents under the category of 
positive reciprocation saw this as the primary role of the LL unit.  
“I think fundamentally any BS or any faculty has to be financially strong, I think a lot of 
issues with the faculties emerge because, in effect, if you’re not delivering the level of 
resources you need, then the University have to carry things out. Again through my 
experience in other places, if you are not making whatever level of return or surplus or 
however the University defines it, then I think you do come under pressure. So I think in 
terms of what the basis of a good relationship, I think it is all based on strong financial 
position as it would be in any business, a business that is not doing well comes under 
pressure in lots of different ways. You may argue that this is not academic or that but to 
be realistic, a strong financial position allows you to do and gives people confidence in 
your ability to deliver other things.” 
7.2.2 Active Legitimation 
Legitimation activities were not only confined to meeting role “obligations”, but it also 
involved extra–role activities  at  both the levels of the boundary spanners  and of the LL unit 
as a whole.   
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7.2.2.1 Boundary Spanners’ Informal Relationship Building108 
At the boundary spanners’ level, active legitimacy involved the use of the informal 
organisational route. The reliance on formal lines of communication can sometimes be less 
efficient due to the high bureaucratisation of the sector under study, and hence there tended to 
be informal organisational channels based on the boundary spanners’ relationship building. 
Boundary spanners representing the LL units were actively building informal relationships 
and sometimes trust–based relationships to maintain their “personal” legitimacy. However, 
such “personal” legitimacy is not maintained for a personal reason, it is rather used to 
facilitate meeting their role expectations (in representing the LL unit).  
“I think [informal relationships] are usually important because as in most 
organisations, there is a kind of clear path laid down in procedures and structures 
which often take you around the woods not the tree you need.  So if you know the tree 
you need, you can move to the tree straight sometimes informally by knowing the 
individuals or the groups that would be actually dealing with them and resolve the 
issues that you need to tackle.” 
“Usually there is a way around things if you know the right person  ...” 
                                                             
108 The boundaries between the boundary spanner’s level and the unit’s level tend to be very blurred as most of 
these legitimation activities are made via boundary spanners or the other members of the LL unit. However, the 
distinction made in this chapter is based upon whether the legitimation activity involves using the boundary 
spanner’s specific resources and initiatives for maintaining legitimacy or such legitimacy is maintained through 
using the resources and initiatives of the unit as a whole. In other words, the distinction reflects whether the 
legitimation activities and initiatives are shared by the LL unit members or just reflect individual, and therefore 
discrete and less sustainable, initiatives. This will typically differ from case to case and, therefore, this 
distinction is rather a broad one. It is just meant to show that active legitimation can occur at both levels, rather 
than establishing two distinct categories.  
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7.2.2.2 Extra–Role Activities 
At the level of the LL unit, active legitimation involved doing extra–role activities that would 
benefit the institution as a whole, even sometimes at the expense of the LL unit itself.  
“I think you would be mad not to support the University position and I think you've got 
to. I have gone across all sorts of opportunities not for us but for the University’s 
sake, and I pass them on and they tell me I need to speak to X because you can do 
some good stuff. And there is a time that we are running events and most of the things 
will be linked to them [the University] and not to us and we paid for it for instance, 
but it is for the greater good.” 
Legitimation activities, in general, do not only represent positive reciprocation to a positively 
perceived VIRQ, but they are also part of achieving influence. An influence on the LL unit’s 
destiny was perceived to be realised only via this legitimation. It is therefore suggested that 
the choice of positive reciprocation is a rational one as it seeks to increase the scope of 
influence of the LL unit and to maintain its already satisfactory scope of influence. Under the 
positive reciprocation mode, the way the LL units chose to manifest their potential capacity 
(potential power) was not only through showing their compliance to the HL unit, but also 
through showing also their credibility. In sum, positive perception of VIRQ with positive 
interdependence gave rise to positive reciprocation in the cases studied. 
Taking this line of thinking further, positive reciprocation via maintaining legitimacy was 
associated with a well–functioning relationship for both of the two parties to the vertical 
relationship. One can argue that this process can be seen as a self–reinforcing circle where the 
positive perception of the VIRQ by the LL caused positive reciprocation via compliance and 
active legitimation activities from the LL. This in turn is reciprocated back by an empowering 
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relationship from the HL, which will be reciprocated by compliance and active legitimation 
activities made by the LL and so on.  
7.2.3 Positive Reciprocation and Structural Stability  
Given the nature of positive reciprocation described, the power distribution structure of the 
vertical relationship was not disturbed by sudden or confrontational attempts at refinement 
initiated by the LL. To illustrate, the relationship was sufficiently satisfactory to its involved 
parties, and therefore there were less apparent contests for influence. Satisfactory influence 
was achieved given the established relationship power structure and the LL was empowered 
by maintaining legitimacy. Positive reciprocation relationships are therefore argued to be 
characterised by stability of the power distribution structure from the side of the LL, except in 
cases where the structural change was initiated by the HL in the vertical relationship. This is 
because the potential power of the LL is directed towards stabilising the relationship structure 
rather than towards changing it; and therefore, any possible structural refinement is not 
directly related to the power dynamics between the parties to the vertical relationship. Vertical 
relationships in the case of positive reciprocation are likely to be more stable in the short–
medium term, until the state of the balance of interdependence shifts in favour of the LL unit. 
The following table (7.2) summarises the features and the characteristics of the cases grouped 
under the positive reciprocation mode. This table shows manifestations of legitimacy and 
positive reciprocation in each case along with highlighting the LL’s influence and the short–
medium term structural stability of power distribution in the vertical relationship. 
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Table 7.2: Positive Reciprocation and Structural Stability of the Vertical Relationship 
based on Evidence from Cases Studied. 
  Case Characteristics Manifestations  of 
Reciprocation Mode   
LL’s Influence Structural Stability  
C4  Positive 
interdependence. 
 Positive perception 
of relationship 
quality. 
 Positive 
reciprocation. 
 Dual identification at 
the boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 LL’s boundary 
spanners and unit 
meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Unification and 
integration of the 
vertical relationship 
levels. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
  Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
 Extra–role activities to 
gain the trust of the HL. 
Achieving the 
desired influence 
within the existing 
structure through 
legitimation and 
relying on informal 
relationships. 
No mention of recent 
attempts of structural 
change initiated by the 
LL unit.  
Selected Illustrative Quote 
“I always found that if you work with people, you get virtually what you want, but you know part 
of that is working with people so they understand what you want. I think a number of issues 
around BSs stand from probably the stance of we bring in all these money ..[..].. and I [want to] 
control what X or Y person does. You don’t need to control these people to do what you want if 
you work well with the whoever their line managers..[..]..  There is a pragmatic approach here 
in a sense that if they can do these things, it is a win–win situation.” 
 
C6  Positive 
interdependence. 
 Positive perception 
of relationship 
 Dual identification at 
the boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 LL’s boundary 
Achieving the 
desired influence 
within the existing 
structure through 
No mention of recent 
attempts at structural 
change initiated by the 
LL unit. However, the 
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quality. 
 Positive 
reciprocation. 
spanners and unit 
meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Unification and 
integration of the 
vertical relationship 
levels. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
 Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
legitimation. HL amended the 
structure due to 
external pressures and 
a perceived economic 
necessity. 
Selected Illustrative Quote 
“So we have a shared vision, it has made us a lot of money as a University because there is 
absolute unity in our thinking..[..].. So that has been a real added value to what we do.” 
 
C8  Positive 
interdependence. 
 Positive perception 
of relationship 
quality. 
 Positive 
reciprocation. 
 Dual identification at 
the boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 LL’s boundary 
spanners and unit 
meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Unification and 
integration of the 
vertical relationship 
levels. 
Achieving the 
desired influence 
within the existing 
structure through 
legitimation. 
No mention of recent 
attempts of structural 
change initiated by the 
LL unit. 
C13  Positive 
interdependence. 
 Positive perception 
of relationship 
quality. 
 Positive 
reciprocation. 
 Dual identification at 
the boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 LL’s boundary 
spanners and unit 
meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Unification and 
integration of the 
Achieving 
satisfactory influence 
within the existing 
structure through 
legitimation. 
A structural 
refinement initiated by 
the HL due to the 
change of the HL’s 
leadership. The new 
leadership had a 
different managerial 
philosophy which 
entailed further 
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vertical relationship 
levels. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
 Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
empowerment to the 
LL units, although the 
LL did not push for 
such change. 
  
 
Selected Illustrative Quotes 
Understanding the position of the University: “Inevitably, if you don't get exactly what you want; 
you feel, if you like, you have not won. But at the end of the day, I understand exactly why 
decisions have been made. And at the end of the day, if I was in the VC shoes, I would probably 
take the same decisions, even though from the BS perspective it would not necessarily work in 
our favour…” 
 
“One tries to develop relationships with the institution, because it impacts on what you do and 
how we do it, because it's normally easier to do things informally than rely on doing things 
through committees which is the normal way of doing things in universities. So, if you work with 
people informally you are more likely to get the outcome that you desire rather than waiting for, 
if you like, decisions almost to be made and reach committee stage where it is borne for 
ratification. So yes probably, you spend more time trying to develop relationships with people to 
try to influence what's brought forward…” 
 
C14  Positive 
interdependence. 
 Positive perception 
of relationship 
quality. 
 Positive 
reciprocation. 
 Dual identification at 
the boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 LL’s boundary 
spanners and unit 
meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Unification of the 
vertical relationship 
levels. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
 Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
Achieving the 
desired influence 
within the existing 
structure through 
legitimation. 
No mention of recent 
attempts of structural 
change initiated by the 
LL unit. 
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C15  Positive 
interdependence. 
 Positive perception 
of relationship 
quality. 
 Positive 
reciprocation. 
  Dual identification at 
the boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 LL’s boundary 
spanners and unit 
meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Unification and 
integration of the 
vertical relationship 
levels. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
 Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
Achieving the 
desired influence 
within the existing 
structure through 
legitimation. 
No mention of recent 
attempts of structural 
change initiated by the 
LL unit. 
 
7.2.4 Summarising Propositions 
 Favourable perception of vertical inter–unit relationship is likely to be associated 
with positive reciprocation from the LL unit. 
 In positive reciprocation cases, since the LL units are more dependent on the HL 
than vice versa, pushing for a structural refinement of the vertical relationship 
from the LL unit’s side is less likely. 
 Keeping other variables constant, relationships built on positive reciprocation are 
likely to be productive ones; meeting the expectations of the two parties of the 
vertical relationship.  
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Section II 
7.3 Tactful Reciprocation 
Both positive and tactful reciprocation involve showing a positive reaction or response to the 
way the VIRQ is perceived. However, in case of tactful reciprocation, the positive reaction is 
not a reflection of the indebtedness of the LL to the HL as tactful reciprocation is likely when 
the vertical inter–unit relationship is not entirely positively perceived; i.e., moderately or 
negatively perceived. The positive reaction in tactful reciprocation mode is not meant to 
reward the HL for the moderate or the negative VIRQ that the parties to the relationship have. 
It rather reflects a calculative choice to reciprocate positively or to a moderate a negatively 
perceived relationship. The aim is to increase the scope of influence which is regarded to be 
less than is deserved (i.e. not regarded as a fair influence by the LL unit given the perceived 
state of the balance of interdependence).  
Tactful reciprocation is also characterised by noteworthy active legitimation activities from 
the LL’s side that go beyond a simple positive reaction to a positive relationship perception 
reported in the cases of positive reciprocation.  
Tactful reciprocation was identified in cases C2, C5, C9, C10, C11 and C12. In C3 and C7
109
, 
tactful reciprocation was sometimes mixed with negative reciprocation, due to the very 
negative assessment of the VIRQ as seen by respondents in these two cases.  
There were many features common to cases showing such tactful reciprocation; as follows: 
                                                             
109  C7 on the whole shows negative reciprocation but it also has many features of tactful reciprocation 
represented in the maintenance of legitimacy by many of the LL unit members. C3 had two distinguishable intra-
groups which tended to have different perceptions on the VIRQ itself. C3 showed elements of both tactful and 
negative reciprocation reflecting the presence of two sub-groups.  
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1. The perception of VIRQ was initially moderate or negative, not positive; highlighting 
that the scope of influence of the LL had was not seen to be sufficiently satisfactory
110
.   
2. The state of the balance of interdependence of the LL units with their direct HL 
(intermediate or ultimate) was either balanced or negative.  
3. Tactful reciprocation is a deliberate and calculative choice based on a rational cost–
benefit assessment of the options of the LL. It is also based, in many instances, on 
relationship learning. In C2, C3, C7 and C12, respondents stressed that they have 
learned to manage the vertical relationship tactfully after directly or indirectly 
experiencing negative consequences associated with negative reciprocation (this will 
be explained in further detail in Section III in this chapter).  
4. Tactful reciprocation was motivated by the desire to increase the scope of influence of 
the LL, which was regarded as unsatisfactory.  
5. However, tactful reciprocation is meant to increase the LL’s scope of influence while 
maintaining its legitimacy within the vertical institutional relationship. This can be 
explained in the light of the state of the balance of interdependence in cases showing 
tactful reciprocation. Six of the eight cases (C2, C3 group 1, C9, C10, C11, and C12) 
showing tactful reciprocation demonstrated a balanced interdependence with their HL. 
The other two cases (C5 and C7) showed negative interdependence in terms of their 
relationship with their direct (intermediate) HL but positive interdependence in terms 
of their relationship to the ultimate HL. This means that in the eight cases showing 
                                                             
110 The word initially is used to indicate that even if the relationship assessment is reported to be currently 
positive, it had not started as a positive one. Rather, it is due to the tactful reciprocation efforts that the 
relationship and its perception had improved from negative to positive. This is evident in C2, C3, and C12, and it 
was verified trough adopting a relatively retrospective perspective on the vertical relationship. Respondents were 
asked to describe the vertical relationship retrospectively, depending on the scope of their knowledge. This 
provided some insight into the recent history of the relationship. 
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tactful reciprocation, the LL units not only needed to remain legitimate within their 
vertical relationship, but also needed to actively maintain such legitimation. This is 
because such LL units strongly needed the support and the empowerment they derive 
from their vertical relationship. The LL, therefore, used its potential capacity to 
increase its potential influence, yet legitimately.  
6. As increasing the scope of influence of the LL unit was the key driver behind tactful 
reciprocation, respondents in these cases shed light on a myriad of upward influence 
techniques. Yet, all of these upward influence techniques were used within a 
framework of maintaining legitimacy.  
7. As in positive reciprocation cases, legitimation was categorised into compliance 
(meeting expectations) and active (exceeding expectations) legitimation. However, in 
tactful reciprocation cases, exceeding expectations was more commonly mentioned. 
This was generally attributed to two broad reasons. The first is that these were cases of 
direct balanced or negative interdependence, which infer that the LL unit is not a weak 
one as the immediate HL depends on its contribution and, therefore, they are already 
meeting their basic expectations (legitimate). The second is that LL units in these 
cases perceived that the main way to increase the scope of their thus far dissatisfactory 
level of influence within the vertical relationship is to show they are legitimate or that 
they are “good citizens in the University”. 
8. As in positive reciprocation cases, legitimation occurred at two levels; the level of the 
boundary spanner and the general unit level. However, the boundaries between the 
two levels were not clear due to the undeniable overlapping areas between them. Such 
overlapping is deemed to be appropriate as these boundary spanners are acting as 
agents for the organisational units they represent.  
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7.3.1 Compliance Legitimation 
7.3.1.1 Identification of Boundary Spanner 
In tactful reciprocation cases, key boundary spanners (usually the dean or the head of the BS) 
generally suggested that “they wear two hats”. However, in some cases, some boundary 
spanners tended to prioritise the LL over the HL identification (particularly if they are not the 
key boundary spanners); and in other cases, respondents tended to prioritise the HL over the 
LL.  
“[I identify myself] with all of the University but I have responsibility for the BS” 
“To me it is absolutely the same [identification with the school and identification with 
the University].  I think once one starts to make that distinction, [then that is not 
right]. My approach is that the strength of the BS is important because it makes the 
University stronger, and the University is important because it makes the BS 
stronger...” 
Boundary spanners’ identification was, thus, found to show inconsistent patterns in case of 
tactful reciprocation. One reason can be the moderate or negative perception of the VIRQ, 
which can make identification a conscious choice made by the boundary spanner rather than a 
taken for granted consequence of affective commitment or belonging to a given organisational 
context. The other reason could lie in the state of the balance of interdependence in the tactful 
reciprocation cases. The boundary spanners’ identification can vary based on the state of 
affective, social, and economic dependence on both levels; the LL boundary spanners and the 
whole unit’s level. This can make the process of understanding of the boundary spanner 
identification rather complicated.  
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The exact reason behind the inconsistency of the boundary spanners’ identification is beyond 
the scope of this research, but could be worthy of further study. What seems to be important, 
however, is that the findings shed light on the nature of the boundary spanner’s identification 
in tactful reciprocation. When VIRQ is moderately or negatively perceived, the boundary 
spanners’ dual identification cannot be taken for granted.  
7.3.1.2 The Unification of the Vertical Relationship Levels 
In all the tactful reciprocation cases, respondents stated that they see (or would like to see) the 
LL unit as part of a whole, stressing their desire to be integrated within their institution. This 
is seen as tactful reciprocation since the integration of the LL into its institutional context is 
not a consequence of a positively perceived VIRQ, but is rather a calculative choice to 
maximise the influence of the LL within such a relationship. 
“I think it is a bit like your family. Your brother can annoy you to high heaven, your 
dad can annoy you to heaven, but they are your family. So you have to put up with 
them [HUA], you've got to work with them. You know for me I am a pragmatist, they 
are there!  So on the same way that sons and daughters manipulate the parents, so you 
have got to manipulate them, so you are a family.  It might be a dysfunctional family 
sometimes, so we have got to manage them as well…” 
In one case, maintaining legitimacy had even involved a reshaping of the agenda of the LL to 
fit that of the HL.  
 “… we shaped this investment plan twice now, and we are constantly reshaping it to 
fit their [the University] agenda. The same one but to fit their priorities…” 
More importantly, the conscious decision to integrate the LL with the other party(ies) of the 
vertical relationship was more obvious in quotes describing the process of reintegration after 
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an episode of disintegration. Disintegration, as will be highlighted in Section III in this 
chapter, is a common feature in negative reciprocation modes. Most tactful reciprocation 
initiatives took place after a wave of negative reciprocation. However, by showing negative 
reciprocation, the LL did not attain its desired influence (due to the very nature of negative 
reciprocation which does not seek increased influence, but just manifests frustration), and 
therefore it started to adopt tactful reciprocation. The adoption of tactful reciprocation is thus 
seen as calculative and based on relationship learning. In C2, C3, C9, C11, and C12, 
respondents highlighted that the initiatives of reintegrating the LL with its HL unit(s) were 
consciously made based on the negative outcomes or the missed opportunities that were 
associated with the separation of the LL from its wider organisational context.  
“I think where the school …. has missed out in terms of its profile, it hasn't recognised 
it is part of an extremely large and potentially very powerful University and so I think 
that the school needs to be central to the University so I see my role is to make sure 
that the school is central but also that the school engages with the University much 
more than perhaps it did over the last 15 years. And there are lots of reasons why it is 
sensible for the school to do that. So that puts me in a situation where, yes, if you like, 
I am looking upwards to the [faculty] and all the University in terms of raising the 
profile of the school, which I  think we have done, and making the school part of the 
[University].” 
“[the relationship before I took the role] was poor, very poor. And the other half of 
reassuring the University that we are with them, having me telling the staff that we are 
with the University.  And we are getting resources and that if we [want to] continue 
having resources we have got to change our attitude toward the University. By leading 
that by actually setting up committees with other faculties, sending people from here 
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to go to committee saying that the University committee is not something you don’t go 
to…[..].. So I have been working on it trying to get to realise that whatever the past 
was, it is not it now, and I think it has made a difference.” 
“I have been only been Dean since X year only..[..].., and my impression was that 
prior to me becoming Dean, the BS had tried to separate from the University. My 
strategy is to take it back, to be integrated with the University. The BS was probably 
identifying itself with its own brand, not utilising central services strongly, not 
collaborating strongly.… [..]..  So I am here and saying we are part of the University, 
so branding is certainly one issue. In terms of utilising the central services again..[..].. 
And thirdly in terms of collaboration with other groups or other departments…[..].. 
We are paying the central servers a big percent of tax anyway, so why would you want 
to pay the tax and also pay for your HR [human resources] department. So it didn't 
strike me as a good idea really, besides thinking of the BS is a subsidiary of the big 
company, you will use your company services as much as possible to reduce the cost. 
It doesn't make a lot of business sense to me, because it aligns us more with the 
University …” 
The previous quotes not only stress the idea of relationship learning, but also highlight that 
tactful reciprocation is used as a way of maintaining legitimacy aimed at increasing the scope 
of the LL influence.  
7.3.2 Active Legitimation  
What seems interesting in tactful reciprocation is the intensity and the extent of the use of 
active legitimation techniques. These techniques can be seen in essence as upward influence 
techniques, although within a framework of maintaining legitimacy. More precisely, they aim 
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to maximise the boundary spanners’ and the LL unit’s legitimacy in the eyes of the HL people 
so that the LL unit can increase its scope of influence
111
.  
7.3.2.1 Active Legitimation Techniques 
Based on the findings, these techniques have involved a number of inter–related initiatives 
including trust building techniques, building social relationships, building common 
understandings, utilising informal channels of communication, lobbying, persuasion and other 
techniques besides (cf: Lyles and Reger, 1993).  
7.3.2.1.1 Active Trust Development 
7.3.2.1.1.1 Trust Building Mechanisms at the Boundary Spanner’s Level 
Respondents from all cases grouped under the category of tactful reciprocation have explicitly 
mentioned that they engage in active trust development (see also: Child and Mollering, 2003) 
in order to maximise the scope of potential influence of the units they represent
112
.  
Active trust building was evident at both the boundary spanner’s personal level (stressing the 
boundary spanner’s personal achievements) and at the whole unit’s level (stressing the unit’s 
deliverables). Trust building was seen as an important upward influence technique since the 
perceived dissatisfactory scope of influence at the LL’s end was attributed to the HL’s lack of 
trust in its LL. Therefore, active trust building is seen as a mechanism to maximise 
legitimation, and hence influence, by reversing the conditions that attributed to HL’s 
undesirable control.  
                                                             
111 As mentioned, the line between the boundary spanner and its unit in active legitimation cannot be clearly 
defined. 
 
112 This is not to point to the fact that boundary spanners in positive reciprocation cases were not actively 
building trust, but rather to highlight that the mention of trust building was remarkably stressed in cases of tactful 
reciprocation.  
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“If you are restrained, you’ve got to roll with the ball to a certain extent; you can't win 
everything straightaway, it is an on–going relationship ...[..]...  If you're thinking 
you’re not making any headway, all you can do is to operate in a professional manner 
and try to articulate your case the best way you can to get the support of your 
colleagues, so you win different people to try to send the same message and signals 
and also to try and to be credible, you have got to be credible. If I can say, one of the 
ways in which I am credible is in terms of my own output …[..]..  I have remained 
research active, so within that context I can hold my head up high. And in terms of the 
REF, I am into top end. Therefore, I can speak to my colleagues in the faculty as 
leading professor as well as the Dean …[..]…, so that is within this context gives me a 
lot of credibility I think. Because credibility then, maybe, gives me a greater ability to 
have my voice heard. I think it would be very difficult in this kind of University if I 
wasn't research credible in terms of what I am seeking to pursue for the school.” 
In explaining how trust can be built after it has been partially lost, one respondent discussed:  
“[You have to]: 1. View the school from the view of the University.  2. Look at how it 
got back like that, what did the school do that made they [the University] feel like that. 
3. Set about trying to reverse as many of those perceptions and the causes of those 
perceptions as it could be at multiple levels but very obviously starting with the VC 
but also with other deans…” 
Many respondents also highlighted that trust building was associated with achieving the 
desired influence; even if that desired influence just meant avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy. 
“…  I appointed X new professors …  in the last year, and the University kind of 
trusted me to do this. I have not provided them with the detailed business plan of 
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exactly how they are going to bring in money, what courses they will teach. They have 
trusted me to be able to do that. And the quality of people I have hired, they are 
outstanding world–class individuals. But that did not sort of force me to go through 
bureaucratic hoops in order to be able to do that. They trust my judgement on this…” 
7.3.2.1.1.2 Building a Credible Profile at the Unit Level  
At the unit level, trust building was undertaken by raising the profile and emphasising the 
deliverables of the unit as a whole. This can increase the unit’s influence by showing that it is 
a well–functioning unit and thus it does not need excessive control from its HL. 
“I am well aware and I always tell [the HL’s person] that we are number X for 
[ranking]. It depends on which ranking you are looking at, but in general we are on 
the top X of everything including our MBA. And the [HL’s person] is very keen on 
ranking. He knows that he has got something very important, he also knows that, he is 
very close to business, he is very keen on business…” 
In many instances, the aim of trust building was to build a common understanding as the lack 
of common understanding (cognitive disparity) was identified as one of the key reasons 
behind the lack of the desired latitude.  This can also involve networking to communicate this 
credible profile to the people concerned. 
“With us, it is historical, we nearly doubled our income within three years, [and] we are 
rapidly growing. Traditionally, we were a very small BS relative to others, but we are 
rapidly expanding, and earning a greater and greater share of the University's income. 
Traditionally we were not in the same perceived quality in research terms as the rest of 
the University, which meant that the starting point was a lack of trust, and then we made a 
lot of appointments, brought in more staff, and what we have been trying to do over the 
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last five years or so. It developed that trust with the University. By networking upwards 
continuously, so just try to establish trust with them and show them that we are a different 
organisation to what we were in the past. Five or ten years ago, if you mentioned the BS, 
people just laugh, it's a joke you know, these people are hopeless and incompetent, you 
know …[..].. but then you know is there trust ...[..]..…I think trust is developing, it is not 
just trust, it is understanding as well…” 
7.3.2.1.2 Development of Shared Understanding  
Building or developing a shared understanding was also emphasised as the key upward 
influence technique in a number of cases adopting tactful reciprocation. In these cases, as 
cognitive disparity was the key source of contention, the LL was engaged in activities to 
foster shared understandings. The previous quote shows that building common 
understandings emerged as a by–product of active trust development. However, there were 
other examples that stressed the building of shared understandings as an end in itself.  
7.3.2.1.2.1 Building an Understanding at the Boundary Spanner’s Level 
In one case, the different boundary spanners in the unit recognised the need to build common 
understandings upwards, and therefore there were initiatives at both the boundary spanners’ 
level and at the whole unit’s level to build such shared understandings. Respondents in this 
case explicitly suggested that building common understanding was one of the key ways 
towards generating more influence.  
On the boundary spanners’ level, building shared understandings was initiated by nurturing 
favourable personal relationships with the people concerned, or sometimes through utilising 
other available modes of organisational communication. 
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“It is necessary to have a good relationship with the [HL person] for him to 
understand the BS because he is not from the BS; he is from a different area, a 
different discipline within social science. And one of the things that we understand or 
increasingly understand that …[…]… what we seek to do is often very different from 
other conventional social science departments are seeking to do, and we try to operate 
in a different kind of way, so to interface with somebody who is not from that 
background, who doesn't have any previous connection with a BS, who doesn't really 
understand the BS, there is a learning curve for that individual. So it is necessary to 
nurture that relationship, so that we can try and convey to him the difference and 
convey to him how perhaps things should be operated somehow differently here.” 
The different boundary spanners utilise every possible opportunity towards building this 
shared understanding.  
“… in the faculty research committee, a couple of weeks ago, each department does a 
presentation in the faculty on the progress etc…. So I thought I would use this as an 
opportunity to educate them. So first we presented our strategy and show them how we 
use incentive systems rather than sticks to encourage staff to do things. It is just a 
minor thing ... [...]… We were having this conversation as part of the educational 
process. There is a total lack of understanding of what the BS is, the market, the 
difficulty of attracting and retaining staff, and it is our fault for not educating them in 
the past, but the educational process has now started and you cannot hope to get what 
you want from the University unless you engage them in an educational process and 
that is one of the things which I think we didn't do in the past.” 
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7.3.2.1.2.2 Building Understanding as a Unit wide Initiative  
Because the members in this case were using every available opportunity to educate the HL 
about the nature of their unit, building shared understandings in this case also took place on 
the wider unit level whenever an opportunity arose. Building shared understandings in this 
case was adopted as an implicit or an informal policy by the different members. It was their 
way of reciprocating the perceived lack of sufficient influence by showing their potential 
power, yet tactfully. However, the boundaries between building trust and common 
understandings were not clear as each of them supports and feeds back into the other. 
“.. a lot of it is personal, it is about personal relationships. So a lot of the trust 
building we have been doing is about developing personal relationships on project by 
project basis.  So we are developing relationships and therefore partly understanding. 
Because there are not formal channels with the VC and the University, so it is not 
formal, so we do it on an opportunistic basis so lots of business staff are working on 
projects with PVC. So for example..[..].. when the PVC sees us, it is an opportunity to 
partly develop an understanding of the BS and what it needs..[…].. The formal 
channels are there, so what you have to do is to develop the informal networks and it 
is normally based around projects and then use those opportunities, use these 
temporary project teams which are put together to do individual things. Use this 
situation as other context in which you improve their understanding what you really 
are ...[...]...it is not even explicit. So we have not sat down as an executive team of the 
BS in setting our strategy and then talked about it, it is just called seizing the 
opportunity when they are just available.”  
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Regardless of how it is approached, building shared understandings was suggested to result in 
satisfactory outcomes in a number of cases, giving it more validity as one of the key tactful 
reciprocation mechanisms.  
“I think the breakthrough was to take [people from the HL] to [a top BS] for a day to see 
it. None of these has seen a proper BS and we said come and see a proper BS and see 
what we want to be like if you want really proper BS and that that was helpful.” 
7.3.2.1.3 Utilising Informal Channels 
Since the LL boundary spanners relied heavily on active trust building and the active 
development of shared understanding, the high dependence on the informal institutional 
channels in tactful reciprocation was not surprising. In seven of the eight cases of tactful 
reciprocation, the LL respondents stressed their reliance on informal channels in order to 
circumvent the rigidity of the formal structure or to maximise their scope of influence via 
building trust, developing shared understandings, and clarifying potential misunderstandings 
common to bureaucratic settings.  
“… and I have been doing it by having drinks with the deans. I gave a drink and some 
nibbles, and I told them how I see the world, and then I got them to tell me about any 
issues they see and if these issues are not facts I correct them. So I have been working 
on it trying to get to realise that whatever the past was, it is not now, and I think it has 
made a difference...” 
Informal communication channels were also used in lobbying to get the desired outcome. 
Many respondents highlighted the importance of informal “chats” before important meetings, 
so that LL boundary spanners can get the support of their seniors or their colleagues. Actively 
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building good informal relationships with people who hold decision making powers was thus 
seen by many respondents as a way of facilitating their job. 
“And I think you have to build those relationships and the University is very very 
large organisation and inevitably, large organisations are difficult to work within.  So 
you have got to identify fairly quickly who are the key people, who do you want to get 
on your side and it may be not the same key people for different particular 
initiatives…” 
Based on the analyses of the interviewees’ responses, other upward influence techniques 
included internal (with internal organisational members whether they are colleagues or 
seniors) and external lobbying (with external bodies such as advisory board), persuasion 
(sometimes by stressing potential mutual benefits) and reliance on rational arguments when 
suggesting a certain proposal. The following table summarises techniques used in tactful 
reciprocation.  
Table 7.3: Patterns of Tactful Reciprocity Manifested via Compliance and Active 
Legitimation Activities Aiming to Maximise the LL’s Upward Influence 
Legitimacy in tactful reciprocation cases 
 The Boundary Spanner Level The Unit Level 
Compliance 
legitimacy  
 Inconsistent identification 
patterns. 
 Meeting expectations. 
 LL unit integration and the 
unification of the vertical 
relationship levels. 
 LL unit meeting the HL’s 
expectations. 
Active 
legitimacy 
 Active trust development. 
 Development of common understanding. 
 Informal relationship building. 
 Utilisation of informal channels. 
 Other upward influence techniques including lobbying, persuasion, and 
rationality. 
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7.3.3 Tactful Reciprocation and the LL’s Legitimation 
As mentioned, all of these upward influence techniques were used within a framework of 
legitimacy. The LL boundary spanners in the case of tactful reciprocation were actively 
attempting to maximise their unsatisfactory scope of influence by maintaining and sometimes 
maximising their own and their unit’s legitimacy. Quotes stressing the importance of 
maintaining and maximising legitimacy while attempting to increase the scope of influence 
were remarkably common in all the tactful reciprocation cases. Maintaining and maximising 
legitimacy were seen as rational choices based on cost–benefit analysis. Tactful reciprocation 
is mainly used because the HL possesses a higher structural power in the vertical relationship. 
This can also be seen in the light of the balance of interdependence of these eight cases as 
previously highlighted. 
There are more elements of dependence in addition to the inter–unit interdependence; the 
boundary spanners themselves can be dependent on the positions they occupy. However, this 
can be a difficult issue to analyse given the complications associated with delving into the 
personal motivations and aspirations of the different boundary spanners involved. 
Nevertheless, the following quote summarises why both the boundary spanners’ and the unit’s 
legitimacy are seen to be significant.  
“We have got to conform to it, we have got to conform to the vertical relationship, we 
cannot deviate from it. I think if I simply ignored it, they will get rid of me and get 
somebody else, so it is very critical to conform to that and to play the game within the 
set of rules and do the best you can. That means that you need to gain the respect to 
those who are further up in the hierarchy, they have got to see this as a viable unit 
which is performing well at the research level, which has got good teaching, which is 
generating income, which is being led in an appropriate way. If this was not the case 
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that; either they would ignore us, and we wouldn't prosper at all or they would 
probably see to get somebody else to do it; to conform with what they were 
expecting.” 
A key observation in tactful reciprocation is that the boundary spanners were working on 
some of the predictors of the quality of the vertical inter–unit relationship in order to improve 
it. The previous analysis shows that respondents were consciously working on cognitive 
disparity by developing common understanding and they were working on autonomy through 
active trust building initiatives and the utilisation of informal channels. In addition, the 
analysis shows that the boundary spanners were directly or indirectly working on the balance 
of interdependence as by maintaining legitimacy the LL units were gaining more 
empowerment from the HL, which could be then reflected on more dependence from the HL 
on the LL, and hence altering the balance of interdependence in the long–term. 
7.3.4 Tactful Reciprocation and the Structural Stability of Power Distribution in the 
Vertical Relationship 
In tactful reciprocation cases, and unlike positive reciprocation cases, the vertical relationship 
structural refinement (as initiated by the LL) tended to be more common. The reason can be 
obvious, that the very essence of tactful reciprocation is to maximise the scope of influence of 
the LL. In more than half of the tactful reciprocation cases (C2, C3, C5, C11 and C12), 
respondents explicitly mentioned that the autonomy of the LL was increased or the LL 
managed to influence a certain decision or to realise a desired outcome as a result of tactful 
reciprocation techniques. This is why the reported current
113
 perception of VIRQ in C2, C3 
group 1, and C12 were moderate or positive after previously having been negatively 
                                                             
113 Based on the time the interviews were conducted. 
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perceived. However, the process of influence was sometimes described as “work in 
progress”.  
The following table summarises the features and the characteristics of the cases grouped 
under the tactful reciprocation mode. This table shows manifestations of legitimacy and 
tactful reciprocation in each case along with highlighting the LL’s desired influence and the 
structural refinement in the power distribution achieved by the LL unit. 
Table 7.4: Tactful Reciprocation and Structural Refinement of the Vertical Relationship 
based on Evidence from Cases Studied 
  Case 
Characteristics 
Manifestations  of  the 
Reciprocation Mode   
LL’s Influence Structural Stability  
C2  Balanced 
interdependence 
 An evolution 
from a previous 
negative 
perception of 
relationship 
quality to a 
current positive 
perception. 
 Tactful 
reciprocation. 
 Dual identification at the 
boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 LL’s boundary spanners 
and unit meeting the 
HL’s expectations.  
 Reunification of the 
vertical relationship 
levels. 
 Active trust building at 
the boundary spanner’s 
level.  
 Credible profile building 
at the unit’s level. 
 Development of common 
understandings. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
  Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
The LL previously lacked 
sufficient financial 
autonomy, particularly 
with regards to promotion 
and recruitment. This case 
had manifested some 
features of negative 
reciprocation including 
organisational 
disintegration and 
voluntary turnover. 
However, with tactful 
reciprocation, the LL’s 
respondents expressed 
their satisfaction with the 
latitude they currently 
have, although there was 
no change in the formal 
structure. Respondents 
expressed they can 
The formal structure 
was not changed but 
influence was 
achieved through 
utilising informal 
organisational 
channels. The 
structural refinement 
was achieved by 
strengthening the 
informal channels 
where the formal 
structure became less 
constraining. 
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 Extra–role activities to 
gain the trust of the HL. 
achieve the desired 
influence based on the 
trust and the 
understanding they have 
built in their relationship 
with the power holders in 
the HL. 
 Selected Illustrative Quote  
“…  essentially when I took over I used to go to  meetings and everyone would say OK, I suppose 
[the BS] would not wanna help us to do this, and I say why not. And I kept doing it and I kept 
persuading people that we are part of the University and this has taken me [X] years. And there is 
about 6 months, I suddenly started to get things from the VC that I have been denied before and we 
have now got [X number of posts] more than the school have  ever had at one go,  [X] and [X] as 
well and the University has been on a campaign to in fact  cut staff not to actually increase them 
and we have [X staff to be hired], so we had a release of resources and it  has not  been referred to 
as any change but it is obvious that the [the HL] now believes  that I, therefore the school, is on 
[their] side and that we are part of the University.” 
 
 
C3 
Gp 1 
 Balanced 
interdependence 
with the 
intermediate HL. 
 Positive 
interdependence 
with the ultimate 
HL.  
 An evolution 
from a previous 
negative 
perception of 
VIRQ to a 
current 
moderately 
positive 
 Dual identification at the 
boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 Boundary spanners and 
unit meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Active trust building at 
the boundary spanner’s 
level.  
 Credible profile building 
at the unit’s level. 
 Development of common 
understanding. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
  Utilisation of informal 
The LL previously lacked 
latitude on decision 
making and consequently 
the allocation of 
resources. This case had 
manifested many features 
of negative reciprocation 
including organisational 
disintegration, general 
organisational “paralysis”, 
and voluntary turnover. 
However, some boundary 
spanner’s in this case had 
adopted tactful 
reciprocation via 
strengthening the informal 
The formal structure 
was not changed but 
influence was 
achieved through 
renegotiating the 
financial arrangement 
which was propelled 
by the LL. The 
structural refinement 
was achieved by 
attempting to 
strengthen the 
informal channels  and 
building common 
understanding where 
the formal structure 
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perception. 
 Tactful 
reciprocation. 
channels. 
 Extra–role activities to 
gain the trust of the HL. 
relationships, building 
trust and common 
understanding which had 
led to renegotiating the 
financial arrangements.  
became relatively less 
constraining, although 
not yet highly 
satisfactory. 
C5  Negative 
interdependence 
with the 
intermediate HL. 
 Positive 
interdependence 
with the ultimate 
HL.  
 An overall 
negative 
relationship as 
the benefits of 
the revised 
financial 
arrangement 
have not been 
fully realised yet.  
 Tactful 
reciprocation. 
 LL’s boundary spanners 
and unit meeting the 
HL’s expectations.  
 Development of common 
understanding. 
 External lobbying. 
 
The LL previously lacked 
financial autonomy. 
However, through 
building common 
understandings and 
lobbying with external 
bodies, the LL could 
manage to change the 
financial arrangement in 
which the LL became its 
own budget holder. 
The formal structure 
was not changed but 
influence was 
achieved through 
renegotiating the 
financial arrangement; 
a process propelled by 
the LL. The structural 
refinement was 
achieved by building 
common 
understandings which 
resulted in more 
latitude for the LL.  
  
 
 
Selected Illustrative Quote 
“This year we have started negotiating a different financial arrangement. We spent [X] years really 
negotiating a financial regime with the University that gives us much more financial autonomy and 
we had and that is based largely on [X BS]. We took some senior people from the University down 
to [X BS] [X] years ago and because basically up until that point, we were in the same budgeting 
system as the rest of the University which was within say our gross income, we are given an 
operating budget, it was not a random budget, it was somewhat proportionate to income but there 
WAS quite a big fudge factor in there, it was clear we are making more than most of the schools. So 
we negotiated a financial regime whereby the gross revenue comes to us and we pay the centre  
some per capita charges per staff member per student and we are the only school that actually does 
that  …[…].. Things that we have been doing over the last few years, it is a bit like privatisation.  I 
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mean legally is not because we are still part of the University but that comes down to a kind of 
dynamic moving from essentially a state funded organisation where  you get your money from the 
state and there are essentially some set of rules to those funds to administer that.  If you don't spend 
that money, it is taken back and you make a big big premium on making sure you spend these funds 
as transparently and fairly as possible, that is quite different from [our case]…. [..]…yes there is 
this [person in the HL] who is on the whole supportive but from time to time he refers to the BS 
exceptionalism, and fair enough I think sometimes we are an  exception. We are also quite an 
exception in regards to what we do. I think it was a complete revelation to some colleagues in other 
schools to know, but I think some of the practices we are having is now spreading.  People are 
being financially more aware; the circumstances are compelling people…” 
 
C7  Negative 
interdependence 
with the 
intermediate HL. 
 Positive 
interdependence 
with the ultimate 
HL.  
 An overall 
negative 
relationship. 
 Signs of both 
tactful and 
negative 
reciprocation (as 
manifested by 
different 
boundary 
spanners). 
 Dual identification of 
some boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 Boundary spanners and 
unit meeting and 
exceeding the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Active trust building at 
the boundary spanner’s 
level.  
 Credible profile building 
at the unit’s level. 
 Development of common 
understanding. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
  Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
 
The LL was pushing for a 
structural change that 
aimed at achieving more 
autonomy. Such structural 
change was instigated 
after the LL’s deliberate 
legitimation and active 
legitimation activities. 
However, the LL could 
not attain the required 
influence and therefore 
signs of both tactful and 
negative reciprocation 
were going hand in hand 
at the time of data 
collection. 
A structural 
refinement was pushed 
for by the LL, yet it 
was not attained as the 
HL held a higher 
structural power in the 
relationship. Signs of 
negative reciprocation 
started to come to 
surface as will be 
explained in Section 
III.  
 Selected Illustrative Quote 
“When I started, I have been here for X years, the BS has running in a pretty sizeable deficit, so that 
was an irrelevant question …[..].. Within less than [X] years we turned that around, so we now 
generating a considerable surplus ... [..].. you have to play within the rules of the game..” 
C9  Balanced  LL’s boundary spanners Due to the remarkable The formal structure 
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interdependence 
with the 
intermediate HL.  
 Positive 
interdependence 
with the ultimate 
HL.  
 An overall 
moderately 
positive 
relationship 
evolving from a 
negatively 
perceived 
relationship. 
 Tactful 
reciprocation. 
and unit meeting and 
exceeding the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Active trust building at 
the boundary spanner’s 
level.  
 Credible profile building 
at the unit’s level. 
 Development of common 
understandings. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
  Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
 Internal lobbying (with 
other LL units). 
initiatives of building 
common understandings, 
the LL could influence 
many of the HL’s 
decisions and gain 
influence and autonomy 
on a number of areas as 
desired. The influence 
gained halted many signs 
of negative reciprocation 
that were starting to 
permeate the LL’s unit.  
was not changed but 
influence was 
achieved through 
renegotiating the 
financial arrangement 
and achieving 
influence on a number 
of areas which 
significantly increased 
the latitude of the LL. 
The structural 
refinement was 
achieved by building 
common 
understanding. 
  
 
Selected Illustrative Quotes 
“Well it is very difficult to take action, obviously a lot of morale might suffer. You know, why should 
I bother, why should I do this. I am faced with so many students, therefore if I have to do this, just 
how much time I can do on research etc… There is a kind of just collapse in morale and general 
decrease in terms of the enthusiasm towards things that should be done and a general reduction in 
performance so therefore they have got to be able to manage that. The more income we earn, the 
more we can keep at the margin because it is just coming in, but if there is this feeling that we are 
simply being exploited, it would be very damaging. But because we've had the kind of support that 
we have had …[..]..  And if we are able to get most of the posts replaced as people leave, then there 
is that kind of support is witnessed. So therefore, the morale could be sustained… [..]…Because 
there is a greater faith and confidence in the ability of the BS to deliver. That was not there before. 
And there was a kind of a seen change in the REF…[..]… Given these improvements, there was 
more confidence in the University and the faculty in terms of the school to deliver and that it has 
changed the performance and they [the HLs] have seen the importance. They have also seen just 
how far behind this place [is] compared to [the other] schools in terms of size, in terms of position 
etc…, and they recognised we can grow, we can get better, so they are prepared now to back 
that…” 
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“The University quite quickly understood that and after us using our informal networks to lobby 
and try to find a solution and they offered us [XXX] ...[..].. Now, this was in time of recession and 
they offered us £X million …[..].. The University has been understanding of what our needs are, 
because we did educate them on them. So that is one which has worked…[..].. The informal 
educational mechanisms with some lobbying from other departments ... [..].. within the 
University …” 
C10  Balanced 
interdependence. 
 Moderately 
positive perception 
of relationship 
quality. 
 Tactful 
reciprocation 
Tactful reciprocation 
 Boundary spanners and 
unit meeting and even 
exceeding expectations 
of the HL.   
 Reunification of the 
vertical relationship 
levels.  
 Credible profile 
building at the unit’s 
level. 
 Development of 
common 
understanding. 
 Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
 Extra–role activities to 
gain the trust of the HL. 
 Using negotiated 
exchange (emphasising 
mutual benefits while 
negotiating).  
 Using rationality. 
Although it is a case of 
balanced interdependence, 
the LL highly recognises 
the importance of the HL, 
and therefore the LL 
maintains a noteworthy 
legitimacy. The structural 
refinement came from the 
HL and it was relatively 
satisfactory for the LL 
unit as it meant devolving 
further autonomy to the 
LL in strategic areas.  
The HL initiated the 
structural refinement 
which was seen 
relatively favourable 
the LL as it met many 
of its influence 
expectations. 
 Selected Illustrative Quote 
“So one of the expectations of the University of the BS is that we should recover our previous 
prestigious position, because we were regarded as quite a prestigious BS and we lost a lot of that 
for various reasons.” 
C11  Balanced 
interdependence 
 Boundary spanners and 
unit meeting and 
The LL unit in this case 
has managed to initiate a 
The LL initiated the 
structural refinement 
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 Negative 
perception of 
relationship 
quality evolving to 
a moderately 
positive 
perception. 
 Tactful 
reciprocation. 
exceeding the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Unification of the 
vertical relationship 
levels. 
 Active trust building at 
the boundary spanner’s 
level.  
 Credible profile 
building at the unit’s 
level. 
 Development of 
common 
understanding. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
  Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
 Extra–role activities to 
gain the trust of the HL. 
 Internal and external 
lobbying. 
 
recent organisational 
structural change, 
reflecting a change in the 
power distribution 
structure, after a wave of 
negative reciprocation. 
The lower managed to 
rearrange the financial 
agreement to have more 
autonomy. However, the 
boundary spanners in this 
case described the 
situation as “work in 
progress”, highlighting 
that the desired influence 
was yet to be fully 
achieved.  The boundary 
spanners also highlighted 
that if the desired 
influence was not fully 
realised, negative 
consequences would start 
to surface; or as they 
described the situation, “it 
can blow us up”.  
with the support of 
some external bodies.  
 Selected Illustrative Quotes 
“… and there is something that [is happening] over time on the academic front. I think it [the 
school] is beginning to get more respect around the University, I think we do things in the school 
that people in other schools do not expect the BS to do. And over time, I think that might alter our 
positions in terms of the school being perceived to be critical for its subject matter, so moving away 
from the cash cow….” 
 
 
 “[if the desired influence is not achieved], it can blow us up. It is a barrier as far as you are rooted 
in a really wrong understanding of the business. It will end up with the morale going to the floor, 
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and good folk would just say enough. I had discussions with a number of people outside and inside  
the  school on exactly this point and  I can point the folk in the school,  one who could go for a 
breakdown and one of who is just absolutely vent. There will be a volcano, and both of them could 
leave. But the route cause for them all is this barrier; meaning the difficulty from our point of view 
not feeling that we are understood in terms of our business…[..].. . But it will blow it up...”  
 
C12  Balanced 
interdependence 
 An evolution from 
a negative 
perception of 
relationship 
quality to an 
overall positive 
one.  
 Tactful 
reciprocation. 
 Dual identification at 
the boundary spanners’ 
level.  
 Boundary spanners and 
unit meeting the HL’s 
expectations.  
 Active trust building at 
the boundary spanner’s 
level.  
 Credible profile 
building at the unit’s 
level. 
 Development of 
common 
understandings. 
 Informal relationship 
building. 
  Utilisation of informal 
channels. 
 Extra–role activities to 
gain the trust of the HL. 
 Lobbying  
 Relying on rationality 
while negotiating.  
 
Through tactful 
reciprocation in general, 
and trust and informality 
in particular, boundary 
spanners from the LL 
could attain satisfactory 
influence. The informal 
organisation in this case 
was playing a key role 
where the formal 
organisational structure 
was less relevant.  
The formal structure 
was not changed but 
influence was 
achieved through 
strengthening the 
informal 
organisational 
channels. The 
structural refinement 
was achieved by 
active trust 
development and 
building common 
understanding which 
resulted in more 
latitude for the LL. 
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7.3.5 Summarising Propositions 
 Moderate or negatively perceived VIRQ is reciprocated by either tactful reciprocation 
or negative reciprocation.  
 Structural refinement in tactful reciprocation situations tends to be more likely, as 
tactful reciprocation is usually motivated by the desire to increase the LL’s scope of 
influence. 
 If tactful reciprocation fails to realise the desired influence, negative reciprocation is 
likely to follow. 
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Section III 
7.4 Negative Reciprocation  
If positive reciprocation forms one end of a continuum, negative reciprocation constitutes the 
other end. In negative reciprocation, the motives and responses of the LL boundary spanners 
are exactly the opposite of those in positive reciprocation. 
Negative reciprocation was identified in C1, C3 group 2, and C7. In addition, there were some 
aspects of negative reciprocation in other cases (mostly emerging while discussing the history 
of the case). The following are common features in these cases. 
1. Cases which showed negative reciprocation perceived the quality of the vertical inter–
unit relationship negatively, i.e. the boundary spanners interviewed did not regard the 
scope of influence they had as satisfactory or fair. 
2. These were cases which showed negative interdependence in general or negative 
interdependence in terms of their relationships with their intermediate HL. C1 was a 
case of general negative interdependence.  In C3 and C7, the negative interdependence 
was with the intermediate HL, although these two cases were in a positive 
interdependence with the ultimate HL.  
3. Negative reciprocation was seen as a response to the dissatisfactory scope of influence 
that the LL had, given its balance of interdependence with its HL (i.e. unfair 
influence). Therefore the LL units under this mode used their potential power to 
express such dissatisfaction.  
4.  Conformity and more generally legitimation were not key considerations in cases of 
negative reciprocation, unlike positive and tactful reciprocation. In negative 
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reciprocation, there was a form of “retaliation” due to the perceived unjust vertical 
relationship. 
5. Many organisational aspects in the negative reciprocation cases were seen as 
dysfunctional. Generally, the work environment in these cases was described by 
respondents as lacking innovation, and characterised by low levels of staff morale and 
inefficiency. Negative reciprocation was thus not seen as a direct way of increasing 
the scope of influence, but rather as an expression of frustration. 
6. Negative reciprocity was manifested both at the boundary spanners’ level and at the 
whole unit’s level, however, the former tended to be more common.  
7. In most cases, negative reciprocation was mixed with signs of tactful reciprocation and 
vice versa. In many cases (C2, C3, C11 and C12), negative reciprocation preceded 
tactful reciprocation. However, the case study evidence also suggests that tactful 
reciprocation can be also followed by negative reciprocation if tactful reciprocation 
fails to bring about the desired influence.  
7.4.1 The Boundary Spanners Level  
7.4.1.1 Boundary Spanner’s Identification  
As mentioned, negative reciprocation was manifested at the boundary spanner’s level as well 
as at the whole unit level, although the latter is less common. At the boundary spanners’ level, 
negative reciprocation was manifested in the singular identification of some of the boundary 
spanners, that is, only with their LL.  
“I have always tried in my role as [a head of the BS] for the University to be my 
principal source of identification, with the BS second and identification with the 
management team of the University first and the BS management team second. I have 
to say that, you know, having made the decision to stand down, and to move on 
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because it has been very difficult to maintain that orientation, and just it is 
psychologically difficult to do; to maintain that superordinate loyalty if you like.” 
7.4.1.2 Loss of the Relationship Embedded Assets 
As articulated in the previous quote, in negative reciprocation cases, the key boundary 
spanners tended to leave the LL unit itself due to the perceived lack of influence.  This aspect 
of negative reciprocation is deemed to be a very detrimental one as it means that some of the 
key relationship assets are lost. In the sector under study, individuals (academics) are seen as 
very valuable assets.  When key boundary spanners decide to leave voluntarily, it means that 
the LL unit as well as the HL unit will lose the boundary spanner’s (or more generally the 
organisational member’s) output, knowledge base, and networks and relationships. It also 
sends a negative message about the HL to the other members in the LL unit, which can 
negatively affect general morale. 
Voluntary turnover (a decision to leave) was reported in C1 and C3. This has been also 
identified in C11 and C2. 
“… I left because of extra hierarchy, bureaucracy…” 
7.4.2 The Unit Level 
7.4.2.1 Loss of Relationship Embedded Assets 
On the unit level, and due to the negative relationship, morale in the LL unit as a whole 
tended to be negatively affected. In extreme cases, negative morale would not only affect the 
productivity, creativity and innovation of the different organisational members, but can also 
propel them to leave the LL unit and search for a better alternative. This is particularly true 
with good or high potential members as they can find better alternatives elsewhere.  However, 
 
 
300 
 
this can be a bitter loss to both the LL and the HL units, and therefore will make the vertical 
relationship less effective. 
“[Due to the high control], people were leaving, and a lot of entrepreneurial people 
have left, whether they are very active professors or program directors. People who 
can be different types of leaders in all parts of the organisation, and very good leaders 
have left, I think that has affected morale…” 
7.4.2.2 Low Morale 
On the unit level, respondents in negative reciprocation cases also stressed that the morale of 
the different LL staff members can be negatively affected due to the lack of desired influence. 
“I think the staff are working so much harder and there is no benefit. They get no 
benefit and to be honest it just really annoys them. I pick up a lot of flak from my staff 
when they say all you've done is taking on more X students …[..]..  I may take zero 
benefit, I don't get more money, I get less research time, all you're doing is sweating 
the assets of the BS and have no benefit. …[..].. We, the leadership of the BS, we 
decided we are going to turn this place and we have and I have been part of that, but 
the question is what my staff think; they will say let's go back to the time when we have 
made a loss, life was more easier for them, they taught less, they had more time for 
research.” 
Consequently, there was a sense of separation between the HL and LL units in negative 
reciprocation relationships, or sometimes an “us and them” attitude. 
“Are people in the BS enthusiastic about achieving the same vision and mission? No, I 
don't think they are…” 
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This is in addition to the various dysfunctionalities identified in Chapters 5 and 6 that are 
likely to occur when the LL has a dissatisfactory scope of autonomy. The following table 
summarises the consequences associated with negative reciprocation.  
Table 7.5: Patterns of Negative Reciprocity based on the Case Study Evidence. 
Legitimacy in negative reciprocation cases 
 The Boundary Spanner Level The Unit Level 
(Delegitimation)    Single identification. 
 Loss of relationship 
embedded assets (voluntary 
turnover). 
 Low morale. 
 Organisational disintegration 
 Loss of relationship embedded 
assets (voluntary turnover) 
 Low morale 
 Decreased motivation, 
innovation, and creativity 
 Various organisational 
dysfunctionalities. 
 Organisational “paralysis”. 
 
 
7.4.3 Negative Reciprocation and the Structural Instability of Power Distribution in the 
Vertical Relationship 
More importantly, relationships based on negative reciprocation are suggested to be unstable 
ones due to the different dysfunctionalities associated with them and the likely loss of key 
human assets that is associated with the lack of fair or satisfactory influence. Negative 
reciprocation is an expression of frustration that shows the potential power of the LL unit. 
Therefore, it can propel structural instability as it sends a message to the HL notifying them 
that corrective actions should be taken. Negative reciprocation was generally identified in 
cases where negative perception of relationship quality was expressed to be high. It was seen 
in cases where respondents emphasised that they wanted to increase the scope of their 
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influence, but failed to do so due to a perceived use of unjustified control by the HL, and 
therefore low morale was wide–spread among the different members of the LL unit. Negative 
reciprocation was generally followed by a structural refinement or by tactful reciprocation, yet 
the latter tended to occur sometime after costly organisational experiences. 
The following table summarises the features and characteristics of the cases grouped under 
the negative reciprocation mode. This table highlights the LL’s influence and the push and 
pull factors that can trigger structural instability in the vertical relationship. 
Table 7.6: Negative Reciprocation and Structural Instability of the Vertical Relationship 
based on Evidence from Cases Studied. 
  Case Characteristics Manifestations  of 
Reciprocation Mode   
LL’s Influence Structural Stability  
C1  Negative 
interdependence 
 Negative 
perception of 
relationship 
quality. 
 Negative 
reciprocation. 
 The negative 
reciprocation in C1 
was limited in scope at 
the time of the data 
collection.  
 Singular identification 
of some boundary 
spanners. 
 Voluntary turnover of 
a key boundary 
spanner was reported 
(loss of relationship 
key assets).  
 Potential low morale 
was highlighted by two 
of the key boundary 
spanners.  
 Organisational 
The LL unit’s boundary 
spanners were attempting 
to increase the autonomy 
of the LL unit to achieve 
what they perceive as fair 
influence. Key areas of 
contention were related 
to the financial autonomy 
of the LL. Due to a 
dissatisfactory level of 
influence, one of the key 
boundary spanners 
exercised his personal 
power to leave the 
relationship (an exit 
strategy according to 
Hirschman Typology 
(1970)). Signs of low 
Only some boundary 
spanners started to 
exercise their personal 
power by leaving the 
relationship or 
manifesting low morale. 
Some relationship 
dysfunctionalities were 
also reported due to the 
lack of satisfactory 
influence. Signs of 
negative reciprocation 
can send signals to the 
HL to take a corrective 
action by investigating 
and addressing its 
causes (the lack of fair 
influence). This means 
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disintegration. 
 However, there were 
also some boundary 
spanners who referred 
to some manifestations 
of tactful reciprocation; 
attempting to alter the 
dissatisfactory 
relationship (mainly by 
relying on utilising 
informal channels to 
build common 
understandings). 
morale were starting to 
permeate the LL unit, yet 
only at the level of some 
boundary spanners (it 
was not a unit wide 
phenomenon at the time 
of data collection).  
that the distribution of 
power in the 
relationship can be 
potentially revised; 
reflecting a possible 
structural instability. 
 Selected Illustrative Quote  
“…and I think that one of the key things that I see happening is that when we try to initiate 
changes, we try to innovate, now as a result of the reduction in autonomy, what often happens is 
that we are prevented from innovating and told that actually what we should be doing is combining 
with the rest of the University in implementing innovations. The consequences of that are that it 
slows down the ability to introduce innovation and it also introduces a kind of lowest common 
denominator approach to change. So instead of saying OK this will be a brilliant way to do this, 
and we are doing it, let’s say based on the research evidence, what we end up doing is how to 
compromise dramatically on the kind of processes that we would use and it also takes enormously 
longer. You know for a BS  operating in highly competitive environment, we can’t afford not to be 
adaptive and agile and innovative in the way we do things, so it is a concern…[..].. My perception 
is that we increasingly had to compromise rather than [integrate decisions] …[…]..  there is a 
much higher degree of top down command and control, which is inhibiting the integration of 
decision making so there is not an openness of discussion, and exploration of positions, and 
exploration of context in order that we can then  come to collective decisions about the most 
effective and  innovative way forward..[..]… What that is leading to is a great deal of compromise 
and I think low quality decision making as well….” 
 
C3 
Gp 
2 
 Negative 
interdependence 
with the 
intermediate HL.  
 Single identification of 
the boundary spanners 
representing group 2.  
 Voluntary turnover 
The LL unit’s boundary 
spanners were attempting 
to increase their 
autonomy to reach what 
Many of the key 
boundary spanners and 
other key LL unit’s 
members started to 
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 Positive 
interdependence 
with the ultimate 
HL.  
 An overall 
negative 
perception of 
relationship 
quality. 
 Negative 
reciprocation. 
spreading among the 
boundary spanners as 
well as the other 
members of the LL 
unit.  
 Remarkably low 
morale was reported 
among the LL unit 
members and boundary 
spanners. 
 Organisational 
disintegration.  
 Various organisational 
dysfunctionalities. 
 Decreased creativity 
and innovation. 
they perceive as a fair 
level of influence. Key 
areas of contention were 
related to the financial 
autonomy of the LL. Due 
to the dissatisfactory 
influence, many 
boundary spanners and 
other key organisational 
members exercised their 
personal power by 
leaving the relationship 
(an exit strategy). Low 
morale wide–spread 
across the members of 
LL unit, perhaps 
unintentionally sending a 
message to the HL that 
corrective actions should 
be taken. 
exercise their personal 
power by leaving the 
relationship or 
demonstrating low 
morale. Many 
relationship 
dysfunctionalities were 
also reported due to the 
lack of satisfactory 
influence. This included 
what resembled a case 
of organisational 
“paralysis” where the 
whole of the LL unit 
was not moving forward 
towards achieving its 
goals.  
 Selected Illustrative Quote 
“Well, expansion in introduction of new programs became much more difficult because now you 
have [lost part of your latitude], so I think the introduction of new programs literally stopped, I 
don’t think they have introduced any new programs in the BS [we became more constrained]”. 
 
C7  Negative 
interdependence 
with the 
intermediate HL. 
 Positive / 
balanced 
interdependence 
with the ultimate 
HL.  
 An overall 
 Single identification of 
some boundary 
spanners.  
 Organisational 
disintegration.  
 Negative morale 
amongst the staff of the 
LL unit. 
  
Failure to achieve what 
was seen to be fair 
influence through 
structural change made 
some staff members 
perceive the HL 
negatively.  In this case, 
tactful reciprocation 
preceded the negative 
reciprocation as the LL 
Many of the key 
boundary spanners and 
other key LL members 
started to exercise 
their personal power 
via showing low 
morale as they started 
to lose the incentive 
behind their 
legitimising efforts.  
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negative 
perception of 
relationship 
quality. 
 Negative 
reciprocation. 
unit was re–legitimising its 
position via notable 
credible profile building. 
Some of the LL staff 
members exercised their 
power by showing 
negative morale and 
distancing themselves from 
their HL to express their 
frustration as their efforts 
at tactful reciprocation had 
failed. However, both 
negative reciprocation and 
tactful reciprocation were 
seen to be going hand in 
hand in this case.  
Some relationship 
dysfunctionalities 
were also reported due 
to the lack of 
satisfactory influence.  
 Cases which have showed a history of negative reciprocation  
C2  Balanced 
interdependence. 
 A history of 
negative 
reciprocation. 
According to the findings, due to the 
lack of satisfactory influence,  this case 
showed a history of negative 
reciprocation manifested in:  
 Low morale wide–spread across 
the LL unit’s members.  
 Organisational disintegration. 
 Voluntary turnover.  
 Consequently, relationship 
dysfunctionalities emerged. 
With the change of the leadership of the 
LL unit, tactful reciprocation followed 
negative reciprocation building on 
relationship learning. 
C11  Balanced 
interdependence. 
 A history of 
negative 
reciprocation. 
According to the interview findings, 
due to the lack of satisfactory influence,  
this case showed a history of negative 
reciprocation manifested in:  
 Low morale spreading across 
the LL unit’s members.  
 Voluntary turnover of some of 
the boundary spanners and 
Negative reciprocation along with 
tactful reciprocation propelled 
structural change; particularly with the 
change of the leadership of the LL unit.  
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other members of the LL unit.  
 Consequently, relationship 
dysfunctionalities emerged. 
C12  Balanced 
interdependence. 
 A history of 
negative 
reciprocation. 
According to the interview findings, 
due to the lack of satisfactory influence,  
this case showed a history of negative 
reciprocation manifested in:  
 Organisational disintegration.   
 Consequently, some 
relationship dysfunctionalities 
emerged. 
With the change of the leadership of the 
LL unit, tactful reciprocation followed 
negative reciprocation building on 
relationship learning. 
 
7.4.4 Summarising Propositions  
 Negatively perceived VIRQ can incite negative reciprocation by the LL unit, if tactful 
reciprocation was attempted but failed to achieve the desired influence, or if there is a 
perception of excessive or unjustifiable lack of influence on the part of the LL. 
 Negative reciprocation can potentially give rise to structural instability or tactful 
reciprocation as the vertical relationship becomes dysfunctional (i.e vertical 
relationships built on negative reciprocation are not sustainable).  
7.5 Summary of the Qualitative Findings 
Qualitative data analyses reported in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 was directed towards addressing the 
three questions that motivated this research enquiry regarding the meaning and attributes, the 
antecedents, and the different concomitants that are likely to be associated with the perception 
of VIRQ. 
The meaning and attributes of VIRQ were approached from the perspective of both parties to 
the vertical relationship; the higher and the lower level. The higher level respondents tended 
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to personify the vertical relationship in terms of their relationship with their contact people in 
the lower level unit and therefore the relationship has an inherent social dimension. The 
higher level respondents tended to view mutual trust, openness and open communication, 
fairness, collaboration, and satisfaction as attributes that compose favourable relationships 
with their lower level units. From the higher level’s perspective, the meaning of having 
favourable relationships with its lower level unit tended to revolve around maintaining 
effective control on that unit so that it works according to the higher level’s agenda. 
Similar to the higher level, the lower level respondents also tended to view mutual trust, 
mutual openness, fairness, support, and satisfaction as the key intrinsic social characteristics 
that make up for a favourable vertical relationship. These social dimensions tended to reflect 
the power distribution in the vertical relationship which was then manifested in a constraining 
or an empowering vertical relationship to the lower level unit. The meaning of a favourable 
relationship from the lower level perspective tended to revolve around realising a satisfactory 
or a fair balance of influence on the terms of the vertical relationship. Fairness of influence is 
seen in the light of the state of the balance of interdependence between the two levels of the 
vertical relationship.  
For the antecedents and the consequences of the perception of VIRQ, only the lower level’s 
perspective was considered. Five different antecedents were identified. These are: the state of 
the balance of interdependence, the lower level’s orientation, the lower level’s autonomy, the 
state of cognitive congruence between the two levels, and the inter-personal relationship 
quality between the concerned boundary spanners. The qualitative evidence suggests that all 
these antecedents tend to be inter-related, with the state of the balance of interdependence 
playing the key role in shaping the perception of the rest of the antecedents and the perception 
of VIRQ.  
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For the consequences of the perception of VIRQ, three different reciprocation modes were 
identified. The first is positive reciprocation, which tends to occur in cases where the 
perception of VIRQ was favourable. These cases tended to be more dependent on their higher 
level than vice versa and therefore they viewed their balance of influence as satisfactory or 
fair. In their reciprocation to their higher level, they tended to comply with the higher level’s 
agenda (both at the boundary spanner’s level and at the whole unit’s level) by meeting and 
sometimes exceeding the higher level’s expectations (by involving in extra-role activities and 
utilising the informal organisational channels). Due to the positive reciprocation, the balance 
of influence in the vertical relationship tended to be stabilised in the short/medium term.  
The second mode of reciprocation was tactful reciprocation. The lower level under this mode 
was responding to a negatively or a moderately negative perceived relationship quality, yet, 
their reciprocation was positive. Cases under this category were also complying with the 
higher level’s agenda. However, their engagement in active legitimation activities (active trust 
development, development of common understanding, informal relationship building, and 
utilisation of informal organisational channels) was noteworthy. Tactful reciprocation resulted 
in a structural refinement of the terms of the vertical relationship whereby the lower level unit 
could gain more influence on the terms of the relationship in the medium-term.  
The third mode of reciprocation was negative reciprocation, where the lower level unit was 
responding negatively to a negatively perceived vertical relationship quality (i.e. the lower 
level under this category did not perceive the balance of influence as being fair). Cases under 
this mode of reciprocation were less concerned about legitimising their position in their 
institutions. Boundary spanners showed evidence of single identification only with their unit 
and low morale. Across the whole unit, low morale, decreased motivation, innovation, and 
creativity, increased levels of voluntary turnover, and organisational disintegration (“us” 
 
 
309 
 
versus “them” attitude) were also evident. Negative reciprocation tended to result in structural 
instability as it can characterise dysfunctional vertical relationships.  
These findings were summarised in a number of propositions. For the sake of providing 
further support for these propositions and with having the lower level perspective as the key 
focus in this study, propositions concerning the lower level’s perspective will be transferred 
into hypotheses, when possible, to be tested in the wider population of UK University-based 
Business Schools. These hypotheses are shown in table 8.1 in the following chapter. The first 
set of hypotheses focuses on the attributes and the meaning of VIRQ. In particular, they test 
whether the identified social attributes (trust, openness, fairness, support, and satisfaction) 
make up for a measure representing VIRQ. They are also verifying the underlying meaning of 
VIRQ (from the lower level perspective) by looking at the correlation between the identified 
social attributes and the perception of power distribution in the vertical relationship.  
The second set of hypotheses focus on testing the identified antecedents that could cause 
variation in the perception of VIRQ and the inter-relationships among these antecedents. 
The third set of hypotheses focus on the concomitants of the perception of VIRQ. As the 
concomitants of the perception of VIRQ were manifested in a reciprocation process, testing 
this process quantitatively was not possible. However, only some facets of this reciprocation 
process were tested. These were represented in the relationship between the perception of 
VIRQ on one hand and subjective performance, affective commitment, and boundary 
spanners’ intent to leave on the other hand.  
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CHAPTER 8: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
8.1 Introduction  
Based on the previously discussed analyses of the qualitative findings in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, 
a number of propositions have been suggested.  With the aim of testing the suggested 
propositions further, an additional data set drawn from the wider population of UK UBBS 
(University–based Business Schools) was used. The additional dataset collection was 
administered through an online survey which targeted all the UK UBBS population (114 at 
the time of data collection). 50 responses were obtained and each response is assumed to 
represent a different school. The response rate was approximately 44% of the population 
which is considered to offer good representation. Three responses were excluded due to 
problems of missing data. With 47 responses, a response rate of approximately 41% was 
obtained, which was still considered to be reasonably high. Given the sample and typically 
quantitative data; this chapter primarily focuses on hypothesis testing. Hypotheses are derived 
from the suggested propositions. Not all propositions were translated into testable hypotheses 
as some referred to process dynamics that were difficult to access through a questionnaire
114
. 
This was particularly true of the propositions suggested in Chapter 7 concerning the modes of 
reciprocation. The following table highlights the study propositions and their corresponding 
hypotheses that were tested.  
 
 
 
                                                             
114 All the constructs used in the quantitative investigation along with their constituting items, operationalistions, 
and sources are presented in Appendix I. These were the constructs and the items which were used in the on-line 
survey. During the process of data analysis, some items were revised to enhance their reliability. The final items 
used to derive the analysis reported in this chapter are presented in Appendix III. 
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Table 8.1: Suggested Propositions and the Derived Testable Hypotheses 
Propositions Testable Hypotheses 
First: Propositions related to the attributes and meaning of VIRQ 
P1: VIRQ is a higher order construct that is 
composed of multiple, yet interrelated five 
dimensions; trust, openness, fairness, support, 
and satisfaction. Trust, openness, fairness, 
support, and satisfaction are likely to be the key 
intrinsic social attributes that make up for VIRQ.  
 
P2: From the LL perspective, the perception of 
the relationship instrumentalities (being 
empowered or constrained) is dependent on the 
perception of the power distribution in the 
vertical relationship. The perception of the power 
distribution in the vertical relationship is likely to 
reflect the perception of vertical inter–unit 
relationship social intrinsic attributes. 
 
P3: The different VIRQ attributes are likely to 
boil down to one underlying meaning; achieving 
a satisfactory/fair balance of influence between 
the HL and the LL. 
 
H1: Perceived trust, openness, fairness, support, 
and satisfaction are the key social attributes of 
perceived VIRQ. 
  
H2: there is a strong positive correlation between 
the perception of the key social attributes of 
VIRQ and the perception of the power 
distribution in the vertical relationship.  
 
Second: Propositions related to the antecedents of VIRQ 
The balance of interdependence 
P4: In general, the balance of interdependence is 
likely to influence the perception of VIRQ by the 
LL unit, such that if the LL unit is positively 
interdependent on its HL unit, the former is more 
likely to perceive the VIRQ favourably in 
comparison to if the LL is negatively or equally 
interdependent on its HL.  
 
H3: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of net dependence of the LL on the 
higher level and the perception of VIRQ. 
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The lower level’s orientation 
P5: In general, the LL unit’s orientation, whether 
it to be towards the vertical intra–University 
institutional relationship or the wider institutional 
sector, is likely to affect the perception of VIRQ.  
 
P6: The neutralisation of the institutional duality 
via alignment is likely to positively influence the 
perception of VIRQ and vice versa. 
 
H4: The perception of shared understandings and 
views strengthens the relationship between the 
LL’s orientation towards the wider sector and the 
perception of VIRQ. 
 
Cognitive congruence  (further sub–divided into shared understandings and shared vision) 
P7: Cognitive congruence is based on a 
satisfactory alignment of broad visions, means, 
frames of references, and perceptions. 
 
P8: In general, the balance of interdependence 
can affect the state of cognitive congruence 
between the higher and the lower level units of 
the vertical relationship; such that the more the 
LL is dependent on its HL unit, the higher the 
perception of cognitive congruity between them. 
 
P9: In general, the state of cognitive congruence 
or disparity is likely to affect the perception of 
VIRQ, such that lower cognitive congruence 
across the organisational levels will be associated 
with lower perception of VIRQ. 
 
P10: Balanced interdependence is likely to be 
associated with a negative perception of control 
and an unfavourable perception of VIRQ if the 
perception of cognitive congruence was negative.  
 
P11: In all cases, a favourable perception of the 
state of cognitive congruence is likely to be 
H5: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of positive net dependence and the 
perception of shared vision.  
 
H6: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of positive net dependence and the 
perception of shared understandings and views. 
  
H7: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of shared vision and the perception of 
VIRQ. 
 
H8: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of shared understandings and views 
and the perception of VIRQ. 
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associated with a favourable perception of VIRQ. 
 
Autonomy 
P12: The general perception of control (as 
acceptable or excessive) is likely to have an 
impact on the perception of the VIRQ by the LL 
unit.  
 
P13: Acceptable (neutralised) control is likely to 
be associated with a favourable perception of 
VIRQ. 
 
P14: Excessive (negative) control is likely to be 
associated with an unfavourable perception of 
VIRQ. 
H9: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of autonomy and the perception of 
VIRQ. 
 
H10: the perception of shared understanding and 
views strengthens the positive relationship 
between the perception of autonomy and the 
perception of VIRQ. 
 
H11: the perception of shared understanding and 
views strengthens the positive relationship 
between the perception of autonomy and the 
perception of VIRQ. 
 
Inter–personal relationship quality 
P15: Personal qualities, personal and background 
similarities, and personal loyalties can affect the 
perception of the inter–personal relationship 
between the key boundary spanners in the vertical 
inter unit relationship.  
 
P16: The more favourable the perception of the 
inter–personal relationship (represented in inter–
personal trust and satisfaction) between the key 
boundary spanners in the vertical inter–unit 
relationship, the higher the VIRQ.  
 
P17: Friendly formal or informal relationships are 
more likely to be associated with a favourable 
perception of the VIRQ compared to strictly 
formal relationships.  
 
H12: there is a positive correlation between the 
perception the interpersonal relationship quality 
between the boundary spanners and the 
perception of VIRQ. 
 
 
 
314 
 
Interrelationships among  variables focusing on the balance of interdependence 
P18: The perception of the balance of 
interdependence, coupled with the LL’s level of 
maturity, is likely to be associated with the 
neutralisation of the institutional duality as seen 
by the LL unit in the vertical relationship.  
 
P19: The perception of the balance of 
interdependence is likely to influence the 
perception of cognitive congruence/disparity 
between the HL and the LL units in the vertical 
relationship as seen by the LL unit in the vertical 
relationship. The more the LL is dependent on the 
HL, the higher the level of cognitive congruence 
between them. 
 
P20: The perception of the balance of 
interdependence is likely to influence the 
perception of autonomy as seen by the LL unit in 
the vertical relationship. The more the LL is 
dependent on the HL, the more likely the HL’s 
control will be favourably perceived (neutralised) 
by the LL unit. 
 
P21: The perception of the balance of 
interdependence is likely to have bearing on the 
perception of the inter–personal relationships 
between the key boundary spanners in the vertical 
inter–unit relationship as seen by the LL unit. 
The more the LL is dependent on the HL, the 
more likely the inter–personal relationships 
between the key boundary spanners concerned 
will be favourable. 
 
 
H13: there is a positive correlation between the 
perception of positive net dependence and the 
perception of autonomy.  
 
H14: there is a positive correlation between the 
perception of positive net dependence and the 
perception of the quality of the inter–personal 
relationship between the boundary spanners.  
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Interrelationships among  variables focusing on autonomy 
P22: The perception of interpersonal relationship 
quality is likely to have a bearing on the 
perception of autonomy from the perspective of 
the LL unit. The higher the perceived 
interpersonal relationship quality, the higher the 
autonomy perceived by the LL unit. 
 
P23: The state of cognitive congruence is likely 
to have bearing on the perception of autonomy 
from the perspective of the LL unit. Cognitive 
congruence is more likely to neutralise the 
perception of control compared to cognitive 
disparity. The higher the perceived cognitive 
congruity by the LL unit, the higher it perceives 
autonomy. 
 
H15: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of shared vision and the perception of 
autonomy.  
 
H16:  There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of shared understandings and views 
and the perception of autonomy.  
 
 
Overall propositions 
P24: Positive interdependence of the LL unit is 
likely to have a positive impact on the perception 
of cognitive congruence, to neutralise the 
perception of control, and to have a positive 
impact on the perception of the VIRQ. 
 
P25: The negative interdependence of the LL unit 
is likely to have a negative impact on the 
perception of cognitive congruence, the 
perception of control, and the perception of the 
VIRQ. 
 
P26: Balanced interdependence is likely to be 
associated with a neutralised perception of 
control and a favourable perception of VIRQ if 
the perception of cognitive congruence is 
positive.  
H17: Perceived net dependence, perceived 
autonomy, perceived shared vision, perceived 
shared understandings and views, and perceived 
inter–personal relationship quality between the 
boundary spanners are the key predictors of 
VIRQ. 
 
H18: The perception of net dependence affects 
the perception of perceived autonomy, perceived 
shared vision, perceived shared understandings 
and views, perceived inter–personal relationship 
quality between the boundary spanners, and 
perceived VIRQ. 
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P27: Balanced interdependence is likely to be 
associated with a negative perception of control 
and an unfavourable perception of VIRQ if the 
perception of cognitive congruence is negative.  
 
P28: In all cases, a favourable perception of the 
state of cognitive congruence is likely to be 
associated with a favourable perception of VIRQ. 
 
Third: Propositions related to the Concomitants of VIRQ 
Modes of reciprocation 
Positive reciprocation 
P29: Favourable perception of vertical inter–unit 
relationship is likely to be associated with 
positive reciprocation from the LL unit. 
 
P30: In positive reciprocation cases, since the LL 
units are more dependent on the HL than vice 
versa, pushing for a structural refinement of the 
vertical relationship from the LL unit’s side is 
less likely. 
 
P31: Keeping other variables constant, 
relationships built on positive reciprocation are 
likely to be productive ones; meeting the 
expectations of the two parties of the vertical 
relationship.  
 
Tactful reciprocation  
P32: Moderate or negatively perceived VIRQ can 
be reciprocated by either tactful reciprocation or 
negative reciprocation.  
 
P33: Structural refinement in tactful reciprocation 
situations tends to be more likely, as tactful 
H19: There is appositive correlation between the 
perception of VIRQ and the perception of 
subjective performance.  
 
H20: There is a positive correlation between the 
perception of VIRQ and the perception of 
affective commitment.  
 
H21: There is a negative correlation between the 
perception of VIRQ and the intent to leave.  
 
H22: The higher the VIRQ, the higher the 
subjective performance of the LL unit, the 
affective commitment, and the lower the 
boundary spanners’ intent to leave.  
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reciprocation is usually motivated by increasing 
the LL’s scope of influence. 
 
P34: If tactful reciprocation failed to realise the 
desired influence, negative reciprocation is likely 
to follow. 
 
Negative reciprocation 
P35: Negatively perceived VIRQ can stir 
negative reciprocation by the LL, if tactful 
reciprocation was attempted but failed to achieve 
the desired influence or when there is a 
perception of excessive or unjustifiable lack of 
influence from the LL’s side. 
 
P36: Negative reciprocation could potentially 
give rise to structural instability or tactful 
reciprocation as the vertical relationship becomes 
dysfunctional; (i.e, vertical relationships built on 
negative reciprocation are not sustainable). 
 
8.2 Quantitative Data Analysis  
8.2.1 Missing Data 
Data were analysed using SPSS Version 19. Reverse coded responses were considered during 
data entry. However, before proceeding to hypothesis testing and as missing data points were 
noticed, 3 cases were deleted from the data set reducing the number of cases from 50 to 47. 
These three cases had more missing than completed data points and therefore imputing 
missing data for these cases would provide arbitrary results. Yet, before their deletion, Little’s 
MCAR (Missing Completely at Random) test was performed and the results showed that 
missing data were missing completely at random (Chi–Square= 74.509, DF= 94, Sig. = 
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0.931), supporting the decision of their deletion as this would not cause a significant bias (see 
Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1998). However, very sparse missing data points could 
be still noticed in the remaining 47 cases, this led to the decision to “treat” such missing data 
points in order to enhance the power of further statistical tests.  
Missing data fell into two categories based on the nature of the question; some missing data 
were categorical data (nominal scale) and others were scale data. For categorical data, no 
statistical techniques were used to replace the missing data at random, rather, due effort was 
made to identify the actual category to which each school belonged. This was enabled by 
looking into the other data points provided by the same respondent
115
.  
For missing scale data, Little’s MCAR test was used again (after the deletion of the 3 cases) 
to test whether the missing data points are not biased and therefore are due to chance. MCAR 
test verifies whether the missingness is related to the values of variables in the data set or not 
(Little, 1988). The test results were significant (Chi–Square = 240.093, DF=294, Sig. = 
0.991),  supporting  the alternative hypothesis that the missing data are random; while bearing 
in mind that these results are suggestive rather than definitive as noted by Little (1988).  
To estimate the missing data points, mean imputation was avoided as it was suggested to 
affect the distribution of variables, underestimate their standard deviation, and affect the 
relationships between variables (cf: Hair et al., 1998). Other missing data imputation methods 
                                                             
115 Most missing categorical data points (8 missing data points) were related to question (1); perhaps due to the 
questionnaire layout. The first question was concerned with the type of the immediate higher University level; 
whether it is a faculty/college level or the University management board. Responses for the final question in the 
questionnaire were used in order to derive the missing data points for the first question. Through the final 
question, the name of the school was recognised and therefore the nature of the school’s organizational structure 
and the type of its immediate higher level was identified. This was deemed to provide more accurate results 
particularly with some categorical data. Other missing categorical data were very sparse and were not easily 
derived from other responses. For other missing categorical data, missing data were not imputed, putting them 
under a distinct category so as to avoid bias.  
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that can affect the quality of the data or cause a presumed significant bias were also avoided 
(such as regression methods which can result in unconstrained solutions, i.e., might go 
beyond the scale used) (cf: Hair et al., 1998; Roth, 1994). Since most measures were multi–
item measures reflecting on a latent variable, and since all respondents provided information 
about all the latent variables under study where the missing data points were only coincidental 
and very sparse; the Expectation Maximisation Method was chosen to impute those sparse 
missing data points. The choice was supported by the percent of the missing data points which 
is very low
116
, the availability of data points for each latent variable in each case
117
, and the 
need to perform an exploratory factor and regression analyses at latter points in the analysis 
(cf: Gold and Bentler, 2000).  
While this study relies on a number of different developed and adapted constructs, there is a 
core construct that is central to this research investigation; VIRQ. The latter construct is 
suggested to be a new construct to the general organisational literature. Since it is the core 
construct in the study and with little quantitative evidence that such developed construct 
actually reflects the desired attribute (VIRQ), a special focus is given to this construct, the 
procedures used in the process of developing it, its reliability, and its validity before 
proceeding to testing the rest of the study hypotheses. The remaining analysis section, 
therefore, is divided into two main sections. Steps towards VIRQ scale development and the 
relevant issues involved in that are discussed in Section I. The rest of the hypotheses will be 
tested and results will be interpreted in Section II. 
 
                                                             
116 Missing data were very sparse not exceeding 4% (2 data points) for any given variable and most variables had 
no missing data points; perhaps due to the nature of the respondents who come from an academic background. 
 
117 There was no missing data imputed for single-item measures or categorical data. 
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Section I 
8.2.2 VIRQ: Towards a Scale Development  
With the overall objective of developing a quantitative scale to measure VIRQ, both the 
literature (prior to any data collection) and qualitative data collection and analysis in three 
different phases were considered. The following figure shows a visual representation of the 
process. 
Figure 8.1: The Process of Generating and Validating the Scale Items before the 
Quantitative Data Collection (Survey Distribution) 
 
8.2.2.1 Discovering the Literature 
As VIRQ is seen as a new construct, due effort was made prior to any data collection to 
explore the literature for relevant terms. In the marketing literature, relationship quality was 
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broadly defined as a set of favourable perceived attributes that facilitate the achievement of 
relationship goals (see Lages, Lages, and Lages, 2005).  Based on previous definitions of 
relationship quality in other contexts, relationship quality in vertical inter–unit relationships 
was broadly conceptualised as the overall assessment of the "climate" of the relationship, the 
extent to which it meets the needs and expectations of its parties based on a history of 
successful or unsuccessful transactions, as well as how the relationship serves the 
achievement and improvement of the business goals. Assessment of the "climate" of the 
relationship was primarily addressed through some intrinsic characteristics that members in 
the relationship perceive as important factors in characterising a good or bad relationship.  
Assessment of whether the relationship addressed the expectations and needs of the parties to 
the relationship was manifested by the parties' satisfaction with aspects of the relationship and 
communication quality. Assessment of whether the relationship helps the achievement and/or 
the improvement of the business goals was addressed through relationship perceived 
importance or added value. This was in line with previous studies in the marketing field that 
conceptualised relationship quality as a higher order construct made of many different, 
however, inter–related dimensions.  
Based on this apriori approach of developing a primary idea about the construct based on 
other literatures, VIRQ was seen to include numerous sub–dimensions.  
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Figure 8.2: Apriori Constructs as Derived From the Literature Review 
 
The literature was then used to look for the relevant measures in contexts perceived to be 
similar to this study context (mainly the headquarter–subsidiary literature and the broad 
organisation literature) (see Figure 8.2). Such measures were used to construct a primary 
questionnaire. The questionnaire included 43 items and was then used as the key focus in 6 
pilot, yet in–depth face to face, interviews with key boundary spanners representing the LL 
unit
118
. This was in January 2010 prior to any case study investigation. The aim of such in–
depth interviews was two–fold: 
 To provide a better understanding of the vertical inter–unit relationship context and 
dynamics in UK UBBS. 
                                                             
118 The 43 items included in the first pilot questionnaire are shown in the Appendix II along with their 
operationalization’s and sources.  
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 To verify the sufficiency and the appropriateness of the apriori measure derived from 
the literature and whether it reflects the intended construct or not.  
An apriori pilot questionnaire representing the suggested dimensions was shown to the 
interviewees. The interviewees, who were all academics, were also shown the model 
representing the VIRQ, dimensions included in it, and the items included under each 
dimension. The objective of the study was explained thoroughly to them stressing the 
objective of a scale development. The interviewees were asked to reflect on the dimensions as 
well as the individual items. Based on thorough discussions with the boundary spanners on 
the nature of the research context and the appropriateness and the number of the items to be 
included in the scale, the items were reduced to 14 questions only where many dimensions 
were removed and others were added. For instance, the strength of the personal ties, the 
strength of the inter–unit ties, subsidiary identification, conflict resolution, communication 
quality, and relationship importance were seen either as less relevant dimensions or 
dimensions that are related to but not representing the construct under investigation. The 
remaining 14 items were found to reflect two main dimensions; trust and satisfaction.  
8.2.2.2 Collecting Qualitative Data  
The second stage of the scale development took place while conducting the qualitative data 
analysis. As described in Chapter 5, 43 in–depth open–ended interviews were conducted with 
the key boundary spanners representing the LL in 15 different BSs. Respondents were asked 
to express the attributes they attach to a favourable vertical inter–unit relationship and to 
reflect on their experiences of what they see most satisfactory and least satisfactory, to give 
examples and to tell stories based on their own experiences. Such attributes were mainly 
guided by the respondents’ answers with no intervention from the interviewer at this stage. 
Towards the end of the interview, respondents were shown the 14 items generated from the 
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literature and asked to reflect on them. Respondents were asked to assess whether the items 
included in the questionnaire are good reflectors of VIRQ based on their experiences, whether 
any attributes or items need to be added or removed, and whether the scale is a good 
representative of the construct under developed (whether it shows face and construct validity).  
Based on the answers of 43 respondents and the thorough analyses of the qualitative findings, 
the scale had 13 items keeping most items reflecting inter–unit trust and satisfaction with 
some modifications; and adding extra items to reflect on fairness, openness, and transparency.  
8.2.2.3 Piloting the Suggested Scale 
These 13 items (shown in table 8.2) were used in the final questionnaire after being 
extensively tested in 3 stages; the pilot stage in January 2010, the case study investigation 
stage from November 2010 till June 2011, then another pilot study before the final 
quantitative data collection in June 2011. The final pilot stage involved piloting the whole 
questionnaire in its final format prior to its distribution. 6 boundary spanners representing one 
LL unit participated in the final pilot stage. 
Table 8.2: Suggested Scale Items In Order (VIRQ) 
1. The higher level’s cooperation with the Business School is satisfactory.  
2. The balance of influence between the higher level and the Business School is satisfactory 
3. The communication process between the Business School and the higher level is satisfactory.  
4. In general, the Business School’s relationship with the higher level is satisfactory.  
5. The higher level management meets its agreed upon obligations to the Business School.  
6. The higher level management acts in the Business School’s best interest. 
7. The higher level management usually keeps its word.  
8. The higher level management is transparent in dealing with the Business School.  
9. The higher level management discusses issues with the Business School openly.  
10. The higher level management does not mislead the Business School. 
11. The higher level management discusses joint expectations fairly.  
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12. The Business school can share information openly with staff at the higher level because they 
do not take advantage of this by acting against the Business School interests.  
13. The higher level’s management at times must make decisions which seem to be against the 
interests of the Business School. When this happens, we are confident that the Business 
School's current sacrifice will be justified by the higher level’s future support for the Business 
School.  
 
8.2.2.4 Suggested Scale Reliability 
Following Churchill’s (1979) steps for scale development, the first step after the collection of 
the quantitative data was to test the reliability of the scale. Cronbach Alpha for the intended 
scale was 0.95, which shows very high reliability
119
. The following tables show the reliability 
test results including the inter–item correlation matrix and the item–total statistics.  
Table 8.3: Cronbach Alpha for VIRQ 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.955 .956 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
119 While item number (13) was found to have the lowest corrected item-total correlation and its removal would 
have slightly improved the reliability score, the decision was to keep it for the exploratory factor analysis as the 
increase in Cronbach Alpha score was minimal and keeping it would mean that the (0.5) criteria suggested by 
scholars such as Netemeyer, Boles, and McMurrian (1996) would be still met. 
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Table 8.4: Inter–Item Correlation Matrix for the Items Composing VIRQ 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  13  
1 1.000             
2 .765 1.000            
3 .659 .678 1.000           
4 .794 .745 .773 1.000          
5 .727 .699 .502 .633 1.000         
6 .715 .751 .763 .684 .664 1.000        
7 .537 .648 .578 .556 .730 .679 1.000       
8 .660 .773 .693 .628 .762 .687 .828 1.000      
9 .605 .702 .720 .600 .618 .671 .727 .875 1.000     
10 .398 .570 .624 .487 .533 .686 .654 .675 .688 1.000    
11 .517 .713 .697 .630 .535 .618 .638 .696 .668 .736 1.000   
12  .446 .572 .680 .557 .586 .671 .719 .788 .766 .745 .652 1.000  
13  .414 .423 .298 .303 .589 .430 .500 .496 .443 .306 .312 .504 1.000 
 
Table 8.5: Item Total Statistics for the Items Composing VIRQ 
 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected Item–
Total 
Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
1 60.1219 222.022 .748 .808 .952 
2 60.5899 221.327 .834 .804 .949 
3 59.7389 229.602 .786 .802 .951 
4 59.8027 230.610 .764 .793 .951 
5 59.7417 227.038 .788 .781 .950 
6 60.3985 226.585 .829 .804 .949 
7 59.3559 228.133 .802 .758 .950 
8 59.9729 222.333 .891 .903 .948 
9 59.6751 224.704 .833 .811 .949 
10 59.1857 238.183 .718 .741 .952 
11 59.4836 237.067 .755 .723 .952 
12  59.6325 228.440 .783 .790 .951 
13  60.6993 238.604 .508 .462 .958 
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8.2.2.5 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The second step in the scale development was to perform an Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA) to test whether the items in the scale reflect the same construct or not. EFA is argued to 
be a significant step in latent scale development as it tests the dimensionality of the scale.  As 
noted by Jung and Lee (2011: 701), “[EFA] is used for the analysis of interdependencies 
among observed variables and underlying theoretical constructs, often called factors, so that 
the underlying structure of observed variables can be discovered.”  
While many behavioural science researchers use EFA and Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) interchangeably, many others highlight the difference in the theoretical and 
computational rationale between them, although both of them often yield similar solutions 
(Stewart et al., 2001). EFA primarily examines the structure of data, while PCA is primarily 
interested in data reduction; which is a by–product of factor analysis (Stewart et al., 2001). 
While Stewart el al. (2001) prefer the use of Principal Factor Analysis (PFA) to PCA in 
behavioural research as the former accounts for measurement error, PFA has more 
assumptions related to the sample size than the PCA, making the use of the PCA more 
convenient in cases where the sample size is small. The following section discusses the 
different assumptions for EFA and PCA as well as the considerations taken into account while 
performing them.  
8.2.2.5.1. Assumptions of Exploratory Factor Analysis  
8.2.2.5.1.1 Data Distribution  
According to Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006), assumptions of EFA tend to 
be more conceptual; primarily focusing on an underlying structure in a set of selected 
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variables (items) found in a homogenous sample. Hair et al. (2006) inferred that normality of 
the variables is of less importance if the significance of specific factors is marginal to the 
analysis.  
Although according the Shapiro–Wilk Test of Normality, items were not normally distributed. 
Shapiro–Wilk test can be suitable for a sample below 50 cases but it does not inform on how 
much the data are deviating from normality (Field, 2009). Histograms describing the data 
distribution and the Q–Q plots were therefore checked and it was observed that while the data 
are not normally distributed, they are approaching normality
120
.  
In order to investigate further the deviation of the data from normal distribution, a comparison 
between a parametric and non–parametric test results was made. More specifically the results 
of inter–items correlations based on Pearson and Spearman rho correlation tests were 
compared. The results were very similar to each other which helped in providing some 
confidence in the observation that the data were approaching normality. The two test results 
along with the items are shown in Tables 8.6 and 8.7.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
120 Data for individual items are not expected to be normally distributed as they are based on a 7-point Likert 
scale (see Nunally, 1978; Malthouse, 2001).   
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Table 8.6: Inter–Item Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Table 8.7: Inter–Item correlation based on Spearman rho  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  13  
 1  1.000             
2  .766** 1.000            
3  .679** .674** 1.000           
4  .799** .760** .811** 1.000          
5  .705** .731** .567** .699** 1.000         
6  .760** .779** .741** .718** .716** 1.000        
7  .597** .718** .603** .639** .750** .718** 1.000       
8  .684** .795** .736** .711** .804** .729** .848** 1.000      
9  .638** .697** .733** .662** .686** .692** .726** .881** 1.000     
10  .432** .581** .646** .581** .576** .647** .655** .687** .696** 1.000    
11  .540** .721** .703** .706** .605** .638** .703** .763** .685** .772** 1.000   
12  .486** .604** .690** .624** .685** .665** .777** .860** .821** .745** .734** 1.000  
13   .438** .457** .319* .342* .589** .473** .591** .546** .528** .310* .348* .535** 1.000 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  13  
1 1.000             
2 .765 1.000            
3 .659 .678 1.000           
4 .794 .745 .773 1.000          
5 .727 .699 .502 .633 1.000         
6 .715 .751 .763 .684 .664 1.000        
7 .537 .648 .578 .556 .730 .679 1.000       
8 .660 .773 .693 .628 .762 .687 .828 1.000      
9 .605 .702 .720 .600 .618 .671 .727 .875 1.000     
10 .398 .570 .624 .487 .533 .686 .654 .675 .688 1.000    
11 .517 .713 .697 .630 .535 .618 .638 .696 .668 .736 1.000   
12  .446 .572 .680 .557 .586 .671 .719 .788 .766 .745 .652 1.000  
13  .414 .423 .298 .303 .589 .430 .500 .496 .443 .306 .312 .504 1.000 
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While the data can be assumed to approach normality, PCA (which is a less sensitive test to 
the shape of the data distribution) was first used and the results were compared to principal 
axis factoring. The results were found to be not only consistent but also very similar.  
8.2.2.5.1.2 Sample Size 
One of the main criteria for factor analysis is the sample size. It is commonly suggested to 
have between 5 – 10 participants per each item (variable) for a sample size up to 300 (Kass 
and Tinsley, 1979). Different authors offer different ratios ranging from 3:1 till 201: 1 (see de 
Winter, Dodou and Weiringa, 2009). Other authors focus on the absolute sample size, 
suggesting sometime 50 and other times 200 or 300 cases as the minimum sample size to 
perform factor analysis (see Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007;  Comrey and Lee, 1992; Field, 
2009;  de Winter et al., 2009; Jung and Lee, 2011). Yet, these remain as “rough” criteria (Jung 
and Lee, 2011:701).  
More recently, based on simulation studies, neither the participant–to–variable ratio nor the 
absolute sample size remain the key determinants (Field, 2009; de Winter et al., 2009).  
Arrindell and van der Ende (1985) conclude that changes to the participant–to–variable ratio 
does not affect the stability of the factor solutions. According to de Winter et al. (2009:148) 
“there are no absolute thresholds: minimum sample size varies depending on the level of 
communalities, loadings, number of variables per factor, and the number of factors.” 
Stevens (2002) argues that with 30 or more items and communalities higher than 0.7, the 
results tend to be similar. Field (2009: 647) highlights Gaudagnoli and Velicer (1988) 
argument that “if a factor has four or more loadings greater than 0.6, it is reliable regardless of 
the sample size”. Mundfrom, Shaw, and Ke (2005) recent study based on Monte Carlo 
simulations also demonstrates that even for a sample size below than 50, if communalities are 
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high and the number of factors is small, the factor analysis can be still reliable. In a similar 
line, Costello and Osborne (2005:4) argue that the sample size criteria for factor analysis has 
“mostly disappeared” as it now depends more on the strength of data.  
“Strong data” means to them the consistency of obtaining high communalities without cross 
loadings, while having more than three variables loading strongly on each factor.  Based on 
these rough criteria, a sample of 47 cases was seen appropriate given that only one factor was 
extracted, the number of items exceeded 3 (8 items) all of which loaded strongly on the one 
extracted factor, and the communalities were 0.7 approximately or more (as will be shown in 
the EFA tables). 
8.2.2.5.1.3. Overall Measures of Inter–correlations 
According to Hair et al. (2006), all items must be inter–correlated for factor analysis to be 
valid; inter–correlations should exceed 0.3 and partial correlations should be below 0.7. Based 
on the correlation matrixes presented above, item (13) was removed to enhance the inter–
items correlations while retaining the other 12 for further analysis. The anti–image correlation 
matrix also showed that the negatives of the partial correlation among the remaining 12 items 
were very low (below 0.3).  
Other criteria to judge the appropriateness of running a factor analysis are suggested to be 
through an examination of the entire correlation matrix (Hair et al., 2006). This can be done 
via looking to the results of Bartlett Test of Sphericity which should yield significant results 
(P value of  less than .05); denoting that the correlation matrix differs significantly from an 
identity matrix (Field, 2009). This can be also done via checking the measure of sampling 
adequacy (Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sample Adequacy – KMO) which increases with 
the increase of the sample size, the average correlations and  the number of factors; and 
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decreases with the increase of the number of factors Hair et al., 2006). Ranging from 0 to 1; 
with less than 0.5 as unacceptable and 0.8 or more as meritorious (Hair et al., 2006), Table 8.8 
shows that the data for the 12 items hypothesised to form the scale of VIRQ meet the criteria 
for factor analysis meritoriously.  
Table 8.8: KMO and Bartlett's Test for the Items Composing VIRQ 
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .898 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi–Square 547.255 
df 66 
Sig. .000 
However, to meet the criteria of the items having a communality of 0.7 or more, four further 
items were removed to enhance the reliability of the factor analysis. The 4 items were 
removed after considering their theoretical significance.  
The decision of their removal was also supported by the detection of some problematic items 
in the resulting pattern matrix as few items were showing loadings of higher than 1. The 
decision was taken to retain 8 theoretically important items that reflect the construct as 
suggested by the qualitative analyses and the pilot studies. All the dimensions that were 
suggested to be part of the latent construct based on the qualitative analyses were still 
reflected in the remaining items. Retaining the 8 items yielded very satisfactory results as they 
could explain 73.8% of the variance. All the items loaded on one factor based on the Scree 
plot and Eigen values; based on Kaiser criteria of Eigen values more than 1 (Field, 2009). In 
addition, the reproduced correlation and residual matrixes showed satisfactory results. 
Oblique Rotation (Promax) was used instead of Orthogonal Rotation as the items are 
suggested to be theoretically inter–correlated (Stewart et al., 2001; Field, 2009). Tables 8.9 
and 8.10 show the items’ communalities and the total variance explained based on PCA.  
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Table 8.9: Items’ Communalities (VIRQ) 
 Initial Extraction 
1 1.000 .693 
2 1.000 .700 
3 1.000 .738 
4 1.000 .853 
5 1.000 .793 
6 1.000 .689 
7 1.000 .743 
8 1.000 .698 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 8.10: Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.906 73.824 73.824 5.906 73.824 73.824 
2 .525 6.558 80.382    
3 .483 6.041 86.422    
4 .378 4.726 91.148    
5 .285 3.560 94.708    
6 .201 2.507 97.215    
7 .143 1.785 98.999    
8 .080 1.001 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Very similar results were obtained when using Principal Axis Factoring instead of Principal 
Component Analysis. Only one factor solution was obtained. The communalities table 
showed very minor differences
121
 and the extracted factor accounted for 70.1% of the 
variance instead of 73%. Results from both methods are seen to be consistent. Based on the 
results of the EFA, the following 8 items were used to represent the latent variable of VIRQ 
(Table 8.11).  
                                                             
121 The very way of determining communalities in both methods is different (see Stewart et al., 2001). 
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Table 8.11: Suggested Scale Items In Order after Running EFA (VIRQ) 
1. The balance of influence between the higher level and the Business School is 
satisfactory 
2. The higher level management acts in the Business School’s best interest. 
3. The higher level management usually keeps its word.  
4. The higher level management is transparent in dealing with the Business School.  
5. The higher level management discusses issues with the Business School openly.  
6. The higher level management does not mislead the Business School. 
7. The higher level management discusses joint expectations fairly.  
8. The Business school can share information openly with staff at the higher level 
because they do not take advantage of this by acting against the Business School 
interests. 
 
8.2.2.6 Scale Reliability 
The next step was to calculate the reliability of the 8 items again. Using Cronbach Alpha, the 
reliability for the 8 items was 0.94 which is seen to be high reliability.  
8.2.2.7 Scale Validity 
While the results obtained seem very satisfactory, an ideal further step towards scale 
development is to perform Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to test whether the aprori 
structure obtained from the EFA is “consistent with the structure obtained in a particular set 
of measures” (Stewart, Barnes, Cote, Cudeck, and Malthouse, 2001: 76). However, 
performing this step has not been possible due to the sample size limitation (47 cases in total); 
as well as the small size of the whole population (only 114 cases). CFA requires larger data 
sets for the results to be reliable. Results of simulation studies for CFA suggest that 
conclusions drawn from small samples (less than 100) can be “dangerous” (Boomsma, 1982; 
de Winter et al., 2009: 149).  
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Although conducting CFA was not possible due to the limitation of the sample size, testing 
the validity of the scale under development was not ignored. Face and construct validity were 
verified through the previous stages of extensive qualitative investigation and pilot studies. 
Face validity is concerned with the relationship of the items to the latent construct they intend 
to measure, while construct validity is related to the adequacy of the items to reflect the 
intended construct. The latter was maintained by comparing the construct items to the 
dimensions derived from the qualitative investigation and ensuring that each dimension is 
covered by at least one item, while the former is verified through recruiting the opinions of 
the interviewees on the construct’s face validity.  
To test convergent validity (see Churchill 1979; Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma, 2003), the 
construct of VIRQ was compared to another reflection of relationship quality that is 
concerned with the perception of the power distribution in the vertical inter–unit relationship. 
According to the qualitative analysis, both constructs (VIRQ and the perception of power 
distribution in the vertical relationship) are different manifestations to the same 
characteristics; perceiving a (dis)satisfactory influence.  
The perception of power distribution items were tested using PCA after considering the 
previously discussed criteria. The results suggest that the three items of the perception of 
power distribution construct were attributed to one factor (Table 8.12).  
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Table 8.12: Suggested Scale Items for the Perception of Power distribution Construct 
(listed orderly) 
1. The relationship between the higher level and the Business School is characterised by a great 
deal of support and cooperation. 
2. The relationship between the higher level and the Business School is characterised by a great 
deal of control and dominance. 
3. The relationship with the higher level is constraining for the Business School. 
 
With the perception of the power distribution construct showing reliability with a Cronbach 
Alpha of 0.826 and with its 3 items loading on one factor based on PCA  where the three 
items accounted for 74.8% of the variance, the Pearson correlation of the composite measures 
of the VIRQ scale and the perception of power distribution was significant: r (45)= 0.770 
(P<0.01). This indicates that the two constructs are likely to share the same underlying 
meaning in consistence with the qualitative propositions and supporting the convergent 
validity of the hypothesized construct
122
. 
In order to test the discriminant validity, the correlation between the VIRQ and another 
construct that is distinct from it should not be very high. The construct reflecting BS 
orientation towards the wider BS's sector was correlated to the VIRQ construct using 
spearman correlation
123
 and the correlation was low and not significant r (45) = 0.192 
(P<0.01); showing discriminant validity.  
In order to test nomological validity (see Netemeyer et al., 2003), theoretically related 
constructs were correlated to the hypothesised scale. Using the composite scores for the 
                                                             
122 Pearson correlation was used as the composite measures of the two constructs were normally distributed. 
 
123 As the composite score for BS orientation was not normally distributed. Data descriptive along with the data 
distribution and the reliability of the study constructs are presented in Appendix III. 
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shared vision, shared understandings and views, and affective commitment; the correlation 
was positive and significant as suggested theoretically: (r (45) = 0.667, 0.333, 0.418 (P<0.01) 
respectively). A negative, yet an insignificant, correlation was obtained with the boundary 
spanners’ intention to leave as suggested by the qualitative propositions: (r (45) = –0.199 
(P<0.01))
124
. Consistency with the suggested theory shows that the hypothesised scale is valid 
nomologically. 
While due effort was made in order to develop a scale for measuring VIRQ, and while the 
obtained results support the reliability and the validity of the scale under development, these 
are seen only as steps towards a scale development. The suggested construct is used in further 
quantitative analyses while acknowledging the limitations involved in the process of its 
validation, mainly due to the sample size limitations and the unsuitability of using CFA.  
However, with the results of the scale validity accepted for this study, the previous analyses 
support H1 and H2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
124 The composite scores for shared vision and shared understandings and views were normally distributed and 
therefore Pearson correlation was used. For the boundary spanners’ intent to leave and affective commitment, the 
data distribution was not normal and therefore spearman correlation was used. 
 
 
338 
 
Section II 
8.2.3 Vertical Inter–unit Relationship Quality Predictors and Outcomes 
8.2.3.1 Predictors Correlated to VIRQ
125
 
For testing H3, H7, H9, and H12 (correlations of the hypothesised predictors with VIRQ) and 
H5, H6, H13, H14, H15, and H16 (inter–correlations between the predictors); the following 
correlation matrices were performed. The matrices focus on the correlations of the suggested 
predictors with the outcome variable (VIRQ) as well as the inter–correlations among the 
predictors themselves. For the first matrix (Table 8.13), as the composite scores of inter–unit 
relationship quality, perceived autonomy, perceived shared understandings and views, and 
perceived shared vision were normally distributed; Pearson correlation was used. For the 
second matrix (Table 8.14), as the perceived net dependence, the perceived orientation, and 
the inter–personal relationship quality data were not normally distributed, Spearman 
correlation was used. However, the results obtained from both types of correlation did not 
vary strongly.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
125 The possibility of common method bias was examined by applying the Harman Factor Test which resulted in 
three factors each with eigenvalues of over 1.0 and with the first factor accounting for less than 50% of total 
variance. These results do not suggest a high level of common method bias. 
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Table 8.13: Correlation Matrix for Perceived Autonomy, VIRQ, Shared Understandings 
and Views, and Shared Vision. 
 
Autonomy VIRQ 
Shared Und. and 
Views Shared Vision 
Autonomy   1    
VIRQ  .664** 1   
Shared Understanding and Views   .501** .667** 1  
Shared Vision  .318* .333* .460** 1 
 
 
Table 8.14: Correlation Matrix for VIRQ, Perceived Net Dependence, BS’s Orientation, 
and Inter–Personal Relationship Quality 
 
VIRQ 
Perception of 
Net 
Dependence 
BS 
Orientation 
Inter–
Personal RQ 
Spearman's 
rho 
VIRQ  1.000    
Sig. (2–tailed) .    
Perception  of Net 
Dependence 
 .488** 1.000   
Sig. (2–tailed) .001 .   
BS Orientation  .192 .063 1.000  
Sig. (2–tailed) .196 .675 .  
Inter–Personal RQ  .811** .363* .261 1.000 
Sig. (2–tailed) .000 .012 .076 . 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2–tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2–tailed). 
 
Based on the correlation matrices, although none of the hypotheses were refuted, some points 
can be noted. First, the perception of net dependence did not correlate significantly with 
shared vision, although the correlation was positive as expected in H5
126
. Second, there were 
significant positive correlations between perceived net dependence and shared understandings 
                                                             
126 This can be explained in the light of the qualitative findings presented in Chapter 6 where sharing the vision 
with the HL can carry in its folds various cultural and methodological divides as a vision can be very broad. 
What seems to matter more is having common understanding and views.  
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and views (H6) on one hand, and autonomy (H13) on the other hand. Third, inter–personal 
relationship quality, shared understandings and views, perceived autonomy, perceived net 
dependence, and shared vision were respectively positively correlated with VIRQ (H3, H7, 
H9, and H12). Fourth, except for the correlation with the BS orientation, all correlations with 
VIRQ were significant, yet inter–personal relationship quality showed the highest correlation. 
Fifth, H15 and H16 were supported as the correlation between autonomy and shared vision, as 
well as between autonomy and shared understandings and views were significant.  
8.2.3.1.1 Examining the Moderating Effects 
For testing H4, H10, and H11, the moderating impacts of both shared vision and shared 
understandings and views on the relationship between autonomy and VIRQ on one hand and 
on the relationship between BS’s orientation and VIRQ on the other hand were considered. To 
do that, the centred values for all the respective values were calculated and the product of 
multiplication of the centred values was used in further analysis in an attempt to minimise 
multicollinearity. 
These three hypotheses were statistically rejected as the impact of the moderating effect was 
not significant. The hierarchical regression models did not show significant improvement in 
the prediction of the outcome variable (VIRQ) when the moderating variables were added to 
the regression equation. Yet, there are theoretical reasons to believe they can have some 
validity (as discussed in Chapter 6).  
8.2.3.2 VIRQ Key Predictors: The Regression Model 
While the previously presented correlations suggest that all the proposed predictors were 
correlated to VIRQ, in order to highlight the power of the individual predictors in predicting 
this outcome variable, multiple hierarchical regression analysis was performed. Taking into 
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account the general rule of thumb of 10 cases for each predictor (Field, 2009) and with no 
significant correlations between the outcome variable and the BS’s orientation; only inter–
personal relationship quality, perceived autonomy, shared vision, shared understandings and 
views, and perceived net dependence were entered into the analysis. The latter construct was 
entered in the first model, while the other predictors were entered in the second model. With 
all of the theoretical predictors entered into the hierarchical regression analysis, an adjusted R 
Square of 0.723 (F (4, 41) = 22.205, P<0.01) was obtained for the second model. However, 
the Beta coefficients for shared vision and shared understandings and views were only 
marginally significant (0.091 and 0.051 respectively in the second model). The results provide 
support for H17 where perceived net dependence affects the perception of autonomy and the 
perception of inter–personal relationships between boundary spanners which in turn could 
predict the perception of VIRQ. The concept of shared vision was perhaps too broad to affect 
the prediction of VIRQ significantly (see Chapter 6) and shared understandings and views 
was found to affect the perception of the interpersonal relationship quality (the regression 
model will be shown latter in this chapter), hence the interpersonal relationship quality along 
with autonomy were more direct predictors. Figure 8.3 summarizes the results of the 
regression analysis and Tables (8.15 and 8.16) show the results of the hierarchical regression 
model.  
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Figure 8.3: Key Predictors of VIRQ based on Hierarchical Regression Model Analysis 
 
 
 
Table 8.15: Model Summary  (VIRQ) 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin–
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .468a .219 .202 1.16002 .219 12.650 1 45 .001  
2 .868b .753 .723 .68297 .534 22.205 4 41 .000 1.595 
a. Predictors: (Constant), perceived of net dependence 
b. Predictors: (Constant), perceived net dependence, Shared und. & views, Shared vision, autonomy, inter–personal relationship quality.   
c. Dependent Variable: VIRQ 
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Table 8.16: Beta Coefficients(VIRQ) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Zero–
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 3.213 .551  5.828 .000      
perceived net 
dependence 
.507 .143 .468 3.557 .001 .468 .468 .468 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) .121 .526  .230 .819      
P. Net 
Dependence 
.333 .093 .308 3.59 .001 .468 .490 .279 .821 1.218 
Autonomy  .289 .103 .269 2.80 .008 .664 .401 .218 .651 1.535 
Inter–personal 
relationship 
quality  
.413 .130 .413 3.18 .003 .756 .445 .247 .357 2.797 
Shared und. & 
views 
.284 .141 .256 2.01 .051 .667 .300 .156 .372 2.691 
Shared vision –.165 .096 –.158 –1.71 .094 .333 –.259 –.133 .708 1.413 
a. Dependent Variable: VIRQ 
 
8.2.3.3 Inter–Relationships among the Proposed Predictors 
8.2.3.3.1 Autonomy  
While autonomy is positively correlated to the perception of net dependence, shared vision, 
shared understanding and views, and inter–personal relationship quality;  performance and the 
perception of net dependence were found to be the most significant predictors of autonomy 
with an adjusted R square =  33.1%. This provides partial support for H18; where the 
perception of net dependence
127
 is suggested to affect the other predictors of VIRQ. Figure 
8.4 summarizes the results of the regression analysis and Tables (8.17 and 8.18) show the 
results of the hierarchical regression model.  
                                                             
127 High perception of net dependence refers to the LL positive interdependence on the HL (the need of the LL to 
the HL is greater than vice versa). Low perception of net dependence refers to the LL negative interdependence.  
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Figure 8.4: Key Predictors of Autonomy based on Hierarchical Regression Model 
Analysis 
 
Table 8.17: Model Summary (Autonomy) 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin–
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .600a .360 .331 .98929 .360 12.395 2 44 .000 2.021 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Perception of net dependence, subjective performance 
b. Dependent Variable: autonomy  
 
Table 8.18: Beta Coefficients (Autonomy) 
 Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero–
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) –1.697 1.021  –1.662 .104      
Subjective 
performance 
.673 .156 .540 4.311 .000 .419 .545 .520 .927 1.079 
Perception of net 
dependence 
.450 .126 .446 3.564 .001 .300 .473 .430 .927 1.079 
a. Dependent Variable: autonomy 
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8.2.3.3.2 Inter–Personal Relationship Quality  
While inter–personal relationship quality was found to be significantly correlated to 
orientation, perceived autonomy, shared understandings and views, and shared vision; the key 
predicting variable of inter–personal relationship quality was shared understandings and 
views, where an adjusted R square of 58% was obtained (F(1,45)= 64.43, P<0.01). This 
provides partial support to H17, where shared understandings and views is suggested to affect 
inter–personal relationship quality which is a key predictor to VIRQ. Figure 8.5 summarizes 
the results of the regression analysis and Tables (8.19 and 8.20) show the results of the 
hierarchical regression model.  
Figure 8.5: Key Predictor of Inter–Personal Relationship Quality based on Hierarchical 
Regression Model Analysis 
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Table 8.19: Model Summary (Inter–Personal Relationship Quality) 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin–
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .767a .589 .580 .84212 .589 64.437 1 45 .000 2.399 
a. Predictors: (Constant), shared understandings and views  
b. Dependent Variable: inter–personal relationship quality 
 
Table 8.20: Beta Coefficient (Inter–Personal Relationship Quality) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Zero–
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .989 .535  1.849 .071      
Shared 
und. & 
views  
.851 .106 .767 8.027 .000 .767 .767 .767 1.000 1.000 
a. . Dependent Variable: inter–personal relationship quality 
 
8.2.3.4 VIRQ: the Correlated Outcomes  
In order to test H19, H20, and H21 which focus on the correlation between VIRQ as a 
proposed predictor on one hand and the LL unit’s subjective performance, affective 
commitment of the key boundary spanners of the LL unit, and the LL boundary spanners’ 
intent to leave, on the other hand. The following correlation matrices (Tables 8.21 and 8.22) 
show that both subjective performance and affective commitment are positively and 
significantly correlated to VIRQ, however the relationship with the boundary spanners intent 
to leave was insignificant, although it is negative. This provides support for H19, H20, and 
H21.  
One of the interesting results that appeared as a by–product of the correlation matrices is that 
the perception of net dependence is negatively correlated to subjective performance, although 
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the magnitude of the correlation relationship is very weak (r (45) = –.089). This could be seen 
as indicating that when the LL’s performance increases, their perception of their reliance on 
the HL slightly decreases.  
Table 8.21: VIRQ and the Correlated Outcomes 
 
Inter unit 
V RQ 
Subjective 
performance 
Affective 
commitment 
Intent to 
leave 
Spearman's rho VIRQ  Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000    
Subjective 
performance  
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.345* 1.000   
Affective 
commitment 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.418** .407** 1.000  
Intent to leave Correlation 
Coefficient 
–.199 –.281 –.519** 1.000 
 
Table 8.22:  Correlations among the Study Constructs 
 
 
Prec..of 
net 
depend. 
Orientati
on 
Inter–
person
al RQ 
Autono
my 
Shared 
Und 
Shared 
Vision 
Sub 
Perfor
mance 
Affecti
ve 
Commi
t 
Intentio
n to 
Leave 
Spearman
's rho 
Perceived  net 
dependence 
 1.000         
Orientation  .063 1.000        
Inter–personal RQ  .363* .261 1.000       
Autonomy  .341* .223 .548** 1.000      
Shared Und. & views  .152 .302* .804** .523** 1.000     
Shared Vision  .332* .142 .505** .339* .553** 1.000    
Sub. Performance  –.089 .524** .493** .442** .647** .519** 1.000   
Affective Commit.  .263 .195 .480** .553** .380** .428** .407** 1.000  
Intention to Leave  .114 –.309* –.237 –.494** –.299 –.121 –.281 –.519** 1.000 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2–tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2–tailed). 
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8.2.3.5 VIRQ Outcomes: the Regression Models 
8.2.3.5.1 Affective Commitment 
Depending on a hierarchical regression model, VIRQ contributed significantly to the 
prediction of affective commitment along with autonomy and inter–personal relationship 
quality.  These three predictors could predict 44.1% (F (1, 43) = 13.078, P< 0.05) of the 
variance in affective commitment. This provides partial support for H22. Figure 8.6 
summarizes the results of the regression analysis and Tables 8.23 and 8.24 show results of the 
hierarchical regression model.  
Figure 8.6: Key Predictors of Affective Commitment based on Hierarchical Regression 
Model Analysis 
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Table 8.23: Model Summary (Affective Commitment) 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin–
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .636a .404 .377 1.25584 .404 14.930 2 44 .000  
2 .691b .477 .441 1.19019 .073 5.988 1 43 .019 1.607 
a. Predictors: (Constant), inter–personal RQ, autonomy. 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Inter–personal RQ, autonomy, VIRQ 
c. Dependent Variable: affective commitment  
 
 
Table 8.24: Beta Coefficients (Affective Commitment) 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Zero–
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.239 .770  1.608 .115      
autonomy .454 .182 .345 2.494 .016 .550 .352 .290 .706 1.416 
Inter–
personal 
RQ 
.464 .170 .379 2.736 .009 .566 .381 .318 .706 1.416 
2 (Constant) 1.748 .759  2.303 .026      
Autonomy  .674 .195 .512 3.464 .001 .550 .467 .382 .556 1.799 
Inter–
personal 
RQ 
.784 .207 .640 3.783 .000 .566 .500 .417 .425 2.353 
VIRQ –.570 .233 –.465 –
2.447 
.019 .359 –.350 –.270 .337 2.971 
a. Dependent Variable: Affective Commitment 
 
8.2.3.5.2 Subjective Performance  
VIRQ also predicted variance in subjective performance along with two other study variables; 
these are perceived autonomy, shared understandings and views, and affective commitment. 
Both shared understandings and views and affective commitment were seen as mediating 
variables between the perception of VIRQ and subjective performance. The three variables 
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used in the hierarchical equation model accounted for 47% of the variance in subjective 
performance. This provides partial support for H22. Figure 8.7 summarizes the results of the 
regression analysis and Tables 8.25 and 8.26 show results of the hierarchical regression 
model.  
Figure 8.7: Key Predictors of Subjective Performance based on Hierarchical Regression 
Model Analysis 
 
Table 8.25: Model Summary (Subjective Performance) 
  
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin–
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .256a .066 .045 .94895 .066 3.167 1 45 .082  
2 .710b .504 .470 .70705 .439 19.029 2 43 .000 1.863 
a. Predictors: (Constant), VIRQ  
b. Predictors: (Constant), VIRQ, affective commitment, shared understandings and views. 
c. Dependent Variable: Subjective performance 
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Table 8.26: Beta Coefficients (Subjective Performance) 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Zero–
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 4.026 .565  7.131 .000      
VIRQ  .192 .108 .256 1.780 .082 .256 .256 .256 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) 2.329 .504  4.625 .000      
VIRQ –.246 .109 –.329 –2.25 .029 .256 –.325 –.242 .540 1.850 
Shr.  Und. & 
Views  
.565 .122 .682 4.646 .000 .597 .578 .499 .535 1.868 
Affective 
commitment 
.222 .071 .365 3.113 .003 .499 .429 .334 .840 1.190 
a. Dependent Variable: Subjective performance 
 
8.2.3.5.3 Boundary Spanners’ Intent to Leave  
The boundary spanners intent to leave correlated significantly with perceived autonomy, 
orientation towards the BS’s sector, and affective commitment. All correlations were negative 
in value and there was no direct significant correlation with VIRQ. However, only affective 
commitment was found to predict 30.4% of the variation in the boundary spanners intention 
to leave. Therefore, it could be deduced that the relationship between VIRQ and the intention 
to leave is mediated by the boundary spanners’ affective commitment, and hence it is 
statistically an indirect relationship. This provides partial support to H22. Tables 8.27 and 
8.28 show results of the regression model.  
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Table 8.27: Model Summary (Intention to Leave) 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin–
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .567a .321 .304 1.49100 .321 18.479 1 39 .000 2.307 
a. Predictors: (Constant), affective commitment. 
b. Dependent Variable: Boundary spanners’ intention to leave. 
 
Table 8.28: Beta Coefficient (Intention to Leave) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Zero–
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 6.170 .757  8.150 .000      
Affective 
commitment 
–.619 .144 –.567 –4.299 .000 –.567 –.567 –.567 1.000 1.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Boundary spanners’ intention to leave. 
 
For all the regression models presented, the criteria of running regression analysis were 
considered and met (cf: Field, 2009). All the predictor variables were quantitative, continuous 
and unbounded; and they had a positive variance value. Multicollinearity was not an issue as 
most of the predictor variables for any given analysis were not highly correlated. The 
theoretical foundation of the hypotheses (the qualitative analyses) suggest that most of the 
relevant variables were accounted for in designing the quantitative survey and therefore the 
predictors are uncorrelated with an external third variable. The graphs of the residuals 
variance were also checked to ensure their homoscedasticity. Durbin–Watson values were 
checked to maintain the criteria of independent errors (uncorrelated residual terms) where the 
general rule of thumb of acceptable values between (1.5 and 2.5) was considered. The error 
terms (residuals) were approaching normality, the outcomes variable values were 
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independent; and the graphs showed linear relationships among the predictors and the 
outcome variable.   
8.2.3 Cluster Analysis 
Finally, a two–step cluster analysis was performed to provide an overview on the patterns of 
data that are likely to emerge. A two–step cluster analysis was chosen as it is the only cluster 
analysis in SPSS that allows clustering based on categorical and continuous variables (Mooi 
and Sarstedt, 2011). Two different clustering analyses were performed. The first was based on 
the type of the HL (intermediate faculty/college level or a direct University management 
level) where two groups were obtained. The first group (26 cases) which had the Central 
University Management (CUM) as its higher hierarchical level generally showed a more 
positive perception of all the study variables except the boundary spanners’ intent to leave. 
The other group, which had the Faculty/College as its immediate HL (20 cases as one case 
was not identifiable), showed comparatively less positive perception of all the study variables 
except for the intention to leave. While acknowledging that the results are only indicative, 
they can be used to provide some insights into the relationship between the number of 
hierarchical layers and VIRQ. The results also support the findings of the qualitative analyses. 
Figure 8.8 shows that the cluster quality is “good”. Table 8.29 shows the average composite 
scores for each cluster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
354 
 
Figure 8.8: Model Summary and Cluster Quality 
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Table 8.29: Average Composite Scores for Each Cluster (Two–Cluster Solution) 
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For the second cluster analysis, the type of the HL (whether an intermediate faculty level or a 
direct CUM) as well as the perception of net dependence were used to obtain 5 distinct 
groups
128
 . 
The first group showed a tendency towards balanced interdependence and had a direct vertical 
relationship with the CUM. The 18 schools at this cluster showed a relatively high perception 
of VIRQ, relatively high perception of autonomy, shared vision, shared understanding and 
views, orientation towards the BS’s sector, and performance. This group has also showed the 
highest inter–personal relationship quality between the boundary spanners, the highest 
affective commitment, and relatively very low intent to leave. Perhaps this emphasises the 
point in qualitative analysis that when the LL unit has a direct link with the University, the 
perception of VIRQ becomes more favourable as the LL boundary spanners engage in 
building bridges of trust and shared understanding (inter–personal relationship quality) with 
the direct seniors and this makes them perceive they have a satisfactory influence in the 
vertical relationship. 
The second group showed some tendency towards negative interdependence (where the LL 
depends less on the HL than vice versa) and their immediate HL was the CUM. The seven 
schools in this group showed a relatively low perception of VIRQ, relatively very low 
perception of autonomy, low shared vision, shared understanding and views, orientation 
                                                             
128 The number of the groups was given to SPSS software. Such number was based on the need to reflect three 
different perception of net dependence (balanced, positive, and negative) in combination with the two different 
types of the HL (University Management Board or Faculty/College level). Using 6 clusters was not found to be 
useful as the groups became very small. Having 5 clusters, the cohesion and separation between the different 
groups was exceeding 0.5 which was considered as “good”.  
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towards the BS’s sector, and average performance. This group has also showed the relatively 
high inter–personal relationship quality between the boundary spanners, high affective 
commitment, and the lowest intent to leave. This is also consistent with the qualitative 
findings as the perception of negative interdependence can spread a sense of unfairness or 
unsatisfactory unbalanced relationships. This in turn reflects on the relatively low perception 
of VIRQ and perception of low autonomy. These schools had also shown a relative low 
orientation towards the BS’s sector which indicates that they are not top–tier schools rather 
their strength comes from the income they generate. The relatively high inter–personal 
relationship quality could indicate that the LL boundary spanners were engaging in active 
trust building in order to enhance their scope of influence through inter–personal relationships 
this has also been reflected on the high affective commitment and the low intent to leave.   
The third group showed a tendency towards balanced interdependence, yet their immediate 
HL was a faculty or a college intermediate level. The 14 schools at this group showed average 
perception of autonomy, average shared vision, the lowest shared understanding and views, 
the lowest orientation towards the BS’s sector, and low performance. This group has also 
showed relatively low inter–personal relationship quality between the boundary spanners, 
average affective commitment, and average intent to leave. With the presence of an 
intermediate HL (a faculty level) between the LL unit and the ultimate HL, and with a 
perception of balanced interdependence; a perception of an average VIRQ was reported.  
The fourth group showed a tendency towards negative interdependence, yet their immediate 
HL was a faculty or a college intermediate level. The 5 schools at this cluster showed the 
lowest perception of VIRQ, the lowest perception of autonomy, lowest shared vision, a 
relatively low shared understanding and views, relatively high orientation towards the BS’s 
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sector, and surprisingly the highest subjective performance. This group has also showed the 
lowest inter–personal relationship quality between the boundary spanners, low affective 
commitment, and high intent to leave. This also strongly supports the qualitative findings as 
the presence of an intermediate level with a perception of negative interdependence (less 
reliance of the BS on the University than vice versa) would result in the lowest perception of 
VIRQ,  autonomy, and shared vision. The highest subjective performance along with the 
relatively high orientation of these schools towards the BS sector indicate that it is the 
strength of the performance of such schools that make the boundary spanners perceive the 
relationship as one of negative interdependence; and hence a perception of lack of satisfactory 
influence.  
The fifth group showed a tendency towards positive interdependence (where the BS depends 
on its HL more than vice versa), and their immediate HL was the CUM with no intermediate 
layers. The two schools at this cluster showed the highest perception of VIRQ, average 
perception of autonomy, the highest shared vision, the highest shared understanding and 
views, the highest orientation towards the business school sector, and surprisingly the lowest 
subjective performance. This group has also showed relatively high inter–personal 
relationship quality between the boundary spanners, the lowest affective commitment, and the 
highest intent to leave. Although the number of schools in this category is very small, positive 
interdependence along with the absence of intermediate HL resulted in the highest perception 
of VIRQ. The lowest subjective performance reported by these two schools supports their 
perception of positive interdependence (where the BS depends more on the University than 
vice versa). However, perhaps because these two BS were performing poorly and very 
dependent on their universities, the boundary spanners were not committed and had the 
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highest intent to leave. However, due to the small number of cases in this group, the results 
are only indicative. 
While the results obtained from the cluster analysis are only indicative; they provide a 
general, yet a strong support to the qualitative analysis and shed light on conditions which 
affect the perception of VIRQ. Figure 8.9 shows that the cluster quality is “good”. Table 8.30 
shows the average composite scores for each cluster. 
Figure 8.9: Model Summary and Cluster Quality 
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Table 8.30:  Average Composite Scores for Each Cluster (Five–Cluster Solution) 
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8.3 Summary 
This chapter reported data analysis of the qualitative findings. The qualitative analyses 
conducted in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 resulted in suggesting a number of propositions; many of 
these propositions were used to generate testable hypotheses. Such hypotheses were tested 
and all of them were confirmed or partially supported except H4, H10 and H11. These 
hypotheses dealt with the moderating effects of shared vision and shared understandings and 
views on VIRQ. While the statistical results did not support these three hypotheses, it is still 
believed that there are some theoretical grounds that could support their moderating effect as 
suggested in the qualitative analyses (see Chapter 6).  
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises and discusses the key empirical findings based on both the 
qualitative and the quantitative data analyses presented in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.  It starts by 
addressing the research questions posed in Chapter 1. It then discusses the key theoretical and 
practical implications of the reported findings.  
9.2 Key Findings 
 What are the meanings and the attributes associated with the concept of vertical inter-
unit relationship quality [VIRQ]? 
 What are the antecedents that are likely to cause variations in the perception of VIRQ? 
 And what are the consequences and other concomitants that are likely to follow the 
perception of VIRQ? 
These were the three key questions that motivated this study. To answer these questions, both 
qualitative and quantitative studies were undertaken, with the qualitative study being the 
principal mode of investigation. The qualitative investigation preceded the quantitative one 
and resulted in a number of propositions. The quantitative investigation then focused on the 
lower level side by testing its relevant propositions for validity on the wider population of UK 
University-based Business Schools.  
In answering the first question and based on the case study data, both the higher and the lower 
level tended to attach similar attributes to VIRQ. Mutual trust, openness, and satisfaction were 
the important common attributes. Fairness was a particularly central attribute for the lower 
level. The findings, while they have some commonalities with those found in the relationship 
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marketing literature, are also significantly different. While satisfaction, mutual trust, and 
possibly openness (as an attribute related to trust) are common in both contexts, commitment 
is a significant attribute in relationship marketing but it is not an important attribute in vertical 
inter–unit relationships. Fairness, on the other hand, is not an important attribute in 
relationship marketing but it is significant in vertical inter–unit relationships, particularly 
from the perspective of the lower level. The reason is that vertical relationships are not 
entirely voluntary compared to market ones in which the customer can normally switch to 
another seller. Rather, it is a relationship that involves a higher level of investment from the 
higher and the lower level. Fairness is also a significant attribute in this context because of the 
higher level’s structural power over the lower level which can make many aspects of the 
relationship seen to be unfair in the eyes of the less powerful party.   
More interestingly, the meaning that both parties to the relationship attached to VIRQ focused 
on a desire to maximise the influence of each party. While the meaning they attach tends to be 
similar, in essence it indicates the presence of incompatible needs. The higher level desires to 
maximise its influence through maintaining control while the lower level desires to maximise 
its influence through gaining empowerment and autonomy (while acknowledging its 
constraints). This could potentially lead to contests for influence between the two levels of the 
vertical relationship. However, these contests are not evident in all vertical relationships; it 
greatly depends on the perception of VIRQ by the lower level.  
The lower level perceives the vertical relationship favourably when it can achieve a fair or a 
satisfactory influence. A satisfactory or fair influence is based on a calculative process that 
primarily reflects the perception of the balance of interdependence between the parties to the 
vertical relationship. If the lower level perceives that it is more dependent on the higher level 
 
 
364 
 
 
than vice versa (positive interdependence), it tends to accept the higher level’s control with 
minimal influence contests as it is this acceptance that empowers the lower level to function. 
The influence of the lower level in this case is derived from legitimation within the vertical 
relationship by accepting the terms and the conditions stipulated by the higher level. Positive 
relationship quality thus tends to characterise situations of the lower level’s positive 
interdependence. Such positive interdependence relationships tend to be stable and functional 
due to the favourable perception of relationship quality. 
Nonetheless, the lower level sometimes perceives that it and the higher level are equally 
dependent on each other (balanced interdependence) or that the lower level is less dependent 
on the higher level than vice versa (negative interdependence); this is due to the development 
and evolving power of the lower level. The lower level in such cases tended to make a 
significant contribution to the income of the higher level; this was the factor which shifted the 
balance of interdependence in the favour of the lower level. In cases of balanced or negative 
interdependence, contests for influence were more evident, particularly in cases of negative 
interdependence. In such cases, the lower level expectation of influence is higher than in 
positive interdependence cases; this expectation leads it to demand more influence through 
pushing for more autonomy from the higher level’s control. These demands are seen as 
legitimate or fair in view of the state of the balance of interdependence, giving rise to the 
concept of fair influence. If these demands are not sufficiently addressed by the higher level 
(which possesses a higher structural power that the lower level unit lacks), contests for 
influence start to arise, although the style of the contest can vary (tactful or negative 
reciprocation). 
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Based on the lower level’s perspective, the quantitative analysis gave further support to the 
attributes and the meaning attached to VIRQ. The quantitative analysis gave support to the 
two hypotheses that:  perceived trust, openness, fairness, support, and satisfaction are the key 
social attributes of perceived VIRQ (H1) and that there is a strong positive correlation 
between the perception of the key social attributes of VIRQ and the perception of the power 
distribution in the vertical relationship (H2); highlighting that the two concepts are likely to 
have the same underlying meaning. Although due effort has been made to ensure the validity 
of the quantitative results, the insufficiency of the sample size as well as the population size 
were the key limitations as Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) could not be performed. 
Validity was examined through other techniques, yet they are less statistically powerful than 
CFA. Having laid the foundation of the VIRQ attributes and meaning, further research on the 
quantitative validity of attributes and meaning represents a promising research area where 
larger data sets are available.  
In answering the second question, the qualitative findings indicated that antecedents of VIRQ 
from the lower level perspective were the perceived state of the balance of interdependence, 
the lower level’s orientation, the perceived state of cognitive congruence (shared vision and 
shared views and understandings), perceived autonomy, and the perceived state of inter–
personal relationship quality between the concerned boundary spanners. The latter antecedent 
is the only one that is based on individual–level analysis while the rest are based on unit–level 
analysis. However, all antecedents tended to be mutually associated. There are some 
qualitative associations and significant quantitative correlations among the antecedents 
themselves as well as between the different antecedents and VIRQ.  
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The balance of interdependence emerged as the most significant antecedent as it affects all the 
others. The balance of interdependence affects the lower level’s orientation through 
determining the latter’s latitude of choice, which in turn can affect its prioritised choice 
between, and extent of legitimation to, the dual institutions it confronts (the vertical 
relationship with its host university and the wider sector of business schools). The balance of 
interdependence also affects the state of cognitive congruence between the lower level and the 
higher level. More dependent lower level units showed higher perceptions of cognitive 
congruence than their less dependent counterparts. More importantly, the balance of 
interdependence determines the lower level perception of control or autonomy. The lower 
level legitimises the higher level’s control if the former is more dependent on the latter; and 
hence the perception of control is neutralised and control becomes legitimate and acceptable. 
If the lower level is highly dependent on the higher level, its survival as a business unit is 
more important than its autonomy. 
The balance of interdependence can also affect the inter–personal relationship between the 
boundary spanners representing the vertical levels through relationship building or human 
resources (HR) control. Moreover, interpersonal relationship quality and cognitive 
congruence tend to affect the perception of the higher level’s control as favourable 
interpersonal relationships are conductive to building better mutual understanding between 
the two levels, and hence the higher level’s control will be more appropriate to the needs of 
the lower level and more favourably perceived.  
Positive interdependence (where the lower level is more dependent on the higher level than 
vice versa) tended to be associated with a positive perception of relationship quality. The 
benefits derived through positive interdependence tended to colour the lower level’s 
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perception of cognitive congruence and control. When the lower level unit is more dependent 
on the higher level, it tends to choose to be seen as a legitimate unit in the higher level’s eyes, 
as it can derive more benefits through such legitimation. It is the motive of legitimacy that 
affects the perception of choices, cognitive congruence and control, and hence relationship 
quality.  
The opposite is likely to happen if there is a negative interdependence between the lower and 
the higher level (where the lower level is less dependent on the higher level than vice versa). 
The lower level unit can then decide its own direction, have different choices and therefore its 
need for greater autonomy increases as the higher level’s control could become debilitating. 
The perception of VIRQ becomes negative when the lower level is negatively interdependent 
on the higher level and when the lower level perceives that it lacks satisfactory influence on 
the vertical relationship (given the state of the balance of interdependence between the two 
levels). In this situation, the lower level becomes less concerned about maintaining 
legitimacy.  
In cases of balanced interdependence (where the two parties of the relationship depend on 
each other more or less equally), the perception of VIRQ can be positive or negative 
depending of the perception of the state of cognitive congruence between the two levels of the 
relationship. In balanced interdependence, if the lower level and the higher level have a 
common vision and share understandings and views regarding the environment and the role of 
the lower level unit, they are more likely to have a favourable relationship quality compared 
to situations where there is a wide gap in perceptions and understandings between the two 
levels. With balanced interdependence and a favourable perception of cognitive congruence, 
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the relationship becomes similar to one of partnership or collaboration whereby mutual 
benefits and interests become the foundation upon which the relationship is based. 
The integral role played by the balance of interdependence points to the perceptions of 
relationship variables and the relationship quality itself being mainly based on rational 
calculative processes of the costs and benefits derived from the vertical relationship. The 
perception of the balance of interdependence tended to shape what is acceptable and what is 
not acceptable, what is fair and what is not, what is empowering and what is not. The balance 
of interdependence thus determined whether and to what extent the lower level pushes for 
autonomy.  
Although tests of validity were limited, the quantitative outcomes provided general support 
for these qualitative findings. According to the quantitative findings, the key predictors of the 
perception of VIRQ from the lower level’s perspective were inter–personal relationship 
quality, perceived autonomy, shared vision, shared understandings and views, and perceived 
net dependence. These predictors resulted in an adjusted r square of 0.723 (F (4, 41) = 22.205, 
P<0.01) explaining a significant percentage of the variation of the perception of VIRQ, with 
perceived net dependence as a higher order predictor in the hierarchical regression model. 
These results provide support for hypothesis H17 where perceived net dependence affects the 
perception of autonomy, the perception of inter–personal relationships between boundary 
spanners, shared vision, and shared views and understandings, which in turn predicted the 
perception of VIRQ. However, the Beta coefficients for shared vision and shared 
understandings and views were only marginally significant (0.091 and 0.051 respectively). 
The reason is that shared vision tends to be a very broad concept, and therefore it does not 
have a significant impact on relationship quality. Also, the variable of shared understanding 
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and views was a predictor of inter–personal relationship quality (adjusted r square = 58%). 
Hence, only inter–personal relationship quality variable along with autonomy and the higher 
order predictor of perceived net dependence were more direct predictors of variations in 
VIRQ. The lower level’s orientation was not significantly correlated to the perception of 
relationship quality, possibly because all the lower level units tended to have both orientations 
which cannot be mutually exclusive choices but they rather refer to a general tendency. This 
tendency might not have been captured by the survey questions. The variation in the 
perception of autonomy was explained by the two predicting variables of perceived net 
dependence (the more the lower level net dependence on the higher level, the more favourably 
the perception of autonomy) and the lower level’s subjective performance (r square = 33.1%). 
Inter–personal relationship quality was mainly predicted by shared understandings and views 
(r square = 58%). 
For the third question regarding the consequences and the concomitants of VIRQ, the lower 
level’s perception of relationship quality resulted in three identified modes of reciprocation; 
positive, negative and tactful reciprocation. Positive reciprocation is when the lower level 
responds favourably to a favourable perception of relationship quality with its higher level 
through legitimation and sometimes active legitimation. Negative reciprocation is when the 
lower level responds to a negative relationship quality negatively by being less concerned 
about being legitimate in the eyes of its higher level; which usually results in a dysfunctional 
relationship. Tactful reciprocation is when the lower level responds positively to a less 
favourably perceived relationship quality (negative or moderately negative) by maintaining 
legitimation and active legitimation. This reciprocation affected the distribution of power 
structure in the relationship resulting in structural stability, instability, or refinement. 
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Based on the qualitative findings, positive reciprocation tended to occur when the lower level 
was highly dependent on its higher level than vice versa (positive interdependence) and was 
usually associated with structural stability; where the distribution of power in the vertical 
relationship is stable (in the short/medium term) as the parties to the relationship satisfactorily 
empower each other. Tactful reciprocation tended to occur in cases of balanced or negative 
interdependence. Tactful reciprocation is a choice that reflects strategic aspirations for a 
refinement in the power distribution in the vertical relationship; and therefore it was usually 
associated with structural refinement, however, not necessarily via changing formal 
organisational structure. In most instances, the lower level managed to gain more influence or 
realise more autonomy through tactful reciprocation based on the informal organisational 
channels and inter–personal or inter–unit trust building and common understanding building 
initiatives.  
Negative reciprocation was the result of negatively perceived relationship quality mostly in 
cases of direct negative interdependence. Negative reciprocation was associated with 
dysfunctional relationships due to the dissatisfactory distribution of power and therefore the 
distribution of power itself becomes unstable, resulting in structural instability. Structural 
change in tactful reciprocation is referred to as structural refinement and in negative 
reciprocation is referred to as structural instability; the reason is that the former refers to a 
structural change that occurred via pursuing legitimation while the latter was a by–product of 
a dysfunctional relationship.  
These different modes of reciprocation offer fresh insights into the intra–organisational power 
dynamics reflected in the structural stability of power distribution, particularly tactful 
reciprocation. Reciprocation based on the perception of the VIRQ highlights that the 
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structural power of the higher level in vertical relationships cannot be taken for granted, as 
power is a reciprocal phenomenon. These findings reflected a dynamic process, and therefore 
not all of them were tested quantitatively. However, the quantitative findings supported the 
conclusion that the perception of relationship quality by the lower level can play a major role 
in determining the lower level boundary spanners’ affective commitment, intention to leave, 
and the lower level unit’s performance. These represent some of the suggested facets of the 
different modes of reciprocation affecting the structural stability. The perception of 
relationship quality was found to be correlated to the lower level’s subjective performance, 
the perceived affective commitment of the lower level’s boundary spanners and their 
intension to leave. The correlation with the boundary spanners’ intension to leave was 
negative as expected from the qualitative findings, albeit not statistically significant. Based on 
hierarchical regression models, affective commitment could be predicted directly by VIRQ 
and by perceived autonomy and perceived inter–personal relationship quality between the 
boundary spanners as two higher order variables (r square for VIRQ as a single predictor = 
37.7% and r square for the whole model = 44.1%). For predicting subjective performance, 
both shared understandings and views and affective commitment were found to be two direct 
predictors while VIRQ was a higher order predictor in the hierarchical regression model (r 
square = 47%). 
Based on the previously mentioned empirical findings, the apriori research model presented in 
Chapter 3 is revised as shown below in the following two models. While the two models are 
guided by the same propositions, the first model is rather more general as it is based on the 
qualitative findings and the second one is more specific and more detailed as it is based on the 
quantitative findings.  
 
 
372 
 
 
The first model shows the antecedent, attributes, and consequences of VIRQ. While this 
model is similar to the one presented in Chapter 3, the revised model presented below is much 
more detailed. Based on the empirical data collected, the revised model confirms that the 
balance of interdependence, perceived autonomy, and perceived cognitive congruence are key 
predictors to VIRQ. The revised model also includes other antecedents such as the inter–
personal relationship quality and the orientation of the lower level’s unit and shows that the 
lower level’s positive interdependence can have a positive effect on the perception of VIRQ 
unlike the posited apriori proposition. The revised model shows that all antecedents tend to be 
mutually associated. More importantly, the component attributes of relationship quality were 
significantly revised whereby many variables in the original apriori model were seen as 
irrelevant after data collection. Only trust, openness, fairness and satisfaction are seen as the 
key social attributes. Based on the findings of the study, reciprocity became more detailed as 
different modes of reciprocation emerged and their implications on the vertical relationship 
were manifested.  
The model derived from the quantitative findings includes the aspects of the revised 
qualitative model which could be tested on the wider population of UK University-based 
Business Schools and received quantitative support.  
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Figure 9.1: The Qualitative Model  
 
Figure 9.2: The Quantitative Model
129
 
130
 
 
                                                             
129 Based on different regression models due to the limitation of the sample size. 
 
130 Dotted lines refer to the consequences of the perception of VIRQ. 
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One could conclude from the overall findings of this study that the norm of reciprocity makes 
power a dynamic factor, and such dynamism is manifested through the stability or the 
instability of the intra–organisational power distribution. Yet, is power (and its associated 
character of influence) better seen as a contested resource in vertical relationships? In other 
words, do power relationships represent a zero–sum game whereby the empowerment of one 
of the parties to the vertical relationship means the dis–empowerment of the other party?  
This question does not have a straightforward answer as the different modes of reciprocation 
previously highlighted suggest three different scenarios.  
According to the findings of this study, a positive reciprocation mode manifests power as a 
non–zero–sum game where the parties to the relationship mutually empower each other. 
Positive reciprocation was seen in cases of the lower level’s positive interdependence where 
the lower level strongly needed the empowerment of the higher level and the higher level was 
keen to see the success of the lower level, and where the relationship was described to be 
meeting the expectations of both parties. The vertical relationship in positive reciprocation 
modes is described as being highly productive, giving rise to a win–win scenario. 
Yet, this ideal scenario is not sustainable when the state of the balance of interdependence 
between the lower level and the higher level changes in favour of the lower level. Tactful and 
negative reciprocation were seen in cases of direct balanced or negative interdependence 
where the lower level needed either the higher level no more than or even less than the higher 
level needed it. In tactful and negative reciprocation, there seemed to be a competition 
between the higher level and the lower level on the way power should be distributed. Both 
tactful and negative reciprocation were motivated by the lack of satisfactory influence 
perceived by the lower level, and therefore the lower level had to increase its scope of 
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influence either by tactful strategizing or by sending a message to the higher level about the 
dysfunctionality of the vertical relationship.  
In tactful and negative reciprocation, although mutual empowerment was still theoretically 
possible, power seemed to be a contested resource where each party to the relationship was 
trying to maximise its scope of influence at the expense of the other. Mutual empowerment 
was seen in cases of balanced interdependence when the relationship was positively 
perceived. Yet, such mutual empowerment was not easily earned; it was only realized after 
many contests for influence and tactful initiatives that enabled the higher level and the lower 
level to reach common views and understandings. It seems that the higher level does not tend 
to give up its control easily to the lower level, perhaps fearing what is going to happen in 
future when the lower level develops further. This makes the view of power in tactful and 
negative reciprocation modes similar to zero–sum games. 
Possibly the push and pull dynamics in the vertical relationship will not have a temporal 
stability unless the power distribution in the relationship is perceived to be fair (see Chapter 
6). However, there are two problems with this interpretation. First, fairness is not absolute and 
is hard to define because what is seen to be fair to the higher level can be seen as unfair to the 
lower level (see Chapter 5). Second, vertical relationships are themselves dynamic due to the 
changes that occur to the balance of interdependence as the lower level unit develops or as the 
needs of the parties to the relationship change. Therefore, any stability in the power 
distribution of the vertical relationship could be seen at best as a temporal one.   
While they particularly address the principles of social exchange and power dependence 
theories, the findings of this study can also be linked to insights from the structuration 
(Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984) and institutional theories. Structuration theory focuses on the 
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formation, reproduction, and modification of structures through human agency. Institutional 
theory, on the other hand, focuses on constraints that institutions place on human actions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), albeit it contends that it is the social action that shapes 
institutions at the first place (see Barley and Tolbert, 1997). While these two theories share 
the premise that institutions impose constraints on human actions, at least by shaping 
rationalities guiding such actions, they also maintain that these constraints are also subject to 
modification (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). It is “through choice and actions, individuals and 
organisations can deliberately modify, and even eliminate, institutions” (Barley and Tolbert, 
1997: 94).  
This was the case in the reported findings. The action and choices of the boundary spanners, 
particularly those from the lower level unit, reflected the institutional constraints. The lower 
level boundary spanners actions were shaped by the meso-level structure represented in the 
balance of interdependence between the lower and the higher level units. This is evident in the 
reciprocation mode the lower level boundary spanners and their units chose to pursue.   
Meanwhile, their actions and choices also reshaped institutional constraints by influencing the 
balance of interdependence itself. The process of reciprocation clearly shows the interplay and 
the exchange between social action and structure.  
The findings of this study also challenge the view that institutions are overpowering 
exogenous forces and that social actors are obliged to comply with their pressures (see 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2004). The analysis reported in this study not only shows 
the role of actors in introducing an endogenous change (see also Greenwood, Suddaby, and 
Hinings, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008), but also illustrates how social actors can manipulate 
interdependencies with their institutional environment over time. Previous studies contend 
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that a certain institutional frame can be challenged if social actors find alternative institutional 
frames (see Beckert, 1999) and that actors’ compliance and behaviour in relation to a given 
institutional frame can reflect the extent of their dependencies (among other factors). Oliver 
(1991) argued that social actors can play an active role in choosing the extent of compliance 
with the institutional pressures. However, this study goes further by highlighting how the 
different types of interdependencies stimulate actors’ behaviours in ways that lead to shifts in 
interdependencies themselves.  
In addition, the findings highlight that social actors can prioritise or choose between different 
institutional frames in the case of institutional duality or multiplicity. This confirms Kostova 
et al. (2008) argument that institutional duality allows for uniqueness of actors rather than 
imposing isomorphic convergence. Kostova et al. (2008) suggested that actors can play a role 
in making sense of, manipulating, and negotiating multiple/dual institutional pressures. This, 
as reported in the analysis chapters, might enable social actors to reshape their environment 
(at least partially) resulting in a “perception-based” rather than an isomorphic legitimacy131 
(Kostova et al., 2008). The reported case study evidence shows that social actors could 
negotiate the terms of the vertical relationship with their institution.   
On the practical side, this in a way can be related to the idea of managerialism which, 
ironically, has been primarily articulated by some business school academics (see Locke and 
Spender, 2011; Klikaver, 2003), but does not suit the business school environment. 
Managerialism focuses on conformity of actions of the “managed” actors132. However, such 
conformity can be achieved when the social actors are subject to similar/unified institutional 
                                                             
131 This idea was presented in a short paper submitted by the author to the EGOS conference 2012. 
132 Locke and Spender (2011) view managerialism as unilateral way of management that deprives the managed 
actors from access to power while confining authority to a privileged managerial caste (see also Friend, 2012).  
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pressures. University-based Business Schools, particularly as they mature, may be subject to 
pressures from different and sometimes competing institutional frames, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. This suggests uniqueness rather than conformity and sometimes necessitates their 
individual choice, and hence a higher degree of autonomy. 
9.3 Theoretical Contributions 
This study represents a departure from the main stream organisational literature which tends 
to give relatively little consideration to vertical relationships. It brings vertical relationships to 
attention and sheds light on many of its contentious aspects and important dynamics. By 
introducing the concept of relationship quality to the study of inter-unit vertical relations, this 
research provides an elaborate account of VIRQ meaning and attributes, based on both the 
lower level and the higher level responses. In focusing on the lower level perspective which 
tends to have less structural power in the vertical relationship and tends to be generally less 
heard in the academic arena, the antecedents and the consequences pertinent to the lower 
level’s perception of VIRQ are also examined. The study of relationship quality in this 
context thus provides new insights into vertical relationship and illuminates novel relationship 
dynamics that hardly received any prior academic attention.  
In Chapter 2, the theory of bureaucracy, agency theory, transaction cost theory, and resource 
dependence theory were briefly presented. Although the contributions of these theories are 
significant, they are seen to be insufficient in addressing the inherent political side of the 
vertical relationship, particularly in situations where the power of the lower level evolves
133
. 
To shed light on the inter–unit integration as well as politics and conflict, social exchange and 
                                                             
133 The study of the evolution of one of the relationship parties is more common in other contexts such as in 
joint ventures and other lateral business arrangements but not in intra-organisational vertical relationships (for 
example see Lyles and Reger, 1993 and Child, Tse, and Rodrigues, 2013). 
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power–dependence theories seemed more appropriate. The following section highlights 
theoretical contributions to these two theories. 
9.3.1 Contribution to Social Exchange and Power–dependence Theories 
VIRQ was viewed as a social resource that is exchanged in a power–dependence relationship. 
While this study draws on the premises of social exchange and power–dependence theories 
(Emerson, 1962) and supports all their core ideas, it extends these theories by shedding light 
on the meaning of relationship quality in power–dependence relationships and the likely 
concomitants of relationship quality. The following summarises this contribution. 
First, maximising one’s power and influence is the sought after goal of both parties to the 
vertical relationship. The state of the balance of interdependence, thus, plays the most 
fundamental role in vertical relationships and parties to vertical relationships attempt to make 
it in their advantage whenever possible as it is a basis for demanding and realising more 
influence. This has a number of inter–related implications.  
1. Power relationships represent relationships of mutual interdependence even when one 
party is more dominant over the other. As asserted by Crozier and Thoenig (1976: 
562), “even if one partner appears completely to dominate the other, the dependence 
remains reciprocal, no matter how absolute the right of life and death is held by 
masters over their slaves. Masters are dependent on their slaves' survival in order to 
retain lordship over them”. However, while power relationships are mutual and 
reciprocal, these relationships are not necessarily symmetrical. The range of 
asymmetry power relationships has received relatively little academic attention in 
vertical relationships and in the resource dependence perspective – the commonly used 
perspective in organisational power studies (see Cascairo and Piskoriski, 2005 and 
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Blazejewski and Backer–Ritterspach, 2011). The present study has attempted to 
address this gap by dividing interdependence into positive, negative and balanced 
categories, taking the lower level’s perspective. This is a novel contribution to the 
study of vertical relationship as well as to power–dependence relationships in general. 
As for the power–dependence theory (Emerson, 1962), advances in this theory tend to 
be dominated by pure theoretical and experimental research rather than empirical data 
based on real life situations (Molm et al., 1999). Experimental research into issues 
such as power and influence provides significant contributions, yet it has been 
generally criticised for its lack of external validity (Greenhulgh, Neslin, and Gilkey, 
1985). This is because experimental research seems to use oversimplified simulations 
and to assume that subjects can have a realistic experience of the simulation situation 
(see Greenhulgh et al., 1985). The present study offers a number of propositions on 
vertical relationship dynamics (a power–dependence relationship) and provides a 
quantitative support for such propositions, based on real–life empirical data.  
2. The study of the different states of the balance of interdependence reveals that its 
perception tends to colour the perception of all the other relationship variables, and 
highlights the important role of rational
134
 calculations in power–dependence relations. 
Such rational calculations (based on cost–benefit analysis as shown in Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7) tend to underlie actions of the involved parties as well as their perceptions
135
. It 
                                                             
134
 Rational here has two main facets in accordance with Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005: 879): “an end of value 
(influence) maximisation and a means of logic”. 
 
135 In a way, these findings could be compared to Clark and Geppert’s (2011) different scenarios of political 
sense-making regarding the subsidiary integration with its head office, particularly the consensual and the 
oppositional sense-making scenarios. Although the context and the purpose are different, congruent interests can 
minimise the negative impact of institutional duality and lead to congruent perceptions and thus to a smoother 
integration (as in the case of positive interdependence), while conflicting interests manifest the differences and 
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is the state of the balance of interdependence that legitimises (or not) actions, 
demands, and control of the higher level over the lower level. This is significant since 
the power distribution in power–dependence relationships might not be stable over 
time mainly due to the motivation of the lower level to increase its influence as it 
develops.  
3. Dynamism in the vertical power dependence relationships studied is governed by 
conditions of social exchange. Three modes of reciprocity were identified: positive, 
tactful, and negative reciprocity. The mode of reciprocity is a choice that is guided by 
the perception of the state of the balance of interdependence and the desire to increase 
future influence
136
.  
4. Maintaining legitimacy (or not) was an important consideration in each of the 
identified modes of reciprocation. This possibly positions legitimation as a political 
tool used by the lower level unit to increase its potential influence, or as one source of 
its soft power that can be used effectively in shifting situations in its favour in the 
medium to long–term. 
5. Realising fair influence is what tends to stabilise power–dependence relationships 
(where the judgement of fairness is determined by the state of the balance 
interdependence). If fair influence is not perceived, structural refinement or instability 
are likely to occur through tactful or negative reciprocation.  
While the premise of structural stability and balancing operations are established in the work 
of Emerson (1962) on power–dependence relations, both structural refinement and tactful 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
the discrepancies and can lead to alleviated political contests (such as negative and sometimes balanced 
interdependence).  
 
136 However, in the case of negative reciprocity increasing future influence is not guaranteed as the relationship 
becomes unstable and dysfunctional.  
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reciprocation have not received much attention in this literature. Particularly, the concept of 
tactful reciprocation and the dynamics associated with it are seen as a novel contribution to 
the intra-organisational studies. Tactful reciprocation can lead to refinement in the structure of 
power distribution; this might position it as a balancing operation, yet tactfully. 
Second, focusing on the exchange dynamics in vertical relationships as suggested by 
Cropzano and Mitchell (2005) provided a number of insights into the process and the modes 
of reciprocation employed by the lower level. The findings stress the role of legitimation in 
reciprocation and identify the detailed characteristics of each reciprocation mode. This 
contributes to the study of vertical relationships and social exchange in general as legitimation 
was either not considered in social exchange, or was considered in vertical relationships as a 
factor that inhibits the lower level’s retribution and negative reciprocity (see for example the 
leader–member exchange literature). However, this study suggests that legitimation matters 
and guides the lower level’s actions in positive and balanced interdependence cases. Yet, it 
does not prevent the lower level’s negative reciprocity as legitimacy itself becomes less of an 
issue in cases of negative interdependence where the relationship quality is negatively 
perceived.  
Third, this study emphasises that enduring economic relationships have an important social 
side, therefore the nature of the economic exchange will shape the quality of the social 
exchange, and the nature of social exchange can cause changes in the quality of the economic 
exchange; possibly in a reinforcing circle. Economic relationship analysis should, thus, not 
ignore the social dimensions which can create strong dynamics in the economic exchange, but 
equally the social analysis of economic relationships should take the economic side into 
consideration. This is because the state of the balance of interdependence reflects to a great 
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extent the economic side of the vertical relationship, particularly knowing that the key source 
of power of the lower level unit in the cases studied derived from its ability to generate a 
significant income flow into its institution. The balance of interdependence in these cases 
tended to affect all the other social dimensions of the relationship.  
9.3.2 General Theoretical Contributions 
In addition to extending social exchange and power–dependence theories in the context of 
vertical inter–unit relations, the present study offers more general contributions to the 
understanding of vertical inter–unit relationships and their dynamics. 
First, this study introduced the concept of vertical inter–unit relationship quality and 
attempted to develop and validate its measurement. This is a contribution to the general 
organisational literature and a contribution to the more specific literature of headquarters–
subsidiary literature in MNCs. The study reveals that relationship quality in the context of 
vertical relationships is concerned with the concept of fair influence, in which fairness is 
judged in terms of the relationship between the balance of influence and the balance of 
interdependence. This is a different conclusion, to the best of my knowledge, than that 
reached for voluntary market relationships. First, because marketing studies in general were 
less concerned about deriving the meaning of relationship quality but rather focused on 
discovering and validating its associated attributes. Second, because vertical relationships are 
power–dependence relationships that are long–term oriented and involve a higher level of 
investment from both levels of the relationship, hence the context is significantly different 
from voluntary market relationships.  
The attributes of relationship quality in the context of vertical relationships is also different as 
unique attributes such as fairness are stressed while other attributes such as commitment, 
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which is stressed in the relationship marketing literature, do not seem to be relevant. 
However, the study findings share peripheral and general commonalities with the marketing 
studies that have considered the element of differential power. For example, Kumar et al. 
(1995a) examined the effects of the supplier fairness (distributive and procedural fairness) on 
vulnerable resellers, but they conceptualised fairness as an antecedent to supplier–reseller 
relationship quality (conceptualised in terms of  conflict, trust, commitment, willingness to 
invest in the relationship, and expectation of continuity) rather than a core meaning and 
component of relationship quality. Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995b) studied 
asymmetric channel relationships and concluded that asymmetric interdependence can 
increase conflict and affect trust and commitment negatively, while stronger mutual 
interdependence (total interdependence) affects trust and commitment positively and 
decreases the potential of conflict. In a similar vein, Gundlach and Cadotte (1994) found that 
joint dependence in inter–firm channel relationships results in more favourable relationships 
and less conflict; while lower relative dependence (relative high power of one actor) was 
associated with less favourable performance evaluations of the other relationship actor, yet 
with less residual conflict. These results, while useful and informative, are neither as holistic 
as the findings reported here nor do they take into account the specificity of the vertical 
relationship context.   
Moreover, while fairness in general is an important quality in employer–employee 
relationships (see for example Walker and Hamilton, 2011), this study sheds light on new 
areas affecting the perception and the response to the perception of fairness in influence. 
Previous research contends that employees are sensitive to the distribution of power, and that 
the distribution of power affects their attitudes (Drake and Mitchell, 1977). This study extends 
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this point further by detailing how and when employees’ attitudes are affected by the different 
states of power distribution. While organisational research suggests that power imbalance 
relationships are contentious, unfair, and unfavourable (see Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), 
this study suggests that the consequences of power imbalance are not necessarily negative if 
the lower level perceives the relationship as one of positive interdependence where it expects 
to take more than to give and the higher level supports it in expectation of future outcomes. 
Conflicts might surface when the lower level, which has less structural power in the vertical 
relationship, starts to gain power as it develops and starts to compete with the higher level on 
influence. It is therefore the lower level’s development that makes power dynamics more 
obvious as it challenges the established rules of vertical relationships where the higher level is 
more structurally powerful and more knowledgeable than the subunits it governs. 
Second, this study sheds light on the link of vertical relationships to organisational politics; an 
area that tends to receive less academic attention. If one looks from a political sense-making 
perspective (Geppert, 2003; Clark and Geppert, 2011), the study focused on the sense-making 
of boundary spanners as actors representing their units (the meanings they associate to 
subjects and the mechanisms and structures that tended to shape their perceptions). The 
findings revealed that much of the vertical inter–unit dynamics are political in essence and 
that neither the higher level is always “strategically omniscient” nor the lower level managers 
are always “passive”, although the latter tended to be rational, perhaps due to the nature of 
the sector understudy, i.e. universities (see Clark and Geppert, 2011: 397). The specific 
contribution of this study to organisational politics is that it provides some evidence that 
intra–organisational politics can affect the vertical relationship structural stability, hence 
micro–political processes can affect structures and vice versa. While changes in the power 
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distribution are a logical consequence of organisational politics, most research in this area 
remains conceptual (see for example Mintzberg, 1985) or peripheral. This study provided a 
closer insight into how the power dynamics resulted (or not) in a redistribution of power 
between the parties to the vertical relationship. The findings also show that political contests 
are not necessarily confrontational, as the lower level unit can use legitimation and active 
legitimation as political tools.  
Third, this study provides a response, at least partially, to a number of research calls. Casciaro 
and Piskorski (2005) called for studying mutual as well as asymmetric interdependence in 
organisations. Ambos and Mahnke (2010) called for studying the headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship dynamics when the subsidiary unit becomes more powerful. Ambos et al. (2011) 
called for studying the vertical relationship adopting dynamic theoretical frameworks such as 
social exchange theory. This is in addition to the many calls for studying organisations from a 
political perspective and to theorise processes of “intra–corporate power and contestation” 
(for example: Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011; Clark and Geppert, 2011: 410). Previous 
research agrees that important subunits can influence their organisations (for example 
Hickson et al., 1971; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Mudambi, 2011). This study, however, 
shows how the process of influence can take place and its different dynamics as well as when 
attempts of influence are more likely to succeed as in the case of tactful or positive 
reciprocation.  
Finally, this study has focused on examining the concept of VIRQ in a defined institutional 
field (see Hinings and Greenwood, 2002) and therefore it provides a holistic account of the 
concept of vertical inter–unit relationship quality and its likely antecedents and consequences. 
This is more elaborate than other studies which focus on causal relationships between defined 
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variables that, with few exceptions, tend to dominate the headquarters–subsidiary relationship 
research (for example Schotter and Beamish, 2011b).  
In summary, the introduction and the study of relationship quality in vertical relationships 
provided a number of theoretical insights. The first is related to the meaning and the attributes 
of relationship quality which proved to be unique to the context of vertical inter–unit 
relationships compared to other contexts (for example relationship marketing). A key 
contribution of this study is providing a scale to measure the perception of VIRQ, although 
more statistical validation might be required. The second is regarding the unique concomitants 
of relationship quality which stressed the role of power and power dynamics in such 
relationships, through the balance of interdependence and different modes of reciprocation.   
9.4 Practical Relevance  
While this study offers a number of practical implications, only three of these are seen to 
benefit both the two parties to the vertical relationship. The other practical implications, while 
emphasising similar principles, can be divided into two sections; the first section is directed to 
the lower level managers and the second section is directed to the higher level managers. The 
reason is that influence is the end goal of both parties and it can be a contested resource. 
Overall, both parties are advised to manage the balance of interdependence to their own 
favour if they desire to attain more influence. Yet, since they are in a relationship of mutual 
interdependence, the higher level can do this if its structural power is seen as a legitimate 
authority and the lower level can do this by using its soft power.  
 
 
388 
 
 
9.4.1 General Practical Implications 
As noted by Dörrenbächer and Geppert (2013:25), organisational politics are the “raw truth” 
of organisational life where political conflict cannot be “swept under the rug”. According to 
them, acknowledging organisational politics can be one of the steps towards better 
management. As this study has revealed some of the intra-organisational politics inherent in 
vertical inter-unit relationships, the following general implications can be stressed.  
First, studying the meaning and constructing a measure for VIRQ provides the potential for 
monitoring relationship quality between vertical levels
137
. This will not only show the 
appropriateness of the governance philosophy employed, but can also make the parties to the 
relationship avoid any adverse consequences when the relationship is perceived to be less 
favourable. One way that seems to be beneficial to both of the relationship parties is when the 
relationship actors adopt a win–win philosophy, since zero sum–strategizing can harm the 
stability of the relationship. The higher level should not take its structural power for granted, 
nor should the lower level take its knowledge or centrality power for granted. A relationship, 
in order to be mutually beneficial, should be based on collaboration and partnership. 
Second, this study can offer the higher level and the lower level managers a blueprint that 
shows how each party to the vertical relationship perceives the other; hence the aspects that 
each party to the relationship look for and the criteria upon which it is being judged. This is 
specifically important for University–based Business Schools’ Deans and their Higher 
University Authority officers.  
                                                             
137 The items of the developed measure are presented in Appendix VI. The items are suggested to have equal 
weights as the items’ loading did not significantly vary.  
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Third, continuous learning is key to managing complex relationships. Authority will remain a 
key organisational feature (whatever the organisational form). However, it should be a 
learning authority; an authority that is not only willing to listen and take into account other 
perspectives but one that is also actively engaged in a continuous learning process on how to 
manage the relationship better by being proactive in collaborating with the lower level unit on 
solving the issues they face. Likewise, the lower level should continuously learn how to 
manage the relationship with its higher level. There is not an off–the–shelf way to learn as 
each context is different, but the social skills of the higher level and the lower level managers 
as well as their personal qualities are believed to be important. This is because units are 
represented by people, and therefore the quality of the inter–personal relationship between the 
key boundary spanners is one of the most significant predictors of VIRQ. Learning in vertical 
relationships can be based on the ability to listen, and listening requires mutual trust, 
openness, and fairness.  
9.4.2 Practical Implications for the Lower Level Managers  
This study offers a number of implications for the lower level managers and more specifically 
for the leadership of University–based Business Schools. If the objective of the lower level 
managers is to increase their empowerment, and hence to increase their influence on the 
vertical relationship as the lower level unit develops, they need continuously to manage the 
balance of interdependence so that it is favourable to them. When this happens, the lower 
level assumes a better position to demand and realise more influence in the vertical 
relationship, mostly represented by more autonomy.  
Ideally, interdependence should be kept in a balanced state so that the cost of the relationship 
is more or less equal to the benefits it provides. Positive interdependence can also result in 
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favourable vertical relationships, given that the higher level foresees the potential contribution 
of the lower level provided mostly by the merit of the lower level’s development and 
improved performance. Negative interdependence, however, casts doubt on the higher level’s 
legitimacy of control; but the lower level can still gain from a relationship of negative 
interdependence if the lower level managed to reduce the higher level’s unnecessary control 
through tactful reciprocation. The following two points elaborate this argument further. 
 First, this study clarifies what the higher level managers seek in their relationship with 
the lower level; control that ensures that the higher level’s agenda is met. Yet, it 
should be noted that such control does not necessarily constrain the lower level in the 
case of positive and sometimes balanced interdependence. In some cases, such control 
can empower the lower level. In cases when the lower level perceives that the 
relationship can be mutually empowering and mutually beneficial, the lower level 
should not only understand the higher level’s perspective, but also understand its 
agenda and attempt to work according to this agenda, yet in a way that could be 
mutually beneficial. Maintaining legitimacy is seen to be of vital importance if the 
relationship is to be sustained, particularly if the lower level is less or sometimes 
equally powerful to the higher level. Legitimacy can be one source of the lower level’s 
soft power; it increases the chances of the lower level to be seen as trustful by the 
higher level, and trust is the basis for autonomy. In addition, active legitimacy through 
trust building and common understanding development techniques and the utilisation 
of the informal organisational channels can also play a significant role in making the 
lower level realise its desired goal in the vertical relationship. If the relationship is less 
favourable because the higher level does not understand the context of the lower level, 
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the lower level can proactively educate the higher level about its context and about its 
needs. 
 Second, if the relationship is seen to be unfavourable but the parties to the relationship 
want it to be sustained, tactful strategizing (which is based on legitimacy and active 
legitimacy) could result in more favourable outcomes than negative reciprocation in 
which legitimacy does not become the key concern. The reason is that the higher 
level’s structural power might outweigh the lower level’s centrality power (or its other 
sources of power), particularly in the short–term (although which power is more 
powerful is still an open question). The higher level usually presumes that it can 
overcome the lower level’s power by simply changing the leadership of the lower 
level unit when the latter does not work to their agenda. Tensions in the relationship 
might be ongoing with the change of the leadership of the lower level unit, even when 
the new leadership is recruited to address the higher level’s agenda. This is because 
very negative relationships usually create an atmosphere of frustration that permeates 
to other organisational levels beyond the leadership level. In such cases, the vertical 
relationship can become dysfunctional due to negative reciprocation. This affects the 
lower level unit, the higher level unit, as well as the organisation as a whole. However, 
as vertical relationships are guided by cost–benefit analysis from both sides of the 
relationship, if the relationship is dysfunctional, the vertical relationship itself 
becomes unstable. Individual as well as organisational factors can impact vertical 
relationships, however it is generally the social skills of the leadership of the lower 
level as well as their personal motivation that are influential in determining the 
direction of changes in vertical relationships. 
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9.4.3 Practical Implications for Higher Level Managers 
Taking the higher level’s side, the key point is to realise that lower level units can develop 
and when this happens they become harder to control. In these circumstances, the only 
possible way to control the lower level unit with less resistance is when the higher level’s 
structural power is viewed by the lower level units as legitimate. Legitimacy of the higher 
level unit can be negatively affected by two interrelated factors: shifts in the state of the 
balance of interdependence (when the lower level relative power evolves) and if the higher 
level is seen to adopt inappropriate governance strategies (whatever the state of the balance of 
interdependence but particularly in the case of the lower level’s balanced and negative 
interdependence). 
Therefore, one possible way to control the lower level unit in a way that maintains a good 
relationship quality is to continually manage the balance of interdependence so that it is in the 
favour of the higher level, and in this way to secure legitimacy for the higher level’s control.  
However, managing the balance of interdependence should be done wisely as it can provoke 
the lower level’s resistance if done only with the purpose of maintaining the upper hand in the 
relationship. Adopting an appropriate and a fair governance philosophy is thus key to 
maintaining the higher level’s legitimacy. With this in view, three points can be made.  
 First, due to the structural power of the higher level in the vertical relationship, the 
higher level tends to fall into the trap of inappropriate governance. Governance should 
be tailored to fit the nature and the needs of the lower level unit as the lower level’s 
needs change with its development. Young and positively interdependent lower level 
units need to be empowered through the higher level’s governance so that they can 
develop. For such units, attaining the higher level’s support is their primary concern in 
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the vertical relationship. As the lower level unit develops further, it requires its voice 
to be more heard as its needs usually diverge from those devolved by the higher level. 
The higher level, therefore, has to ensure that mature and important lower level units 
are listened to and have the opportunity to participate in relevant decisions, not only 
informed by them. Important lower level units are not supposed to be implementators 
of the higher level’s agenda; they also need to shape this agenda, otherwise the 
relationship can be dysfunctional for both sides of the relationship. Dysfunctionality 
can result from the higher level’s limited knowledge about the context of important 
lower level units (while making decisions for them) and from the subsequent lower 
level resistance to the higher level’s agenda. Members of the lower level unit, if their 
unit is strategically important but not listened to, can react in a counterproductive 
manner, by being less committed or by leaving the organisation altogether. 
 Second, control is generally undesirable unless it is supportive control. The higher 
level is generally advised to use subtle (social) control mechanisms as they are less 
obvious and more tolerable than behavioural controls. As well as investing in the 
lower level unit financially, the higher level can invest in its relationship with 
important lower level unit socially; mainly by building bridges of trust, common 
understanding, and ensuring fairness in the relationship, so that it appreciates the 
needs of the lower level, before these needs are extraverted to tensions and conflict.  
 Third, an interesting finding of this study is that lower level units which did not have 
an intermediate layer between them and the ultimate higher level (no faculty or college 
level) tended to view the vertical relationship more favourably than their counterparts 
which have an intermediate level (see results of the cluster analysis in Chapter 8). This 
is particularly true for more important lower level units. Strategically important lower 
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level units need access to the ultimate organisational authority and the presence of an 
intermediate level in the vertical relationship can debilitate their influence. Lower 
level units with an intermediate vertical level tend to view the relationship 
unfavourably and tend to react accordingly in order to increase their desired influence. 
This might involve by-passing the middle layer either formally or informally or just 
expressing features of frustration from a perceived dysfunctional organisational 
design. As emphasised, a major problem for the higher level is when it is seen by the 
lower level as less legitimate. In order to be legitimate, the higher level unit should 
add value to the lower level unit and in the case of important lower level units, the 
intermediate higher level can be seen as a redundant unit. 
Saying this, it should be acknowledged that the management of vertical relationships will 
remain paradoxical. If the lower level is allowed to grow, and hence influence the higher 
level, there may come a point where the lower level might create its own empire and escapes 
of the higher level’s control. On the other hand, if the higher level is tightly controlling the 
lower level and does not consider the fairness of its influence, the higher level’s control can 
be resisted and the relationship can become dysfunctional and debilitating to the development 
of the lower level unit. These are only implications that might improve the perceptions of the 
quality of relationship, some of them, while easily suggested, can be very hard to apply in 
practice. The study of vertical relationships between organisational units therefore leaves us 
with fundamental questions. 
Can organisations benefit from advances in larger democratic social structures? Are the 
qualities of mutual openness, trust, transparency, and fairness practically attainable in 
complex political environments? Does it all depend on the balance of interdependence and 
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whoever is more powerful to manage it strategically (and even deviously) will “win” this 
political game? Perhaps the answers are not known, but it is also acknowledged that while 
there is no perfect system or structure, there are structures that are better than others; and 
hence is the suggestion of relationship quality and its “practical” implications. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has presented an in–depth exploratory study into vertical inter–unit relationships. 
Borrowing from the relationship marketing literature, I introduced the concept of vertical 
inter–unit relationship quality (VIRQ) to the study of intra–organisational vertical nexuses. 
The study addressed three main questions regarding the meaning and attributes, the 
antecedents, and the consequences likely to be associated with the perception of VIRQ, 
placing a particular emphasis on the perspective of the lower level. Building on thorough 
qualitative and quantitative investigations, VIRQ was seen from the lower level’s perspective 
as comprised of trust, openness, fairness and satisfaction. Similar attributes were associated 
with the concept of VIRQ from the higher level’s perspective. The higher level unit tended to 
view VIRQ in terms of achieving effective control over the lower level unit, while the latter 
tended to view VIRQ in terms of fairness insofar as the balance of influence reflects the 
balance of interdependence between the two vertical levels. The balance of interdependence is 
found to be the key predictive factor in determining variations in the lower level’s perception 
of VIRQ. The state of the balance of interdependence is likely to affect all the other 
relationship aspects (the lower level’s choices, perception of autonomy, cognitive congruence, 
and sometimes the inter–personal relationship quality between the concerned boundary 
spanners). Based on the lower level’s perception of VIRQ, a reciprocation process is likely to 
follow. Three different modes of reciprocation were identified, whereby the different modes 
are seen as reflectors of the lower level unit’s choice, which in turn is shaped based on its 
relative interdependence on the higher level unit. However, as with any exploratory work, the 
thesis in hand is not without limitations. The following sections discuss these limitations and 
suggest a number of avenues for future research. 
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10.1 Study Limitations  
While due effort was made to avoid or minimise the impact of the study’s limitations while 
addressing the research questions, there remain several limitations to be acknowledged.  
First, this study has given more weight to the lower level’s perspective. In part, this was done 
purposefully as the lower level unit tends to be less heard and its needs as it develops are seen 
to be worthy of further research.  However, giving greater weight to the lower level was also a 
result of practical difficulties in recruiting sufficient respondents to represent the higher level 
perspective.  
The second limitation is a consequence of the first. While the study referred to the dyadic 
views of the two parties to the vertical relationship on the meaning of VIRQ and its associated 
attributes, analysing the dyadic perspective regarding specific issues of the vertical 
relationship was not possible in all cases. This was, however, beyond the scope of this study 
as its main purpose concern factors related to VIRQ in general so that more general 
propositions may be drawn, rather than focusing on descriptive analyses of detailed 
conflict/harmony situations.  
Third, this study adopted a cross–sectional design based on in–depth comparative case study 
analysis. Respondents were asked to reflect on the on–going vertical relationship and the 
recent history of the relationship, when possible, to understand changes occurring. With the 
practical limitations and time considerations, this was seen sufficient to address the research 
objectives. However, longitudinal research designs could offer more in–depth insight into the 
dynamics and the processes discussed; particularly in relation to changes in the balance of 
interdependence and to the different modes of reciprocation. 
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The small size of the sample as well as the study population was the fourth limitation to this 
study. This study focused on UK University–based Business Schools, which makes 
comparative case study analysis possible by focusing on a specific institutional field (see 
Hinings and Greenwood, 2002). For the quantitative validation of the propositions, the 
population of UK University–based Business Schools meeting the sample criteria by the time 
of data collection was 114 schools, and 41% of the study population completed the on–line 
survey. Nonetheless, this was not enough to run a CFA to ensure the validity of the 
measurement of VIRQ as most studies suggest a minimum of 300 as an adequate sample size 
(which exceeds the size of the population). Although the quantitative results strongly 
supported the qualitative findings, and although the validity of the measurement of VIRQ was 
checked through other simpler statistical techniques not requiring large sample sizes, the 
quantitative results are better seen as setting the foundation for developing a measurement and 
as providing preliminary, yet strong, quantitative evidence about the reported patterns of 
inter–connections. The quantitative investigation therefore does not aim to prove the external 
validity of the findings, but to indicate that the qualitative findings have some quantitative 
support that could be used as a strong basis for future large scale quantitative studies. This is 
consistent with the study objectives as it did not aim at any generalisation but to highlight and 
explain the likely relationships considering factors of internal validity. 
Fifth, general conclusions as well as directionality of causality established among variables 
can be questioned if one uses a different interpretative or theoretical lens. However, the 
patterns suggested are based on the qualitative analyses and the theoretical frameworks used. 
This is not to deny rival interpretations but to suggest one possible interpretation of the 
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findings while ensuring that personal bias was kept to the minimum possible. Since it is an 
exploratory study, more, and perhaps different, theoretical interpretations are still desirable. 
Sixth, the study adopted subjective measures in its qualitative and quantitative investigations. 
As “how individuals and groups experience their interdependence and believe theory goals 
are linked greatly impacts on how they work together” (Tjosvold, 1986: 531), I relied on a 
perceptual assessment of the state of the balance of interdependence. This concept was 
studied subjectively as actors, being representatives of their units, build their perception about 
interdependence based on a variety of variables including structure and behaviour (Tjosvold, 
1986). As a key predictor, the balance of interdependence tended to colour the perception of 
most of the other study variables. Using perceptual measures was seen as the most suitable 
way given the study context, the variations among the case studies, the nature of the study 
variables, and the study objectives. After conducting the first pilot study and after conducting 
the case study interviews, the suitability of depending on the subjective assessment of the 
respondents was more assured as the whole process of assessing VIRQ tended to be 
perceptual. However, future studies might benefit from comparing these findings with other 
findings derived from using more “objective” measures, particularly for variables such as 
performance. 
Seventh, many of the responses obtained touched upon sensitive areas such as conflict and the 
personal characteristics of the individuals involved. Due effort was made to assure 
respondents of the confidentiality of the study in order to keep the social desirability bias to a 
minimum (see Randall and Fernandes, 1991), but this does not entirely eliminate the 
possibility of bias.  
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10.2 Avenues for Future Research  
Due to its exploratory nature, this study poses more questions than it answers. Accordingly, 
there are a number of avenues for future research that could lead to the construction of a 
promising research agenda in the field of vertical relations and organisation studies in general.  
First, by identifying the meaning and laying the foundation of a scale for assessing VIRQ, a 
number of research opportunities may arise. A very promising research area is validating this 
measure on a wider scale using larger data sets. The construct, antecedents and consequences 
of VIRQ could be also examined in different contexts and under different conditions. For 
example, is the measure (and its constituent items) culturally dependent? Could the measure 
be applied in different types of organisations (professional organisations rather than 
bureaucratic ones)? The concept of VIRQ can be either used as a dependent or the 
independent variable; which paves the way for further exploration of the factors affecting its 
perception and the implications of its perception. For example, researchers could explore the 
impact of the different governance modes or organisational forms on the perception of VIRQ; 
and the impact of VIRQ on the vertical units’ performance, innovation, cooperation and 
collaboration, and development.  
Second, due to the sample size limitations, propositions postulated by this study might be 
further verified in other organisational contexts where larger data sets could be obtained, 
particularly MNCs. The use of the VIRQ concept could be particularly informative for the 
study of headquarters–subsidiary relations in MNCs as a special, yet significant, form of 
organisational diversification. Including additional factors such as the institutional, cultural, 
and psychic distance between headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries might help enrich 
our understanding of these relationships, and hence facilitate the identification of more 
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effective ways for their management. Considering other variables such as the impact of the 
extent of the subsidiary’s local embeddedness versus its corporate embeddedness or other 
macro–level institutional factors could also have promising theoretical and practical 
potentials. Future studies are encouraged to employ both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques in order to build upon the findings by looking to other variables and processes and 
to test the validity of the findings in different contexts.  
Moreover, the dynamics of the vertical inter–unit relationship in general and headquarters–
subsidiary relationship specifically is still an area that needs further research attention, 
particularly by adopting dynamic theoretical perspectives (Ambos et al., 2011). This is why 
social exchange and power–dependence theories are used in this study. Future research could 
benefit from using other theories such as co–evolution theory and strategic choice theory to 
illuminate some of the dynamics involved in the vertical relationship. There are also 
intriguing opportunities for merging insights from more than one theoretical perspective to 
study the vertical relationship and organisational politics in general. This could include using 
the power–dependence theory in conjunction with institutional theory or merging insights 
from power /resource dependence and co–evolution theories.  
Third, in this study, the higher level’s perspective was considered but was not fully elaborated 
due to practical limitations. More attention should be paid to the higher level’s or the 
headquarters’ perspective in vertical relationships. From the higher level’s perspective, does 
the inter–personal relationship between boundary spanners representing the two vertical levels 
play any role in managing the vertical relationship? How can shifts in the balance of 
interdependence affect the higher level behaviour and governance to the lower level unit? 
How does the higher level respond to the different reciprocation modes of the lower level? 
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Why and when does the higher level interfere more in the management of the lower level and 
when it decides to leave a greater scope for autonomy? Does the higher level really fear the 
development of the lower level unit when such development challenges its structural power, 
and if so what is the implication of the higher level’s fear? How does the higher level ensure 
the stability of the vertical relationship so that when the lower level units develop, they 
remain committed to the relationship? More importantly, what is the view of the higher level 
on governance and power; is power seen by them as a zero–sum phenomenon (power over) or 
is it seen as a win–win game (power with or power to)? Are the views of the higher level on 
power stable over time or do the higher level’s views change with changes in the states of the 
balance of interdependence between the vertical levels? Longitudinal in–depth case studies 
that take a dyadic perspective of both the higher level and the lower level units could provide 
very interesting and new insights.  
Fourth, this study has examined the case when the lower level unit is less dependent on the 
higher level one (negative interdependence from the lower level’s perspective). Such cases 
were less common in this study and it is believed to be less common in practice as well. 
However, the case of negative interdependence could be a very promising area for further 
research investigation; particularly if the research investigation is based on longitudinal case 
studies where individual–related factors as well as unit–related factors are considered. What is 
the role of personal motivation and the aspirations of the lower level’s leadership in deciding 
the behaviour of the lower level unit in the case of negative interdependence? How does 
negative interdependence affect the members of the lower level unit beyond its leadership? 
Does the higher level plan for situations that make lower level negative interdependence less 
likely or does it work to a win–win agenda (by building on the success of the lower level 
 
 
403 
 
 
unit); in any case, how? What is the role of the structural power of the higher level in the case 
of negative interdependence and what is the future of the vertical relationship in cases of 
negative interdependence? These questions have been only touched upon, but further in–depth 
investigation is likely to provide significant theoretical contributions. Asymmetric 
interdependence, particularly when the lower level is less dependent on its higher level than 
vice versa, is an area that has not received much attention in the organisational studies or the 
headquarters–subsidiary literature; despite its significance.  
Fifth, the study has highlighted the use of soft power by the lower level units to improve their 
influence in vertical relationships. Political games based on soft power can be also an 
interesting area for future research. What are the different techniques used by the different 
relationship actors? Under what conditions is soft power used and what are the implications of 
using soft power in intra–organisational contexts? Could the higher level unit use its soft 
power to support its authority? What is the role of intra–organisational social capital in 
enhancing the potentiality of the use of soft power? This study has highlighted the interaction 
between formal and informal aspects of organisational life and the role informal organisations 
play in soft political games. Despite its sensitivity, this is still an interesting area, particularly 
given that parallel informal organisations can sometimes dominates over formal organisations 
when it comes to power and influence. There is also a promising, yet a challenging, research 
agenda, whereby future research could focus more on individual motivations, interests, 
aspirations, and the goals of the key boundary spanners as key decisions makers in the units 
they represent and how these factors affect the intra–organisational micro socio–political 
dynamics (see also Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2009; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2010; 
Schotter and Beamish, 2011a,b).  
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Finally, focusing on University–based Business Schools, a number of research questions 
could be posed. What is the future of University–based Business Schools in the light of the 
constraints they face and the support they gain from being part of a wider University 
environment and in the light of the fierce international competition coming from more 
autonomous peers? Can these Business Schools build upon the benefits of being part of a 
University as a source of competitive advantage rather than viewing this as burden that affects 
their competitiveness
138
? Will they try to strengthen their position in their University 
environment in order to gain enough autonomy to compete with their autonomous rivals? 
Another relevant area relates to how these schools will maintain legitimacy in their University 
environment? Will they change their course to mimic other academic disciplines by building a 
strong research orientation and perhaps work with other established disciplines on potential 
areas of collaboration, or they will proceed to maintain their legitimacy through exhausting 
their advantageous position and extra ability in generating more financial returns? Will they 
stick to a middle way? What seems to be the most successful business model and business 
strategy that best ensures that Business Schools are not exploited but are still seen as 
legitimate in their University environment? How do Business Schools reconcile and prioritise 
the institutional pressures they face from their wider sector and from their University 
environments? The future of University–based Business Schools and their conformity to 
external pressures and to the pressures they face in their University environment is an area of 
importance to universities, Business Schools, as well as the other business school 
stakeholders.
                                                             
138 See Saka-Helmhout and Geppert (2011) for an alternative view on institutions as both enabling and 
constraining (comparative institutional analysis literature). 
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APPENDIX I 
Variables used in the Final Questionnaire, their Measures and Operationalisations 
Variable Operationalisation Items  Source and notes  
Perceived Net 
Dependence  
Refers to the difference between the BS 
perceived dependence on the University 
and the University perceived dependence 
on BS. 
 
A positive dependence is when the BS 
depends on the University more than the 
dependence of the University on the BS 
and negative dependence occurs when the 
opposite applies. 
 
Balanced dependence is reached when 
the difference between the dependence of 
the two parties is not significant, i.e, they 
more or less depend equally on each 
other. Similar practices have been used in 
measuring similar concepts such as 
unilateral, bilateral, asymmetric, mutual, 
and joint dependence, interdependence, 
although the details of the measuring 
technique could vary (see for example 
Lusch and Brown, 1996; Yilmaz, Sezen, 
Ozdemir, 2005; Gulati and Sytch, 2007) 
 
An item representing perceived net 
Business School’s  Perceived Dependence on the Higher 
University Authorities 
 
 
On the whole, the relationship between the Business School and its 
higher University level could be  characterised as a relationship 
where 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
(Developed) 
 
Reverse coded so that 
the scale reflects the 
extent to which the BS 
relies on the University 
than otherwise.  
 
High perception of net 
dependence thus 
indicates a tendency 
towards positive 
interdependence where 
the BS depends on the 
University more than 
vice versa. Low 
perception of net 
dependence suggests a 
tendency towards 
negative 
interdependence where 
the University is 
perceived to depend 
more on the BS than 
vice versa. A middle 
Business School 
is more 
dependent on 
the University 
than vice versa 
Balanced 
dependence  
The University is 
more dependent 
on the Business 
School than vice 
versa 
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dependence was developed by the 
researcher to reflect on the general 
perceived magnitude of the BS net 
dependence. 
score is assumed to 
indicate tendency 
towards balanced 
interdependence where 
the two levels of the 
vertical relationship 
depend on each other 
more or less equally.   
 
7–point Likert scale 
measure.  
Business 
School 
Orientation  
Refers to the degree to which key people 
(boundary spanners) in the BS have an 
internal (University) versus external (BS 
as an external sector) focus. Some 
schools have an external frame of 
reference and identify themselves as part 
of the wider BS sector, while others are 
internally oriented and see themselves as 
part of the wider University  and similar 
to other schools in the University. The 
construct is similar to reference group 
orientation which is used as one of the 
sub dimensions of Cosmopolitan –Local 
Orientation developed by Gouldner 
(1957). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. In this Business School, our main criterion of success is 
how we perform relative to the other Business Schools 
rather than relative to other schools in the University. 
2. In this Business School, we give little attention to the 
practices of other Business Schools. 
3. This Business School is just like other schools in the 
University. 
4. This Business School is different from the rest of schools 
in the University. 
5. On the whole, we value our contact with other Business 
Schools more than other schools in the University. 
 
(Developed) 
 
Item number (2) and (3) 
are reverse coded.  
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
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Perceived 
Autonomy  
Adapting Prahalad and Doz (1981 a) 
definition of autonomy which views 
autonomy as the extent of interference 
and formal influence the higher level has 
on lower level concerning decisions that 
affect the lower level’s strategy. 
Based on case studies conducted, the 
researcher focused on key areas of 
decision making as follows, as well as 
questioning directly about the general 
perception of autonomy: 
 Reinvestment of financial surplus 
 Key staff appointments 
 Research policy  
 Teaching policy 
 Students’ recruitments 
1. The Business School can take decisions regarding the 
reinvestment of its financial surplus without consulting 
its higher University level. 
2. The Business School can take decisions regarding 
faculty appointments (for example a lecturer) without 
consulting its higher University level. 
3. The Business School can take decisions regarding 
students’ target number without consulting its higher 
University level 
4. The Business School can take decisions regarding its 
pursued research areas without consulting its higher 
University level. 
5. The Business School can take decisions regarding the 
design of its curriculum without consulting its higher 
University level. 
 
In some universities, strategic decision–making for the Business 
School is largely centralized at a higher University level; in other 
universities, Business Schools have a large amount of autonomy. In 
general, what is this Business School’s autonomy to decide its own 
strategies and policies?  
 
Very Little 
Autonomy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Very High 
Autonomy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The scale is similar to 
that used by Taggart 
(1997) and Andersson 
and Forsgren (1996).  
 
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
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Perceived 
Cognitive 
Congruence  
Refers to the extent to which the BS and 
its higher University level have : 
1. Shared vision  
2. Shared understandings and 
views.  
This construct is sub–divided into 2 
different sub–constructs that might be 
theoretically unrelated as shown in the 
case study analyses.  
 
1. Shared vision is  based on 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and 
Tsai and Ghoshal (1998)   
Shared Vision 
1. The Business School shares the same ambitions and 
vision of the higher University level. 
2. People in the Business School are enthusiastic about 
pursuing the collective goals and mission of the higher 
University level. 
 
 
 
 
Shared vision is adapted 
based on  Tsai and 
Ghoshal (1998) 
 
  
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
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According to Tsai and Ghoshal (1998: 
467) shared vision “embodies the 
collective goals and aspirations of the 
members of an organization.”  
 
2. Shared understandings and views 
refer to the extent to which the 
BS and its higher level share the 
same views regarding the role of 
the BS in the University, the 
overall competitive environment 
of the BS, and the BS corporate 
requirements. This construct was 
developed based on the case 
study evidence. 
 
 
Shared Understandings and Views 
 
1. The Business School and the higher University level 
have a shared understanding of the Business School’s 
competitive environment. 
2. The higher level does not understand the Business 
School’s business and corporate requirements. 
3. The Business School and the higher University level 
have a shared understanding of the Business School’s 
role in the University. 
4. The Business School and the higher University level 
share common views on how to achieve the Business 
School goals. 
Shared understandings 
and views construct is 
developed. 
   
Item (2) in shared 
understandings and 
views is reverse coded. 
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
Inter–personal 
relationship 
quality. 
Refers to the degree to which the 
boundary spanners representing the BS 
finds the inter–role relationship with 
his/her contact person in the higher level 
satisfactory and trustful. An additional 
nominal scale question was added as a 
separate construct to reflect on the 
perceived degree of formality between 
the boundaries spanners. These construct 
were developed based on the case study 
evidence.  
 
1. In my role, I am satisfied with the relationship I have 
with my key contacts at the higher University level. 
2. In my role, I can fully trust my key contacts at the 
higher University level. 
3. I can describe the relationship I have with my key 
contacts at the higher level as a:  
 
–––– Strictly formal relationship 
––––  Friendly formal relationship 
––––  Informal relationship 
 
Developed. 
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures for item (1) 
and (2).  
 
Item (3) is a nominal 
scale question which is 
to be used as a separate 
construct referring to the 
degree of formality 
between the boundary 
spanners as perceived by 
the lower level’s 
respondents.  
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Perceived 
Inter–Unit 
Relationship 
Quality  
Refers to the extent to which boundary 
spanners in the BS see their relationship 
with the higher level’s management as 
satisfactory, trustful, open, fair, and 
supportive so that the balance of 
influence that the BS enjoys is perceived 
to be fair or satisfactory.  
 
 
 
1. The higher level’s cooperation with the Business 
School is satisfactory. (Satisfaction (support)– 
developed) 
2. The balance of influence between the higher level and 
the Business School is satisfactory. (satisfaction– 
developed) 
3. The communication process between the Business 
School and the higher level is satisfactory. 
(Satisfaction– developed) 
4. In general, the Business School’s relationship with the 
higher level is satisfactory. (Satisfaction– developed) 
 
5. The higher level’s management meets its agreed upon 
obligations to the Business School. (Trust – Kostova 
and Roth, 2002). 
6. The higher level’s management acts in the Business 
School’s best interest. (Trust – Kostova and Roth, 
2002) 
7. The higher level’s management usually keeps its word. 
(Trust – Kostova and Roth, 2002 and Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998) 
 
8. The higher level’s management does not mislead the 
Business School. (Trust – Kostova and Roth, 2002) 
9. The Business School can share information openly with 
the higher level’s management because they do not take 
advantage of this by acting against the Business School 
interests. (Trust and openness – Kostova and Roth, 
2002; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; and Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1993).  
Satisfaction items are 
developed based on case 
study evidence.  
Trust characteristics are 
based on integrity, 
benevolence, and 
competence–based trust 
following Mayer and 
Davies (1999). Specific 
statements used to 
measure trust are 
adapted from Kostova 
and Roth (2002); Tsai 
and Ghoshal (1998); and 
Kim and Mauborgne 
(1993). Both satisfaction 
and trust items cover 
support items. 
 
Openness and fairness, 
items were developed.  
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
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10. The higher level’s management at times must make 
decisions which seem to be against the interests of the 
Business School. When this happens, we are confident 
that the Business School’s current sacrifice will be 
justified by the higher level’s future support for the 
Business School.  (Trust – Kim and Mauborgne, 1993) 
 
11. The higher level’s management is transparent in dealing 
with the Business School. (Openness– developed) 
12. The higher level’s management discusses issues with 
the Business School openly. (Openness– adapted from 
Kostova and Roth, 2002) 
 
13. The higher level’s management discusses joint 
expectations fairly. (Fairness – developed) 
 
The perception 
of the power 
distribution  
Refers to the power distribution in the 
vertical relationship as perceived by the 
lower level unit.  
1. The relationship between the higher level and the 
Business School is characterised by a great deal of 
support and cooperation. 
2. The relationship between the higher level and the 
Business School is characterised by a great deal of 
control and dominance. 
3. The relationship with the higher level is constraining 
for the Business School. 
 
Power over/with items 
are developed based on 
the case study evidence.  
 
Items (2) and (3) are 
reverse coded. 
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
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Subjective 
Performance  
Refers to the extent to which the 
boundary spanners view their current 
performance as satisfactory versus 
unsatisfactory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Compared to its relevant competitors, this Business 
School is achieving its full potential. 
2. Compared to its relevant competitors, this Business 
School is achieving a satisfactory performance. 
3. This Business School supports its staff to achieve their 
full potential. 
4. The Business School's performance could be better if it 
were more independent from the higher level. 
5. In general, this Business School does a good job of 
meeting its targets. 
 
Adapted based on 
Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004). 
 
Item (4) is reverse 
coded.  
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
Affective 
Commitment  
Refers to the extent to which boundary 
spanners show affective commitment to 
the University. More specifically, it 
shows the extent to which the boundary 
spanners have “ positive feelings of 
identification with, attachment to, and 
involvement in the work organisation” 
(Meyer and Allen, 1984: 375) 
1. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in 
this University.  
2. I do not feel “emotionally attached” to this University.  
3. This University has a great deal of personal meaning to 
me.  
4. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to the 
University. 
 
Adapted from Allen & 
Meyer (1990).  
 
Items (2) and (4) are 
reverse coded.  
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
 Intention to 
Leave  
Refers to the extent to which the 
boundary spanner is likely to leave 
his/her managerial boundary spanning 
position within the next 12 months. 
 
1. I strongly feel about leaving my managerial position in 
the Business School within the next 12 months. 
2. I am likely to step down from my managerial position in 
the Business School within the next 12 months. 
 
 
Developed.  
 
7–point Likert scale 
measures. 
Other 
Questions   
 The type of the immediate higher 
level. 
 Category of the BS. 
 The managerial position of the 
respondent.  
 Longevity of inter–role 
1. Please indicate who are the immediate higher University 
level with which the Business has most contact: 
College/ Faculty             
University Management Board 
 
2. In which of the following categories does this Business 
Developed 
 
Categorical data on a 
nominal scale except 
items (5), (6), and (7).  
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relationship. 
 Longevity of the inter–unit 
relationship. 
 Position.  
 School. 
 Relationship with whom 
(University directly or college). 
School lie? 
–––– Category A (list of the top tier) 
–––– Category B (list of the second tier) 
–––– Category C (list of the third tier) 
 
3. What is your managerial position? 
––– Dean /head of School     
–––– Associate/Deputy Dean                         
–––  Head of an Academic Department  
–––– Programme Director 
–––  Other 
 
4. How long you have been in your current position? 
–––– Years                                                                    
–––– Months 
 
5. How long the current structural link with the higher 
level has been in place? 
–––– Years                                                                  
–––– Months 
 
6. When was business and / or management education first 
offered on a regular basis in this University? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––                    
 
7. Kindly answer the following questions if your school 
would be like a feedback report 
The name of your School  –––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Please provide appropriate contact information ––––––––––––– 
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APPENDIX II 
 Items Generated from the Literature based on an Aprori Definition of VIRQ (Items Used in the first Pilot Study). 
Dimension Definition Items Questions 
(Measuring the degree of agreement or disagreement 
unless otherwise stated) 
Intrinsic Characteristics 
1. Strength of 
personal ties 
between top 
managers in LL 
and HL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"The strength of a tie is a (probably 
linear) combination of the amount of 
time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy (mutual confiding), and the 
reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie. Each of these is 
somewhat independent of the other, 
though the set is obviously highly 
intracorrelated" (Granovetter, 1973: 
1361) 
1. Amount of time spent 
(frequency of contact). 
2. The emotional intensity. 
3. The intimacy (mutual 
confiding). 
4. The reciprocal service. 
 
Adapted questions based on Granovetter (1973) items, 
Hansen (1999) questions and Ghoshal, Korine and 
Szulanski (1994) scale of measuring frequency of 
communication. 
1. On Average, how frequently do you personally 
interact with the HL's contact person(s)? 
(Hansen, 1999) 
1: daily; 2: weekly; 3: monthly; 4: annually; 5: less 
than annually 
2. Your personal relationship with the HL's 
contact person(s) is a close one (Hansen, 1999) 
3. You regard your personal relationship with the 
HL's contact persons as a relationship of 
mutual benefit (developed based on 
Granovetter (1973) items). 
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2. Strength of 
inter–unit ties 
 1. Frequency of inter–unit 
communications (Hansen, 
1999). 
2. Closeness of inter–unit tie 
(Hansen, 1999). 
Using Hansen measure of inter–unit tie weakness  
1. On average, how frequently do people in your 
unit interact with the HL? (question adopted 
from Hansen (1999) measure of inter–unit tie 
weakness) 1: daily; 2: weekly; 3: monthly; 4: 
annually; 5: less than annually (scale used by 
Ghoshal,  Korine and Szulanski (1994) in 
measuring frequency of communication). 
 
2. How close is the working relationship between 
your unit and HL? [0 = "Very close, practically 
like being in the same work group," 3 = 
"Somewhat close, like discussing and solving 
issues together," 6 = "Distant, like an arm's–
length delivery of the input"(Hansen , 1999: 
11). 
 
3.  Trust Trust is viewed as an expectation or 
belief that one can rely upon another 
person’s actions and words, and/or 
that the person has good intentions 
toward oneself (Dirks and Ferrin, 
2001; Li, 2005). 
 
In the headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship, local senior executives’ 
trust in headquarters refers to 
executives’ belief in the integrity, 
truthfulness, and benevolence of 
headquarters’ management (Zhang et 
1. Interpersonal trust among LL 
managers and HL’s contact 
persons 
 
2. Inter–unit trust between LL 
and HL: trust of a subsidiary 
in its parent organization is 
seen as "a common belief 
within the subsidiary that the 
parent: 
a. makes good–faith efforts to 
behave in accordance with 
commitments, both explicit 
  Interpersonal Trust 
1. As the unit's manager, you regard the HL’s 
contact person (s) as trustworthy (Lui and Ngo, 
2004) (interpersonal  general trust). 
 
2. As the unit's manager, you regard the HL’s 
contact person(s) as person(s) who are fully 
capable of keeping their promises. (developed) 
(interpersonal competence trust). 
 
Inter–Unit Goodwill Trust 
1. Your unit trusts HL  (inter–unit general trust) 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
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al., 2006). 
 
and implicit, 
b. is honest in whatever 
discussions preceded such 
commitments, and 
c. does not take excessive 
advantage of the subsidiary, 
even when the opportunity is 
available" (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002: 218–19). 
 
3. Goodwill trust: “The 
expectation that some others 
in our social relationships 
have moral obligations and 
responsibility to demonstrate 
a special concern for other’s 
interests above their own” 
(Barber, 1983:14). 
 
4.  Competence trust: “The 
expectation of technically 
competent role performance” 
(Barber, 1983:14). 
2. Your unit can rely on HL’s managers without 
any fear that they will take advantage of your 
unit even if the opportunity arises. (Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998) (inter–unit goodwill trust). 
3. Your unit thinks that people in HL tell the truth 
when they deal with your unit.  (inter–unit 
goodwill trust) (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
4. Your unit feels that HL discusses issues with 
you honestly (inter–unit goodwill trust) 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
5. Your unit feels that HL does not mislead you. 
(inter–unit goodwill trust) (Kostova and Roth, 
2002) 
6. Your unit feels that [company] headquarters 
discusses joint expectations fairly. (inter–unit 
goodwill trust) (Kostova and Roth, 2002) 
7. Head office management at times must make 
decisions which seem to be against the interests 
of your unit. When this happens, as a unit 
manager you trust that your unit's current 
sacrifice will be justified by the head office's 
future support for your unit.  (inter–unit 
goodwill trust) (Kim and Mauborgne, 1993). 
8. As the unit manager, you feel free to discuss 
with HL’s management the problems and 
difficulties faced by your unit without having 
fear of jeopardizing your position or having 
your comment 'held against' you later on. (inter–
unit goodwill trust) (Kim and Mauborgne, 
1993). 
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Inter–unit Competence Trust 
1. Your unit is sure that they can fully trust the 
HL’s decisions (Zhang. George and Chan, 
2006) (inter–unit competence trust). 
2. Your unit thinks HL meets its agreed upon 
obligations to your unit. (inter–unit 
competence trust) (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
3. Your unit feels that HL will keep its word. 
(inter–unit competence trust) (Kostova and 
Roth , 2002) 
4. Your unit is willing to accept and follow those 
strategic decisions made by HL (inter–unit 
competence trust) (Kim and Mauborgne, 
1993). 
 
 
4.  Lower level’s  
identification 
Identification of the LL unit with its 
parent organization is defined "as the 
degree to which subsidiary 
employees (or managers) experience 
a state of attachment to the parent. 
They feel that they are part of the 
parent organization, belong to it, and 
partly derive their self–identities 
from this organizational 
membership" (Kostova and Roth, 
2002: 219). 
 Using Kostova and Roth (2002) questions (minimal 
changes in wording) 
1. Your unit, at this location, is [X University] 
2. A problem solved for the HL means a problem 
solved for your unit. 
3. Your unit, at this location, see your success as 
directly related to the success of the HL.  
4. A failure in the HL’s performance is your unit's 
failure too  
5. The way you would describe the HL would 
describe your unit at this location too 
6. Your unit thinks of itself as being part of the 
corporate family (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
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5. State of Conflict 
and Disagreement 
Resolution 
 1. Avoiding/ denial / ignoring 
the issue. 
2. Obligating smoothing over 
difficulties 
3. Integrating, collaborating, 
participative issue 
4. Dominating, forcing decision 
to a higher authority 
(hierarchical approach) 
5. Compromising (Pahl and 
Roth, 1993)  
Adopted from Pahl and Roth (1993) and Mohr and 
Spekman (1994).  
1. Assuming that some conflict exists over a 
decision and the way you conduct business in 
your unit, how frequently are the following 
methods used to resolve such conflicts? 
        (very frequent/ very infrequent) 
 Avoiding or ignoring the issue 
 Smoothing over the problem 
 Joint problem solving 
 HL's– imposed domination 
 Compromising solving the problem 
Relationship Expectations and Needs 
1. Satisfaction  Satisfaction with the relationship 
may be defined as a positive 
emotional state resulting from the 
assessment of the working 
relationship (Lages, Lages, and 
Lages, 2005) that has successfully 
met the satisfied party expectations.  
1. Support 
2. Knowledge and information 
exchange 
3. Budget allocated 
4. Interaction/ communication 
5. Conflict/disagreement 
resolution techniques 
6. Overall satisfaction with the 
content of the resulting 
strategy decisions  (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1993) 
7. Overall satisfaction with the 
relationship 
 
 
1. Your unit is satisfied with the support it gets 
from the HL. 
2. Your unit is satisfied with the knowledge and 
information it gets from HL.  
3. Your unit is satisfied with its allocated budget 
by HL.  
4. Your unit is satisfied with its communication 
process with the HL.  
5. Assuming that a conflict or a disagreement 
between your unit and HL arises, your unit is 
generally satisfied with the way such conflict 
or disagreement is resolved. 
6. Your unit is satisfied overall with the content 
of the resulting strategy decisions. (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1993) 
7. Your unit would prefer another strategy 
decision (re–verse scored) (Kim and 
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Mauborgne, 1993). 
8. Your unit is satisfied with its overall 
relationship with the HL. 
2. Communication 
quality 
High–quality communication 
between parties allows for the 
sharing of information about values, 
goals, and norms and enables both 
parties to learn about each other’s 
idiosyncrasies and develop mutual 
understanding (Zhang et al., 2006). 
Mohr and Spekman (1994): 
Communication quality dimensions 
are: 
1. Timeliness 
2. Accuracy 
3. Adequacy 
4. Completeness 
5. Credibility 
 
Communication quality adapted from Mohr and 
Spekman (1994): and Zhang et al. (2006) 
 
1. You feel that your unit's communication with 
the HL  is : 
 Timely (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) 
 Accurate (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) 
 Adequate (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) 
 Complete (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) 
 Credible (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) 
 Useful    
 
2. As the unit's manager, you find it very difficult 
to talk to the HL office (reverse coded) (Zhang 
et al., 2006). 
 
3. Communication is a big problem between your 
unit and the overseas head HL’s office (reverse 
coded) (Zhang et al., 2006). 
 
4. As the unit's manager, you cannot 
communicate effectively with the HL (reverse 
coded) (Zhang et al., 2006). 
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Relationship 
Perceived 
Added Value in 
Meeting Business 
Goals 
 
  Developed:  
1. As the unit's manager, you feel that your 
personal relationship with the HL’s contact 
person(s) is important to the achievement of 
the business goals. 
2. Your unit's relationship with the HL is 
important to the achievement of the business 
goals. 
3. Your unit's performance could be better if the 
unit independent from the HL. 
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APPENDIX III 
 Distribution and Reliability of Composite Scores of the Variables Used 
A. Reliability: Cronbach Alpha of the Constructs 
1. The perception of net dependence was a single item measure and therefore calculating 
its reliability was not possible.  
2. Cronbach Alpha for orientation towards the business school sector is 0.871 after the 
removal of the first and fourth items; keeping only two items.  
3. Cronbach Alpha for perceived autonomy after the removal of the item dealing with 
autonomy in research is 0.72 (remaining items dealt with reinvestment of surplus, 
appointing new lecture, target students’ numbers, colloquium design, and the general 
perception of autonomy.  
4. Cronbach Alpha for shared understandings and views is 0.766; this is after the 
removal of one item (the item dealing with the common understanding of the 
competitive environment) and keeping the other 3 items.  
5. Cronbach Alpha for shared vision is 0.851. 
6. Cronbach Alpha for inter–personal relationship quality is 0.725. 
7. Cronbach Alpha of the items used to measure VIRQ is 0.95 
8. Cronbach Alpha of the items used to measure the perception of power distribution is 
0.826. 
9. Cronbach Alpha for subjective performance is 0.751 after the removal of the item 
stating “The Business School's performance could be better if it were more 
independent from the higher level” 
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10. Cronbach Alpha for affective commitment after the removal of the second item is 
0.782. 
11. Cronbach Alpha for the boundary spanners’ intention to leave is 0.56; this is 
considered to be a low reliability, however, because the construct is theoretically 
important, the decision was taken to use it in the quantitative analysis. Yet, the results 
related to this construct should be interpreted with caution.  
The following table shows the items used in the final analysis for each construct. 
Perception of net dependence 1. On the whole, the relationship between the Business School 
and its higher University level could be characterised as a 
relationship where 
The business school is more dependent on the University than 
vice versa, balanced dependence, the University is more 
dependent on the business school than vice versa (7 point scale 
question). 
 
 
Orientation  Towards Business 
School Sector 
1. In this Business School, our main criterion of success is 
how we perform relative to the other Business Schools 
rather than relative to other schools in the University. 
2. In this Business School, we give little attention to the 
practices of other Business Schools. 
Shared Understanding and views 1. The higher level does not understand the Business 
School’s business and corporate requirements.  
2. The Business School and the higher University level 
have a shared understanding of the Business School’s 
role in the University. 
3. The Business School and the higher University level 
share common views on how to achieve the Business 
School goals. 
Shared vision  1. The Business School shares the same ambitions and 
vision of the higher University level. 
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2. People in the Business School are enthusiastic about 
pursuing the collective goals and mission of the higher 
University level. 
 
Inter–personal Relationship 
Quality 
1. In my role, I am satisfied with the relationship I have 
with my key contacts at the higher University level. 
2. In my role, I can fully trust my key contacts at the higher 
University level. 
VIRQ 1. The balance of influence between the higher level and 
the Business School is satisfactory 
2. The higher level management acts in the Business 
School’s best interest. 
3. The higher level management usually keeps its word.  
4. The higher level management is transparent in dealing 
with the Business School.  
5. The higher level management discusses issues with the 
Business School openly.  
6. The higher level management does not mislead the 
Business School. 
7. The higher level management discusses joint 
expectations fairly.  
8. The Business school can share information openly with 
staff at the higher level because they do not take 
advantage of this by acting against the Business School 
interests. 
Perception of Power Distribution  1. The relationship between the higher level and the 
Business School is characterised by a great deal of 
support and cooperation. 
2. The relationship between the higher level and the 
Business School is characterised by a great deal of 
control and dominance. 
3. The relationship with the higher level is constraining for 
the Business School. 
Subjective Performance 1. Compared to its relevant competitors, this Business 
School is achieving its full potential. 
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2. Compared to its relevant competitors, this Business 
School is achieving a satisfactory performance. 
3. This Business School supports its staff to achieve their 
full potential. 
4. In general, this Business School does a good job of 
meeting its targets. 
Affective Commitment 1. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in 
this University.  
2. This University has a great deal of personal meaning to 
me.  
3. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to the 
University. 
Boundary Spanners intent to 
leave 
1. I strongly feel about leaving my managerial position in 
the Business School within the next 12 months. 
2. I am likely to step down from my managerial position in 
the Business School within the next 12 months. 
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B. Data Descriptives: Mean and Standard Deviation   
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N 
Rang
e 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m Mean 
Std. 
Deviati
on 
Varianc
e Skewness Kurtosis 
Statist
ic 
Stati
stic Statistic Statistic 
Statisti
c Statistic Statistic 
Statisti
c 
Std. 
Erro
r 
Statisti
c Std. Error 
Autonomy  47 5.60 1.00 6.60 3.3234 1.20978 1.464 .500 .347 –.128 .681 
Perc. of net 
dependence 
47 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.6809 1.19975 1.439 .262 .347 1.618 .681 
Shared und. 
& views 
47 5.00 2.00 7.00 4.9149 1.17177 1.373 –.368 .347 –.086 .681 
Shared vision 47 5.00 1.50 6.50 4.5957 1.24516 1.550 –.616 .347 –.150 .681 
Orientation 47 5.00 2.00 7.00 5.3191 1.34498 1.809 –.786 .347 –.077 .681 
Sub. Perf. 47 5.00 1.50 6.50 5.0000 .97105 .943 –1.076 .347 2.251 .681 
Perc. of 
power 
distribution 
47 5.00 1.33 6.33 4.0290 1.40018 1.961 –.143 .347 –.904 .681 
Inter–
personal RQ 
47 5.00 2.00 7.00 5.1700 1.29891 1.687 –.600 .347 –.078 .681 
Affective 
com. 
47 6.00 1.00 7.00 5.1467 1.59134 2.532 –.727 .347 –.402 .681 
Intent to leave 41 6.00 1.00 7.00 3.0732 1.78732 3.195 .478 .369 –.750 .724 
            
Valid N 
(listwise) 
41 
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C. Data Distribution for Composite Measures 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov–Smirnova Shapiro–Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Perceived  net 
dependence 
.237 41 .000 .894 41 .001 
Perceived autonomy .119 41 .156 .973 41 .432 
Inter–unit vertical RQ .154 41 .015 .948 41 .057 
Shared understandings 
and views 
.130 41 .080 .969 41 .328 
Shared vision  .114 41 .200
*
 .952 41 .079 
Orientation .177 41 .002 .899 41 .002 
Subjective 
Performance 
.113 41 .200
*
 .941 41 .035 
The perception of 
power distribution  
.095 41 .200
*
 .959 41 .143 
Inter–personal 
relationship quality  
.142 41 .037 .934 41 .019 
Affective commitment  .142 41 .038 .924 41 .009 
Boundary Spanners’ 
Intent to Leave  
.128 41 .090 .912 41 .004 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
 
Tests of Normality (centred Values) 
(Centred 
values) 
Kolmogorov–Smirnova Shapiro–Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Shared und. 
& views  
.146 47 .014 .968 47 .218 
autonomy .116 47 .132 .972 47 .318 
Shared und. 
& views * 
autonomy 
.162 47 .004 .909 47 .001 
Orientation  .183 47 .000 .912 47 .002 
VIRQ  .144 47 .016 .950 47 .045 
Shared 
vision 
.128 47 .052 .942 47 .022 
Shared 
vision * 
autonomy 
.123 47 .071 .927 47 .006 
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Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov–Smirnova Shapiro–Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Perceived  net 
dependence 
.237 41 .000 .894 41 .001 
Perceived autonomy .119 41 .156 .973 41 .432 
Inter–unit vertical RQ .154 41 .015 .948 41 .057 
Shared understandings 
and views 
.130 41 .080 .969 41 .328 
Shared vision  .114 41 .200
*
 .952 41 .079 
Orientation .177 41 .002 .899 41 .002 
Subjective 
Performance 
.113 41 .200
*
 .941 41 .035 
The perception of 
power distribution  
.095 41 .200
*
 .959 41 .143 
Inter–personal 
relationship quality  
.142 41 .037 .934 41 .019 
Affective commitment  .142 41 .038 .924 41 .009 
Boundary Spanners’ 
Intent to Leave  
.128 41 .090 .912 41 .004 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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APPENDIX IV 
Vertical Relationship Quality: Understanding the Concept and its Concomitants 
Interview Guide: The Business School Perspective 
A Semi Structured Interview 
Respondent: Business School Leadership 
A. Back ground Questions 
1. How many formal vertical relationships exist in the Business School?  
2. What are these relations concerned with?  
3. How frequently do you communicate with people at the higher level? In a typically 
weak, how much of this communication takes the form of formal meetings, informal 
meetings, telephone, and other written forms? 
4. What does the Business School aim to achieve in its relationship with the higher level? 
What does the higher level aim to achieve in its relationship with the Business School?  
5. In your opinion, what are the most important factors that affect the Business School’s 
cooperation with the higher level? And what are the most important factors that affect 
the cooperation of the higher level with the Business School? 
6. How would you describe the state of the Business School’s relationship with the 
higher level during the last year?  
7. In your opinion, what are/were the outcomes of this relationship state? 
8. Is the state of the vertical relationship important for effective conduct of the BS? In 
what ways? 
9. On a scale from 1 to 10, how important is the BS to the rest of the University? Why?  
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B. Attributes that Comprise Vertical Relationship Quality 
10. Having the vertical relationship in mind, what would the idea of relationship quality 
mean to you? What attributes comprise a high quality relationship between the 
Business School and the higher level?  
C. Factors that Affect the Relationship State 
11. From your own experience, what are the factors that might affect the state of vertical 
relationship both positively and negatively? Could you give examples? 
12. What are main sources of disagreements in this relationship?  
D. Decision Making Autonomy 
13. To what extent do you describe the Business School as being autonomous with respect 
to decision regarding  the following areas: 
Area Highly Controlled                    Highly 
Autonomous 
Reinvestment of BS  surplus  1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Key faculty appointments (existing 
and new) 
1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Students’ admissions 1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Research policy 1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Teaching policy 1 2     3     4 5   6     7     8     9 10 
 
14. Considering the BS decisions in its relationship with the higher level, what tends to 
characterize the process of the Business School’s decision making, is it negotiated, top 
down, or bottom up? 
15. Are you satisfied with the balance of influence in this relationship?  
16. How could BS autonomy affect the state of its relationship with the higher level?  
17. What is the impact of issues concerning resources allocation/reinvestment of surplus 
on the state of the relationship?  
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18. In your opinion, what are the main factors that affect the higher level decision 
concerning resources allocation? Could the Business School leadership do anything to 
influence such decisions? 
E. Shared Vision and Perceptions 
19. Do you think that you as one of the Business School leaders and the people higher up 
in the University have the same vision and goals for the Business School? 
20. Do you think that you and the higher level have a shared understanding of the BS 
needs (staff needs, specific programme’s needs, competition needs... etc)? 
21. Do you think that the presence or absence of shared vision and understanding affect 
the state of the relationship? How? 
F. Dependence 
22. Do you think this is a relationship of mutual interdependence or one party depends on 
the other more? In what ways? 
23. Do you think that this could have bearing on the relationship state? 
G. Personal Relationships and Identification 
24. Do you know your contact persons at the higher level personally (have formal or 
informal meetings… etc)? Does the presence of personal relationships have any 
bearing on the relationship state? 
25. With whom do you identify yourself more, with the BS or the University as a whole? 
H. Factors Affected by the Relationship State 
26. Does the state of the BS relationship with the higher level affect the relationships 
within the BS? 
27. In your opinion, what could be the possible consequences of good/bad relationships 
with the higher level?  
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28. Could good or bad relations with the higher level affect the decision making process 
regarding the BS?  
29. Could good or bad relations with the higher level affect the Business School 
performance/ adaptability to the market place?  Staff morale (enthusiasm and 
willingness to take initiatives)? How? 
30. Could the state of the relationship affect the willingness or the ability to cooperate 
with the higher level? How?  
31. Do you think that higher level make an effort to build and maintain good relations 
with their contact persons in the Business School? Why and why not? If yes, how? 
I. Negotiating Relationship Conditions 
32. Does the fact that the BS has to relate to a higher level within the University affect the 
extent to which it can achieve its targets (either positively or negatively)? Do you 
think that if the BS has greater autonomy it would improve its chances of achieving 
better performance? 
33. How do you personally cope with situations when the upward relationship is not a 
good one? 
34. Do you think that the level of autonomy is negotiated? If yes, how? And what factors 
affect it? (Role of performance and cooperation and shared vision). 
35. Have there been any changes in the level of autonomy of the Business School lately? 
36. Does previous performance affect the level of autonomy that the Business School is 
now having? 
37. Does the Business School (represented in you and other leaders) make an effort to 
build and maintain good relations with the higher level?  Why and Why not? How? 
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Measuring Vertical Relationship Quality 
The Business School Perspective 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
on a scale from (1) to (7), where (1) corresponds to "strongly disagree" and (7) 
corresponds to "strongly agree". 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
 Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
First: Relationship Expectations and Needs 
1. You are satisfied with the higher level’s cooperation 
with the Business School. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. You are satisfied with the balance of influence between 
the higher level and the Business School. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. You are satisfied with the communication process 
between the Business School and the higher level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. In general, the Business School transactions with the 
higher level are very satisfactory. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. You are satisfied with the Business School overall 
relationship with the higher level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second: Relationship Intrinsic Characteristics 
6. You regard the higher level’s management as 
trustworthy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. You feel that the higher level management is 
straightforward in dealing with the Business School. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. You think that the higher level management meets its 
agreed upon obligations to the Business School. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. You feel that the higher level management usually keeps 
its word. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. You feel that the higher level’s management discusses 
issues with you honestly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. You feel that the higher level’s management does not 
mislead you. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. You feel that the higher level’s management discusses 
joint expectations fairly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. You could share information openly with the higher 
level’s management because they do not take advantage 
of this by acting against your/Business School interests. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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14. You regard the higher level’s management as fully 
capable of keeping their promises.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. The higher level’s management at times must make 
decisions which seem to be against the interests of the 
Business School. When this happens, you are confident 
that the Business School's current sacrifice will be 
justified by the higher level’s future support for the 
Business School.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Third: Relationship Perceived Value 
16. You think that the Business School functional and 
structural relationship with the higher level is important 
to the achievement of the Business School goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. The Business School's performance could be better if it 
were more independent from the higher level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
To what extent do you describe the Business School as being autonomous with respect to 
decision regarding the following areas: 
 
Area Highly Controlled                    Highly 
Autonomous 
Reinvestment of BS  surplus  1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
 
Key faculty appointments (existing 
and new) 
1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
 
Students’ admissions 1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
 
Research policy 1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
 
Teaching policy 1 2     3     4 5   6     7     8     9 10 
 
 
How close is the working relationship between the Business School and the higher level?  
–––– Very close, practically like being in the same work group. 
–––– Fairly close, like discussing and solving issues together. 
–––– Not so close, yet a cordial relationship. 
–––– Distant, like an arm's–length delivery of the input. 
–––– Very distant, we hardly have any relationship. 
 
 
 
Thank you very much indeed for your time and cooperation. 
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APPENDIX V 
Vertical Relationship Quality: Understanding the Concept and its Concomitants 
Interview Guide: The University (Higher level) Perspective  
A Semi Structured Interview  
Respondent: University (higher level) Boundary Spanners. 
1. On what matters do you as pro–vice chancellor relate with the Business School? 
2. As a member of the University leadership, what aspects does the University attach 
most importance in its relationship with the leadership of the Business School? 
3. How would you describe the state of the Business School’s relationship with the 
University during the last year?  
- Probes: what aspects of the relationship do you find most/ least satisfactory? 
4. In your opinion, what are/were the outcomes on the BS and on the University, given 
the state of this relationship? 
A. Attributes that Comprise Vertical Relationship Quality 
5. Having your relationship with the BS in mind, what would the idea of relationship 
quality mean to you? What attributes comprise a high quality relationship between the 
Business School and the University?  
6. Could you describe an incident which you would consider as a representative of a high 
relationship quality? 
7. Could you describe an incident which you would consider as a representative of a poor 
relationship quality? 
B. Factors that Affect the State of the Relationship 
8. From your own experience, what are the factors that might affect the state of vertical 
relationship both positively and negatively? Could you give examples? 
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9. What are main sources of disagreements in the relationship between the BS and you?  
C. Autonomy and Integration 
10. In terms of the relationship between the University and the BS, how would you assess  
the  balance between integration between the two levels  and autonomy of the BS? 
11. Generally, how decisions concerning the Business School are reached? (compromised, 
integrated,  top down, bottom up). 
12. To what extent are the Business School goals compatible with the University’s goals 
and objectives?  (Scale) 
13. To which degree would do you describe the Business School as being autonomous? 
(Scale)  
D. Shared vision 
14. To what extent do you as representing the higher level and the Business School 
leaders share the same vision and goals for the Business School and the University? 
15. Could the relationship state affect the willingness or the ability to cooperate with the 
BS? How?  
16. Does the presence of personal relationships have any bearing on the state of the 
relationship? 
17. In your opinion, what responsibility lies on the Business School leadership in order to 
improve (or sustain) relationships with the University leadership?  
18. How could the BS leadership improve/sustain good relationships with the University 
leadership? 
19. Do you think this is a relationship of mutual interdependence and mutual benefits or 
one party depends on the other more? In what ways? 
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1. Please indicate the extent to which you describe the Business School as being autonomous 
with respect to decision regarding  the following areas: 
Area Highly 
Controlled 
                   Highly 
Autonomous 
Reinvestment of Business School surplus  1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Key faculty appointments (existing and 
new) 
1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Students’ admissions 1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Research policy 1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
Teaching policy 1 2     3     4 5 6     7     8     9 10 
 
2. The Business School is : 
–––– Much more influential than the norm for other schools. 
–––– Somewhat more influential than the norm for other schools. 
–––– About the same as other schools than the norm for other schools. 
–––– Somewhat less influential than the norm for other schools. 
–––– Much less more influential than the norm for other schools. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Suggested constituting Items for the Vertical Inter–Unit Relationship Quality Scale 
1. The balance of influence between the higher level and the Business School is 
satisfactory 
2. The higher level management acts in the Business School’s best interest. 
3. The higher level management usually keeps its word.  
4. The higher level management is transparent in dealing with the Business 
School.  
5. The higher level management discusses issues with the Business School 
openly.  
6. The higher level management does not mislead the Business School. 
7. The higher level management discusses joint expectations fairly.  
8. The Business school can share information openly with staff at the higher level 
because they do not take advantage of this by acting against the Business 
School interests. 
 
Items Loadings: Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
1 .923 
2 .890 
3  .862 
4 .859 
5 .837 
6 .835 
7 .833 
8 .830 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
 
